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1. INTRODUCTION 
This report contains: 
- a summary of the work of the Safety and Health Commission for 
the Mining and other Extractive Industries and its 11 working 
parties in 1979» 
- lessons to be learned from recent mining disasters; 
- common accident statistics for coalmines for the whole Commu-
nity, country by country. 
The annexes include the usual information, updated to 31 December 
1979» on the terms of reference and the composition of the Safety 
and Health Commission and its working parties, the recommanda-
tions or proposals made to the Member States' Governments, 
opinions and a bibliography of the work of the Safety and Health 
Commission. 
As in previous years, there then follows a brief socio-economic 
review of the coal industry as a background to the safety and 
health aspect of the industry, together with a general survey of 
underground accidents in coalmines. It is hopes that this general 
survey will be supplemented next year by data on the victims of 
occupational diseases. 
As in the last two reports, this review includes a survey of ac-
tivities in the other extractive industries. These figures are 
again for 1978» hut have been revised in several details to in-
clude statistics which were not available in time for the pre-
vious report. It is hoped that harmonized accident statistics 
will also be available for the other extractive industries, at 
least in summary form. 1.1. COAL MINING ACTIVITIES 
The statistics given below are drawn from the bulletin published 
by Eurostat on 30 January I98O and from information supplied by 
the national mining authorities (see Tables 1 and 2 below). 
1.1.1. The situation in the coal mining industry in 1979 was characte-
rized by: 
- a substantial rise in overall demand for coal (l6 million ton-
nes), mainly for power stations and coking plants; 
- stabilization in production levels (238 million tonnes or + 
0.2
 c/o) due to increased productivity (1.2 °/o) and the continu-
ing decline in underground personnel (353 6OO or 
- the result of the above was an appreciable decline in stock 
levels (- I7.6 %) to 26.4 million tonnes and a 24·5 % rise in 
imports from third countries, which amounted to 58.2 million 
tonnes. COAL MINING ACTIVITIES 
Production (Mio t) 1977 
1978 
1979 
Variation 1978/1977 in 1° 
1979/1978 in <?<, 
Output in kg/man-hour, 1978 
underground 1979 
Variation 1979/1978 in % 
Underground personnel on books (1000' s 
of persons) mean for year 1978 
1979 
Variation 1979/1978 in % 
Number of mines operating at: 
end 1978 
end 1979 
Stock of coal at mines (Mio tons) 
end 1978 
end 1979 
Variation 1979/1978 in $ 
Percentage of output power loaded 
1977 
1978 
1979 
Percentage of output produced from 
faces with powered supports 
1977 
1978 
1979 
* plus 10,000,000 tons of National 
Reserve Stock 
EUROPE 
IX 
240,4 
238,1 
238,6 
- 1,0 
+ 0,2 
417 
422 
+ 1,2 
362,9 
353,6 
- 2,6 
297 
298 
32,1 
26,4 
- 17,6 
92,6 
95,1 
98,3 
87,4 
88,8 
92,2 
P.R.G. 
91,3 
90,1 
93,3 
- 1,3 
+ 3,5 
533 
546 
+ 2,4 
121,0 
119,1 
- 1,6 
41 
39 
13,8 
12,6* 
- 8,9 
98,6 
98,8 
99,0 
89,6 
91,0 
94,1 
Prance 
21,3 
19,7 
18,6 
- 7,5 
- 5,5 
322 
337 
+ 1,5 
35,7 
33,0 
- 7,6 
24 
23 
4,8 
3,9 
- 18,4 
87,0 
87,6 
88,8 
42,1 
46,8 
48,4 
Belgium 
7,1 
6,6 
6,1 
- 6,8 
- 7,1 
281 
276 
- 1,8 
17,6 
17,1 
- 2,8 
9 
8 
0,3 
0,2 
- 41,5 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
61,1 
61,3 
68,4 
U.K. 
120,7 
121,7 
120,6 
+ 0,8 
- 0,9 
376 
374 
- 0,5 
188,0 
184,0 
- 2,1 
223 
219 
13,1 
9,7 
- 26,0 
93,8 
93,4 
99,1 
95,2 
95,5 
98,6 1.1.2. General review of underground accidents in coal mines. 
For three years now it has been possible to present 
this analysis for the Community of Nine in the same 
form, including the four principal producer countries: 
the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
France and Belgium. The number of hours worked was 
557*13 million hours, as compared with 557.16 million 
hours last year. 
1.1.2.1. The total number of accidents resulting in three or 
more days' absence from work, or in death, was 77 586, 
as compared with 84 033 in the previous year. The 
frequency rate (number of accidents per million man-
hours worked) was 139.26, as compared with 150.82, 
which is equal to a decrease of 7«66 %, statistically 
significant at 95 °/° confidence level. As is explained 
below, this decrease is observable in all the catego-
ries of accident. 
1.1.2.2. Accidents resulting in an absence from work of between 
4 and 20 days numbered 51 042, giving a frequency rate 
of 91.62, representing a decrease of 7»4-2 % as compared 
with the figure 98.97 for the previous year (a-statis-
tically significant difference). 
1.1.2.3· Accidents resulting in an absence from work of between 
21 and 56 days numbered 20 4-21, giving a frequency rate 
of 36.65, representing a decrease of 8.35 °/° compared 
with the figure 39·99 for the previous year ( a 
statistically significant difference). 
1.1.2.4. Accidents resulting in an absence from work of more 
than 56 days numbered 5 992, giving a frequency rate 
of 10.76, a decrease of 7.4 % as compared with the 
figure of 11.62 for the previous year ( a statistically 
significant difference). 1.1.2.5· There were I3I fatal accidents, with 3 group accidents 
resulting in 22 fatalities. The figures for the 
previous year were 138 fatal accidents including 
1 group accident involving 7 fatalities. 
The frequency rates were respectively : 
- including the group accidents, 0.235, a decrease 
of 5»24- % as compared with the 0.24-8 for the previous 
year 
- excluding the group accidents, 0.201, a decrease 
of 15.19 % as compared with the 0.237 for the 
previous year. These decreases are not mathematically 
significant at a 95 % confidence level. 
1.1.2.6. A more detailed analysis, taking account of the 
figures for the last four years and the main causes 
of the accidents, may be found in section IV. 
10 1.2. ACTIVITIES OP ALL THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES 
1.2.1. Appended to thiB report are tables covering the same items as 
last year, brought up to date and completed with further informa-
tion. Given the difficulty of collecting this information for 
certain industries, the previously published figures omitted some 
details which have subsequently been added: 
- (l) a set of minerals selected last year as a suitable basis 
for initial comparison 
- (2) a second class, not standard throughout the Community, 
comprising a wider variety of minerals which account for 
a substantial volume or value of production in the coun-
try in question. 
1.2.2. The number of sites or companies, production and unit of produc-
tion are given opposite each product. 
1.2.3· A distinction is drawn between the three methods of extraction 
(deep mining, opencast mining and quarrying, or boreholes). 
Wherever possible, the manpower figures for these various methods 
of extraction do not include administrative and commercial staff 
nor the work force employed in mineral processing; they do, how-
ever, include workers employed in preparation (crushing, concen-
tration, cleaning, loading). 1.3· THE COMMUNITY'S DEPENDENCE ON ENERGY 
The statistics in the following table are taken from the Statis-
tical Office of the European Communities' Bulletins on "Hydrocar-
bons" of 30 January I98O and "Coal" of I4 February 1979· 
1.3.1. Trends in the coal market have already been discussed in 1.1. 
Summing up, it may be said that in 1979 production stabilized, 
there was a substantial rise in consumption with a resultant fall 
in stocks and an appreciable increase in imports from third coun-
tries. 
1.3.2. There was an appreciable rise in lignite production in the Pede-
ral Republic of Germany. 
1.3.3. There was a large increase (almost 40 fo) in petroleum production 
as a result of a rise of almost 46 fo for the United Kingdom. 
Nevertheless, imports of oil increased by 2.2 fo and were slighly 
higher than in 1977· 
1.3·4· Gas production increased by 3 fo in 1979» hut failed to reach the 
1977 level; there was a 2.4 fo rise in imports from third countries. 
13 COMMUNITY ENERGY PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS  (X) 
Coal in Millions of 
Imports from Non 
Community Sources 
Lignite 
Liquid Petroleum 
Products in MillionE 
of Tons 
Imports 
Natural Gas ^ ' 
Imports 
Tons 
1977 
1973 
1979 
1977 
I973 
1979 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1977 
I978 
1979 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1977 
1973 
1979 
1977 
I978 
1979 
Eur. 9 
240,4 
238,1 
238,7 
46,0 
45,3 
58,2 
127,9 
128,2 
135,1 
47,2 
52,2 
36,5 
435,1 
475,5 
486,3 
ö491,5 
5192,6 
6375,3 
802,2 
1410,3 
1735,7 
D 
91,3 
90,1 
93,3 
5,6 
5,7 
6,2 
122,9 
123,6 
130,6 
5,4 
5,1 
4,8 
95,3 
90,6 
97,3 
673,0 
719,9 
741,9 
232,8 
505,5 
615,3 
Ρ 
21,3 
19,7 
13,6 
15,6 
15,9 
19,5 
3,1 
2,7 
2,4 
1,1 
1,1 
1,2 
115,7 
114,0 
123,0 
298,5 
307,1 
301,5 
123,5 
135,3 
199,5 
I 
_ 
12,3 
9,9 
11,3 
1,9 
1,9 
2,1 
1,1 
1,5 
1,7 
105,4 
110,4 
114,7 
526,1 
526,0 
500,0 
354,9 
403,4 
395,5 
NL 
3,3 
3,4 
3,9 
: 
1,6 
1,5 
1,5 
56,1 
54,1 
52,9 
3407,4 
3120,2 
3308,8 
10,2 
51,9 
98,4 
1 
3 
7,07 
6,6 
6,1 
3,2 
2,7 
5,9 
-
-
35,4 
32,7 
33,1 
1,3 
1,3 
1,3 
10,3 
54,9 
80,0 
L 
0,1 
0,2 
0,2 
-
-
-
— 
-
UK 
120,7 
121,7 
120,7 
2,1 
2,0 
4,0 
"" 
37,5 
52,6 
77,0 
68,7 
66,3 
57,9 
1534,3 
1517,6 
1498,0 
70,4 
199,3 
347,0 
Ir 
0,05 
0,03 
0,06 
0,67 
0,52 
0,35 
': 
2,2 
2,2 
2,2 
0,4 
24,3 
-
Dk 
4,6 
5,04 
6,5 
i 
-
« 
3,5 
3,4 
3,4 
5,3 
5,2 
5,2 
i 
ι 
I  i 
- i 
— < 
i 
! 
- Î 
- j 
- 1 
(X) Extracted from "Eurostat" of 31.1.80. 
(XX) 35.17 Mega Joules/m at 8.5OO Kcal/m^ ór 1.000 Tera Joules = t 28.4 x 10 m 
14 1.4. GENERAL ACTIVITIES OP THE SAFETY AND HEALTH COMMISSION POR THE 
MINING AND OTHER EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES 
1.4·1· Meetings held 
The Safety and Health Commission for the Mining and Other Extrac-
tive Industries met on 27 March, 12 June and 7 September 1979, 
preparatory meetings of the Restricted Committee being held on 
26 March, 11 June and 6 September. 
The working parties met 22 times} 5 of which, on the occasion of 
visits to mines. Committees of experts met on 39 occasions to pre-
pare for the meetings of the working parties. 
An information symposium ivas held on 27 and 28 November 1979 f°r 
officials of miners' trade unions. 
The Safety and Health Commission also took part in a symposium 
on new technologies for exploration and exploitation of oil and 
gaz resources, which was organized in Luxembourg from 18 to 20 
April 1979 hy the Commission's Directorate-General for Energy. 
1.4·2. Group accidents (i.e. accidents resulting in the death or injury 
with eight weeks' absence from work of at least five victims): 
- on 19 February 1979, a rockburst in the Haus Aden Mine in 
North-Rhine Wesphalia resulted in the death of 5 people; 
- on 18 March 1979, a firedamp explosion at Golborne Colliery 
resulted in the deaths of 3 people and serious injuries to 8 
others, 7 of whom subsequently died of their injuries; 
- on 22 March 1979, 7 people were killed by an explosion in the 
Hansa Mine. 
I.4.3· Decisions of the Safety and Health Commission for the Mining and 
Other Extractive Industries 
The Safety and Health Commission approved the following: 
I.4.3.1· Information report on the maintenance of safety standards and im-
provement of the Safety of highly-worked friction winding ropes 
of Btranded construction (meeting of 27 March I979 - see 2.2.). 
This study was appended as Annex IV to the 16th Report to speed 
15 
(3) up distribution. 
1.4.3.2. Information report on the use of filter self-rescuers in European 
coalmines - Part III - Possibilities of improvement (meeting of 
27 March 1979 - see 2.1.). 
1·4·3·3· Information report on the construction of gateside packs of long-
wall faces 
(meeting of 27 March I979 - see 2.10.). 
This report was appended as Annex VIII to the 16th Report. 
I.4.3.4· Report on the study of measures relating to the safety training 
of workers employed in the coalmines of the European Community 
(meeting of 12 June 1979 - Doc. No. 4372/3/77, available as an 
offprint in e, f, d - see 2.7·)· 
1.4.3·5· Proposal by the Safety and Health Commission to the Governments 
on control of the firedamp risk arising during drivage and fol-
lowing the abandonment of cul-de-sac and other old workings 
(meeting of 7 September 1979 - see 2.8. and Annex IV). 
1.4·3.6. Proposals the Governments on the exploration and exploitation of 
offshore petroleum and gas deposits entitled "Production well 
completion offshore". 
I.4.3.7· Workover programme offshore 
(meeting of 7 September 1979 - see 2.11. and Annex V and VI). 
1.4«4« Information symposiums for officials of miners' trade unions held 
on 27 and 28 November 1979 
Some 70 delegates, representatives of the workers, the Safety and 
Health Commission, the Member States' governments and the employers 
took part in the symposium. The first day was devoted to visits 
in the Saar and Lorraine coalfields, and the subject chosen for 
the second day in Luxembourg was "Improving conditions of work 
in underground mines", a matter of great current importance in 
terms of safety, health and the humanization of working conditions, 
and one which directly affects the indispensable recruitment of 
young workers. 
The subject matter of the symposium was restricted to the problems of respirable dusts, climate and noise. They were the subject of 
9 papers and discussions which reflected not only the state of 
the art of certain research work but also the situation in mines 
as regards these three health-impairing factors. 
The exchange of views prepared the ground for the recommencement 
of work by the Working Party on Health in Mines, which met on 19 
December 1979 (see 2.6.). 
1.4·5· Consultation of the Safety and Health Commission for the Mining 
and Other Extractive Industries in preparation for Council direc-
tives. 
1·4·5·1· As was mentioned in 1·4·1· of the 16th Report, the Safety and 
Health Commission has taken a stand on Council directives which 
would have applied to mines and which would have been at variance 
with its terms of reference. Discussion on these questions conti-
nued in 1979, and in expressing its views, the Safety and Health 
Commission took into account the following: 
1·4·5·2. Some directives provided from the outset for coal mines to be 
exempted from their provisions. This was the case, for instance, 
which Council Directive 76/II7/EEC of 18 December 1975 on the ap-
proximation of the laws of the Member States concerning electrical 
equipment for use in potentially explosive atmospheres, and 
Council Directive 79/196/EEC of 6 February 1979 which contained 
provisions for the implementation of the 1975 Directive. 
The Working Party on Electricity, in conjunction with CENELEC, 
drew up a draft directive on the same line as the Council Direc-
tive, but applying to gassy mines and harmonizing with the 5OO 
or so rules applying to speciflo mining conditions. 
On 1 December 1978, the Safety and Health Commission approved this 
document, which was then communicated by the Commission to the 
Council of Ministers on I4 January I98O, the SHCMOEI acting in a 
consultative capacity. This approach somewhat unconventional in 
view of the terms of reference of the SHCMOEI, was adopted to 
standardize the rules for construction, marking and certification 
as far as the safety of apparatus for use in gassy mines and in 
potentially explosive atmospheres on the surface is concerned. 
17 1.4·5·3· On the other hand, the draft directive on safety signs at the 
place of work did not exclude mines. At the request of the ECSC 
Consultative Committee and the SHCMOEI, it was agreed that coal 
mines would not be subject to the provisions of this directive. 
An ad hoc committee appointed by the SHCMOEI draw up a document 
adapting the provisions of the Council Directive to coal-mining 
conditions. The SHCMOEI adopted this document on 1 December 1978 
(Doc. No. 3040/3/78) and submitted it to the Member States' Go-
vernments as a proposal designed to improve safety in mines in 
accordance with Articles 1 and 4 of its terms of reference (see 
Annex VII of the 16th Report of MSHC). 
In effect, this document - which has been accepted by all the 
Member States' Governments - differs very little from the terms 
of the Council Directive and in fact has taken over the direc-
tive's objectives in their entirety. 
I.4.5«4· Work arising from the European Community action programme on safe-
ty and health. Draft directive on lead and other chemical, physi-
cal and biological agents regarded as a health hazard. 
These draft directives, drawn up by the Safety and Health Direc-
torate (of which the SHCMOEI forms part), do not provide for any 
exemption for mines. 
The draft directive on lead was submitted to the SHCMOEI at its 
meeting on 12 June 1979 in the form of an internal document num-
bered VF/Lux. 78/73-7. 
Later editions of this document very largely took account of these 
amendments, but had not been resubmitted to the SHCMOEI by the 
time it re-examined the question on 7 September 1979· Lead in 
mines seemed to have only a marginal effect, but the level of 
lead in the air and blood which would make the directive - or at 
least its provision on monotoring - applicable might be unattain-
able in most lead mines. 
The SHCMOEI conceded that there was no reason why mines should 
not be subject to the same biological criteria as those provided 
for all industries in the draft directive. It was felt, however, 
that monitoring arrangements should take account of the special 
nature of underground work in mines. Some members were insistent that mines should be excluded from 
the scope of the directive. 
The following motion was adopted unanimously: 
'Having regard to the fact that the hazards to the safety and 
health of personnel in the extractive industries and other indus-
tries very often differ from each other, and that this difference 
necessitates preventive measures specific to the extractive in-
dustries, the Safety and Health Commission is of the opinion that 
measures relating to the safety and health of personnel in the 
European Community should where appropriate be drawn up and 
adopted separately for the extractive industries and other in-
dustries' . 
1.4·6· Radon measurement campaign in mines (other than uranium mines) 
A study has been subsidized by the Commission of the European 
Communities to collect information on the radiation levels suf-
fered by persons thought to be not-exposed to a radon hazard, e. 
g. in the environment, buildings or in foodstuffs. 
Against this background, the Commission is organizing a measure-
ment campaign in mines throughout the Community, with the excep-
tion of uranium mines. The question of the possible danger of ra-
don in mines had been brought up - inter alia - by the Italian De-
legation at several meetings of the Safety and Health Commission 
and at the congress to mark the 20th anniversary of the Safety 
and Health Commission (Doc. No. 1664/2/77). 
As a first stage, the Health and Safety Directorate in Luxembourg 
has, in conjunction with the French Atomic Energy Commission as 
the contracting party, worked out what apparatus should be used 
and what would be the most representative method of evaluating 
the amount of radon inhaled by miners. 
In a second stage, a certain number of coal and other metallife-
rous non-uranium mines would be selected for measurement of the 
amount of inhaled radon. 
The assistance of the Safety and Health Commission and more par-
ticularly of the Restricted Committee was requested to select 
these mines and to authorize implementation of the tests, this 
19 being entirely within the jurisdiction of the heads of the natio-
nal mining authorities. 
As agreement was divided on the need for this study and its degree 
of priority, a meeting was organized on 28 May 1979 (Doc. No. 
3922/79) of the representatives of the Restricted Committee, ex-
perts from the French Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission's 
Health and Safety Directorate to explain to the SHCMOEI the new 
method to be used (i.e. portable dosimeters) to measure the doses 
of radon inhaled by each worker at his place of work, which was 
thought to be more meaningful than simply taking global dose 
samples from the return air. 
At its meeting on 12 June 1979, the SHCMOEI took note of the re-
sults of this meeting. The Secretariat undertook to use its good 
offices to facilitate implementation of the measurement campaign. 
The choice of the most representative mines for the tests will be 
based - for Belgium, France and Italy - on a questionnaire drawn 
up by the contracting party. Measurements will not be carried out 
in the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland 
and Denmark because - as a result of measurements which have al-
ready been taken in varying degrees - these countries believe 
that the radon content in the mines does not constitute a substan-
tial risk to miners. 
The results of these tests will be discussed by the Safety and 
Health Commission. 
I.4.7· Examination of the 16th Report of the Safety and Health Commission, 
Lack of activity of the Working Party on Health in Mines 
At its meeting on 7 September 1979, the Safety and Health Commis-
sion approved the 16th Report, and adopted a clear position with 
regard to the Working Party on Health in Mines: 'The Working Party 
again did not meet in 1978 as the Secretariat lacked the necessary 
staff. 
The Safety and Health Commission deeply regrets this lack of acti-
vity in a field of such importance. It urgently insists that the 
situation be rectified as quickly as possible and demands once 
more that sufficient staff be provided for the Secretariat'. 
20 The Working Party resumed its activities on 19 December 1979 -
see 2.6. 
I.4.8. Revision of the terms of reference of the working parties and 
committee of experts. 
1.4.8.1. At its meeting on 7 September 1979 (Doc. No. 3313/79), the Safety 
and Health Commission resumed its periodic review of the terms of 
reference of its working parties and committees of experts with a 
view to rationalizing their work and taking into account new prio-
rities. 
1.4.8.2. The amended terms of reference are set out in Annex II to this 
report. 
The amendments made included the following: 
- a reminder of the convention of holding meetings of working 
parties in coalfields, where the members are able to study new 
developments at first hand (for reasons of economy, the Commis-
sion has cut back drastically on meetings held away from the 
headquarters of the Secretariat); 
- the production of statistics (if necessary in summary from) on 
occupational diseases; 
- consideration of the concept of 'humane working conditions' 
(known as 'Welzijn' in Dutch) along with health and safety at 
the place of work by the Working Party on Health in Mines and 
the Working Party on Human Factors affecting Safety; 
- in the Working Party on Health in Mines, consideration be given 
to nuisances other than dust, such as climate, noise, vibra-
tions, lighting, gas and materials which are dangerous to in-
hale or handle; 
- the terms of reference of the Working Party on Human Factors 
affecting Safety were reviewed and amplified by the Working 
Party on 31 October 1979 (approved by the Safety and Health 
Commission on 7 May I98O). 
I.4.9. Safety campaigns 
As a result of the decision taken by the Safety and Health Commis-
21 sion at its meeting on 11 July 1978 to give a fresh boost to sa-
fety campaigns, part of the financial aid of 1.5 million Belgian 
Francs set aside for this purpose in the budget was spent in 1978 
on safety on quarries in the Tuscany region of Italy. Money was 
spent in 1979 on opencast lignite mines (stumbling or falling) 
and opencast quarries in the Federal Republic of Germany (safety 
of -chile equipment) and opencast working in the United Kingdom 
.;:al zir.es ana quarries) with the theme of transport safety. 
22 SECTION II 
Activities of the working parties 
CHAPTER A 
Rescue arrangements, mine fires and underground combustion 
2.1.1. The full Working Party met three times on 11 May, 19 September 
and 22 November 1979· There were 21 meetings of committees of ex-
perts, as follows: 
- on Fire-resistant conveyor belts and other long 
items of plant 3 
- on Fire-resistant fluids 11 
- on Filter self-rescuers 4 
- to prepare reports on mining disasters 3 
(ll of these meetings were intended only for study and editorial 
purposes and involved only 3 or 4 experts). 
2.1.2. Work examined by the Safety and Health Commission in 1979 
On 27 March 1979, the Safety and Health Commission approved an 
"Information report on the use of filter self-rescuers in Euro-
pean coal mines - Part III - Possibilities of improvement". 
At the request of the Safety and Health Commission, this report 
was published as Annex IX to the 16th Report to speed up distri-
bution. This part defines the limited possibility of improvement 
of this type of apparatus, which is now considered to be fully 
developed. Attention is drawn to self-contained self-rescuers 
providing oxygen - see 2.1.6. 
2.1.3. Work completed 
Sections I and IV (dealing with health) of the 6th Report of fire-
resistant fluids (see 2.1.5·)· 
2.1.4· Fire-resistant conveyor belts and other long items of plant 
Following the Safety and Health Commission's approval, on 6 April 
I978 (Annex VI to the 16th Report), of the proposal on tests for 
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(4) the quality control of conveyor belts with fabric carcasses, the-
se tests - planned to extend over 3 years from 6 April 1978 - are 
now underway in the testing centres, using the Barthel burner and 
critical oxygen index texts: two simple tests which should make 
it possible to check that delivered belts exhibit similar fire-
resistant properties as when type approved. Pinal recommendation 
is anticipated for I98I. 
2.1.5· Fire-resistant fluids 
2.1.5.1· The numerous meetings of this committee of experts were devoted 
to the preparation of the 6th Report on the specifications and 
test conditions for fire-resistant fluids. 
Revision of the 5th Report was justified by the progress which had 
been made in standardizing tests since the publication in 1975 of 
the 5th Report where the British tests and the tests used by the 
Community of Six were simply juxtaposed. More than 4OO requests 
for this document had been received from the oil and capital goods 
industries throughout the world and had prompted this standardiza-
tion. 
2.1.5«2. The fire-resistant test will be standardized on the basis of work 
carried out at the Safety in Mines Research Establishment (SMRE) 
in Buxton, whereby the length of flame produced by the jet of 
fluid atomized at 35 bars in measured when the igniting flame is 
held in the jet; this permits graduated assessment and hence clas-
sification of the fire resistance of all fluids. 
The flammability tests described in the Parts III and VI of the 
5th Report could be used as before until all the Member States 
have had a chance to familiarize themselves with the nev; test. 
Complementary tests - propagation of flame in a mixture of oil and 
coal dust or the wick test - will continue to be used. 
2.1.5«3. The tests described in the 5th Report have been reviewed by the 
National Coal Board; the board's proposals have in turn been exa-
mined by the committee of experts, which has reached agreement on 
this section. 
2.1.5.4« Finally, the health criteria have been reviewed by the committee 
24 of medical experts, and have been amended to enable them to be 
implemented more quickly without affecting their quality. The 
Working Party added another amendment at the request of the Bri-
tish delegation, whereby if a widely-used fluid whose characteris-
tics are well-known undergoes no more change than the addition of 
known, non-toxic components in isolation or as a mixture, no new 
tests are necessary. 
This section of the health criteria will be submitted to the Sa-
fety and Health Commission at the beginning of I98O *. 
2.I.5.5· A study of the toxicity by intra-muscular injection fluids has 
been undertaken with the financial assistance of the Commission 
of the European Communities as a result of two accidents (one fa-
tal), one in conjunction with an A Type fluid and the other, in a 
surface industry, with an non approved phosphate ester. The con-
clusion reached was that the health tests mentioned above are suf-
ficient and there was no need to include an intra-muscular injec-
tion test. 
2.1.6. Self-contained self-rescuers operating on oxygen produced by che-
mical reactior 
The committee of experts completed its proposals for the design 
and monitoring of self-rescuers operating on oxygen produced by 
chemical reaction (known in France as self-contained evacuation 
apparatus). 
This document is along the same lines as the one drawn up for fil-
ter self-rescuers (Annex X to the 13th Report and Annex VIII to the 
14th Report) and Annex IX to the 16th Report (Doc. No. 3919/79) re-
produces the three parts of the report in all the Community langua-
ges. The new document will be submitted to the Working Party and 
subsequently to the Safety and Health Commission at the beginning 
of I98O **. 
These self-contained apparatus have the great advantage of guaran-
teeing protection to the wearer in low-oxygen atmospheres. Their 
* Adopted by the Safety and Health Commission on 26 March I98O. 
** Adopted by the Safety and Health Commission on 7th May I98O. (See Annex VIII). 
25 drawbacks include their weight (more than 3 kg) and the high cost 
for a self-contained apparatus with an effective life of between 
1 72 and 4 hours. Devices weighing less than 1.5 kgs do exist, but 
can only operate independently for a very short period (around 15 
minutes). 
".1.7. As to the rescue aspects of its terms of reference, the Working 
Party took note of the circumstances surrounding the two explo-
sions at Golborne Colliery, where there was no problem with the 
rescue arrangements, and in the Hansa Mine, where the high tempe-
rature, the high concentration of CO (4 fo) and the configuration 
of the workings made it difficult to remove the bodies of the 7 
victims (documents 3828/79 and 4273/79)· 
2.1.8. A study and editorial committee set up by the Working Party com-
pleted its report on the lessons to be learnt from the accidents 
at Merlebach on 30 September 1976 (l6 dead) and at the Schlägel 
and Eisen Mine on 27 October 1977 (7 dead). The report, which was 
submitted to the Working Party and the Safety and Health Commis-
sion at the beginning of I98O, goes into the early detection of 
fires, fire-righting and rescue operations: it is reproduced in 
extenso in Section III of this Annual Report. 
2.1.9« Stabilization of ventilation in the event of fires in shafts 
A committee of experts devoted its attention to the stabilization 
of ventilation in the event of mine fires. Work on this subject 
started in i960 and was last put in concrete form in document 
708/3/74 (offprint) and in the "Notes for guidance on the measures 
to be taken to stabilize ventilation in the event of open fires 
underground (except in shafts)", published as Annex IX to the 14th 
Report. The study of fires in shafts was omitted because of its 
highly specific and complex nature, and the Commission subsidized 
a study on this subject, the importance of which was hightlighted 
by the Bois du Cazier (Marcinelle) disaster of 8 August 1956. 
The study was commissioned from Messrs Champagnac, Schubert and 
Stenuit, who played an active part in the work of the above com-
mittee of experts. 
Consideration of the effects of fire on ventilation and the spray-
26 ing of ventilation airways concentrated on typical cases and was 
verified by computer computations carried out at the Westfälische 
Berggewerkschaftskasse in Bochum. 
The experts' report was received by the Secretariat of the Safety 
and Health Commission (on behalf of the Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities) at the end of 1979· The full Safety and Health 
Commission will take note of the report in I98O. 
27 CHAPTER Β 
Winding ropes and shaft guides, winding engines and winches 
2.2.1. Number of meetings 4 
- two full meetings on 16 May 1979 in Sheffield and on 15 Octo­
ber 1979 
- two meetings of an editorial committee. 
2.2.2.1. On 15 May 1979, the Working Party visited the Safety in Mines Re­
search Establishment (SMRE) in Sheffield to take note of the re­
sults of a study - carried out with the financial assistance of 
the Commission of the European Communities - on new means of elec­
tromagnetic rope testing. 
Comparative tests were carried out on devices from the United King­
dom, France, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland 
and Poland. Devices from Japan and South Africa had not been dis­
patched on time. Tests were carried out on six ropes, mostly of 
locked-ooil construction, one of which had artificial defects. The 
others were used ropes which had been discarded; one of these was 
a cable belt support rope which contained a splice. In every case, 
corrosion was correctly detected, but the extent of the corrosion 
was not always correctly assessed. However, the limits of detec­
tion of defects by these devices had been extended since the ear­
lier comparative tests requested by the Safety and Health Commis­
sion in I965 (3rd annual report). Higher standards were attained 
thanks to the four-pole DC Hall generator used for the British 
device (described in document 4IO6/79 available in d/e/f from the 
Secretariat of the Safety and Health Commission). 
The final report will be published as an offprint. 
2.2.2.2. Again during the visit to the United Kingdom, the Working Party 
was able to see a pneumatic installation for the shaft transport 
of coal in operation at the Shirebrook Colliery. This installation, 
which was constructed with the financial assistance of the Commis­
sion, can increase the colliery's extraction capacity by between 
10 and I5 fo. 6OO tons of fines ((. 25 mm) are brought up every day 
29 from a depth of 350 m by means of a low pressure blower equipped 
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with two 56O kW motors (300 m air per m coal). 
2.2.2.3« The Working Party also inspected the new drum winding engine at 
the Markham No 1 shaft which had been built to the new standard 
established after an accident occurred in the No 3 shaft of this 
mine where 18 people were killed on 30 July 1973 in a cage fall 
resulting from the failure of an element in single brake rod. 
Both sides of the new winding engine are equipped with post brakes 
which provide guaranteed 50 fo braking power in the event of the 
total failure of one of the brakes, and with other multiple safe-
ty devices which will be discussed by the Working Party. 
2.2.3· Minimum safety regulations for winding ropes and cappings (doc. 
no. 5379/3/78), existing in Community countries. 
This document, containing proposals to the Member States' Govern-
ments, should be ready for presentation to the Safety and Health 
Commission in I98O. 
2.2.4. Studies and research 
2.2.4.1· Electromagnetic rope testing. 
The results of the Sheffield tests will be published in the near 
future. 
2.2.4«2. Rope guides 
The Working Party has not yet had an opportunity to discuss a me-
morandum on the study requested by the Versuchsgrube Tremonia, for 
which financial assistance has been obtained from the Commission 
(doc. no. 4704/78). 
2.2·4·3· The Working Party reviewed three research projects, which were in 
turn submitted to the Commission of the European Communities: 
a) Federal Republic of Germany (WBR)J "Research into the affect 
of intermittent shock loading on the fatigue strength of load-
bearing elements in winding and haulage installations in mi-
nes"; 
b) United Kingdom (MRDE Bretby): "Improved monitoring of shaft 
30 winding apparatus"; 
c) Charbonnages de France (Nord-Pas-de-Calais): "Development of 
procedures to increase the effectiveness of winding engine 
braking devices". (This follows on from the research under-
taken in Prance, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Uni-
ted Kingdom as a result of the Markham disaster - see 2.2.2.3·)■ 
The amount of assistance and the deadlines requested were upheld 
after discussion, with the exception of project a), where only 
problems specifically relating to winding were approved. 
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(5) CHAPTER C 
Electricity 
2.3.1. Number of meetings 6 
- 2 meetings of the full Working Party on 1 March and 2 June 1979 
- 4 preparatory meetings on 31 January, 7 June, 12 October and 
7/8 November 1979 
2.3.2. As was mentioned in section 2.3·2.3· of the 16th Report, the Sa-
fety and Health Commission met on 1 December 1978 and approved a 
"Proposal for a Council Directive on the approximation of the 
laws of the Member States concerning electrical equipment for use 
in potentially explosive atmospheres in gassy mines and by way of 
derogation from the scope of the Council Directive 76/II7/EEC of 
18 December 1975". 
The Secretariat of the Safety and Health Commission prepared this 
document for transmission to the Council by the Commission of the 
European Communities. 
This unusual procedure on the part of the Safety and Health Com-
mission has already been referred to in paragraph 1.4·5·2. of 
this report. 
The German delegation voted against the draft proposal on the 
grounds that paragraph 14.2.1. of European standard EN 5O.OI4, 
which formed part of the proposal, did not include the particle-
proof testing of flameproof enclosures as was practised in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. 
The first two meetings of 1979 were devoted to the quest for a 
compromise which would enable the Member States' delegations to 
vote unanimously for the draft proposal. An exception was re-
quested for the Federal Republic of Germany, but the Legal Ser-
vice delivered an adverse opinion on the matter. 
The draft proposal underwent certain modifications at the request 
of the Commission's Legal Service and Directorate-General for the 
Internal Market and Industrial Affairs. 
33 The written procedure to enable the document to be adopted by the 
Commission was successfully completed on 18 January I98O. The do-
cument has now been passed on the Council, and the deadlines fixed 
for consultation of the Economic and Social Committee and the Eu-
ropean Parliament are 30 June I98O in both cases, and 30 September 
I98O for a decision from the Council. 
2.3.3· As part of its programme of future activities, the Working Party 
decided to conclude point 9·4· of its terms of reference (Annex 
II) which provides for comparison of the rules covering the instal-
lation and use of electrical equipment in gassy underground mines 
in the Community. 
As was mentioned in paragraph 2.3·5· of the 15th Report, prepara-
tory work was done by a study carried out by Mr Loynes of the Na-
tional Coal Board, which was subsidized by the Commission of the 
European Communities (Doc. no. 4367/77, available in d/e/f). The 
resultant document - some 80 pages long - compares national regu-
lations on this subject. 
Proposals for uniform regulations are contained in Chapter E of 
the document, and this section is currently being examined by an 
editorial committee. 
2.3·4· The Working Party will also be following the work of the working 
party appointed by the Commission's Directorate-General III to 
look into the "Elimination of technical barriers to trade - Elec-
trical equipment for use in an explosive atmosphere - Experimental 
laboratories". This should eventually enable the Working Party to 
comply with point 9·3· of its terms of reference: "To suggest the 
means by which harmonization of the certification procedures and 
reciprocal acceptance of the test methods and test certificates 
could be achieved". 
34 CHAPTER D 
Flammable dusts 
2.4.I· 2 full meetings of the Working Party on 8 June in Merlebach (Pran-
ce) and 25 October 1979· 
2.4·2. Work completed 
On 25 October 1979, the Working Party approved the proposals drawn 
up by a committee of experts concerning the monitoring of dust neu-
tralization by calcareous dust in the underground workings of coal-
mines *. 
The document is concerned not with the proportion of diluent dust, 
which remains under the jurisdiction of the Member States, but the 
monitoring of dust neutralization where this is achieved exclusi-
vely by means of calcareous dust. 
In an attempt to achieve some degree of harmonization, a thorough 
analysis was carried out of the procedures used in each of the 
Member States to monitor the proportion of diluent dust with a 
view to establishing legal provisions and ensuring practical imple-
mentation of those provisions. 
Consensus was reached on a number of points which were formulated 
as "recommendations", such as: 
- a very general distinction between two types of mine workings 
depending on their situation Vis-à—vis the dust deposition. 
Classification of mine workings into these two types is the 
task of the national authorities; 
- certain aspects of monitoring procedures, such as frequency 
and sampling; 
- preparation and analysis of samples. 
As regards other aspects of sampling, each of the countries con-
cerned has its own principles and its own methods which esta-
* This report was approved by the SHCMOEI on 25 March I98O and is included 
in the present Annual Report as Annex VII. 
35 blished after many years of practical experience; these are set 
out in a separate annex. 
2.4«3« The Working Party visited the Simon Colliery run by the Houillères 
de Lorraine, which has an annual output of 2.1 million tonnes, and 
whose 60 km of roadways, covering a very wide range of geological 
conditions, can be readily stonde-dusted using MSA equipment, which 
does four bouts of treatment per year, involving the transport and 
distribution of 4 8OO tonnes of calcareous dust by train and pipe-
line and which enables dust to be neutralized throughout the road-
way network with suitable regularity. The general conditions are 
laid down in the decision of 3 September 1976 * in which the Mines 
Safety and Health Commission, after taking very detailed note of 
the information on the disaster at Luisenthal (2.2.62 - 298 dead) 
and Lens-Liévin (27.12.74 - 42 dead), recommended neutralization 
by dust binding using hygroscopic salts, but regarded stone-
dusting as a suitable alternative provided it was applied over the 
whole periphery of roadways and was regularly and properly applied. 
2·4·4· As regards dust explosions, the Working Party took note of the re-
sults of the "XVIIIthe international conference on scientific re-
search in the field of occupational safety in the mining industry", 
which was held at Cavtat near Dubrovnik in Yugoslavia. This was 
the meeting of heads of testing stations from all parts of the 
world, and every four years it is open to other interested parties. 
This time, the conference was attended by some 20 members of the 
Safety and Health Commission and its working parties. 
2·4·5· The Working Party also examined its future programme of work which 
will be submitted to the Safety and Health Commission. 
* see Annex V of the 14th Annual Report. 
36 CHAPTER E 
Common accident statistics 
2.5.I. The Working Party met on 20 December 1979· 
2.5· 2. It took note of its extended terms of reference decided on by the 
Safety and Health Commission on 6 September 1979 (see Annex II) 
as regards: 
- the possibility of introducing into the table of coalmining 
activities featured in the first chapter of the annual report 
other technical elements which may affect the frequency of oc-
cupational accidents; 
- the practical aspects of drawing up a socio-economic table for 
all the extractive industries; 
- the collection of certain data on occupational diseases, with 
special reference to pneumoconiosis and deafness. 
2.5·3· The Working Party examined its planned programme of work in the 
light of its extended terms of reference. 
37 CHAPTER Ρ 
Health in mines 
2.6.1. The Working Party met on 19* December 1979· . 
2.6.2. The background for this meeting was the information symposium for 
miners' trade union officials held on 27 and 28 November 1979 (see 
1.4·4·)· 
The only subjects dealt with in the field of safety, health and 
the humanization of work (known in Dutch as "Welzijn") were respi-
rable dusts, climate and noise. 
Other factors which could lead to an improvement in working condi­
tions will be discussed at an information symposium for mining 
engineers to be held in Luxembourg on 13 and 14 May I98O. The sub­
jects on the agenda are noise, human factor, ergonomics, reduction 
of physical effort, vibrations and lighting. 
2.6.3. The members of the Working Party also took part in a seminar held 
in Luxembourg on 4 and 5 October 1979 on "Epidemiology and techni­
cal and medical prevention of coal miner's pneumoconiosis". The 
aim of this seminar was to make available the results of research 
carried out in this field and administered by other sections of 
the Commission's Health and Safety Directorate. 
2.6.4· At its meeting on 19 December 1979, the Working Party heard the 
conclusions drawn from this seminar as regards respirable dusts. 
2.6.4.I· The research started in July 1975 °n comparison of devices used 
for measuring dust has been completed, the conclusion being that, 
even if the Member States continue to use their present measuring 
devices, it should still be possible to make a valid comparison 
of the dust concentrations measured, which would enable coalmines 
to comply with point 2 of the Working. Party's terms of reference: 
"... where necessary establishing a scale of comparison of the va­
rious methods employed". 
2.6.4.2. A research report will be officially submitted to the Safety and 
39 Health Commission in mid-1980, and it will then be up to the 
SHCMOEI to make whatever arrangements are necessary to establish 
a uniform method of measurement in this field (to be applied where 
different apparatus is used) which it will submit as a proposal to 
the Member States' Governments in accordance with Article 1 of its 
terras of reference. 
2.6.4.3. As regards ambient health hazards to workers in the extractive 
industries, point 4 of the Working Party's terms of reference pro-
vides for priority to be given to the study of climate, noise, vi-
bration, visibility and noxious gases. 
The Working Party took note of the draft directives which were 
being drawn up by other sections of the Commission's Health and 
Safety Directorate as part of the Directorate's programme of ac-
tion (see 1·4·5·4· of this report). 
In addition to the draft directive on lead, other proposals in 
the pipeline concern noise, asbestos, cadmium and mercury. 
The Working Party will give its opinion on the specific problems 
which mines would face; the opinion will be transmitted to the 
Safety and Health Commission. 
40 CHAPTER G 
Human factors affecting safety 
2.7·1· Number of meetings 4 
- two meetings of the full Working Party on I4 February and 31 
October 1979 
- two preparatory meetings. 
2.7.2. Work completed 
As was mentioned in 2.7·2. of the 16th Report, the study subsi-
dized by the Commission of the European Communities on "Measures 
relating to the safety training of mine workers employed in the 
mines of the European Community" was examined by the Working Party, 
and was subsequently approved by the Safety and Health Commission 
on 12 June 1979· Although the study related specifically to coal 
mines in the Community, it was thought that the points made there-
in were equally applicable to all mines. 
Because of its size (II8 pages) this document cannot be appended 
to the 17th Report; it is available in English, French and German 
from the Secretariat of the Safety and Health Commission (Doc. no. 
4372/3/77)· Editions in the other Community languages will follow 
in due course. 
Following on from one of the conclusions of this study the Working 
Party has drawn up a programme for a study of "Training from the 
point of view of behaviour - selection and evaluation of training 
methods which might influence the attitude of experienced miners 
with a view to improving occupational safety and health". 
Financial assistance for this study was granted by the Commission 
in 1979· The project will be coordinated by the National Coal Board 
and carried out in conjunction with Charbonnages de France and 
Ruhrkohle A.G. At the request of the Safety and Health Commission, 
workers' representatives will be consulted. 
41 2.7·3· Workmen's inspectors 
At the information symposium held in Luxembourg on 28 and 29 Sep-
tember I978 (see 1.4·5· of the 16th Report), the desire was ex-
pressed by the workmen's inspectors to continue these exchanges 
of views, with a view to working, if in the long term, towards 
approximation of the present rather different systems for monito-
ring safety conditions in mines by the workers' own delegates. 
The Secretary of the Safety and Health Commission suggested that 
these exchanges of views should take place in an ad hoc committee 
attached to the Working Party on Human Factors affecting Safety, 
and this point was brought up before the Safety and Health Commis-
sion on 1 December 1978..The SHCMOEI in turn referred the question 
back to The Working Party, which did not go ahead with the crea-
tion of an ad hoc committee involving workmen's delegates, but 
decided instead to compare national reports and then to draw up 
a summary report and table and to set out conclusions which might 
bring out the advantages and disadvantages of the different sys-
tems. 
It was thought that the ways and means of bringing about a long-
term approximation of the different systems could only be studied 
at a later stage. 
2.7·4· Terms of Reference 
Revised terms of reference for the Working Party were studied and 
will be submitted to the Safety and Health Commission at its first 
meeting in I98O. 
2.7.5· The Working Party took note of the progress made in Safety cam-
paigns in opencast mines and quarries in Italy, the United King-
dom and the Federal Republic of Germany. 
42 CHAPTER H 
Ventilation, firedamp and other mine gases 
2.8.1. Number of meetings 7 
- three full meetings of the Working Party on 2 February, 20 March 
and 23 October 1979 at the Duisburg mines 
- four meetings of a committee of experts. 
2.8.2. The Working Party completed the work mentioned in 2.8.2. of the 
16th Report with which it had been charged by the Mines Safety 
and Health Commission following the accidents at Lens-Liévin 
(27.12.74 - 42 dead), Houghton Main (12.5.75 - 5 dead) and Luisen-
thal (21.7.76 - 2 dead, 5 seriously injured). 
The document dealing with minimum requirements for the control of 
the firedamp risk arising during drivage and following the aban-
donment of cul-de-sac and other old workings was adopted by the 
Safety and Health Commission on 7 September 1979 as a proposal to 
the Member States' Governments for the improvement of safety and 
health conditions in coalmines, in accordance with Article 1 of 
its terms of reference. This document is appended as Annex IV to 
this report. 
2.8.3. The Working Party continued its work on the addixional remit 
handed down by the Safety and Health Commission on "Ventilation 
aspects of the use of heading machines with dedusting equipment". 
2.8.3.1. The Working Party also studied the document entitled "Auxilliary 
fans and partial air recirculation in auxilliary ventilated pla-
ces equipped with air coolers" by Mr Graumann (Doc. no. 3326/79 
available in d/e/f from the Secretariat of the Safety and Health 
Commission). 
2.8.3«2. A visit was also paid to inspect examples of the practical appli-
cation of this technique in three collieries run by the Bergbau 
A.G. Niederrhein near Duisburg. 
43 2.8.4· Firedamp monitoring instruments 
A committee of experts has continued its work of drawing up mini-
mum requirements for the design and use of portable methanometers. 
This document, which could be adopted as a proposal to the Member 
States' Governments in accordance with Article 1 of the Safety 
and Health Commission's terms of reference, will be completed in 
I98O. 
44 CHAPTER I 
Mechanization 
2·9·1· Number of meetings 2 
including one meeting of the full Working Party on 5 September 
1979. 
2.9·2. At the above meeting, the Working Party examined a report on the 
safety of transport by belt conveyor (document no. 2193/6/77) 
drawn up by a restricted group of persons, a study and editorial 
committee. Examination of the report will be completed in I98O. 
2.9·3· Study groups have drawn up proposals on the subjects to be studied 
in the vicinity of the face and in roadways and with regard to 
haulage chains and ropes. 
Examination of these proposals will continue in I98O. 
45 CHAPTER J 
Strata control and stability of ground 
2.10.1 Number of meetings 5 
- three meetings of the full Working Party on 8 February (at the 
Zolder Mine in Belgium), 18 May and 21 November 1979; 
- two meetings of a committee of experts. 
2.10.2. At Zolder Mine the Working Party members saw and took note of a 
process which had been developed there to mechanise driva-
ge of the tail gate of the face with elimination of the stable 
and mechanisation of support setting in the roadway in line with 
the face to eliminate the need for miners to be present in this 
dangerous zone. 
2.10.3· On 27 March 1979, the Safety and Health Commission adopted an in-
formation report on "Construction of gateside packs for longwall 
faces". 
At the request of the Safety and Health Commission, this report 
was appended to the loth Report (Annex VIII), and summarized in 
paragraph 2.10.2. of that report. 
2.10.4« The Working Party examined a report on the rockburst on 19 Februa-
ry 1979 at the Haus Aden Mine in North-Rhine Westphalia which re-
sulted in the deaths of 5 persons (see Section III). 
2.10.5· The information report on rockbursts mentioned in 2.10.3.1. of 
the 16th Report is almost complete. 
It draws attention to the fact that the detection of dangerous 
zones is nearly always based on the empirical measurement of the 
coal expelled during the drilling of test holes. A research insti-
tute has been commissioned to produce a study of other means of 
detecting increased tension on a coal seam. The Commission of 
the European Communities is providing financial assistance for 
the project. 
47 2.10.6. The Working Party also examined all the delegations' reports on 
the possibility of reducing accidents caused by falling material 
at the roadhead. 
2.10.7· A small committee of experts was set up to produce a report on 
the stability of tips during tipping and during any subsequent 
exploitation of a mineral from the tip. 
48 CHAPTER K 
Oil, gas and other materials extracted by borehole 
2.11.1. Number of meetings 5 
- two meetings of the full Working Party on 16 May and 30 Octo-
ber 1979; 
- three meetings of committees of experts. 
2.11.2. The Working Party completed two of a total of five proposals which 
the Safety and Health Commission had asked it to draw up following 
the blow-out on the Bravo platform in the Ekofisk field on 22 
April 1977· The actual drafting of these proposals was made the 
responsibility of a committee of experts on the prevention of 
blowouts. 
The two documents - "Production equipment offshore" and "Workover 
programme offshore" - were approved by the Safety and Health Com-
mission on 7 September 1979 and transmitted to the Governments 
of the Member States "for the improvement of safety and health 
conditions", pursuant to Article 1 of the SHCMOEI's terms of re-
ference on offshore oil and gas wellhead installations which come 
under its jurisdiction. 
2.11.3· The committee of experts completed the last part of this series 
on blowout prevention training for personnel employed on plat-
forms. 
2.11.4· At its meeting on 12 June 1979, the Safety and Health Commission 
reviewed the activities and programmes of the working parties, 
with special reference to the Working Party on Oil, Gas and other 
Materials extracted by borehole. The options presented to the Sa-
fety and Health Commission concerned the formation of an ad hoc 
committee to examine accident statistics in the drilling sector, 
study of the rescue of men who have fallen into the sea and the 
evacuation of offshore platforms. 
49 These options gave rise to a wide-ranging discussion, in the 
course of which mention was made of collaboration and work-sharing 
between the Working Party and the London Conference. The link bet­
ween two organisations has been strengthened by the nomination of 
Mr de Korver, the Chairman of the Working Party, as Chairman of 
Group III of the London Conference, which is concerned with the 
safety of personnel. 
The Safety and Health Commission attaches great importance to the 
planned work and will review the terms of reference to be submit­
ted by the Working Party in I98O 
2.II.5. On 18 and I9 September 1979, the Committee of Experts on Well Con­
trol visited the Groningen gas field run by the Nederlandse Aar­
dolie Maatschappij (NAM), which produces 85 billion m natural gas 
per annum or 17 fo of the total primary energy production of the 
Sine. The 28 clusters (groups of 8 to 10 wells) in this field are 
worked centrally. The wellhead equipment and other installations 
and safety measures designed to cope with sudden spurts of gas 
during drilling, production or maintenance were regarded as opti­
mal by the experts. 
The experts also had an opportunity to check the applicability, 
at onshore installations, of the two proposals the committee had 
worked out on offshore wells. They visited the training centre 
which included a training well and a "Sintran" simulator, where 
maintenance and drilling personnel practise techniques for con­
trolling Ά sudden spurt of gas which would otherwise result in a 
blowout, with all its dramatic repercussions. This idea is re­
flected in the proposal which will be submitted to the Safety and 
Health Commission in I98O. 
Finally, the Committee of Experts inspected the large stock of 
equipment which was maintained and tested regularly for use in 
the event of a blowout or similar incidents. As the control of 
such inoidents is not specifically mentioned in the Working Par­
ty's terms of reference, the latter will be reviewed with a view 
to studying the means of tackling a blowout, when preventive mea­
sures have failed. 
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(8) PART I 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. During its meeting on 11th July 1978, the Safety and Health Commission for 
the Mining and other Extractive Industries gave the working party on "Rescue 
Arrangements, Mine Fires and Underground Combustion" the task of studying 
the reports of the above accidents, (viz. doc. 3620/78 and 2712/78, etc.), 
and assembling therefrom the general lessons common to the two incidents, 
and then drawing conclusions from them. The working party entrusted this 
work to experts from the countries affected, and the results of this are set out 
in the enclosed report. 
The conclusions listed in this report take account of the findings from these 
two accidents. They are not intended to be a complete list of fire fighting and 
rescue requirements, but they contain such important basic points that it is 
considered that they should be made available to interested parties in ful de-
tail. 
Also contained in the report is a list of research projects, studies and informa-
tion which were considered relevant and necessary during the evaluation of 
the conclusions and which should be followed up. 
1.2. The report is therefore submitted to the Safety and Health Commission for 
the Mining and other Extractive Industries for approval and presentation to 
the Governments of Member States and other interested parties, in accordance 
with art. 3 of the terms of reference of the M.S.H.C. 
57 PART II 
BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE TWO INCIDENTS 
2.1. MERLEBACH 
2.1.1. At about 11.30 a.m. on 30 September 1976, a fire was discovered at the base 
of the rise heading conveying return air from the southern wing of the double 
unit steep face in seam 2 A, which was being worked by single rising slices bet-
ween levels 1036 and 826 from the second cross-cut north-west at 1036. 
2.1.2. The first means used to fight the fire (extinguishers) proved to be ineffective. 
Shortly afterwards, a roof fall created a passage between the southern end of 
seam 2 A and an adjacent air raise, forming a second source of air at the base 
of the rise heading where the fire was located. 
2.1.3. From the outset, it was decided that if necessary, the fire would be fought 
using hydraulic stowing, and the necessary pipe connections were made at the 
545 and the 686 levels, but at about 2.30 p.m. a rescue brigage wearing appa-
ratus was unable to enter the return on the 825 level to make the last connec-
tions, due to the amount of smoke. 
2.1.4. Meanwhile, the fire was fought - apparently with success - with a number of 
hoses ; however, the firefighters only realized around 3 p.m. that they were 
faced with a fire which was not spreading at the face end, but in the return air 
raise itself. 
2.1.5. The heat and the dense smoke made it impossible to get to the top end of the 
fire-stricken return air raise and it became obvious that the fire could no 
longer be brought under control by direct means. 
2.1.6. So while the hoses were still played on the lower end of the return air raise, 
work began on closing the top of the tubbing-lined central raise in seam 2A to 
enable the face to be stowed hydraulically from the air raise serving as a 
return for the northern unit. 
59 2.1.7. At 4.20 p.m. an ignition of combustible gas occurred 
at the base of the raise, propagating the flame in 
the direction of the rescue workers fighting the fire 
at the foot of the raise, but without causing any 
serious accident. The face was then hurriedly evacuated 
and the hoses abandoned, but water was left on. 
2.1.8. It was not until about 5 p.m. that preparatory work 
aimed at closing the central raise in seam 2A was 
resumed, without any steps being taken to check on 
the spread of the fire at the end of the southern unit 
approximately 400 m away. The leader of the team 
engaged in the capping operations, however, was 
equipped with an anemometer so that he could check 
the stability of the airflow in the southern unit. 
2.1.9. When work on preparing the cap at the top of the cen-
tral raise in seam 2A was at a very advanced stage, 
a violent explosion occurred at the face at about 
6.30 p.m., resulting in the death of 16 men. 
2.2. Schlägel und Eisen 
2.2.1. At about 6.45 a.m. on 27th October 1977, miners wor-
king in the lower part of a 1200 m long return/belt 
incline in the South Field noticed the smell of bur-
ning. They proceeded against the ventilating current 
and, about 70 m above the lowest point of the incline, 
found a smouldering fire under the belt conveyor, on 
which a 1.2 m wide steel cord belt was in operation. 
Sparks were coming from the mounting of a bottom belt 
roller, and under the roller a patch of slack was 
glowing over an area of approximately 1.2 χ 0,5 m. 
One of the miners went to the nearest telephone 
l) Because direct firefighting had been discontinued 
60 (about 20 m away on the intake side of the fire) and 
informed an official (senior electrician). The other 
miners stopped the conveyor by means of the emergency 
switch and began preparations for fighting the fire 
by hosing it with water from the water supply network. 
The official took charge of the firefighting opera-
tions and informed the surface control room. 
2.2.2. Before spraying could begin, a length of about 5 m of 
the bottom belt burst into flames. The fire spread 
immediately to the upper belt and rapidly propagated. 
2.2.3. At about 6.45 a.m. the alarm was given in the control 
room via the CO-analyser at the top of the incline. 
Shortly afterwards this apparatus ceased to function 
because the electricity supply cable was cut by the 
fire. At about 7.05 a.m. the colliery management 
alerted the rescue service. Despite the attempts to 
extinguish the fire by spraying, it could not be 
brought under control, and at 7.30 a.m. evacuation of 
the whole mine was ordered. All except one of the 
miners managed to reach the surface safely. At about 
7.45 a.m. it became apparent that a miner who was 
working as a salt paster was missing. His position 
was thought to be between the top of the belt incline 
and the two adjacent return shafts 3 and 4. 
2.2.4. A six-man rescue team descended upcast shaft 3 at 
7.50 a.m. to look for the missing paster, and at about 
8.00 a.m. another team descended downcast shaft 7. 
When the team which had descended the smoke-filled 
return shaft had not reported back by about 9 a.m., 
further rescue teams were sent to look for the missing 
team from the intake side. The members of the missing 
rescue team were later discovered dead in shaft 3, in 
the cage and on the landing at the shaft 3 bunker 
horizon. The body of the missing paster was found near 
the landing of shaft 4. 
61 2.2.5. On the evening of 30th October 1977 (approximately 
85 hours after the outbreak of fire) the two stop-
pings on the intake sides were completed. About 23 
hours after the outbreak of fire, i.e. before the 
intake stoppings were completed, operations began to 
inject large quantities of nitrogen (approx. 500 m-
5/ 
min) into the fire area in order to reduce the rate 
of combustion and eliminate the risk of explosion. 
These measures made it possible to construct the 
return airway stopping in the incline between 31st 
October and 2nd November 1977, thereby completely 
sealing off the South Field of the mine from the rest 
of the ventilated workings. 
2.2.6. The South Field was subsequently recovered section 
by section, the injection of nitrogen to the burning 
area of the dip being continued until 6th December 77 
and a residual fire area being flooded on 10/llth 
January 1978, i.e. in the twelfth week after the out-
break of fire. All operations to contain the fire and 
to recover the South Field were carried out without 
further incidents or casualties. The paster and the 
six miners in the rescue team had died soon after the 
outbreak of fire. 
62 PART III 
Comparative study of the two accidents and conclusions 
Although the two fires occurred under very different 
circumstances, they do reveal oertain common factors. 
These will be discussed under the following headings. 
3.1. Detection of the fire 
3.2. The alarm 
3.3. Immediate appreciation of the situation and initial 
reactions of underground personnel 
3.4. The development of the two fires 
3.5. Various aspects of fire-fighting operations 
3.5.1. Withdrawal of men 
3.5.2. Voice communications 
3.5.3. Fire-fighting 
3.5.3.1. direct action 
3.5.3.2. indirect action 
3.5.4. Operating conditions for the fire and rescue personnel 
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(9) 3.1. Detection 
3.1.1. Both fires were first detected by the personnel under-
ground close to the source of the fire. 
A t__S chläjgel. und Eisen 
by a team of miners about 25 m downwind of the fire 
in an air flow of about 100 m'/s, who noticed "a 
smell of burning" ; 
At_Merlebaçh_ 
initially by a workman in the southern unit of the 
face, a few metres from the bottom of the raise, up-
'T 
wind of the fire in an air flow of about 5.3 m/s, 
who noticed a "glimmering" at the bottom of the raise; 
but also by workmen in the return airway at the 826 
level, downwind of the fire, in an air flow of about 
30 m^/s,
 w^° noticed a "smell of burning wood". 
3.1.2. There was no early detection by automatic means. 
At_Sc_hilä£;eil und. Eisen 
there were UNOR single-channel continuous analysers 
a) in the upper section of the incline, in an air 
flow of about 100 m^/s, about 1000 metres downwind 
of the fire ; and 
b) at the top of the upcast shaft serving the South 
Field, in an air flow of about 150 m^/s. 
The fire could have been detected from the CO concen-
tration charts at the surface 30 minutes before it 
was discovered underground if there had not been 
hourly intervals between checks on the reading. 
At_Merlebaçhj_ 
there was as yet no CO analyser in the return from 
the southern unit. 
l) Work was in progress on installing the equipment in the 
colliery's return airways. 
64 3.1.3. Conclusions with regard to fire detection 
Smoke, steam and smell are all indications of a fire 
or heating which can be observed by the personnel on 
the spot. It is, however, preferable for early detec-
tion of fires - and of spontaneous combustion, which 
is an easier task - to be possible when no personnel 
are present and if possible such detection should be 
faster than that depending on the observable early 
indications mentioned above or on regular patrolling. 
It should be noted that at Schlägel und Eisen the 
increase in the CO concentration was indicated by the 
two UNOR analysers monitoring the return air before 
the workmen underground had noticed the "smell of 
burning". 
The following points are important for improved 
continuous early detection systems for fires and to a 
still greater extent for spontaneous combustion. 
3.1.3.1. CO, is currently the most convenient indicator for 
such early detection. 
3.1.3.2. CO meters at fixed points should be used for conti-
nuous sampling of the air in the main and secondary 
return airways and in the circuits which are parti-
cularly at risk (e.g. certain trunk conveyor roadways) 
3.1.3.3. The CO concentrations measured by these instruments 
should be transmitted to the surface, recorded or 
stored in a memory, and kept under constant observa-
tion. Such observation may be carried out by a 
"processing system" with sufficient capacity to deal 
with the amount of information received. 
65 3.1.3.4. Instructions for control room staff or data processing 
programs should, in the light of the conditions ob-
taining in each colliery, lay down alarm values for 
the parameters characterising the progress of CO 
emission (e.g. threshold, trend study etc.). 
3.1.3.5. In order to differentiate between the various sources 
of Carbon monoxide it is necessary to determine the 
rate of emission of CO in for example litres per 
minute. 
3.1.3.6. The existence of an automatic detection system must 
not result in 
a) reduced vigilance on the part of personnel ; 
b) a reduction in the attention given to systematic 
checks. 
Research into improving the quality of portable 
fire detectors should be increased. 
3.1.3.7. The speed of detection largely depends on the fre-
quency with which the CO level at a measuring point 
is checked. 
3.1.3.8. Detection of a fire by personnel observing smoke or 
steam will be made easier by better roadway lighting. 
66 3.2. The alarm 
3.2.1. In both cases the alarm could have been given more 
quickly : 
At_M£rl_ebaç,h.í_ 
There was an interval of 45 minutes between the time 
when the miners on level 826 noticed the first smell 
of charred wood and the moment when they gave the 
alarm (Doc. 3620/78 e - p. 7, par. 3.2.4.1.). 
At__Schlä£el_ und Eisen, 
the rise in the CO readings for the air in the belt 
dip "was not noticed in the colliery control room. 
Besides an optical and acoustic alarm when the pre-
se t limit (in this case about 15 ppm) was exceeded, 
there was an instruction to the duty man to read the 
recorder charts every hour" (Doc. 2712/78 e - p. 21, 
par. 9). 
In the first case, the delay was caused by a cautious 
reaction on the part of the personnel and in the 
second by the hourly frequency specified for checking 
the recorder readings. 
3.2.2. Conclusions with regard to giving the alarm 
3.2.2.1. The personnel must be periodically reminded of this 
problem. 
The prime consideration is that the alarm must be 
given promptly as soon as the existence of a fire 
(or spontaneous combustion) is established or pre-
sumed. 
Ways and means of giving the alarm must be carefully 
laid down. 
3.2.2.2. When automatic CO monitoring facilities are available, 
greater speed and reliability in giving the alarm 
67 should result provided exclusive reliance is not 
placed on human alertness, especially if a large 
amount of information is displayed, and the alarm 
is triggered by a lata processing system which 
automatically interprets the data as described in 
par. 3.1.3.3. 
3.2.2.3. If all persons underground are to be able to give 
the alarm rapidly, the primary requirement is for 
an extensive and very reliable telephone network. 
3.2.2.4. In order to enable a duly authorized person to order 
withdrawal of men from any given district with the 
minimum loss of time, a study should be made of a 
system for transmitting a specially modulated alarm 
signal (along the same lines as an air-raid siren). 
The use of an intercom could also be useful. 
68 3.3. Immediate appreciation of the situation and initial 
reactions of the personnel underground 
3.3.1. Identification of the seat of the fire 
At_Merlebaçhj_ 
the first person to notice the fire in the southern 
unit of the face was unable to determine the exact 
source of the "glimmering"; after fetching an extin-
guisher and returning to the spot the persons present 
decided that the fire was starting in the pile of 
coal at the foot of the raise whereas in fact 
-according to the hypothesis identified by the en-
quiry as the most plausible - the fire was also 
taking hold in the raise itself. 
"The firefighters only realized around 3 p.m. that 
they were faced with a fire which was not spreading 
at the face end, but in the return air raise itself" 
(Doc. 3620/78 e, p. 1, par. l). 
The disposition of the workings and the pile of debris 
resulting from the fall between the raises in seams 
2A & 2W, largely account for this faulty appreciation 
of the situation : access to the foot of the raise 
soon became impossible. 
A^Schlägel, und Eisen, 
the first person to discover the fire clearly identi-
fied its initial seat : "A bottom roller on the east 
side was sparking, with the sparks falling to the 
floor" (Doc. 2712/78 e, p. 6, par. 3); "In the vici-
nity of the roller there was glowing material partly 
covered by a thin white layer" (Doc. 2712/78 e, p. 6, 
par. 3). 
69 3.3.2. Initial reactions 
Α.* _Merle baçhj. 
the first person on the scene went to fetch an extin-
guisher from further along the face instead of imme-
diately connecting a hose to the available water 
range. However, the extinguisher "proved to be ina-
dequate" (Doc. 3620/78 e, p. 1, par. l), to suppress 
the fire. 
Thus precious minutes passed before the seat of the 
fire was identified and taking immediate action to 
combat it. 
At^Schlägel^ una Eisen, 
the first reaction was to stop the belt, thus 
initiating propagation of the fire. On coming in 
contact with the glowing debris "the rubber of the 
belt was hissing and bubbling" so that "before the 
firefighting could begin the glowing area suddenly 
sprang into flame ..." (Doc. 2712/78 e, p. 6-7, par.3) 
3.3.3. Conclusions 
The immediate reactions of persons discovering a fire 
or incipient fire may be of critical importance. In 
order to render such immediate action more effective 
one must, inter alia, bear the following principles 
in mind. 
3.3.3.1. Provision of means for immediate action 
Extinguishers (for incidents involving live electri-
cal apparatus), but above all pressurised water mains 
providing a high flow rate throughout the district 
especially for automatic fire-fighting installations 
and hoses. 
70 3.3.3.2. To inform or train underground personnel on what 
should be done 
a) to fight fire 
- recognition of the type of fire 
- use of nearest appropriate firefighting equipment 
- avoidance of certain actions which might have 
adverse effects. 
(While it is not possible to establish detailed 
instructions to cover all eventualities, a list 
of Do's and Dont's in the event of fire should 
be drawn up for non-specialised staff). 
b) to send for assistance wherever possible 
c) to rapidly notify the senior official at the mine 
of the outbreak of fire, its site and extent 
d) to withdraw only if unable, using the fire-fighting 
equipment to hand to control the incipient fire 
discovered. 
71 
(10) 3.4. Development of the fires 
3.4.1. Although they occurred under very different circum-
stances, the initial fuel for both fires was coal 
ignited by different initiating sources. 
A ^Schlägel, und Eisen, 
the ignition was caused by sparks from a bottom belt 
idler which fell on a heap of fines. 
At Merlebach. 
the ignition, in the opinion of the Administration, 
was most probably due to spontaneous combustion in 
the fissured roadway side at the base of the return 
air raise. 
3.4.2. The initial rapidity of propagation differed. 
At_Schlägel_ und Eisen, 
the seat of the fire grew rapidly in the space of a 
few minutes under the eyes of the first fire-fighters. 
The main reasons were as follows : 
- the delay in detecting fire ; 
- the large flow of ventilation ; 
- the decision to stop the conveyor ; 
- the properties of the belt. 
At_Me_rl_eb_açihJL 
the men on site believed that the initial propagation 
was slow, and even reported that they had it under 
control. 
3.4.3· Once discovered, neither of the fires could be brought 
under control by direct means. 
The following were particularly important factors : 
the exceptional rate of propagation at Schlägel und 
Eisen, despite the availability of automatic fire-
fighting systems ; 
72 the very unusual layout of the workings at Merlebach, 
which made it difficult to gain access to the initial 
seat of the fire with the fire-fighting equipment 
available. 
The time spent in fetching the nearest extinguisher, 
at least at Merlebach, delayed immediate action to 
fight the fire, when water was readily available. 
3.4.4. In both cases, the return airways downwind of the 
fires rapidly became impassable for rescue teams. 
3.4.5. Both fires started in ascenslonally ventilated road-
ways (belt dip at a gradient of 15 g at Schlägel und 
Eisen, return air raise at a gradient of 60-65 g at 
Merlebach). 
The considerable buoyancy effects generated by the 
heat of the fires did not affect the direction of the 
ventilation in the fire zones. The personnel initially 
fighting the fire from the intake side had no need to 
take precautions against reversal. 
3.4.6. Conclusions 
3.4*6.1. Without attempting to cover all aspects of precautions 
for conveyors, we would like to draw attention to the 
following. 
3.4.6.1.1. Conveyors should be designed and maintained under-
ground so that installations and workings are kept as 
clean as possible and that cleaning and maintenance 
work can be carried out without difficulty. Pines 
beneath the intermediate structure of belt conveyors 
should be regularly removed. 
3.4.6.1.2. As far as present technology allows, existing belts 
must progressively be raplaced by self-extinguishing 
types (see proposals in the MSHC First Report, 
15th November 1974). 
73 3.4.6.1.3. It is desirable that non-combustible supports and 
lagging should increasingly be used in belt conveyor 
roadways. 
3.4.6.1.4. High airflows favour the rapid development of fire 
and fire precautions must receive especial attention 
in roadways where such airflows obtain. 
3.4.6.1.5. More than any other body of workers, conveyor patrol-
ling and maintenance staff must be trained in accor-
dance with the recommendations made in par. 3.3.3.2. 
3.4.6.2. The buoyancy effect of fires can exercise a conside-
rable influence on the distribution of the air currents 
and can thus endanger fire-fighters, rescue workers 
and other personnel. 
Steps must therefore be taken in advance to ensure 
that the persons responsible for fire-fighting ope-
rations are informed on this subject. 
To this end, case studies of specific situations must 
be carried out, full-scale experiments must be con-
ducted if possible, the methods of calculating 
buoyancy effects ought to be improved and lists of 
their orders of magnitude drawn up. 
In particular, where there are ascensionally or 
descensionally ventilated roadways in certain mines, 
it is desirable to assess in advance the aeromotive 
forces of a fire and to preplan for the essential 
regulators which may be required to maintain stable 
air flows. The requisite equipment can be stocked 
underground. 
74 3.4.6.3. In both cases, the fire-fighters were faced with 
exceptional situations. 
The magnitude of the fires at the time of detection, 
and the unfavourable layout of the workings rendered 
ineffective or inadequate the fire precautions and 
fire-fighting action taken, although these were well 
conceived. 
If, because of a particular layout, the possibility 
of such situations cannot be discounted, it would be 
necessary 
- either to use more adequate fire-fighting equipment 
(e.g. suitable spraying installations where the 
airflows are high), 
- or to make advance preparation for indirect fire-
fighting (e.g. by preplanning sites for stoppings). 
75 3.5. Eire-fighting operations in the two collieries 
3.5.1. Withdrawal of men 
3.5.1.1. In_both cases, the fires broke out in return airways 
or air raises, i.e. downwind of the workings occupied 
by large numbers of men. 
This facilitated orderly withdrawal of most of the 
workforce. 
- At_Sc.hl_ag.el_ und. Eisen, 
the decision to withdraw the entire workforce was 
taken immediately (doc. 2712/78 e, p. 1, par. l). 
- At_Me.r_e_ac.h_ 
men were immediately withdrawn from the district 
affected and other parts of the mine were evacuated 
in due course. 
3.5.1.2. However,_some members of the workforce were on the 
return side of the fire. 
- At_S_h_ä_e_ und Eisen, 
a salt paster who had used a CO self-rescuer, died 
of anoxia and heat. 
- At_M_r_e_açb_ in the return airway on the 826 level, 
some workmen who were not carrying self-rescuers 
managed to escape quickly to a non-contaminated zone, 
3.5.1.3. Conclusions 
The foregoing remarks naturally draw attention to the 
general problem of withdrawal of men and more speci-
fically to the following points. 
3.5.1.3.1. If the effects of temperature are disregarded, a 
higher standard of protection is afforded for miner 
on the return side of a fire by self contained oxygen 
76 content is insufficient to support life. 
However, many other factors must be taken into 
account in the selection of apparatus. 
3.5.1.3.2. Group protection by 'refuge chambers* may be consi-
dered as a principal or secondary means of protection 
provided local conditions permit. 
3.5.1.3.3. Consideration must also be given to the length and 
condition of escape routes. 
3.5.2. Voice communications 
3.5.2.1. Breakdowns in telephone communications occurred. 
At_S_hlä_e_ und Eisen, 
the fire progressively destroyed the telephone link 
with the South Field because the main telephone cable 
ran through the roadway and upcast shaft downwind of 
the fire. 'It was put out of commission section by 
section through the effect of heat' (Doc. 2712/78 e, 
p. 23, par. 35). In the belt incline the telephone 
cable was cut less than half an hour after the alarm 
was given and the connection was completely cut in 
the shaft four hours later. 
At_M_r_eba_h_ 
'direct communication between the rescue station and 
the rescue workers broke down at a crucial moment'. 
(Doc. 3620/78 e, p. 3). The team working at the top 
of the central raise had a direct telephone link with 
the surface plus two telephones 15 m. below the cross-
cut ; there was a temporary breakdown of the set in 
the central raise. 
77 3.5.2.2. Conclusions 
3.5.2.2.1. In order to prevent a breakdown in surface to under-
ground voice communications a number of main tele-
phones below ground should be connected to the surface 
by parallel circuits if their normal circuit passes 
through a return airway. 
3.5.2.2.2. When a rescue team has to operate under difficult 
conditions, an extension line must be provided to 
establish constant communication with its base tele-
phone, which in turn must be connected with the sur-
face via the normal telephone network. A second link 
between the base telephone and surface should be 
established as soon as possible. 
3.5.2.2.3. In general terms, reliable channels of communication 
must be established between the fire-fighting and 
rescue teams, their 'base' telephones, incident con-
trol and the main mine control room (see also 6.2.2.4.) 
3.5.3. Fire-fighting operations 
3.5.3.1. Direct action against the seat of the fire 
3.5.3.1.1. The failure of direct fire-fighting measures has 
already been noted and the reasons analysed. 
3.5.3.1.2. Conclusions 
3.5.3.1.2.1. Water is the most effective medium for fighting 
open fires except where electricity is involved and 
even here once the power has been switched off. 
3.5.3.1.2.2. Rapid use of water is possible only if the following 
requirements are satisfied : 
- reliable supply by a mains system, (e.g. by closed 
loop or duplicate range extending to all working 
areas and consisting of piping of adequate bore, 
especially where there are automatic._lnstallations ; 
78 - speed of operation, to be attained by : 
. suitable siting of hydrants with quick-acting 
manually operated valves, instantaneous coup-
lings and fire hoses with couplings of the same 
type ; 
. fixed spray installations sited at certain 
points on heavy duty conveyors, possibly con-
trolled automatically or from the intake side 
of major installations, and related to the wa-
ter flow available (See Part V, 5.1.10.) as 
to form water barrages in return airways 
adjacent to such major installations. 
3.5.3.1.2.3. The importance of making provision for these fire-
fighting arrangements well in advance, during the 
planning of the mining operations, and the need 
for research work to improve the performance of 
automatic fire-fighting installations are stressed. 
3.5.3.1.2.4. Adequate numbers of portable extinguishers must be 
located at key points. 
3.5.3.1.2.5. The effectiveness of all these fire-fighting ap-
pliances depends on the extent to which the entire 
workforce, and more specifically the personnel 
responsible for conveyor patrolling and maintenance, 
is familiar with the method of use of equipment and 
on very clear indication of its location. 
3.5.3.2. Indirect action 
3.5.3.2.1.After the failure of direct action against the fires, 
it proved necessary to seal off the districts affec-
ted by erecting stoppings on the intake and return 
sides. 
In both collieries, it proved impossible to take 
simultaneous action to seal the intake a_nd_ return 
airways. 
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til) 3.5.3.2.2. The overall approach differed in t_he two mines. 
At_Sc_h_ä_e_ und Eisen 
the fire area was sealed off with stoppings and an 
inert atmosphere created by injecting nitrogen. 
At_M_r_e_açb_ 
the area was sealed off with stoppings and the fire 
was smothered with hydraulic stowing material. 
The stoppings were also of different types : 
At_S_hlä_e_ und Eisen, 
the stoppings were of conventional design, built in 
slightly inclined roadways on the intake side of the 
fire zone ; 
At_M_r_ebaç_h_ 
the first barrier which was partly completed, was of 
very unusual design ; a permeable cap to plug the top 
of a tubbing-lined raise which was virtually vertical 
and constituted the first mode of the ventilation 
network upwind of the fire ; subsequent stoppings were 
of more conventional design and were built in level 
roadways. 
3.5.3.2.3. In both cases, the decision to seal off the fire zone 
was taken rapidly once it had been realized that the 
fire could not be fought directly. 
This was achieved : 
- in six days at Schlägel und Eisen ; 
- in four weeks at Merlebach. 
3.5.3.2.4. The essential difference in the final result was that 
at Schlägel und Eisen the roadways which had been 
sealed off were usable after some months while at 
Merlebach they had been stowed. 
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Without embarking on a detailed technical discussion, 
one may draw attention to some aspects of the two 
fire-fighting methods employed. 
3.5.3.2.5.1. Creation of an inert atmosphere (in the present 
case, by injection of nitrogen). The following 
points should be emphasized. 
- The use of this method cannot be improvised. 
(Arrangements have to be made for the location of 
the equipment to generate inert gas, its operation, 
nitrogen supply, stocks of light flexible piping, 
procedure for using existing pipe ranges etc.) 
- The method is effective only if the airflow can 
be reduced to a level which should if possible be 
lower than the available flow of inert gas. 
3.5.3.2.5.2. Hydraulic stowing, which can both block the air 
circuits and flood the seat of the fire. 
This method, too, cannot be improvised. The fol-
lowing specific points should be noted. 
- It is preferable that means of transporting the 
stowing material should be available on the return 
and/or intake sides of the fire. 
- Placement of the stowing material often involves 
the use of special stoppings known as "filter 
stoppings". These must be built by specialist 
workmen whose training must not be neglected. 
3.5.3.2.5.3. Without wishing to lay down fire-fighting instruc-
tions in detail, one may mention the following main 
points which should be borne in mind in order to 
reduce operational delays and hence the period during 
which the fire-fighters and rescue workers are at 
risk. - Suitable sites for the erection of stoppings must 
be identified. 
- Special permanent fixtures must be developed to 
allow the air supply to be sealed off rapidly at 
certain specific points - such as the top of 
tubbing-lined raises serving faces in steep seams. 
3.5.3.2.5.4. The two methods described are not the only tech-
niques available. Selection of the most suitable 
method depends on local conditions and must be left 
to the discretion of the incident controller. 
3.5.4. Operating conditions for the fire and rescue personnel 
3.5.4.1. In the two accidents the victims were in different 
positions in relation to the seat of the fire. 
At Schlägel und. Eisen 
the victims were rescue brigadesmen equipped with 
their breathing apparatus and conducting a search 
downwind of the fire for a single workman, who was 
also killed, in that part of the ventilation circuit. 
At_M_r_e_a_h_ 
the victims were brigadesmen, workmen, officials and 
engineers engaged in the capping operations at the 
top of the central raise upwind of the fire. 
3.5.4.2. A t_Scb_ä_e_ und. Eisen 
'the missing miner was killed by lack of oxygen, 
the rescue men by hot fire gases and by fall in the 
shaft'. (Doc. 2712/78 e, p. 20, par. l). 
At_Me.r_e_ac.h_ 
'a violent explosion occurred at the face at 6.30 p.m. 
resulting in 16 deaths» (Doc. 3620/78 e, p.2, par.l). 
82 3.5.4.3. The general context of the two accidents differs 
as follows. 
At_Scb_ä_e_ und Eisen 
'there was no evidence of a fire gas, methane or coal 
dust explosion as a result of the fire or in connec-
tion with it' (Doc. 2712/78 e, p. 21, par. 6). 
At_M_rleba_h_ 
'at 4.20, an ignition of combustible gas occurred at 
the base of the raise in the direction of the rescue 
workers fighting the fire at the foot of the raise'. 
(Doc. 3620/78 e, p. 2, par.l). The explosion mentioned 
in the foregoing paragraph occurred at about 6.30 p.m. 
and there were several subsequent explosions inside 
the zone which was in the process of being sealed off. 
3.5.4.4. The foregoing observations emphasize how difficult it 
is to determine the nature of the atmosphere in the 
immediate vicinity of the fire and downwind. The main 
factors to be considered are : 
- temperature ; 
- toxicity : CO and 0„ concentrations ; 
- explosibility of gases. 
3.5.4.4.1. It should be noted that in the area immediately down-
wind of a major fire the usual telemetering instru-
ments are rendered inoperative either because the 
transmission lines are damaged or destroyed or because 
tar deposits coat the transducers or block the inlet 
orifices. 
Only sensors at some distance from the fire, generally 
in a zone where the fire gases have been diluted, can 
continue to provide usable information on CO and CH4 
levels and possibly on temperature. 
3.5.4.4.2. As a general rule the temperature, toxicity and explo-
sibility of the atmosphere can be determined only by 
83 measurements or samples which are taken below ground 
if the returns are accessible. 
3.5.4.4.3. Conclusions 
3.5.4.4.3.1. Monitoring fo the chemical composition and the tem-
perature of the gases downwind of the fire must 
start as soon as possible after the detection of an 
open fire or spontaneous combustion. 
More rapid analysis is required - hence the impor-
tance attaching to the improvement of mobile 
laboratories operating at the pithead. 
3.5.4.4.3.2. The explosion hazard must be assessed by methods 
which take account of the variation in explosibility 
as the gases travel throughout the whole of any air 
circuit affected by the fire. 
3.5.4.5. Observations on the problem of escape routes especial-
ly for fire-fighters and rescue workers. 
3.5.4.5.1. As has already been mentioned, the withdrawal of men 
posed no problems in either colliery as there were 
few workers directly, downwind of the fire. 
At_Scb_ä_e_ und Eisen, 
however, the brigadesmen were unable to escape. 
Although they had reached a shaft landing they could 
not use the signalling apparatus or the telephone 
probably because of heat and water vapour. 
3.5.4.5.2. Conclusions 
3.5.4.5.2.1. Attention is drawn to the importance of existing 
national and local recommendations or regulations 
concerning escape arrangements in the event of a 
fire or spontaneous combustion, with particular 
reference to advance planning of routes, signpos-
ting if necessary, means of communication with the 
84 workforce, avoidance of obstacles on escape routes 
etc. 
3.5.4.5.2.2. The two fires studies demonstrate the importance 
of deploying only such fire and rescue personnel as 
are strictly necessary. Withdrawal would be easier 
if the existing means of mechanized transport 
remained or were made available to fire and rescue 
workers. 
3.5.4.5.2.3. Rescue brigadesmen should not enter a return shaft 
downwind of a fire where they may be exposed to 
heat or dense fumes, unless they have at their dis-
posal some means whereby they can have themselves 
wound to the surface at any moment, e.g. direct 
speech communication with the winding engineman or 
controls installed in the winding cage. 
3.5.4.6. Observations on safety at the place of deployment 
of fire-fighters and rescue workers. 
3.5.4.6.1. The primary concern is that the effects of an explo-
sion initiated near the seat of a fire may be propa-
gated towards the fire-fighters or rescue workers. 
The factors to be taken into account in assessing the 
risks involved in working at a given location include 
•the condition of the workings', 'the state of the 
ventilation' (stability of ventilation) and 'the 
composition of the ventilating air', especially 
explosibility near the seat of the fire. 
3.5.4.6.2. Conclusions 
3.5.4.6.2.1. Assessment of the degree of safety of the place of 
deployment of fire-fighters and rescue workers in-
volves a 'synthesis of information' which must be 
carried out by a 'trained and experienced decision-
maker ' . 
85 We therefore again emphasize the following points. 
3.5.4.6.2.2. Care must be taken to ensure that there is as full 
a flow of information as possible from underground 
to surface and surface to underground, e.g. by 
telephone, telemotering, remote alarms, manual 
sampling and testing etc. 
3.5.4.6.2.3. As soon as a fire or spontaneous combustion becomes 
apparent, the direction of operations should be 
organized as quickly as possible. The incident 
controller should, in a preselected headquarters, 
assemble a staff of the most appropriate specialists 
e.g. the superintendent of the Central Rescue Sta-
tion, a ventilation specialist, etc. 
3.5.4.6.2.4. In order to ensure a »rapid and reliable flow of 
information', particular attention must be paid to 
the standard of voice communication between : 
- incident control, 
- the fire-fighting and rescue teams (the forward 
team and the fresh-air base), 
- the mine control room. 
3.5.4.6.2.5. In view of the complexity of the problem to be sol-
ved by the incident controller, we urge that there 
should be more intensive comparison of experiences 
of such incidents - both large and small - not only 
among the mining areas within a given country, but 
also among mining countries on a Community-wide 
and world-wide basis so that all can benefit as 
quickly as possible from the experience of each. 
(This is the ongoing task of the Working Party on 
Rescue Arrangements, Mine Fires and Underground 
Combustion). 
86 3.5.4.6.2.6. At all events one of the most important factors in 
ensuring safety is SPEED ; 
- speed in giving the alarm ; 
- speed in organizing direct action against the fire ; 
- speed in withdrawal of the men from the districts 
at risk ; 
- speed in the flow of information ; 
- speed in the setting up of the incident control 
room ; 
- speed in the erection of seals and stoppings. 
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(12) PART IV 
Summary of the Conclusions 
4.1. Preliminary remarks 
4.2. Human Factors 
4.2.1. Initial and further training of the workforce 
4.2.2. Withdrawal of the Workforce 
4.2.3. Engineers and the firefighting control team 
4.2.4. Exchange of information 
4.3. Technical Factors 
4.3.1. Early detection and alerting systems for fires 
4.3.2. Prevention and limiting of fires 
4.3.3. Firefighting 
4.3.4. Supplementary rules for calling in the mine rescue 
service. 
89 4.1. Preliminary remarks 
In this section it is assumed that the MSHC's general 
recommendations for fire protection underground, fire-
fighting and stabilization of ventilation (Annex V of 
the 13th Report 1975), are known to the reader. 
Therefore this summary contains mainly new findings 
concerning open fires. The question of heatings is 
not treated in the consideration of these two inci-
dents. However, previous experience which has again 
proved very important has been included. The con-
clusions and the reasons underlying them are set out 
in detail in Part III. 
90 4.2. Human Factors 
4.2.1. Initial and Further Training of the Workforce 
In mine fires, the behaviour of the personnel working 
or arriving at the seat of the fire can be of deci-
sive importance to the success or failure of fire-
fighting. It is therefore imperative that the entire 
underground workforce should be given some instruc-
tion in the detection of mine fires, giving the alert 
and firefighting procedure. In this connection, it 
should also be pointed out that persons who discover 
an incipient fire should only withdraw if the fire 
cannot be controlled with the available firefighting 
equipment. 
Members of the workforce in key positions such as 
belt attendants machine operators and electricians 
should be given special training in what to do in 
the event of fire. This applies especially to super-
visors and team leaders or charge-hands, so that 
they are capable of taking charge of the initial ex-
tinguishing operations in the event of a fire. In 
this context it should be pointed out that alterations 
to the ventilation may only be carried out on ins-
truction of the incident controller. This also applies 
to firedamp drainage. 
The training sessions, for which audio-visual teaching 
methods are to be recommended, should be repeated at 
regular intervals and accompanied by films, the issue 
of leaflets to all participants, indicating 'what to 
do in the event of a fire*. 
91 4.2.2. Withdrawal of the Workforce 
When an assessment is made of the effects of a fire 
on the workforce, priority must be given to withdrawal 
as a precautionary measure. Escape routes to be used 
in the event of fire must therefore be kept clear and 
miners must know any alternative routes for their 
particular district. Furthermore the workforce must 
be informed of the availability of self rescuing units 
and equipment and be instructed in their use. For 
special cases where escape might be difficult, the 
possibility of using appropriate self rescuers might 
be investigated (for example underground engine dri-
vers for manriders) or ventilated chambers. 
4.2.3. Engineers and the firefighting control team 
The planning of mines must include all the necessary 
firefighting measures. Firefighting operations should 
be prepared and carried out on the basis of alert 
plans (possibly with the inclusion of check lists) 
which should be available to every engineer at all 
times to serve as guidelines. Engineers should also 
be informed about the effects on ventilation stability 
of buoyancy forces caused by mine fires and the accom-
panying risks for the workforce as a whole. In the 
event of a minefire, the firefighting control team 
should be formed immediately. It consists of a fire-
fighting supervisor with appropriate training and 
experience, and suitable experts, such as the main 
rescue station supervisor, a ventilation engineer etc. 
The success of firefighting operations and the safety 
of the firefighting team are very much dependant on 
an early alert being given, early commencement of 
direct firefighting, prompt establishment of the 
control centre and finally, speed of communication. 
92 4.2.4. Exchange of information 
The information on unusual occurrences exchanged 
between mining districts and countries of the Econo-
mic Community should be increased so that the general 
rules drawn up after mining accidents may be utilised 
by all as early as possible (the permanent terms of 
reference of the Working Party on Rescue Arrangements, 
Mine Fires and underground Combustions apply). 
4.3. Technical Factors 
4.3.1. Early detection of fires and alerting systems 
Carbon monoxide (CO) is currently the most reliable 
indicator for early detection of mine fires. Other 
means are being investigated and this should continue. 
All return air currents in shafts and from ventilation 
districts as well as from main (wide) belt conveyors 
should be continuously monitored by automatic CO 
recording units with threshold indicators. The CO 
value can also be monitored by process control com-
puters with trend assessment to indicate incipent 
danger. 
The use of monitoring systems should not preclude the 
performance of systematic checks in mines. The typical 
signs of a fire are easier to detect in roadways with 
good lighting. 
The means of alerting the men at the surface and the 
endangered persons underground can be improved by the 
installation of more telephones within the network, 
as well as the use of intercom systems and special 
visual, odour or acoustic signals. 
93 4.3.2. Prevention and Limiting of fires 
Belt conveyors should be designed and maintained in 
such a way that deposits of dirt on equipment and in 
the workings are largely prevented, and cleaning up 
and sevicing work can be carried out without difficul-
ty. Any coal which may accumulate on roadway floors 
and components of belt conveyors should be removed 
regularly. 
Roadways with fast air currents should be subject to 
particularly stringent standards of fire prevention. 
The conversion of conveyor belts to fire resistant 
self extinguishing types should be continued. In 
mines with belt conveyors, the supports, including 
lagging, should in future be made of incombustible 
material. 
Stationary automatic fire extinguishing equipment 
should be installed at all belt drives and return 
drums, and if possible in the adjacent return air-
ways also to act as 'fire barriers'. 
4.3.3. Firefighting 
4.3.3.1. Water being the most effective means of fighting open 
fires, adequate quantities of it should be available 
as quickly as possible. The water supply network 
(e.g. duplicate or loop circuits if possible) should 
therefore reach all working areas and have a suffi-
ciently large diameter to supply the automatic extin-
guishing equipment in particular. In order to ensure 
that extinguishing work can be started quickly, an 
adequate number of draw off valves, fire hoses with 
couplings, and spray nozzles must be provided. 
Furthermore, a sufficient number of portable fire 
extinguishers should be available at locations in the 
workings which are more exposed to risks (e.g. belt 
94 drives, return drums, tensioning units etc.). All 
water connections and fire extinguishing equipment 
must be of easy access and well signposted. 
4.3.3.2. Assessments should be made of the buoyancy effects 
and of the measures required to stabilise ventilation 
both for asceneionally and descentionally ventilated 
belt inclines. If necessary, suitable devices for 
reducing the ventilation should be placed in readi-
ness underground. 
4.3.3.3. Neutralisation with nitrogen has proved a very 
effective means of suppressing mine fires. If the 
process is to be applied quickly, preparations are 
required such as the provision of a vapouriser, the 
supply of nitrogen, the switching of pipelines under-
ground and the use of hose pipes. 
4.3.3.4. In access roads of ventilation districts, the zones 
suitable for placing fire dams should be selected 
and marked before the winning operations begin. If 
hydraulic stowing is available for stopping off, it 
is preferable that it should be introduced via the 
intake and return roadways of the seat of the fire. 
Where stopping off presents special difficulties, 
appropriate equipment should be developed and kept 
in readiness to allow roadways to be stopped off 
effectively at short notice. 
4.3.3.5. Immediately after a mine fire has been detected, the 
monitoring of the chemical composition of the return 
air from the fire must begin. Fast analyses may be 
provided by improved mobile laboratories. In order to 
assess the explosion hazard, methods which take 
account of the variation in explosibility as the 
gases travel throughout the whole of any air circuit 
affected by the fire should be used. 
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13) 4.3.4. Supplementary rules for calling in the Mines Rescue 
Service 
The Mines Rescue Service must not enter an irrespirable 
atmosphere unless a Fresh Air Base has already been 
set up or is in the process of being set up. 
The rescue team should consist of the minimum number 
of persons required, and should comply with national 
regulations. Operations of the Mine Rescue Service 
on the return side of a fire may involve grave risks. 
For this reason, apart from regular fire gas analysis 
and assessment of the explosion risk, the temperature 
of the return air must be checked before work com-
mences on this side and at regular intervals after-
wards. In such cases, and generally where conditions 
are difficult, a constant communications link must 
be maintained between the rescue team and the mine 
control station as well as between the mine control 
station and the firefighting control team. This also 
applies during man-riding in air currents containing 
fire gases. Furthermore, the rescue team must be able 
to withdraw at all times. 
96 PART V 
Research and the exchange of information 
5.1. Having evaluated the summary report on the accidents 
at Merlebach and Schlägel und Eisen mines, the 
following list of research and study projects has 
been established. 
5.1.1. Monitoring systems for the advance detection of open 
fires and heatings. 
5.1.2. Development and improvement of portable CO measuring 
units. 
5.1.3. Data processing installations for operation in 
conjunction with a CO monitoring system. 
5.1.4. Rapid systems for alerting personnel, development of 
intercom systems as well as visual, acoustic or 
odour apparatus. 
5.1.5. Design requirements for conveyor systems to prevent 
ingress of dirt and to facilitate cleaning and 
maintenance, to reduce the risk of fire. 
5.1.6. Study of the buoyancy effect in ventilation, caused 
by mine fires by simulation or completion of full 
scale case studies, proposals for the calculation of 
the buoyancy effect, particularly based on full scale 
tests. 
5.1.7. Development of efficient automatic firefighting 
installations. 
5.1.8. Proposals for the development of mobile underground 
gas analysis facilities. 
97 5.1.9. Development of testing methods for new materials 
underground, particularly for assessing their 
flammability. 
5.2. Exchange of information 
The Working Party suggests that it is important for 
the Safety of Mines to have a continual exchange of 
information on fire prevention, detection, 
flammability of materials and fire fighting techniques, 
98 SECTION IV ι COMMON ACCIDENT STATISTICS 
4.1.1. At the end of this chapter there are the following 
tables : 
la and lb 
Victims of accidents by cause and site of accident 
and period of incapacity in absolute figures (a) and 
frequency rates (b). 
2a 
Victims of accidents by location and nature of injury 
for periods of incapacity exceeding 56 days and for 
fatalities in absolute figures (a). The tables of 
frequency rates, which are not very representative, are 
not included. 
Tables 1 and 2 are given by country and for the whole 
of the Community and refer to 1979· 
They are available from the Secretariat by coalfield. 
A and Β 
Frequency rates for serious injuries (A) and fatalities 
(B) for each of the countries of the Community of Six 
since 1958 and frequency rates for fatalities (B) since 
1975 and serious injuries (A) since 1977 for the 
United Kingdom. 
Group accidents by cause for the Community as a 
whole. 
D 
Summary tables for the Community of Six since 1958 
and the United Kingdom since 1973· 
99 4.1.2. It is now possible to analyse the figures on the 
basis of all categories of accidents for the Community 
of Nine for the last four years. Nevertheless, in 
order to trace the longer-term trend since 1958 or 
since 1971» certain tables still relate only to the 
Community of Six. 
4.2. Examination of statistics from 1976 to 1979 (Community 
of Nine). 
4.2.1. Frequency rate trends. 
Period of absence from work 
Year 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
4 to 20 
days 
100.94 
-•99.60 
98.97 
91.62 
21 to 51 
days 
42.10 
41.17 
39-99 
36.65 
> 56 days fatalities total 
11.74 
11.49 
11.62 
10.76 
O.3OO 
0.201 
0.248 
0.235 
I55.O7 
152.46 
150.82 
139-26 
As has originally been pointed out in 1.1.2., the trend 
between 1978 and 1979 was favourable for all categories 
of accidents. It is statistically significant for all 
categories of injuries but it is not statistically 
significant, in the mathematical sense of the term, 
for the fatalities. 
Over the four years in question the general trend 
was towards improvement, in spite of a slight non-
significant increase in serious injuries and fatalities 
between 1977 and 1978. 
4.2.2. Trend in the absolute figures. 
The total number of accidents resulting in more than 
3 days' absence from work decreased from 84 033 to 
77 856 between 1978 and 1979, the number of man-hours 
worked being practically the same. 
100 Between 1976 and 1979 the number of accidents fell by 
13 532, or 14.58 #, whereas the number of man-hours 
worked only fell by 5.18 %, 
4.2.3. Breakdown of accidents in 1979 by period of absence 
from work. 
- accidents resulting in 
between 4 and 20 days' 
absence from work 
- accidents resulting in 
between 21 and 56 days' 
absence from work 
- accidents resulting in 
more than 56 days' 
absence from work 
- fatalities 
TOTAL 
absolute 
figures 
51,042 
20,421 
5,992 
131 
77,586 
frequency 
rate 
65.79 % 
26.32 % 
7-72 % 
0.17 % 
100.00 % 
This breakdown is practically identical to that for 
the three previous years. Nevertheless, it should be 
subject to further checking since it could denote a 
change in the exact nature or in the assessment of 
the injuries as well as in the nature of the treatment 
provided.-
101 4.4. BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENTS BY MAIN CAUSES AND BY SERIOUSNESS 
(Headings I to V of table 1) 
4.4.1. Table with figures given as a percentage of the total of headings I to XII 
o 
K) 
^^-^ 
— Incapacity 
Causes ^\^^ 
I. 
II. 
III. 
IV. 
V. 
Falls of ground 
Transport and 
haulage 
Slipping,falling 
and stumbling 
Machinery, tools 
etc. 
Falling objects 
TOTAL 
4 to 
days 
% 
21.0 
9.5 
26.9 
16.2 
16.6 
90.2 
20 
t 
= 
+ 
t 
I 
f 
21 to 56 
days 
% 
18.5 
10.3 
31.7 
14.8 
17.4 
92.7 
+ 
* 
1 
4 
4 
t 
56 days 
% 
20.7 f 
15.3 | 
27.5 f 
13.0 ï 
18.4 4 
95.1 f 
fatalities 
g. 
(19.1) I 
(35.9) I 
(12.2) t 
(6.1) ♦ 
(9.9) t 
(83.3) ^ 
total 
% 
20.3 
10.2 
28.2 
15.5 
16.9 
91.2 
! 
: 
i 
i 
4 
τ 
4 
f 
Changes compared with 197 8 
Key  No change 
Increase 
Decrease 
I 
* 
Note : () means not statistically significant or random variation, in the 
mathematical sense of the term 4.4.2. Comments on the above table. 
These five causes of accidents still represent this 
year approximately 90 % (a very slight increase) of 
the total number of causes of accidents. 
The breakdown of these accidents by period of incapa-
city for all five headings shows that this proportion 
increases slightly with the seriousness of the accident 
(from 90.2 °/o for 4-20 days' absence from work to 
95.I % for more than 56 days' absence from work). 
The figures for fatalities do not lend themselves to 
a valid statistical comparison, since they are 
mathematically too random. 
A comparison of the figures for those injured with 
the same figures for 1978 shows that, of the various 
causes of accident, there has been a decreasing trend 
for falls of ground, transport and haulage and machines, 
tools and supports. On the other hand, there has been 
a distinct increase in slipping, falling and stumbling, 
and a less definite increase for falling objects. 
These comments are very similar (with a greater or 
lesser degree of distinctness) to those made in the 
previous two reports in which this kind of table was 
used. 
4.5. The general trend in safety in coalmines in the 
Community of Nine has been favorable over the years, 
without being spectacularly so. 
The increasing mechanization of coal mining, particu-
larly as regards the mechanization of support systems, 
has brought with it a decrease in accidents arising 
from falls of ground or from haulage and transport. 
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(14) It is a source of some comfort to note also that, at 
the same time, accidents caused by machines, tools and 
support systems have also declined, which is doubtless 
the consequence of the efforts that have been made to 
make equipment safer. 
4.6. Chronological trend over several years in the Community 
of Six. 
As was said earlier on, some statistics serve to 
illustrate the long-term trend for the former Community 
of Six. 
4.6.1. This has been determined for all categories of accidents 
since 1971 and is included in table E below. 
Between 1978 and 1979 the trend was favourable for 
all categories, as also for the Community of Nine, 
but was only of statistical significance in the case 
of less serious injuries. 
In the longer term, the trend for those injuries 
resulting in between 4 and 56 days' absence from work 
was favourable but with positive and negative 
fluctuations which were often significant. 
4.6.2. In the case of injuries resulting in more than 56 
days' absence from work, comparisons can be taken 
back to 1958 and the relevant data are included in the 
last column of table B. Having remained stationary 
at somewhere around a frequency rate of 13 between 
1958 and. 1967, the rate began to rise up to 1973 and 
since then has been stable at around a frequency rate 
of 16 with a low of 14.92 in 1976. 
The trend in these figures, which is only just of 
significance, does not necessarily reflect an increase 
in the number of accidents, but may simply result from 
104 progress in treating persons who otherv/ise would 
have died within eight weeks. 
4.6.3« The number of fatalities is in fact declining and the 
frequency rate has fallen by about 40 % since 1958. 
Since the variations from one year to the other are 
not of statistical significance, there is no point in 
giving details of the trend. Nevertheless this trend 
provides no evidence to undermine the comments made 
regarding injuries resulting in more than 56 days' 
absence from work. 
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Common Statistics on victims 
of accidents underground in coal mines 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS ACCORDING TO CAUSE AND SITE 
OF ACCIDENT AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
COUNTRY COMMUNITY OP THE IX 
COAL-FIELD 
(absolute figures)  YEAR 1979 
MAN-HOURS WORKED o 557.133.186 
Table 1a 
^■s. SITE OF THE ACCIDENT 
^*v Period of 
CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS \mcapä<:"y 
I. FALLS OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS 
II TRANSPORT, TOTAL 
a) Continuous Transport 
b) Discontinuous Transport 
III FALLS AND MOV EMENT OF THE VICTIM. 
TOTAL 
a) while moving about the mine 
b) in the course of other activities 
IV MACHINES, TOOLS AND SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a) Machines 
b) Tools 
c) Supports 
V FALLS OF OBJECTS 
VI EXPLOSIVES 
VII, IGNITIONS OR EXPLOSIONS 
OF FIREDAMP AND COAL DUST 
VIII, OUTBURSTS OF GAS. DE-OXYGENATION. 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU-
RAL GASES (COi, CH.. CO, H.S). 
TOTAL 
a) Outbursts of Gas 
b) De-oxygenation and Poisoning 
by natural Gases 
IX HEATINGS OR FIRES 
X INRUSHES 
XI. ELECTRICITY 
XII OTHER CAUSES 
TOTAL 
Production faces 
1 
4 to 
20 
days 
I
3) 
6484 
1144 
184 
960 
3572 
521 
3051 
3593 
517 
870 
2206 
3675 
18 
1 
1 
-
1 
1 
8 
2 
1240 
9739 
21 to 
56 
days 
I
1) 
2302 
514 
131 
383 
1994 
217 
1777 
1421 
229 
317 
875 
1601 
8 
-
1 
-
1 
-
4 
7 
346 
8198 
>56 
days 
738 
228 
91 
137 
459 
50 
409 
397 
103 
82 
212 
498 
1 
1 
-
-
-
-
1 
1 
75 
2399 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
10 
10 
5 
5 
4 
0 
4 
4 
1 
0 
3 
4 
0 
3 
-
-
-
-
0 
0 
4 
39 
total 
9534 
1896 
411 
1485 
6029 
788 
5241 
5415 
850 
1269 
3296 
¡778 
27 
5 
2 
-
2 
1 
13 
10 
1665 
30375 
Headings excluding 
shafts and at.pl.-plta 
2 
4 to 
20 
days 
(■> 
3073 
566 
99 
467 
2456 
j n 
2082 
1915 
195 
615 
1105 
1862 
5 
1 
-
-
-
-
-
5 
710 
1059: 
21 to 
se 
daya 
1096 
253 
61 
192 
1236 
139 
1097 
669 
97 
196 
376 
691 
1 
-
-
-
-
-
-
■> 
167 
411! 
>5β 
daya 
(') 
399 
97 
26 
71 
339 
37 
302 
193 
64 
55 
74 
235 
1 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
33 
1297 
Fatal 
acci-
denta 
13 
7 
2 
5 
2 
0 
2 
3 
2 
0 
1 
4 
0 
4 
-
-
-
-
-
. 
0 
33 
total 
4581 
923 
188 
735 
4033 
550 
3483 
2780 
358 
866 
1556 
2792 
7 
5 
-
-
-
-
-
7 
910 
16038 
Shaft, and atapla-plta 
3 
4 to 
20 
days 
(■) 
49 
119 
2 
117 
264 
31 
233 
91 
20 
42 
29 
197 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
43 
763 
21to 
56 
daya 
I") 
10 
64 
3 
61 
155 
10 
145 
34 
11 
20 
3 
82 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1 
17 
363 
day! 
(■) 
4 
51 
2 
49 
59 
7 
52 
8 
3 
3 
2 
27 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
11 
160 
Fatal 
acci-
dent* 
-
3 
0 
3 
6 
0 
6 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
11 
total 
63 
237 
7 
230 
484 
48 
436 
133 
34 
65 
34 
308 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1 
71 
1297 
Oth.*l«c 
4 
4 to 
20 
day. 
(·) 
not 
3027 
241 
2786 
7446 
3053 
4393 
2655 
246 
898 
1511 
2729 
24 
0 
5 
-
5 
2 
1 
10 
2948 
19947 
21 to 
56 
day. 
(') 
380 
126( 
103 
days 
(■) 
102 
543 
67 
1161476 
3081 
108: 
2005 
89! 
108 
32: 
794 
262 
532 
182 
42 
52 
46( 88 
1190 
7 
0 
1 
0 
1 
2 
2 
13 
903 
7745 
344 
3 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
2 
164 
2136 
Fatal 
acci-
denta 
2 
27 
7 
20 
4 
-
4 
1 
1 
0 
0 
3 
0 
10 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
48 
toui 
1584 
4863 
418 
4445 
11330 
4396 
6934 
3733 
397 
1271 
2065 
4266 
34 
11 
6 
-
6 
4 
4 
25 
4016 
2987Í 
4 to 
äo 
days 
(·) 
10706 
4856 
526 
4330 
13738 
3979 
9759 
8254 
978 
2425 
4851 
8463 
47 
2 
6 
0 
6 
3 
9 
17 
4941 
51042 
Total of 
accidwit. underground 
5 
21 to 
50 
daya 
(•1 
3788 
2097 
298 
1799 
6471 
1447 
5024 
3019 
445 
854 
1720 
3564 
16 
0 
2 
0 
2 
2 
6 
23 
1433 
20421 
>5β 
daya 
1243 
919 
186 
733 
1651 
356 
1295 
780 
212 
192 
376 
1104 
5 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
3 
283 
5992 
Fatal 
acci-
denta 
25 
47 
14 
33 
16 
0 
16 
8 
4 
0 
4 
13 
0 
17 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5 
131 
total 
15762 
7919 
1024 
6895 
21876 
5782 
16094 
12061 
1639 
3471 
6951 
13144 
68 
21 
8 
0 
8 
5 
17 
43 
6662 
77586 
Group 
accidents f
1) 
β 
56 
days 
("1 
0 
2 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
5 
17 
total 
5 
20 
'I Number of hours worked by pil staff anel employ··« of contractor firms who belong 
■l Accidents involving more than live casualties (I e who either died or were unable 
Ji Calendar days 
lo a miners' soda' Insurance sci 
work underground for at least eight weeks) o 
oc 
SAFETY AND HEALTH COMMISSION 
FOR THE MINING 
AND OTHER EXTRACTIVE IWXJ3TRIES 
Common Statistics on victims 
ot accidents underground in coal mines 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS ACCORDINO TO CAUSE AND SITE 
OF ACCIDENT ANO PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
COUNTRY COMMUNITY OP THE IX 
(frequency retes)  YEAR 1979 
MAN-HOURS WORKED o 557.133.186 
^s. SITE OF THE ACCIDENT 
\. Period of 
CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS ^i™·!»«'* 
I. FALLS OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS 
II TRANSPORT, TOTAL 
a) Continuous Transport 
b) Discontinuous Transport 
III FALLS AND MOV EMENT OF THE VICTIM. 
TOTAL 
a) while moving about the mine 
b) in the course of other activities 
IV. MACHINES. TOOLS AND SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a) Machines 
b) Tools 
c)Suppo;;s 
V.FALLS OF OBJECTS 
VI. EXPLOSIVES 
VII. IGNITIONS OR EXPLOSIONS 
OF FIREDAMP AND COAL DUST 
VIII OUTBURSTS OF GAS. DE-OXYGENATION. 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU­
RAL GASES (COi, CH.. CO, HiS). 
TOTAL 
a) Outbursts of Gas 
b) De-oxygenation and Poisoning 
by natural Gases 
IX. HEATINGS OR FIRES 
X. INRUSHES 
XI. ELECTRICITY 
XII. OTHER CAUSES 
TOTAL 
υυί VL-l-ltL υ 
Production face« 
1 
4 to 
20 
days 
(') 
11.64 
2,05 
0,33 
1,72 
6,41 
O.93 
5,48 
6,45 
0,93 
1,5« 
3,96 
6,60 
0,03 
0,00 
0,00 
0 
3,00 
3,00 
0,01 
0.00 
2,23 
35.42 
21 to 
56 
days 
m 
4. 13 
0,92 
0,24 
0,69 
3,58 
0,39 
3, 19 
2,55 
0,41 
0,57 
1·, 57 
2,87 
0,01 
0 
0,0( 
0 
0,00 
0 
0,01 
S.5. 
0, 62 
H.T
1 
>56 
days 
«') 
M
2 
0,41 
0, 16 
0, 25 
0,82 
0,09 
0,73 
0, 71 
0, 18 
0, 15 
0,38 
0,89 
0,00 
0,00 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0,00 
9.og 
0,13 
4,31 
Fatal 
acci­
dents 
0.02 
0,02 
0,01 
0,01 
0,01 
0 
0,01 
0,01 
0,00 
0 
0,01 
0,01 
0 
0,01 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
ï 
0,01 
0.07 
total 
17.11 
3,4C 
0,74 
2,66 
10,8! 
1,41 
9,41 
9,72 
1,53 
2,28 
5,91 
10,37 
0,05 
0,01 
0,00 
0 
1,00 
),00 
),02 
?>°2 
29,91 
54.5) 
Heading, excluding 
shaft* end stwla-plta 
2 
4 to 
20 
days 
(■) 
5,51 
1,02 
0, 18 
0,84 
4,41 
0,67 
3,74 
3,44 
0, 35 
1, 10 
1,98 
3, 34 
0,01 
0,00 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Î.9!. 
1,27 
19,01 
21 to 
56 
days 
m 
M
7 
0,45 
0,11 
0,34 
2,22 
0,25 
1.97 
1,20 
0, 17 
0,35 
0, 67 
1,24 
0,00 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.00 
0, 3( 
7,38 
>56 
daya 
m 
0,72 
0, 17 
0,05 
0,13 
0,61 
0,07 
0,54 
0,35 
0, 11 
0, 10 
0, 13 
0,42 
0,00 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0,06 
2,33 
F«H 
acci-
ätna 
0.02 
0,01 
0,00 
0,01 
0,00 
0 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0 
0,00 
ο,βο 
0 
0,00 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0,06 
total 
8.22 
1,66 
0,34 
1,32 
7,24 
0,99 
6,25 
4,99 
0,64 
1,55 
2,79 
5,01 
0,01 
0,01 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.01 
1,63 
28,78 
Shaft· and stipl*-ptt> 
3 
4 to 
20 
day» 
m 
°Λ22 
0,21 
0,00 
0,21 
0,47 
0,06 
0,42 
0, 16 
0,04 
0,08 
0,05 
0.35 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0,08 
Λ" 
21 to 
56 
days 
m 
I 
0, 02) 
O.irj 
0, 0() 
0,11 
0, 2p 
J 
0,(32 
0,2fe 
i 
0, ol 
I 
0,0 
1 
0,0* 
0,0b 
0.15 
0 ! 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0,00 
0,03 
0,6$ 
1 
>56 
days 
m 
0,01 
0,09 
0,00 
0.09 
0,11 
0,01 
0,09 
0,01 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,05 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3.02 
0,29 
Fatal 
acci-
dent« 
0 
0,00 
0 
3,00 
0,01 
0 
0,01 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0,00 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
() 
9,°2 
0,29 
total 
0, 11 
0,43 
0,01 
0,41 
0,87 
0,09 
0,78 
0, 24 
0,06 
0,12 
0,06 
0,55 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
(1,00 
0.13 
2,33 
OtrW placa« 
4. 
4 tO 
20 
day. 
m 
lj97 
5.43 
0,43 
5,00 
13,36 
5,48 
7,89 
4,77 
0,44 
1,61 
2,71 
4,90 
0,04 
0 
0,01 
0 
0,01 
0,00 
0,00 
,ϋΛί 
5.29 
35,80 
21 to 
56 
daya 
η 
0,68 
2,27 
0,18 
2.09 
5,54 
1,94 
3,60 
1,61 
0, 19 
0,58 
0,84 
2.14 
0,01 
0 
3,00 
0 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
Q· 92 
1,62 
13,90 
>S6 
daya 
m 
0, 18 
0,97 
0, 12 
0,85 
1,43 
0,47 
0,95 
0,33 
0,08 
0,09 
0,16 
0,62 
0,00 
0,00 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0,00 
0,00 
0,29 
3,83 
Fatal 
aocl-
dwit» 
0,00 
0,04 
0,07 
0,03 
0,00 
0 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0 
0 
0,00 
0 
0,01 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0,00 
0,08 
toai 
2,84 
8,72 
0,75 
7,97 
20,33 
7,89 
12,44 
6,70 
0,71 
2,28 
3,70 
7,65 
0,06 
0,01 
0,01 
0 
0,01 
0,00 
0,00 
0.04 
7,20 
53,62 
4 to 
20 
day· 
η 
19,22 
8,72 
0,94 
7,77 
24, 66 
7,14 
17,52 
14,82 
1,76 
4,35 
8,71 
15, 19 
0,08 
0,00 
0,01 
0 
0,01 
0,01 
0,02 
0.03 
8,87 
91,62 
Total of 
accidenta undtvg round 
5 
21 to 
56 
daya 
6,80 
3,76 
0,53 
3,23 
11,61 
2,60 
9,02 
5,42 
0,80 
1,53 
3,09 
6,40 
0,03 
0 
0,00 
0 
0,00 
0,00 
0,01 
0,04 
2,57 
36,65 
>56 
daya 
m 
2, 23 
1,65 
0,33 
1,32 
2,96 
0,64 
2, 32 
1,40 
0, 38 
0, 34 
0, 67 
1,98 
0,01 
0,00 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0,00 
0,01 
0,51 
10, 76 
Fatal 
acci­
dents 
0,04 
0,08 
0,03 
0,06 
0,03 
0,00 
0,03 
0,01 
0,01 
0 
0,01 
0,02 
0 
0,03 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0,01 
0, 24 
total 
28,29 
14,21 
1,84 
12,38 
39,27 
10,38 
28,89 
21,65 
2,94 
6,23 
12,48 
23,59 
0, 12 
0,04 
0,01 
0 
0,01 
0,01 
0,03 
0,08 
11,96 
139,26 
Group 
accidents I
1) 
6 
56 
days 
0 
Fatal 
acci­
dents 
0,01 
total 
0.01 
(' ) Number oi houre worked by pit »teff and employ··· r ' .on tract or firma who belong to ■ min·»·»' social Insurance scheme 
('I Accidents involving more than five casualties (I.e. who either died or were unable to mum· work underground tor at Mwat tight 
I
1) Calendar daya. Explanatory notes - Tables 1 
GEHEUL DEFINITIONS 
Bodily injury resulting from a sudden and abnormal external cause in the cours« of work. 
The Mines Safety and Health Commission't statistics should only cover victims of accidents 
underground, including accidenta which occur when een enter and leave the cages and while 
the cages are in notion. 
2. Fatal accident 
An accident causing th« death of the vietin within 56 days following the accident. Victim 
dying »ore than 56 after th· day of the accident should not be included in the fatal acci-
dent category but in that of accidents resulting in incapacity involving an absence fro« 
work of nor· than 56 days. 
3. Persons covered by the statistics 
Pit staff and employees of contractor fir»· who belong to a «liners' social security .have. 
The statistics count victim and not accidents, everyone who is the vietisi of an accident 
while actually underground as well as during descent and ascent should be included. Vieti«· 
can therefor· only b« miners, supervisors, engineers or staff belonging to contractor firms. 
'. Shifts and number of hours worked 
Shifts and number of hours worked by th« persons on the books of the mine and other staff 
belonging to a miners' social inaurane· achem«; account should be taken both of extra shifts 
and overtime. 
The period of reference adopted is the period of actual exposure to riek; one therefore 
counts extra shifts and overtime in terms of time actually worked and not of number of 
hours paid. 
5. Accidents rates 
Number of accidenta par million hours worked. 
Th· frequency rataa are arrived at by dividing the number of accidenta of a given, category 
by th« total number of hours spent on all types of work underground. 
CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS 
I. Fella of Ground and Bocks 
This category of accidents covers falla of atona or coal frog its natural situation 
It does not cover accidente causad by falls of ground resulting from on· of th· factors 
included under another category, for example th« us* of explosives, explosion of firedamp 
or dust, or an outburst. Accidents causad by fall· of atone in a caved weate should be in-
cluded in this category; on the other hand, accidenta during the stowing of vaate should 
b« classed in category 5 "Falls of Objects". Accidents caused by materiale continuing to 
move after falling from their natural position ara included under category I "Falls of 
ground and rocks", except where it ia a case of meteríais aet in motion by som· external 
cause efter first coming to rest. 
II. Transport 
Accidents caused by any means of trensport whether stationary or in motion, used to carry 
men or objects at the face, in other workings. In roadways, in shafts, staple pits, etc., 
including eccidents caused by th« angin*· providing motive pover for traneport. This cate-
gory includes, for example, accident· caused by lumps of coal falling from a conveyor bait 
or blocks of wood from a tub loaded with timber, and ev«n those caused when lumps of coal 
ara projected during their descant down a fixed chut«. An accident cauaed by the gear wheels 
or the driving mechanism of a transport system should also be included in category II ''Trans-
port". 
Electrocution causad by a trolley wire should be included in category XI "Electricity". 
a) Continuous Transport 
Transport equipment which can receive products along the whole of it· length and maintain 
a continuous flow. 
b) Discontinuous transport 
All other maan· of transport. 
This category should include accident· causad particularly by skip·, cages, kibble·, aa 
well as accident· involving man or object· falling from the·· cage·, «kips or kibbles, rope 
haulages, locomotives, monorail·, decking ram« and Other similar devices. 
III. Fall· and movement of the victim 
a) While moving about the mine 
Fall· of men into · shaft or staple pit, falla In general, stumbles, alipa, knocks and bumps, 
aprala· of limbs, ate., whatever the cause, should be Included, at long a· th« Vatic cause 
of th· accldant ia th« victim'· movement through the mine in the cour·· of or at the place 
of vork and ao maana of transport ia involved; the lattar should b« Included in category 11 
"Tranaport" or III b "Fall· of victim during other activities" respectively. 
b) In the cour·· of other activities 
Fall· of man into a shaft or staple pit, falls in general, «tumbles, slips, knock· and bumps, 
sprain· of lima, ate., a· long as the fall was cauaed basically by some particular activity 
■nd not by the movemaat of the victim about the mine, which I» covered in III a. 
Thi· category should only Include accident· cauaed by the victim falling during hie actual 
work and not during the cour·· of moving about th« min« aa under*category III a Tall· of 
victim while moving about the min«". 
IV. Kachine», tool· and supports 
a) Machines 
Accident· caused by engin·· powering a means of transport should be included In category II 
"Transport". Category IV cover· accident· occurring during th« starting up and running of 
other machina·. 
Accldant· caused by machin·· falling while being moved will be included in category V "Falla 
of objects". 
b) Tools 
Category IV covers accidents caused by th. use of tool, .uch a. portable drills, drill· on 
»lad·, band .aw., pneumatic pick., lifting g.ar. puah«., etc. Accldant. eau— by falling 
tool· should be put into category V "Fall· of object·". 
c) Support· 
With regard to accident, occurring during th. handling of .upport. only those '«"Wing 
th. s.tílng up or removal of thi. equlp-ant should be included In eatagory XV. If a auport 
or on. of it. component, fall, during tran.port. the aeeid.nt should be included In cate-
gory V "Fall· of objects". 
109 Category IV only covers accldant. ariaing from th· use and movement of machine., tool, and 
equipment; it ia emphasised la th« case of supports that only accident· occurring during 
the setting up and removal of this equipment should be included in this category. 
V. Fall« of object· 
Accidents involving the falling or di.lodging of excavated material, and of object, such aa 
fram., timber, tool., prop., pipe·, materiali, etc. 
Thi. category include, not only accident, caused directly by fall, of excavating material 
or object., but alio tho.e caused by object, falling while being handled. 
VI. Explosive. 
Accidant. occurring during th« tranaport or handling of explosives, th« charging of shot-
holes, accidental or prämatur« firing of shots, inadéquat· protection of personnel, unfirad 
explosive, being hit by picks or drills, mis-fires, long firas, residues and poisoning by 
fumas from explosivas. 
Uhare the use of explosivas Mts off an explosion of fire-damp or dust or even a heating 
or a fire, the accidant should be Included in category VII or IX respectively. 
VII. Ignitions or explosions of firedamp and coal dust 
This includes poisoning or suffocation by the gaaas so produced. Aa explosion of firsdamp 
or coal dust brought about by th« us· of electricity should be classified under category 
VII. A. a general rula, if th« causes of an accident include the ignition or explosion or 
firedamp or dust. It should alvays ba Included Ín category VII. 
VIII. Outburst· of gas - Daoxygenation, suffocation or poisoning by natural gases (CO2, 
CHA, CO, Η2Ι) 
a) Outbursts of gas 
Accidents causad by ejected mataríais of roof fall, caused by sudden outbursts of gas. In 
accordance with the rula sat out for category VII, If the outburst is followed by an explo-
sion of firedamp, any accidents caused thereby should be included in category«VII "Ignitions 
or explosions of firedamp or explosiona of coal dust**. 
b) Dfloxygenation *ed poisoning by natural gases (C02, CH4 ,C0, B-S) 
This includes accidents caused by lack of oxygen, by suffocation (CHA, C02) and by poiaoning 
(CO, H,S). If suffocation or poisoning Is brought about by gas produced by explosives or by 
an explosion of firedamp or coal dust, or ava« by a heating or fire, the accidant ahould ba 
clas.iflad under those categories. If suffocation or poisoning is caused by exhaust fumas 
from diesel engines, tbs accidents should be included in category IV, "Explosivas". 
IX. Hastings or fires 
This includes poisoning or suffocation by the gasas produced, injuriée from burns, roof 
falls, falls of objects, «te. folioving a heating or fire In the mina. A fire following an 
explosion of firedamp or coal dust should ba this category. 
In generel, if the eccldent is due to several combined causes including a heating or e fire, 
it should slways b« included In category IX "Heatings or fires" unless one of the causae Is 
the ignition or explosion of firedamp or coal dust; in this last ess« the accident would 
ba included in category VII. 
X. Inrush«s 
Accidant« occurring when old workings are broken into or when dead ground It encountered. 
Injurie· from projected material, falls of objects, fall· of ground drowning, etc. 
XI. Electricity 
Accidents caused by electricity - burn*, shocks, electrocution. If electricity causes the 
accidental firing of explosivaa, an explosion of flredarap or coal dust or a heating or a 
fire, the resulting accident ahould be include« in those categories in the following order 
of priority : 
1. Explosion of firedamp or dust 
2. A heating or fire 
3. Explosives 
XII. Other causes 
This category covers accidents which cannot be classified under categories I to XI, that 
is to say, accidents of which it is not possibile .to «atablish the exact cauaa. This ca-
tegory may also ba u.ad to record accident, covered by compre..ed air. 
SITE OF THE ACCIDENT 
Thi. mean, th· placa where the victim va. at th« time of the accident, which may ba diffe-
rent from the victim', normal place of work. 
1. Production face. 
Thi. compri·.· the working face including th* part between the face or ataple hoi« and th» 
stowed or cavad vaste but doa. not includa roads of any kind except dummy roads. 
2. Headings excluding shafts and staple pits 
Thi· ·1·ο cover· the area where loading, timbering and steelvork are carried out immediate-
ly behind the face. In the casa of »lusher packing the curring area extends up to and in-
cluding the lin« of props. 
Development heading· ahould ba considered ·■ drift·. 
3. Shaft« and «tapie pif 
This also cover« the immediate approach to in««t· ••pecially where min* car· and «tor*· are 
loaded and unloaded from the cage«. 
U. Other place· 
Thl. heeding cover« all the victim» of accident, not included under the three preceding 
heading.. 
PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
Accident« should b. broken dovn aa follows according to period, of incapacity : 
- Accident, involving an absence of between ». and 20 calendar day· 
- Accident, involving an abcanc. of between 21 and 56 calendar days 
- Accidents involving an absence of more than 56 calendar day· 
- Fatal accident·. 
Th« day of the accident doe· not count. The number of days of incapacity to ba taken into 
consideration ia defined by th. affective ab.enc. of the miner from vork. 
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COAL-FIELD 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF VICTIM8 ACCORDING TO LOCATION 
AND NATURE OF INJURY AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
(absolute figures) 
URE OF THE INJURY 
PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
Amputations 
and 
enucleations 
>5β 
days 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
Fractures 
with or without 
dislocation 
2 
>5β 
days 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
YEAH 1979 iììì'lìì'l^ without 
MAN-HOURS WORKED o {533.415.690 ""Belgium 
Lunations. 
twist and 
apralnt 
3 
>5β 
days 
(») 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
Co neuesten 
and Inter-
nal Injury 
>tt 
days 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
Open wounds 
contusion 
and muscular 
abrasion« 
S 
>M 
daya 
Fatal 
acci-
denti 
Bumsand 
harmful effect* 
of electricity 
and radiation 
β 
>S6 
dayi 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
Poisoning 
and 
suffocation 
7 
deys 
ÍS) 
Fatal 
acci-
Multiple Injuriée 
ofthoeenot 
specified ( «j 
8 
>M 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
(6) (6) (jj (8) 
4M 
20 
days 
21 to 
56 
daya 
>sa  Fatal 
■eel-
danta 
LOCATION OF THE INJURY 
I Head and neck  73  24  97  13  31  34  170  174  3924  1102  290  36 
80  80  17  17  2154  254  109 
192  205  260  260  21  27  222  226  10  7806  3148  703  27 
IV Upper limbs 
(excluding the hands)  293  294  53  53  227  228  4755  1573  586 
102  102  882  882  33  688  688  11496  7272 1722 
VI Lower limbs 
(excluding leet) I'  586  590  322  547  547  8096  3227  1478 
15  15  424  424  92  92  289  289  3596  1999  827 
VIII Multiple locstions 
71  14  85  39  47  13  18  145  13  2147  842  269  38 
IX Noi specified  21  28  201  70  23 
135  137 2521  56  811  820  66  14  80  2368  1<  2384  24  24  67  32  109  44175  19487  5993  131 
' ι Numb·» ol hour« worked by pll ttaff and employe·· of contractor firm· who belong to a 
Ί >ncluO<ng complication· 
Ί The mould·*· and the wrut· are included under upp·, umto 
miner'· aoclal insurance achem«.  and the ankle· era included under .Lower limb·" 
ear«  (7} Coemunity of th« IX Explanatory notes - Tables 2 
GENERAL DEFINITIONS 
1. Accident 
Bodily injury resulting from a audden and abnormal external cause in the course of work. 
The Mine Safety and Health Commission's statistics should only cover victims of accidenta 
underground, including accidents which occur when men enter and leave the cages and while 
the cages are in motion. 
2. Fatal accident 
An accident cauaing the death of the victim witnin 56 days following the accident. Victims 
dying more than 56 days after the day of the accident should not be included in the fatal 
accidents category but in that of accidents resulting in incapacity involving an absence 
from work of more than 56 days. 
3, Persons covered by the statistics 
Fit staff and employees of contractor firms who belong to a miner's social security scheme. 
The statistics count victims and not accidents; everyone who is the victim of an accident 
while actually underground as well as during descent and ascent should be included. Victims 
can therefore only be miners, supervisors, engineers or staff belonging to contractor firms. 
U. Shifts and number of hours worked 
Shifts and number of hours worked by the persons on the books of the mine and other staff 
belonging to a miners' social insurance scheme; account should be taken both of extra shifts 
and overtime. 
The period of reference adopted is the period of actual exposure to risk; extra shifts and 
overtime must therefor be counted in terms of time actually worked and not of number of 
hours paid. 
5. Accident rates 
Number of accidents per million hours worked. 
The frequency rates are arrived at by dividing the number of accidents of a given category 
by the total number of hours spent on all types of work underground. 
9. Location of the injury 
When an accident has resulted in multiple injuries to different parts of the body and one 
of the injuries is clearly mora serious than the others, this accident should be classified 
in the group relating to the part of the body most seriously injured; for example, α frac­
ture of the leg, together with grazing of a hand, should be classified in category VI "Lower 
limbs" and not in category V "Hands". 
I. Head and neck 
Covers in particular the skull, the scalp, brain injuries, the ears, the mouth (including 
the lips, teeth and tongue), the note, the face, the neck but not the eyes which are in­
cluded in category II. 
II. Eyes 
Also covers the eye socket and the optic nerve. 
III. Trunk 
Covers the back (vertebrae and adjacent muscles, the spinal marrow), the thorax (ribs, 
sternum, bronchi, lungs), the abdomen (including internal organs, kidneys, liver, spleen), 
the abdomen and the genital organs. 
The shoulders and wrists are regarded as part of the upper limbs (category IV) and not 
of the trunk or hands (category V). 
The hips and the ankles are regarded as part of the lower limbs (category VI) and not 
as part of the trunk or feet (category VII). 
IV. Upper limbs (excluding the hands) 
This includes injuries to the shoulders, including the collar bone and shoulder blades, 
injuries to the arms, elbows, forearms and wrists. 
V. Hands 
The wrists are not regarded as part of the hands but of the upper limbs (category IV). 
VI. Lower limbs (excluding feet) 
This includes the hips, thighs, knees, legs and ankles. 
VII. Feet 
The ankles are not regarded as part of the feet but of the lower limbs (category VI). 
VIII. Multiple locations 
This group, covering multiple locations, should only be used when the victim has suffered 
several injuries to different parts of his body, none of which is clearly more serious than 
the others. 
112 The category may cover injurie· to the head and trunk, the head and one or more limb·, the 
trunk and one or more limb· or an upper and a lower limb. 
IX. Not »pecified 
This group »hould only be u»ed when there i» no evidence of the exact location of the injury. 
10. Natur« of the injury 
When an accident has resulted in »everat injurie» to different part· of the body and one 
of them is clearly more serious than the others, the accident «hould be cla»»ified in the 
group relating to the most aerious injury. 
1. Amputations and enucleations 
This includes traumatic avulsion of the eye. 
2. Fractures with or without dislocation 
This includes simple fractures; fractures with injurie« to the »oft part« of the body, 
closed or compound fracture»; fracture« with internal or nerve damage, fractures with luxa-
tions, contusions and crushings. 
3. Luxations, twists and sprains 
LUXATIONS 
This covers minor luxations and dislocation», traumatic lumbago, lumbago »ciática cauaed 
by strain; it does not include luxations with fracture covered by category 2. 
TWISTS AND SPRAINS 
This covers ruptures, torn and lacerated muscles, tendons, ligaments and joint« aa well aa 
hernia due to strain and slipped discs, except when they are associated with open wound«. 
4. Concussion and internal injury 
This category includes internal bruising, internal bleeding, internal laceration« and rup-
tures except where associated with fractures. 
It does not include internal injuries accompanied by fractures which are covered by cate-
gory 2. 
5. Open wounds, contusions and muscular abrasions 
This covers lacerations, flesh wounds, cuts, contusions, scalp wounda, los« of a nail or 
an ear, wounds with nerve injuries, haemarthosis, haematoma and bruises, contusions and 
bruises with superficial wounds. It does not include traumatic amputation, enucleations 
or avulsion of an eye, which are covered by category I, compound fractures, contusions and 
crushings accompanying a fracture which are covered by category 2, concussion covered by 4, 
burns with wounds covered by ft. 
6. Burns and harmful effects of clectrictiv and radiation 
Covers burns from fire, boiling liquid, friction, chemical substances (external burns oMy), 
burns with wounds, electrocution, electric shock and burns caused by electricity, the ef-
fect of X-rays, radioactive substances, ultra violet rays and ionizing radiation. 
It does not cover burns caused by the absorption of a corrosive or caustic substance which 
are classified in category 7. 
7. Poisoning and suffocation 
This category covers the effects of the injection, ingestion, absorption or inhalation of 
toxic, corrosive or caustic substances. 
Asphyxiation or suffocation by compression or roof fall; asphyxiation due to the suppression 
or reduction of oxygen in the atmosphere, the entry of a foreign bodies into the respiratory 
system, to carbon monoxide or other toxic gases. 
8. Multiple injuries or those not specified (including complications) 
This category includes those cases in which the victim has suffered several injuries of dif-
ferent types, none of which is clearly more serious than the others, and those which are 
not covered in any other category. 
It also covers the various early complications of injuries and pathological reactions, which, 
however, should only be classified in this group when the nature of the original injury is 
not known. 
PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
Accidents should be broken down according to two periods of incapacity : 
- accidents involving an absence of more than 56 calendar days 
- fatal accidents. 
The day of the accident does not count. The number of days of incapacity to be taken into 
consideration is defined by the effective absence of the miner from work. 
113 Regarding table 2, which gives the breakdown of 
accident victims according to the location and nature 
of the injury and the period of absence from work, it 
must first of all be pointed out that not all the Mem-
ber States were able to provide all the necessary fi-
gures for the compilation of a properly harmonised 
table for the whole Community. The United Kingdom 
and Federal Republic of Germany give the total figure 
for injuries resulting in more than four days' absence 
according to the nature of the injury, which is not the 
case for France and Belgium. As regards the total, 
Belgium does not give the total number of injuries 
resulting in between four and 56 days
1 absence from 
work; as Belgium accounts for only 4.25 % of total 
man-hours worked, the table of injuries resulting in 
less than 56 days' absence from work only covers the 
other Member States of the Community. 
No table of frequency rates was compiled in view of the 
lack of harmonization from country to country and the 
fact that these figures are of little statistical 
significance. The following conclusions may however 
be validly drawn from these figures. 
No matter what the seriousness of the injuries, 
accidents to hands are the most frequent (29 %) followed 
by accidents to the lower limbs (18 %) and accidents 
to the body (17 %), though we must nevertheless note 
that accidents to the feet resulting in absence from 
work of more than 56 days are slightly more frequent 
than similar accidents to the body. 
As regards the other locations of the injuries, there 
is no longer any harmonization of injuries according 
to the degree of seriousness which could be used as a 
basis for olassifying them all under the heading 
"location of injury". In the case of fatalities, mul-
114 tiple injury locations (38), to which multiple 
unspecified lesions have been added (21), represent 
a total of 45 fo of all fatalities. 
Accidents to the head (36), and in particular fractures 
(24), account for 27 % of fatalities; accidents to 
the body account for 21 °/o. 
115 Comparath'e table of number of persons incapacitated 
by underground accidents for eight weeks or longer 
years 1958 -1979 per '000,000 man-hours 
(frequency) 
COMMUNITY
 V
1 (
IXsinceI"7) 
1) Falls of ground 
2) Haulage and transport 
3) Movement of personnel 
4) Machinery, handling of tools and 
supports 
5) Falling objects 
6) Explosives 
7) Explosions of firedamp or 
coal dust 
8) Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases 
9) Underground combustion and fires 
10) Inrushes of water 
11) Electricity 
12) Other causes 
TOTAL 
1958 
4,846 
2,602 
2,003 
1,098 
1,962 
0,023 
0,017 
0,002 
-
0,002 
0,010 
0,985 
13,551 
1959 
4,490 
2.347 
1,823 
1,064 
2,161 
'0,020 
0,030 
-
-
_ 
0,008 
1,012 
12,954 
1960 
4,571 
2,310 
2,185 
1,264 
2,105 
0,017 
0,010 
-
0,002 
o.oio 
0,513 
12,986 
1961 
4,434 
2,371 
2,185 
1,423 
2,353 
0,012 
0,001 
-
0,001 
_ 
0,018 
0,428 
13,227 
1962 
4,387 
2,521 
2,282 
1,712 
2,375 
0,018 
0,071 
-
-
0,001 
0,007 
0,404 
13,781 
1963 
4,337 
2,520 
2,261 
1,818 
2,406 
0,010 
0,006 
-
-
0,002 
0,012 
0,390 
13,781 
1964 
4,509 
2,346 
2,326 
1,848 
2,442 
0,011 
0,001 
-
. 
0,003 
0,008 
0,364 
13,861 
1965 
4,215 
2,416 
2,354 
1,773 
2,415 
0,013 
0,011 
0,002 
0,002 
-
0,006 
0,289 
13,506 
1966 
4,186 
2,173 
2,320 
1,815 
2,362 
0,007 
0,016 
0,001 
-
0,001 
0,007 
0,354 
13,242 
1967 
4,060 
2,037 
2,354 
1,790 
2,638 
0,019 
-
0,003 
. 
-
0,005 
0,337 
13,246 
1968 
4,261 
2,139 
2,795 
1,945 
2,858 
0,015 
0,002 
-
0,002 
0,002 
0,010 
0,341 
14,370 
1969 
4,492 
2,118 
3,023 
1,865 
3,185 
0,019 
0,004 
-
-
-
0,021 
0,333 
15,160 
1970 
4,135 
2,016 
3,084 
2,011 
3,308 
0,011 
0,025 
-
-
0,009 
0,014 
0,434 
15,047 
1971 
4,109 
1,953 
3,117 
1,876 
3,506 
0,002 
0,007 
-
-
0,002 
0,007 
0,509 
15,088 
1972 
4,08 
1,93 
3,47 
1.75 
3,62 
0,008 
-
-
-
0,003 
0,008 
0,73 
15,60 
1973 
4,29 
2,11 
3,88 
2,01 
3,63 
-
-
-
0,003 
0,009 
0,006 
0,84 
16,77 
1974 
4.15 
1,91 
3,89 
1,98 
3,62 
0,01 
0,02 
-
0,01 
-
0,01 
0,53 
16,12 
1975 
3,61 
2,28 
3,38 
2,29 
3,08 
0,006 
-
.0,003 
0,003 
0,16 
0,37 
15,05 
1976 
3,« 
2,14 
3,62 
2,15 
3,08 
0,01 
-
0,003 
0,01 
0,40 
14,97 
1977 
2,31 
1,β2 
3,05 
1,67 
1.93 
0,01 
-
. 
0,70 
11.49 
1978 
2,36 
1,83 
3,12 
1,62 
2, M 
0.01 
0,01 
0,01 
-
-
0,01 
0,62 
11,62 
1979 
2,23 
1,65 
2,96 
l,4o 
1,98 
o,ol 
ο,οο 
-
-
— 
ο,οΐ 
o,53 
lo, 76 Underground accident·, resulting in death within eight )veeks 
year 195S-1979 
per '000.000 man-hours 
(frequency! 
COMMUNITY VI (IX since 1977) 
1) Falls of ground 
2) Haulage and traneport 
3) Movement of personnel 
4) Machinery, handling of tools and 
supports 
5) Falling objects 
6) Explosives 
7) Explosions of firedamp or 
coal dust 
8) Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gaees 
9) Underground combustion and fires 
10) Inrushes of water 
11) Electricity 
12) Other causes 
TOTAL 
1958 
0,253 
0,147 
0,057 
0,011 
0,045 
0,009 
0,032 
0,016 
-
0,002 
0,016 
0,023 
0,610 
1959 
0,242 
0,141 
0,063 
0,028 
0,027 
0,010 
0,036 
0,010 
0,003 
0,002 
0,007 
0,021 
0,590 
I960 
0,235 
0,146 
0,047 
0,012 
0,024 
0,002 
0,002 
0,006 
-
ο,οοι 
0,007 
0,024 
0,507 
1961 
0,217 
0,168 
0,056 
0,021 
0,041 
-
_ 
0,003 
ο,οοι 
0,006 
0,004 
0,029 
0,546 
1962 
0,234 
0,124 
0,045 
0,037 
0,062 
0,002 
0,375 
0,007 
-
0,005 
0,008 
0,032 
0,932 
1963 
0,217 
0,167 
0,060 
0,013 
0,046 
0,001 
0,001 
0,005 
0,003 
0,005 
0,008 
0,021 
0,547 
1964 
0,175 
0,178 
0,045 
0,030 
0,037 
0,002 
0,001 
0,002 
0,005 
-
0,003 
0,014 
0,492 
1965 
0,177 
0,149 
0,051 
0,024 
0,037 
0,002 
0,053 
0,006 
0,005 
0,001 
0,004 
0,013 
0,522 
1966 
0,208 
0,160 
0,060 
0,023 
0,030 
0,001 
0,030 
0,004 
-
-
0,003 
0,017 
0,536 
1967 
0,192 
0,128 
0,044 
0,024 
0,036 
0,002 
_ 
0,012 
-
0,002 
0,004 
0,015 
0,457 
1968 1969 
0,160 
0,115 
0,054 
0,017 
0,040 
0,006 
0,044 
0,005 
-
-
0,006 
0,012 
0,460 
0,176 
0,145 
0,038 
0,023 
0,031 
-
-
0,004 
-
-
0,006 
0,015 
0,438 
1970 
0,135 
0,132 
0,039 
0,027 
0,025 
0,002 
0,037 
-
-
0,011 
0,004 
0,016 
0,429 
1971 
0,133 
0,104 
0,043 
0,029 
0,041 
0,005 
0,005 
0,027 
-
-
-
0,053 
0,440 
1972 
0,092 
0,141 
0,043 
0,019 
0,038 
-
-
0,022 
0,003 
0,003 
0,003 
0,035 
0,399 
1973 
0,13 
0,12 
0,04 
0,02 
0,02 
-
-
0,012 
-
0,003 
0,003 
0,06 
0,413 
1974 
0,11 
0,08 
0,05 
0,02 
0,04 
-
0,13 
_ 
-
-
-
0,02 
0,456 
197 5 
0,10 
0,11 
0,047 
0,047 
0,038 
-
-
. -
-
-
-
0,003 
0,35 
1976 
0,07 
0,09 
0,06 
0,05 
0,04 
0,006 
0,06 
0,006 
-
-
0,003 
0,02 
0,42 
1977 
0,05 
0,08 
0,02 
0,0? 
0,CI 
0,01 
-
-
o.oi 
-
-
o.oi 
0,20 
1978 
0,08 
0,11 
0,02 
0,02 
0,01 
0,00 
-
-
-
-
0,2b 
1979 
o,o4 
0,08 
o,o3 
o,ol 
o,o2 
0 
o,o3 
-
~ 
o,ol 
o,24 COMPARATIVE TABLE OF UNDERGROUND GROUP ACCIDENTS 
years 1960-1979 
CAUSES 11960 
1. Falls of ground 
8 
2 
2. Haulage and transport \ 
3. Movement of personneil 
4· Machinery, handing of | 
tools and supports | 
5. Falling objects | 
6· Explosives 
Explosions of firedamp 
nr rrtnl dust 
8. 
Sudden outburst of , 
Tiredamp,suffocation by 
9· Underground combustk 
10# Inrushes of water 
11. Electricity 
12. Other causes 
TOTAL 
■ 
\ru 
η 
2 
a 
2 
b 
10 
1961 
H 
1 
Λ  b 
7 
1962 
H 
3 
a 
3 
b 
18 
1963 
F  a b 
—1— 
1 
1964 1 1965 
s 
ι
2 
ι.ιι ill  —H-| ■■■>■ 'll| 
« il ill I 
ΓΊ 
1 1 I 
1 . 
[—f 
ft« 
in 
2 
ra, 
if 
10 
Γ 
«ι ise  \s 
3  52 
ll|| 
I ! M 
II·· 
Ι ί L_í 
ΰβ 
a 
5 
1 
b 
14 
ires 
MIMIMI! 
Μ Μ ι Ι M 1 1 | 
M I Ι ι ι I I 1 I I  ■ -1- -t- 1 ■ ι- t 1 t 1 ' ' 
ii , ί 1 .ill 11  η 
1 
■ 1 
7  6  65 156 
lili 
2  5  14 
H a  b 
i 1 
1966 
H  a  b 
1967 
H  a  b 
1968 
B 
. 1 1 1 1 1 
a  b 
1 
M M ι 1 
1 M 1 1 M 1 1 1 1 
1969 S 1970 
H 
1 
1 
a 
! ¡1 M H 1 M 1 
Ι Ι Ι Ι Ι Ι Ι Ι Ι Ι M ι 
b p a b 
6 
5 
I , 1 1 1 1 1 1 
I 1 
3 4 M  3  11 21 
1 1 
1 1 
1 1 
1 1 
1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 ! I 1 
L7 
I 
1 
Ι Ι Ι Ι Ι ι ι 1 l M 1 I 1 
ι ι ι ι ι ι 1 1 ι ι ι ι ι 1 
I I 1 I ! 1 1 I I ! 1 ! I 1 
11*11111 il' ■ 1 
ι M 1 1 . 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 
1 
3 4 41  3  11 
IIII 
21  1· 
17  2  111 
-ÎM4 
1971 
H 
2 
a b ] 
F 
1972 
ï|a b 
'1 ' · 
1 1 1 M 1 1 
l'Ili 11 
1 1 1 1 1 II  1 M M 1 l 
M M 1 I 1  1 1 1 1 1 II 
Ι ι ι ι ι 1 
1 1116 
44 
II'' 
.•Il 
i 
1 
8 
1 1 1 1 l 1  1 
1 1 1 1 1 II 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1 II 
I I M 1 II 
1 
1 1116  3  20 
1973 
IÍ 
2 
l 
a b I 
1" 
1974 
ί a 
L 1 
ι 1 1 I 1 
b 
5 
Mill 
1975 
«|a|b* 
ii  1 ' 1 
i 1 1  1 1 
M 1 I 1 111 
MUÍ II  'III' Β I 1 
Ι ι 1 M "Il 
1 1 
1 1 
ι 
1 I 
ί 5 
1 1 
11 11 
42 
Mill 
||Ι·> 
I I I ι 1 
1 i i 
1 1 
1 
I 1  11 
1 1 1 
1 1 1  1 ' 1 
ill 
I I I ι i lili 
1 1 ι ι ι 1 " ■ 1 
. . i . 1 1 
2  1'  ΦΡΙ 
Ι Γ I . t » 
1976 
a 
T
-
b 
16 
1: 
1977 
H 
1 
1 
a 
7 
7 
b 
7 
7 
1978 
H 
1 
1 
a 
3 
3 
b 
7 
7 
1979 
K 
1 
2 
3 
a 
0 
2 
b 
5 
17 
2 2.1 
(l) Accidente Involving more than five oamialtioe of type (a). 
(H) iumber of groupa accidenta. 
(a) Caeualtiee were unable to reevune work below ground for at least eight weeka. 
(b) Casualties died within eight weeko. B. RBCAPITOLATIOF s COMMÜBITT OF THE SIX 
Tear 
o 
• rt 
■Ρ 
S 
■tí 
o 
•¿3 
ID « 
. tao 
Β M 
β Π -et 
Ο Η © 
•Η 3 Ai 
r-l O f* 
r-i A O 
•H S 
SE 
SI 
Φ  •rt 
-<p 
•H 
"S 
CD 
I CD OO h 
%$ u : 
g—-o o! 
m ^.+1 o 
m  o 
t 
© -H r-l © 
Gl U ¿Ω Χ 
§3 
m  « α  « o 
■Η ■»» 
-»= 
•Η o 
•3
e 
■g 13 
¿ (HI 
T-J β 
α Ρ, 
M 'S 
'S 
"se 
fc P. 
I
s· 
« 
ja  Λ£ 
1958  252 278  2οο  1 260  770  17 074  3,052  67,68  0,610  13,551 
1959  240 602 
I960  239 967 
-214. 
1 122  622  14 539  2,585  60,43  0,590  12,950 
231  037  ^26  13 459  2,192  56,09  0,507  12, 
"22FT  "9δ2  Õ3W  1961  235 848  52?  12 720  2,235  53,93  13,227 
34ο m 
541 (4) 
"ÎFHB"  T^oTOI 
,320(4) 
"537^4~  ö,932 m 
0,600 (4) 
13,701  Τ9"δΓ 
1963 
"23TTJT  2^0  "W 
229 7°9  27 ο  849  465  11 686  ,024  50,86  0,547  13,761 
1964  235 007  279  841  411  11 726  1,749  49,89  0,493 
1965  224 249  236  784 
U 
1966  210 189 
1967 ! 189 484 
1968 ¡ léTulit 
μ„ 
?69 
322 
698 
"58Γ 
410 
374 
10 595  L.828  47,25  0,522 
9 247  1?779  43,99  0,536 
26Q  7 781  1,420  41,06  0,457 
AT η 
240  7 501  1?32δ  41,44 
176 74^1 371 | 476 ¡209 
"9^Õ~TTLTÔ~355ï ~ ~™33ST | 438 11¿3 
*Τ9ΤΤ'J"Ï64~9ÏO| 39ΰ~'" -
η·~~
{'~" 
f 1972 J l5Ï~S09j" ¡7l 
Π^7Τ~Π39~7Χ«Τ~~~* 
1,181  40, 82 
0,460 
07*38" 
i„,„üi.Ji!
2 
„L-
6 591 
36? ¡1Δ7 
ι 
—r 
1974 ; J-.3 j .>t-
;^ ι 
ί975"Τ"Ϊ29"Ι00 J  ΓΪ97Τ  4o 5
 !  r— 
1 
1  Ll
9!! ;_i23_6co i _417_ J 
l iii '
 
H9-
Ó7° ι 
ΓΊ975 
33g ¡137 
" "3T3 1Ί43" 
MC¡ "Tuo 
301 ¡125 
6 249 
5 763 
_*5 3*-'í-· 
1,104  38,69 
1~104 J 37,89" 
0,429 
1,033  26,34 
0,440 
ΟΓ399" 
4 795 
"Π  4 491 
i?31 Τ
 
37?9
1 ;°»456 
~85Í' |~l77Ï4~te5~ 
0,981 
1 
*4 
i - A£L i  .. ™¿—j 
SÆL 
1 0,694 
35,76 |0,415 
M,— * ii'-.3<>3 
I1979 lliü.oi  ¿io 
.l_._í-ibl3 í_UJÜÍL·. 
30,40 0,293 
1 
eliin-y end ÎÎÎSÎ.  I il) Fe-t extrae
4;:. 
f \¿) Ind, Lui sant'uà! .explosion, 
I (3) Sxcl, Lv.iesntbe.l ^iralosion,, 
4 v4/ Casualties '«re •la.rii.Vis t«.) :Í'33VJ 
4.380 jo,764 
33,18 J 0,352.. 
.!_ 
37,11 b,349 P-6,43 
13,860 
13,506 
13,242 
13,246 
14,370 
15,160 
15,047 
15,088 
15,60 
36,77 
16,12 
15,05 
14,92 
15,36 
ià±L 
jns work for ät laeat eij^jt weeks. 
T130 200 \ A o-, ¡ 306 
^Jj.09 200 M^oj ^j 2ÖS 
.„Jj£L.
 
7°° I i?i f ¿ü.j 
Íl22 iOO 
ÏÏIÜTÏED ECBIIXSä 
74  Γ~49θ"~Τ0,568 ~] 3,7< 
J
 
2ä^j 37 J 417 0,339 ¡ 3,32 
Γ 303 t 55 1 Ì22 [ 0,431 ΐ4~7θ9~ 
294 1 33"" ' 2 280 0,273 |Τ8~874 
1978  121.695  Λ2Α 
1979 |l2o.596| 414_ 
Tfr 
237  43 
4θ 
2.029  Π  ,353  16,673 
0,242 1,60 
0,138 1,555 
0,181 
0,157 
0, 11 
0,150 
Ϊ3737 Γ^Τ3Β 
1,722 
"ΪΪ39Π 
7, 75 
7,07 
^734"  1·δ12 Ι ο,332 
important Note ; The fiâiircs^for serious Ïnjörxes and. those gaven m tue abov"é table 
are not comparable prior to I976 as the definition of"serious acci-
dent'·' for the U.K. before this date was substantially different from 
that used for the Community of six. 
(1) For I976 both figures for both definitions have been given, 
1 :i'J E. ACCIDENT LEVELS SINCE 1971 (COMMUNITY OF THE SIX) 
increase/decrease on previous 
year o/o 
increase/decrease on previous 
more than 56 days-actual 
increase/decrease on previous 
year o/o 
Fatalities total - actual 
increase/decrease on previous 
actual without group accident. . . 
increase/decrease on previous 
YMfa ■ ■ ■ ■ ι ι . °/° 
1971 
47 203 
113,96 
21 116 
50,98 
6 2*9 
15,09 
182 
0,440 
0,391 
1972 
40 376 
109,31 
-Ms) 
18 531 
50,17 
- 1,59 
5 763 
15,60 
♦ 3,4 (s) 
147 
0,399 
- 10 
HI '*
:' 
0,382 
- 2,3 
1973 
37 38* · 
112,77 
♦ 3,17 (s) 
17 325 
52,26 
♦ 4,17 
5560 
16,77 
♦7(s) 
137 
0,413 
♦ 3,9 
128 
0,385 
♦ 1* 
1974 
34 797 
110,97 
-1,6 (s) 
15 875 
50,62 
-3(e) 
5 054 
16,12 
-4(s) 
143 
0,456 
♦ 10,4 
96 
0,307 
- 21 U) 
1975 
33 985 
106,67 
- 3,9 (s) 
15 454 
48,5 
-4,2 (s) 
4 795 
15,05 
-6,7{s) 
110 
0,345 
- 24 
no 
0,345 
♦ 12 
1976 
30 643 
101,77 
-4,8 (s) 
13 923 
46,24 
-4,8(s) 
4 791 
14,92 
- 0,8 
125 
0,415 
♦ 20 
109 
0,362 
♦ 4,9 
1977 
29 466 
103,90 
♦2,1(8) 
13 388 
47,21 
♦ 2,1 
4 357 
15,36 
♦ 2,9 
83 
0,293 
- 29.4(e) 
66 
0,233 
- 39,4 («) 
1978 
27 602 
102,15 
-1,7(») 
13 240 
49,00 
♦ 3.7 (s) 
4 443 
16,44 
•6,6(«) 
95 
0,352 
♦ 20,1 
95 
0,352 
♦ 51,1 (s) 
1979 
26 325 
99,86 
- 2,2(s) 
12 779 
47,95 
- 2,1 
4 38o 
16,43 
— 0,06 
91 
o,341 
- 4,2 
81 
o,3o4 
- 13,6 
(s) significant variation Comparative table of number of persons incapacitated 
by underground accidents for eight weeks or longer 
years 1958 -197 9per '000,000 man-hours 
(frequency) 
FEDERA L REPUBLICOF GERMANY 
1) Falls of ground 
2) Haulage and transport 
3) Movement of personnel 
4) Machinery, handling of tools and 
supports 
5) Falling objects 
6) Explosives 
7) Explosions of firedamp or 
coal dust 
8) Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases 
9) Underground combustion and fires 
10) Inrushes of water 
11) Electricity 
12) Other causes 
TOTAL 
1958 
4,843 
2,550 
2,497 
0,767 
2,537 
0,015 
0,011 
-
-
0,004 
0,010 
0,487 
13,721 
1959 
4,779 
2,569 
2,463 
0,914 
2,719 
0,011 
0,016 
-
-
-
0,014 
0,522 
14,007 
1960 
4,886 
2,445 
2,348 
0,920 
2,738 
0,010 
-
-
0,003 
-
0,012 
0,457 
13,819 
1961 
4,797 
2.458 
2,512 
0,867 
2,945 
0,009 
0,002 
-
0,002 
-
0,014 
0,503 
14,109 
1962 
4,682 
2,501 
2,608 
1,046 
3,077 
0,008 
0,123 
-
-
-
0,006 
0,488 
14,539 
1963 
4,663 
2,433 
2,646 
1,213 
3,038 
0,006 
0,010 
-
-
0,004 
0,012 
0,473 
14,499 
1964 
4,894 
2,385 
2,744 
1,242 
3,242 
0,006 
-
-
-
-
0,009 
0,477 
14,999 
1965 
4,732 
2,411 
3,032 
1,234 
3,344 
0,005 
0,014 
0,005 
-
-
0,002 
0,354 
15,133 
1966 
4,721 
2,067 
2,852 
1,244 
3,272 
0,005 
0,013 
-
-
-
0,010 
0,414 
14,5">8 
1967 
4,524 
1,913 
2,974 
1,124 
3,642 
0,017 
-
0,003 
-
-
0,006 
0,396 
14,599 
1968 
4,618 
1,994 
3,300 
1,396 
3,773 
0,011 
0,004 
-
0,004 
-
0,011 
0,429 
15,540 
1969 
4,736 
2,195 
3,399 
1,291 
4,036 
0,007 
0,004 
-
-
-
0,026 
0,402 
16,096 
1970 
4,321 
2,007 
3,370 
1,382 
4,166 
0,008 
-
-
-
-
0,012 
0,532 
15,798 
1971 
4,354 
1,724 
3,246 
1,597 
3,313 
-
0,012 
-
-
-
0,008 
0,632 
14,886 
1972 
4,20 
1,81 
3,48 
1,38 
3,49 
-
-
-
-
-
ο,οι 
0,96 
15,31 
1973 
4,30 
1,80 
3,98 
1,61 
3,49 
-
-
-
-
-
0,005 
0,99 
16,19 
1974 
4,08 
1,68 
4,15 
1,58 
3,37 
0,01 
-
-
-
-
-
0,52 
15,40 
1975 
3,69 
2,16 
3,37 
2,16 
2,97 
-
-
-
-
0,009 
0,32 
14,69 
1976 
3, «7 
1,119 
3.58 
1,85 
2,92 
0,01 
0,02 
-
_ 
_ 
0,01 
0,*0 
1*. 16 
1977 
3,67 
1.7* 
*,09 
2.09 
3,03 
_ 
-
. 
. 
. 
0.01 
0.36 
H.93 
1978 
3,48 
1.77 
4.17 
1,90 
3,34 
-
— 
-
-
-
0,01 
0,20 
14,87 
1979 
3,51 
1,71 
4,63 
1,85 
3,54 
o,ol 
o,ol 
— 
_ 
o,o7 
0,56 
15,42 Underground accidents resulting in death within eight weeks 
year 1958 ■ Í97Q 
per '000,000 man-hours 
(frequency) 
i*o 
JA 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
1) Fills of ground 
2) Haulage and transport 
3) Hoveaent of personnel 
4) »»chinery, handling of tools and 
supports 
5) Falling objecte 
6) Explosives 
7) Explosions of firedamp or 
coal dust 
8) Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases 
9) Underground combustion and fires 
10) Inrushes of water 
11) Electricity 
12) Other causes 
TOTAL 
1958 
0,268 
0,179 
0,094 
0,010 
0,065 
0,009 
0,011 
0,005 
-
-
0,022 
0,025 
0,687 
1959 
0,290 
0,169 
0,097 
0,027 
0,041 
0,003 
0,012 
0,003 
0,003 
0,003 
0,008 
0,025 
0,680 
1960 
0,263 
0,182 
0,070 
0,012 
0,039 
0,003 
-
0,002 
-
0,002 
0,002 
0,036 
0,611 
1961 
0,216 
0,196 
0,036 
0,027 
0,065 
-
-
0,004 
0,002 
-
0,005 
0,049 
0,651 
1962 
0,280 
0,149 
0,059 
0,037 
0,072 
0,004 
0,660 
0,002 
-
-
ο,οιο 
0,049 
1,344 
1963 
0,260 
0,178 
0;089 
0,019 
0,072 
-
0,002 
-
0,006 
0,004 
0,002 
0,025 
0,657 
1964 
0,200 
0,300 
0,071 
0,028 
0,054 
0,002 
0,002 
-
0,009 
-
0,004 
0,017 
0,587 
1965 
0,184 
0,191 
0,070 
0,025 
0,058 
-
0,019 
0,002 
0,005 
-
0,005 
0,023 
0,582 
.»»»«*-*-. 
1966 
0,197 
0,175 
0,094 
0,030 
0,048 
-
0,056 
0,002 
-
-
-
0,027 
0,629 
1967 
0,206 
0,150 
0,076 
0,020 
0,063 
-
-
0,007 
-
-
0,003 
0,017 
0,542 
_ 
■968 
0,148 
0,126 
0,079 
0,014 
0,051 
0,004 
0,061 
-
-
-
0,004 
0,022 
0,509 
1969 
0,192 
0,143 
0,056 
0,034 
0,049 
-
-
0,004 
-
-
0,004 
,0,022 
0,504 
1970 
0,113 
0,128 
0,058 
0,031 
0,035 
-
-
-
-
0,012 
0,004 
0,027 
0,408 
1971 
0,147 
0,103 
0,032 
0,032 
0,047 
-
0,008 
0,008 
-
-
-
0,083 
0,460 
1972 
0,10 
0,16 
0,06 
0,03 
0,06 
-
-
0,004 
-
-
0,004 
0,04 
0,46 
1973 
0,08 
0,13 
0,06 
0,02 
0,02 
-
-
0,005 
-
-
0,005 
0,09 
0,420 
1974 
0,12 
0,07 
0,06 
0,02 
0,04 
-
-
~ 
-
-
-
0,03 
0,34 
1975 
0,12 
0,12 
0,06 
0,05 
0,05 
-
-
■ *~ 
-
-
-
0,005 
0,41 
1976 
0,06 
0.10 
0,07 
0,03 
0,05 
0,005 
0,01 
0,0, 
-
-
0.005 
0,03 
0,377 
1977 
0,07 
0.08 
0,05 
0,0* 
0,02 
-
-
-
0,0* 
-
ο,οι 
m 
0,3* 
1978 
Û,l3 
0,14 
0,05 
0,04 
0,03 
0,01 
l),4l) 
| 
1979 
o,o8 
o,ll 
o,o7 
o,o3 
o,o5 
o,o4 
_ 
_ 
_ 
o,ol 
0,40 to 
Ui 
SAFETY AND HEALTH COMMISSION 
FOR THE MINING DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS ACCORDING TO CAUSE AND SITE 
AND OTHER EXTRACTIVE i«3LrSTRiEs 0F ACCIDENT AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
Common Statistics on victims 
öiseen., undergo in co., min«, C0UNTRY FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (absolute figures) YEAR 1979  MAN-HOURS WORKED (') 1c 
Table 1a 
COAL-FIELD  721 270 
^S. SITE OF THE ACCIDENT 
— Period ol 
CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS ^*-" 7 
I FALLS OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS 
II TRANSPORT. TOTAL 
a) Continuous Transport 
b) Discontinuous Transport 
III FALL: AND MOVEMENT OF THE VICTIM. 
TOTAL 
a) while moving about the mine 
b) in the course ol other activities 
IV MACHINES. TOOLS AND SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a| Machines 
b) Tools 
c) Supports 
V FALLS OF OBJECTS 
VI EXPLOSIVES 
VII IGNITIONS OR EXPLOSIONS 
OF FIREDAMP AND COAL DUST 
VIII OUTBURSTS OF GAS. OE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU-
RAL GASES (CO,, CH,. CO. H,S), 
TOTAL 
a) Outbursts ol Gas 
b) Oe-oxygenation and Poisoning 
by natural Gases 
IX HEATINGS OR FIRES 
X. INRUSHES 
XI. ELECTRICITY 
XII OTHER CAUSES 
TOTAL 
Production tsces 
1 
4 to 
20 
days 
I") 
1 43: 
13Í 
47 
91 
1 611 
1 611 
64C 
9' 
28; 
?6; 
1 39Í 
-
1 
1 
1 
-
-
1 
105 
3 329 
21to 
56 
days 
(') 
917 
12? 
50 
72 
1 214 
1 214 
526 
100 
142 
284 
848 
-
-
1 
1 
-
-
6 
53 
3 687 
>5β 
days 
('1 
363 
88 
49 
39 
292 
292 
171 
51 
33 
87 
336 
1 
1 
-
-
-
-
1 
18 
1 271 
Fata! 
acci-
dents 
5 
5 
3 
2 
3 
3 
2 
-
-
2 
3 
-
3 
-
-
-
-
-
2 
23 
total 
2 718 
353 
149 
204 
3 120 
3 120 
1 339 
243 
458 
638 
2586 
1 
5 
2 
2 
-
-
8 
178 
103,10 
Headings excluding 
shafts and staple-pits 
2 
4to 
20 
days 
('1 
1 20F 
61 
IÍ 
4< 
1 lie 
1 lit 
49¿ 
73 
243 
i7í 
7« 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
80 
} JIB 
2110 
56 
daya 
('1 
636 
56 
16 
40 
793 
793 
305 
52 
122 
131 
367 
-
-
-
-
-
-
1 
21 
2 IJ? 
>S5 
days 
(') 
255 
37 
12 
25 
226 
226 
113 
46 
35 
32 
162 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
6 
7?? 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
10 
4 
1 
3 
2 
2 
3 
2 
-
1 
4 
-
4 
-
-
-
-
-
-
2T 
total 
2 106 
158 
44 
114 
2 139 
2 139 
915 
173 
402 
340 
1 293 
-
4 
-
-
-
1 
107 
6 l
2i 
Shafts and staple-plte 
3 
4 to 
20 
day« 
(■> 
11 
31 
2 
29 
161 
4 
157 
22 
10 
7 
5 
72 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
6 
¿2¿_ 
21 to 
days 
('1 
6 
38 
1 
37 
L29 
2 
L27 
22 
8 
14 
-
59 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
3 
257 
days 
('1 
4 
32 
2 
30 
47 
1 
46 
6 
2 
3 
1 
24 
_ 
-
_ 
_ 
-
-
-
2 
115 
Fatal 
accl-
de-ls 
-
3 
-
3 
5 
-
5 
-
-
-
-
1 
_ 
-
_ 
_ 
-
-
-
-
9 
total 
21 
104 
5 
99 
342 
7 
335 
50 
20 
24 
6 
156 
_ 
-
_ 
_ 
-
-
-
11 
684 
Other placa 
4 
4 to 
20 
days 
(') 
200 
195 
14 
181 
1 258 
-
1 258 
276 
65 
170 
41 
624 
_. 
4 
_ 
4 
-
-■ 
3 
90 
2 650 
2110 
56 
days 
(') 
127 
25I 
17 
234 
9O6 
-
906 
196 
48 
IO5 
43 
4O6 
__ 
» 
_ 
_ 
-
-
6 
28 
1 920 
day* 
(') 
40 
I65 
20 
145 
309 
-
309 
59 
23 
15 
21 
I46 
_ 
-
' _ 
— 
-, 
-
-
6 
725 
Fatal 
acci-
denta 
1 
9 
2 
7 
3 
-
3 
1 
1 
• -
-■ 
2 
_ 
-
_ 
_ 
-
-
-
-
16 
total 
368 
620 
53 
567 
2 476 
-
2 476 
532 
137 
290 
. 105 
1 178 
_ 
4 
_ 
4 
-
-
9 
124 
Total ol 
accidents underground 
5 
4 to 
20 
days 
(') 
2 849 
425 
78 
347 
4 I4S 
4 
4 144 
1 432 
240 
705 
487 
2 855 
_ 
1 
5 
_ 
5 
-
-
4 
281 
5 31112.000 
2110 
56 
days 
(■) 
1 686 
467 
84 
383 
3 042 
2 
3 040 
1 049 
208 
383 
458 
1 680 
_ 
_ 
1 
_ 
1 
-
13 
105 
BOÍL· 
>5β 
days 
(') 
662 
322 
83 
239 
874 
1 
873 
349 
122 
86 
141 
668 
1 
1 
-
„ 
-. 
-
1 
32 
Fatal 
acci-
denta 
16 
21 
6 
15 
13 
-
13 
6 
3 
-
3 
10 
_ 
7 
-
_ 
-
-
-
2 
Λ' 
2 910 75 
total 
5 213 
1 235 
251 
984 
8 077 
7 
8 070 
2 836 
573 
1 174 
1 089 
5 213 
1 
9 
6 
_ 
6 
-
-
18 
420 
!3 028 
Group 
accidents!
1) 
S 
56 
days 
('1 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
_ 
_ 
1 
-
_ 
_ 
_ 
-
_ 
1 
Fetal 
acci-
dents 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
_ 
_ 
7 
-
_ 
_ 
_ 
-
_ 
7 
total 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
_ 
. 
9 
-
_ 
_ 
_ 
-
_ 
9 
ΙΊ Accidenti involving mor· ifìtn flv* caeuallfts (I.·, who »Uh·* dl#d or nx>r· unabt* to muim work underground lor it ioui eight woejki) n AVI' NLVLill ιΧΛΪΜΙΑΙΙϋΡι 
,'i*i 'If MINIMO 
Itiiiî ¡ΥΠίΛίΤΤΓνί: IMXJ^TBIES 
DETAILED BREAKDOWNS OF AOCäSSKT ΨΌΤΙΐΜ ACC0S3ÎWG TO CAUSE AND SiTe 
OF ACCIDENT AND PSRÎOD Of !f4SAPAC¡TY 
COUNTRY FEDERAL RERJBLIG OP GERMANY 
COAL-FIELD 
(frequency ratas)  Y£AR 1979 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (') 188 721 270 
^^ ant or THE ACCIDENT 
^v Poriod ol 
i'-VuSrs OK OCCIDENTS ^N^cap.icit) 
■ h-V, ί S OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS 
M TRANSPORT. TOTAL 
nl CünWujoUS Transport 
b} Discontinuous Transport 
III FALLS AND MOV EMENT OF THE VICTIM. 
TOTAL 
a) whilo moving about tho nine 
b) in lhe cours« ot other activities 
IV MACHINES, TOOLS AND SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a) Machines 
b) Tools 
c) Supports 
V FALLS OF 03JECTS 
VI EXPLOSIVES 
VII IGNITIONS OR EXPLOSIONS 
OF FIREDAMP AND COAL DUST 
VIII. OUTBURSTS OF GAS, DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU-
RAL GASES (COi, CH«, CO, HiS). 
TOTAL 
a) Outbursts of Gas 
b) Oe-oxyganation and Poisoning 
by natural Gases 
IX. HEATINGS OR FIRES 
X INRUSHES 
XI ELECTRICITY 
XII. OTHER CAUSES 
TOTAL 
ι Ί Number of fiours worked by pit staff and employees o 
Production facsa 
1 
4 lo 
20 
days 
τ, v» 
0,7": 
0,2? 
0,28 
δ, 54 
-
8,54 
?, y-
0,49 
1,50 
1,40 
7,-H 
-
0,01 
0,01 
_ 
0,01 
-
0,01 
0,56 
J? 9 Λ 
— ' -■> 
1 contracte 
21 to 
m 
days 
l'I 
4,3 ( 
0,6
e 
0,21 
0,3t 
£,': 
-
6,4 
?,? 
0,5." 
o,75 
1,5c 
4,49 
-
-
0,01 
_ 
0,01 
-
0,03 
0,23 
lW\ 
rltrmsw 
s 56 
days 
1,92 
0,-17 
0,26 
0,21 
1,55 
-
1,55 
0,2 7 
0,17 
0,-46 
1,73 
0,01 
0,01 
-
_ 
-
-
0,01 
0,10 
6
 
7 "> 
0 belong t 
Falsi 
acci-
dents 
0,0} 
0,0J 
0,0' 
0,01 
0,0? 
-
0,02 
0,01 
-
-
0,01 
0,0? 
-
0,0? 
-
_ 
-
-
-
0,01 
0,1? 
0 aminars 
tota! 
I 
14,4! 
1,3-
0,7
e 
Ι,Οί 
16,5 
-
15,5: 
7,1 
l,?
c 
2,4: 
3,3Í 
1?,7C 
0,01 
0,02 
0,01 
_ 
0,01 
-
0,04 
0,94 
ÎM. 
socia! ins 
Ha£oirv,,s alluding 
shafl3 2:idalaplí'-pit3 
2 
4 to I 51 to 
20 1 ce 
days dayL 
c-> Ι (') 
6,39 
0,3? 
0,08 
0,24 
5,9? 
-
5,92 
j 2,62 
0,3? 
1,70 
0,93 
4,0.3 
-
-
-
_ 
-
-
-
0,42 
¿LIS 
urancesc 
3,37 
0,30 
0,08 
0,21 
4,?0 
-
4,20 
1,60 
0,28 
0,65 
0,6? 
1,94 
-
-
-
_ 
-
-
0,01 
0,11 
lii'37 
heme. 
r-53 
days 
(*) 
1,35 
0,20 
0,06 
0,13 
1,20 
-
1,20 
0,60 
0,24 
0,19 
0,17 
0,86 
-
-
-
_ 
-
-
-
0,03 
4,23 
Fatal 
eccl-
danls 
0,05 
0,02 
0,01 
0,02 
0,01 
-
0,01 
0,02 
0,01 
-
0,01 
0,02 
-
0,02 
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,14 
ICUil 
11, Ιέ 
0,84 
0,23 
0,6C 
11,3: 
-
11,3: 
4,85 
0,92 
2 13 
1,60 
6,85-
-
0,0? 
-
-
-
-
0,01 
0,57 
35,62 
— 
410 
20 
days 
m 
0,06 
0,16 
0,01 
0,15 
0,35 
0,02 
0,83 
0,12 
0,05 
0,04 
0,03 
0,38 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,03 
i,6l 
Shafts and ¿iap! 
3 
Sitó 
sc 
cayr, 
?> 
0,03 
0,20 
0,01 
0,20 
0,68 
0,01 
0,67 
0,12 
0,04 
0,07 
-
0,31 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,02 
hi* 
>5¿ 
daya 
C) 
0,02 
0,17 
0,01 
0,16 
0,25 
0,01 
0,24 
0,03 
0,01 
0,02 
0,01 
0,13 
-
-
-
— 
-
-
-
0,01 
0|6J, 
I 
*-pÍÍ3 I 
I 
Fitti 
KCCi-
dsnts 
-
0,02 
„ 
0,02 
0,03 
-
0,03 
-
" 
-
-
0,01 
_ 
-
-
-
-
-
-
_ 
-
0,05 
IDlXl 
0,11 
0,55 
0,03 
0,52 
1,81 
0,04 
1,78 
0,?6 
0,11 
0,13 
0,03 
0,83 
_ 
-
-
-
-
-
-
_. 
0,06 
3,62 
.■,,0 
so 
days 
Β 
1,06 
1,03 
0,07 
0,96 
6,67 
-
6,67 
1,46 
0,34 
0,90 
0,22 
3,31 
_. 
-
0,02 
-
0,02 
-
-
0,02 
0,48 
14,04 
Oilier piarle 
2110 
M 
days 
ffl 
0,67 
1,33 
0,09 
1,24 
4,80 
_ 
4,80 
1,04 
0,25 
0,56 
0,23 
2,15 
_ 
-
-
-
-
-
-
Jk
0
3 
0,15 
10,17 
dcya 
m 
0,21 
0,87 
0,11 
0,77 
1,64 
_ 
1,64 
0,31 
0,1? 
0,08 
0,11 
0,77 
_ 
-
-
_ 
-
-
-
_ 
0,03 
3,84 
Fatai 
dents 
0,01 
0,05 
0,C1 
0,04 
0,02 
.. 
0,02 
0,01 
0,01 
-
-
0,01 
„ 
-
-
_ 
-
-
-
_ 
-
0,08 
total 
1-95 
3,29 
0,28 
3,00 
13,12 
„ 
13,12 
2,82 
0,73 
1,54 
0,56 
6,24 
. 
-
0,02 
_ 
0,02 
-
-
0,05 
0,66 
?8,14 
<to 
20 
days 
("} 
15,10 
2,25 
0,41 
1,84 
21,95 
0,02 
21,96 
7,59 
1,27 
3,74 
2,58 
15,13 
_ 
0,-01 
0,03 
_ 
0,03 
-
-
0,02 
1,49 
63,59 
Tolalc·! 
accidents underground 
5 
21 to 
59 
days 
('I 
8,93 
2,47 
..O.t.45. 
2,03 
16,12 
0,01 
16,11 
5,56 
1,10 
2,03 
2,43 
8,90 
_ 
-
0,01 
_ 
0,01 
-
0t07 
0,56 
42,62 
>S9 
daya 
P! 
3,51 
1,-71 
0,44 
1,27 
4,63 
0,01 
4,63 
1,85 
0,65 
0,46 
0,75 
3,54 
0,01 
0,01 
-
_ 
_ 
-
-
0,01 
0,17 
15,42 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
0,08 
0,11 
0.03 
0,08 
0,07 
_ 
0,07 
0,03 
0,o2 
-
0,02 
0,05 
_, 
0,04 
-
_ 
_ 
-
-
0,01 
0,40 
total 
27,62 
6,54 
1,33 . . 
5,?1 
42,80 
0,04 
42,76 
15,03 
3,04 
6,22 
5,77 
27,62 
0,01 
0,05 
0,03 
_ 
0,03 
-
-
0,10 
2,23 
122,02 
Group 
accidents!*) 
6 
56 
days 
('1 
-
_ 
_ 
-
-
_ 
-
-
-
-
-
„ 
_ 
),01 
-
_ 
_ 
-
-
-
D,01 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
-
_ 
_ 
-
-
_ 
-
-
-
-
_ 
_ 
0,04 
-
_ 
™ 
-
-
-
3,04 
total 
-
_ 
_ 
-
-
_ 
-
-
-
-
-
_ 
_ 
0,05 
-
_ 
_ 
-
-
-
0,05 
') Accidents involving more than five casualties (i.e. who either died or were unable io resume work underground for at IGBSI eight we*K8). 
Ί Calendar days SAFETY AND HEALTH COMMISSION 
FOfl ΤΉΕ MINING 
AMD OTHER EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES 
Common Statistics on victima 
ot accidents underground in coal mines 
COUNTRY 
COAL-FIELD 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF VECTI&S ACCORDING TO LOCATION 
AND NATURE OF INJURY AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (absolute figures) 
Tabi« 2a 
NATURE OF THE INJURY 
PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
Amputations 
and 
enucleations 
>56 
days 
Fatal 
acci­
dente 
Fractures 
ivith or without 
dislocation 
>55 
deys 
Luxations, 
twist and 
sprains 
>56 
days 
Fatal 
acci­
dents 
ConcuKion 
and intor­
nai Injury 
>5β 
days 
Open «vounda 
contusion 
and muscular 
abritions 
5 
>5β 
daya 
Fatal 
acci­
dent« 
YEAR 1979 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (>) 188 721 270 
Bums and 
harmful effects 
of electricity 
end radiation 
>5fi 
devfl 
(5) 
Faliil 
acci- ' 
dents 
Poisoning 
arvd 
suffocation 
>5β 
days 
(S) 
Falai 
accl-
danta 
Uultipl. Injuria. 
ofthoa.no! 
aa>*clfl*d r») 
>U 
daya 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
o*nta 
ato 
M 
daya 
I') 
21 to 
5Í 
daya 
1') 
daya 
(■) 
Fatal 
acci-
danta 
LOCATION OF THE INJURY 
I Head and neck  17  MO  15  16  132  2 161  32  1 802  595  155  2575 
It Eyes 
52  636  65  578  89  63  730 
354  75  21  83  3 L  37  1 028  224  1 970 
IV Upper limbs 
(excluding the hands) 
i
1)  173  300  18  L35  102  2 368  45  1 823  736  299  2 86o 
19  151  273  5 417  32  3 768  3 721  943  8 4 32 
VI Lower limbs 
(exe'jdmg leet) ι  318  404  103 
286  666  83 
391 
725 
226  474  27  1 546  1 096  3 302 
152  .1 49S 2  14  1 353  1 030  533 
VIII Multiplo location  24 
IX Nol spcrjlied 
178 
\ / 
18  102  3 s  28 
I;j02  lfa4  16233  19  270  46 12 000 8 043  2 910  75  23 0^8 
'1 Number Ol houle worked by pH 
Ί including complications 
d employ«» ol contractor (Irr  Ί ΤΙ» hipa .ina th· ankle; ars I 
Ί Calendar d·»» 
:c!ii£Íed under „Lower limbe" Comparative table of number of persons incapacitated 
by underground accidents for eight weeks or longer 
years 1958-197° per '000,000 man-hours 
(frequency) 
BELGIUM 
1) Falls of ground 
2) Haulage and transport 
3) Movement of personnel 
4) Machinery, handling of tools and 
supports 
5) Falling objecte 
6) Explosives 
7) Explosions of firedamp or 
coal dust 
8) Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases 
9) Underground combustion and fires 
10) Inrushes of water 
11) Electricity 
12) Other causes 
TOTAL 
1958 
5,911 
4,132 
1,354 
2,804 
0,414 
0,027 
-
0,011 
-
-
0,011 
0,260 
14,924 
'959 
4,294 
2,979 
0,998 
2,085 
0,371 
0,007 
-
-
-
-
-
0,255 
10,989 
1960 
4,324 
2,709 
1,008 
2,386 
0,354 
0,032 
-
-
-
-
0,016 
0,260 
11,089 
1961 
4,07 1 
2,770 
1,062 
2,097 
0,301 
0,018 
-
-
-
-
0,018 
0,301 
10,638 
1962 
4,439 
3,331 
1,136 
2,461 
0,445 
_ 
-
-
-
0,010 
0,010 
0,351 
12,161 
1963 
4,432 
3,565 
1,066 
2,414 
0,547 
0,019 
-
-
-
-
0,009 
0,198 
12,250 
1964 
4,417 
3,419 
0,961 
2,310 
0,397 
0,018 
0,009 
-
-
-
-
0,268 
11,799 
1965 
3,574 
2,866 
0,771 
2, 126 
0,292 
_ 
0,031 
-
0,021 
-
0,010 
0,333 
10,024 
1966 
3,568 
3,269 
0,936 
2,146 
0,349 
0,013 
-
0,013 
-
-
0,015 
0,362 
10,669 
1967 
3,850 
2,960 
0,903 
2,265 
0,459 
0,056 
-
-
-
-
-
0,278 
10,771 
1968 
3,676 
3,220 
1,122 
1,903 
0,358 
0,049 
-
-
-
-
0,016 
0,228 
10,57 2 
1969 
5,075 
3,169 
1, 186 
2,353 
1,244 
_ 
0,019 
-
-
-
0,019 
0,175 
13,240 
1970 
4,673 
3,018 
1,144 
1,801 
1,242 
_ 
-
-
-
-
-
0,195 
12,097 
197 1 
3,989 
3,365 
1,496 
2,469 
1,870 
0,025 
-
-
-
0,025 
-
0,324 
13,563 
1972 
4,6 
2,8 
1,3 
1,7 
1.5 
0,03 
-
-
-
-
-
0,2 
12,13 
wi 
4,02 
3,33 
1,41 
2,58 
1,44 
_ 
-
-
-
-
0,03 
0,36 
13,16 
1974 
3,99 
2,43 
1,70 
2,18 
1,84 
_ 
-
_ 
._ 
-
0,03 
0,41 
12,61 
197 5 
2,79 
2,39 
1,29 
1,66 
1,46 
_ 
-
_ 
-
-
0,03 
0,06 
9,71 
1976 
Z.77 
* 2,98 
1,06 
1,81 
1,63 
0,03 
-
-
-
-
-
0,17 
10,t7 
1977 
2,55 
7,?' 
0,93 
1,55 
1,16 
-
-
-
-
-
0,07 
8,»9 
1978 
3,43 
2.74 
1,13 
1,94 
1,98 
-
-
-
0,00 
-
0,16 
11,37 
1979 
3,25 
2,74 
1.3o 
1,98 
1,98 
— 
— 
— 
*~ 
-
o,25 
11,51 Underground accidents resulting in death within eight weeks 
year 1958-197J 
per '000,000 man-hours 
(frequency) 
, ' '1 ' ™"~ .iI'L'IIIJ'UHBBB 
BLLuiUM 
1) Ebouleioents 
2) Moyens de transport 
3) Circulation du personnel 
ri) Machines, maniement i' outiin et 
de soutènement 
5) Chufeo d'objets 
6) Explosifs 
I 7) Explosions de grlaou et de 
] poussieren 
j 8) Dégagement!) instantanés, asphy-
| sies par gai naturel» 
9) Feux de minea et incendies 
10) Coupe d'eau 
jll) Courant électrique 
|l2) Autres cauaes 
1 TOTAL 
1956 
0,223 
0,101 
0,011 
0,005 
0,016 
0,011 
-
0,016 
-
0,011 
0,021 
0,005 
0,420 
1959 
0,213 
0,124 
0,027 
0,014 
-
0,014 
-
0,014 
0,007 
-
_ 
-
0,413 
1960 
0,299 
0,157 
0,008 
0,016 
0,008 
-
0,016 
-
-
-
0,024 
0,008 
0,536 
1961 
0,266 
0,163 
0,035 
0,027 
-
-
-
-
-
0,044 
_ 
0,009 
0,549 
1962 
0,246 
0,142 
0,010 
0,047 
0,010 
-
-
0,047 
-
0,047 
_ 
0,019 
0,568 
1963 
0,264 
0,245 
0,057 
-
0,019 
-
-
-
-
0,019 
0,009 
0,028 
0,641 
1964 
0,222 
0,166 
0,028 
0,018 
0,018 
-
-
-
-
-
0,009 
0,009 
0,471 
1965 
0,239 
0,166 
0,011 
0,052 
-
-
0,011 
0,041 
0,011 
-
0,011 
-
0,542 
1966 
0,324 
0, 187 
0,025 
0,025 
-
-
-
0,013 
-
-
-
0,013 
0,587 
1967 
0,264 
0,180 
-
0,028 
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,014 
0,042 
0,528 
1968 
0,179 
0,114 
0,033 
0,065 
0,016 
0,016 
-
-
-
-
0,033 
-
0,456 
1969 
0,214 
0,097 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,019 
-
0,330 
1970 
0,268 
0,170 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,024 
-
0,462 
1971 
0,100 
0,125 
0,049 
0,025 
-
-
-
0,025 
-
-
-
-
0,324 
1972 
0,08 
0,18 
0,03 
-
0,03 
-
-
0,18 
-
-
-
0,03 
0,53 
1973 
0,21 
0,21 
-
0,03 
-
-
-
0,06 
-
-
-
0,03 
0,54 
1974 
0,06 
0,06 
0,03 
-
0,03 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,20 
1975 
0,03 
0,16 
-
0,09 
-
-
~ 
·-
-
-
-
-
0,29 
1976 
0,07 
0,03 
0,07 
0,03 
0,03 
■-
-
-
-
-
. 
• 
0,2» 
1977 
0.03 
0,07 
0,03 
0.03 
-
-
-
-
-
. 
-
0.193 
1978 
0,04 
0,15 
-
0,04 
0,04 
0,28 
1979 
o,o4 
o,25 
0,04 
— 
-
-
-
o,34 SAFETY AND HEALTH COMMISSION 
FCfl THE MINING 
AND OTHER EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES 
Common statistics an victims 
0' accidents underground in coal mines 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS ACCORDING TO CAUSE AND SITI 
OF ACCIDENT AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
COUNTRY  BELGIUM 
(absolute figures)  YEAR 1979 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (■) 23 717 49" 
Table 1a 
^N. SITE OF THE ACCIDENT 
\. Period ot 
CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS \^
paclt
v
 
I FALLS OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS 
II TRANSPORT. TOTAL 
a) "ontinuous Transport 
b) Discontinuous Transport 
III FALLS AND MOVEMENT OF THE VICTIM. 
TOTAL 
a) while moving about the mine 
b) m ! ho course ol Other activities 
IV MACHINES. TOOLS AND SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a) Machines 
b) Tools 
c) Supports 
V FALLS OF OBJECTS 
VI EXPLOSIVES 
VII IGNITIONS OR EXPLOSIONS 
OF FIREDAMP AND COAL DUST 
VIII OUTBURSTS OF GAS. DE-OXYGENATION. 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU-
RAL GASES (COi. CH«. CO, HiS). 
TOTAL 
a)Outburstsof Gas 
b) Do-oxygenalion and Poisoning 
by natural Gases 
IX HEATINGS OR FIRES 
X INRUSHES 
XI ELECTRICITY 
XII OTHER CAUSES 
TOTAL 
"ι number ol hour3 worked by pit staff tnd employe·! 
4 10 
20 
days 
1574 
y~ 
~r¡ 
13 
117 
Q 
loO 
55íi 
c, "J 
137 
^6S 
463 
0 
0 
0 
o 
0 
0 
0 
0 
ί'Π 
'"'■: >tí 
al contrac 
Proc 
21 to 
56 
days 
I
1) 
163 
p ι. 
18 
5 
17 
1 
lb 
On 
?Δ 
11 
54 
Ίο 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
38 5 
or firms w 
uction faces 
-•56 
days 
Í
3! 
43 
7 
6 
1 
3 
0 
1 
24 
Λ 
4 
16 
18 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
D 
C 
C 
1 
lol 
rio belong 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
o 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 β miner 
total 
I785 
83 
64 
19 
137 
lo 
127 
671 
81 
152 
433 
576 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
73 
33?., 
sodann 
410 
20 
daya 
('I 
848 
195 
47 
148 
393 
80 
313 
497 
34 
157 
3o6 
W
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4 
64 
2571 
urancesc 
Held 
shafts 
2110 
56 
daya 
(
3) 
37 
50 
17 
33 
57 
17 
40 
82 
7 
9 
66 
83 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
6 
166 
nam· 
ngs excluding 
and staple-pits 
2 
>5β 
days 
S3 
17 
5 
12 
13 
4 
9 
2o 
1 
ρ 
17 
15 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
o 
0 
0 
88 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
1 
3 
1 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4 
total 
959 
265 
7o 
195 
463 
lol 
362 
599 
42 
168 
389 
668 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5 
7o 
3o?9 
* to 
20 
day« 
C> 
37 
57 
0 
57 
74 
11 
63 
49 
6 
27 
16 
96 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
11 
334 
Shifts 1 
21 to 
56 
t/ays 
<*) 
4 
8 
0 
8 
12 
0 
12 
6 
? 
2 
7 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
33 
nd staple-pits 
3 
>5β 
days 
(
3> 
0 
12 
0 
12 
6 
2 
4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
21 
Fatal 
■ccl· 
dints 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
total 
41 
77 
0 
77 
93 
13 
80 
55 
8 
29 
18 
lo4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
13 
384 
Other places 
4 
4 to 
20 
days 
167 
199 
5o 
149 
189 
25 
164 
191 
11 
lol 
79 
, Ì
12
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5 
73 
1136 
21 to 
5« 
days 
(') 
17 
47 
9 
Ì
8 
25 
8 
17 
51 
3 
7 
11 
1,1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
143 
>5S 
days 
(■) 
6 
29 
4 
27-
9 
0 
9 
3 
0 
2 
1 
13, 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
63 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
0 
2 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
ρ 
total 
19o 
277 
63 
214 
223 
33 
190 
215 
14 
Ilo 
91 
ÏÏ
6 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5 
78 
1344 
i to 
20 
days 
1') 
2626 
5o3 
136 
367 
773 
125 
648 
1295 
lo4 
422 
769 
1446 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
9 
217 
6869 
Total ol 
accidents underground 
5 
2110 
56 
days 
('1 
271 
128 
44 
84 
111 
26 
85 
198 
36 
29 
133 
211 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
11 
93? 
days 
(·) 
77 
65 
15 
S>° 
31 
6 
25 
47 
5 
8 
M 
47 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
6 
273 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
1 
6 
2 
4._ 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
f 
total 
2975 
7°2 
197 
505 
916 
157 
759 
1540 
145 
459 
936 
17o4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
11 
?34 
8082 
Group 
accidents I
1) 
6 
56 
days 
(') 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
I 
nilerground lor at le ΓΟΠ Τ :í r,MNI'->G 
-\ND cn-:rR EXTRACTIVE INT-LCTRIÜ', 
COUNTRY 
GOAL-FIELD 
BKLGi'üM 
)\V:>-: OF ACCÍííSNT V!C'f¡ÍV?3 ACCORDING TO CAUSE AND SITE 
)F ACC¡DEÍ'
:T fiiiO FL-RIOD 0('
; ¡NCAPACITY 
(frequency rates)  YEAR 1979 Λ . 
MAN-HOURS WORKED ί
1) 23 717 496 
Production faen: 
CAUSES 0!
: ACCIDENT Γ 
\ Penodol 
θΠΓ-'.Hiicily 
i FAI [ S OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS 
I TRANSPORT, TOTAL 
;i) Continuous Transport 
t>) Discontinuous Transport 
III FALLS AND MOVEMENT Of THE VICTIM. 
TOTAL 
a) while moving «bout the mino 
D) in lhe course ol other nctivilioa 
¡V. MACHINES, TOOLS AND SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
¡i) Machines 
b) Tools 
c> Supports 
V. FALLS OF OBJECTS 
VI EXPLOSIVES  __μ. 
VII IGNITIONSOR EXPLOSIONS 
OF FIREDAMP AND COAL DUST 
VIN.OUTBURSTSOFGAS. DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU-
RAL GASES (COi. CH*. CO, HiS), 
TOTAL 
s) Outbursts of Gas 
b| De-oxygenation and Poisoning 
by natural Gasea 
IX. HEATINGS OR FIRES 
XI ELECTRICITY 
XII OTHER CAUSES 
0,0 
'I Numberot hours worked by pit stilt and employees of contractor firms who belong 
'! Accidenti invclving more tri¿n five esausti toe ¡ι β who either died of 'srcreunatrletc 
r> CelendJr dcys 
0 , O 
0,0 
0 Ilo, 'fl; 3,4 
to a miners soci 
resums trerh underground for 
Ho£dinoss.-.cl  :!:-5 
s-plrs 
20 
driy" 
1 '■,
 ς 
ΞΙ IO 
50 
days 
0,7 
1,4 
ir,·-
>5fl 
dei ι 
1,0 
o,7 
h 1 
o,7 
Futfll 
ccci-
dántrj 
0 ,0 
o.l 
0,0 
o,l 
19,5 
4,3 
1,3 
16,4 
Shí.ftr, nnd ctiplo-pdtiï 
20 
dayc 
P) 
1,0 
2,4 
?, 4 
3,1 
0.7 
■1,0 
0,0 
21 10 
ai 
0,0 0.0 
0,3  o,5 
0,3 
o,5 
o,3) 0,0 
0,0 
! 
ο,ο ί 0,0 
ο,ο ο,Ι 
1,0 o,9 
acci­
denta 
0,0 
3,2 
0,5 
2,3 
o,3 
3,8 
o,5 
16,2 
Otlwr placee 
7,o 
8,4 
6,3 
1,1 
o,9 
3,1 
4,3 
3,3 
0,2 
3,1 
47,9 
21 IO 
se 
deys 
o,7 
0,4 
1,6 
1,1 
o,3 
o,7 
o,9 
ο,Ι 
1,3 
6,0 
days 
I') 
1,2 
0,4 
£iL· 
0,1 
Fritei 
acci­
dents 
0,1  11,7 
ο,Ι 
à°. 
9,4 
8,0 
9,1 
0,6 
4,6 
iL· 
0,2 
56,7 
Totelof 
uccidente underground 
4 to 
20 
di ya 
5,7 
IL·!. 
32,6 
5,3 
27,3 
54,6 
4,4 
17,8 
32,4 
61,0 
o,4 
9,1 
289,6 
21 to 
5β 
days 
11,4 
1,9 
JLLL 
4,7 
3,6 
3,3 
1,5 
1,2 
5,6 
Al 
0,1 
0,5 
39, ■ 
2,7 
1,3 
o,3 
1,1 
0,3 
2,0 
Fatai 
acci-
dents 
o,3 
°,3 
ii,5  o,3 
?5,ó 
3ö,6 
64,9 
6,1 
-
;'5 
Jiiá. 
o,5 
9,9 
34o,8 
Group 
accidents (
;
 
Fatai 
acci-
dents 
ut lessi tijf.t *'-flhp) SAFETY AND HEALTH OOHNtSStON 
FOR THE MIMING 
AND OTHER EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES 
Common Statistics on victims 
of sccidents underground in coal mines 
COUNTRY 
COAL-FIELD 
MLGIUM 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF VICTIMS ACCORDING TO LOCATION 
AND NATURE OF INJURY AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
(absolute figures) 
NATURE OF THE INJURY 
PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
Amputations 
and 
enucleations 
Fractures 
•vitti or wllhOUt 
dislocation 
day* 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
>56 
days 
Fatal 
acci-
denta 
YEAR 1979 A ^ 
MAN-HOURS WORKED O 23 7M 496 
Luxations. 
twist and 
sprains 
3 
daya 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
Concussion 
and inter-
nal Injury 
>5β 
days 
Fatal 
ecci-
denta 
Open wounds 
contusion 
and muscular 
ab rationa 
5 
>5C 
daya 
Fatal 
acci-
denta 
Burns and 
harmful affecta 
of «tactricity 
and radiation 
t5 
>5β 
deva 
(5) 
Fatai 
acci-
denta 
Pol toning 
and 
•uftocatkKi 
>58 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
scci-
dents 
Multipla Injuriée 
of moa« not 
specified (*j 
β 
days 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
4to 
20 
da/s 
(') 
21 to 
se 
days 
(') 
>56 
days 
C) 
Fatal 
acci-
dento 
LOCATION OF THE INJURY 
Head and neck 
13  14 
13 
IV Upper limbs 
(excluding the hands) 
15  15 
24 
37  37 
46  46  28  28  78  78 
VI Lower limbs 
(excluding !eet) r  38  38  38 
14  14  16  16 
VII Multiple locations 
IX Not specified 
139  14?  3 119 
Ί Nu"it>»f ol iiouf* worheVd By p'T f 1*1 
Ί Γη* inOijldeM »"Ί ΙίΊ« »VII Iti ('β <n 
•πβ empia/e·· ol coniraeior llrmt who belong lo ■ miner Ί social Inturance »chema 
urt«d und·' upper limbi 
119 
i*) The hip· end irte ankle» ire Included under .Lower limbe' 
(■) Calender devi 
79 
33 
273 
79 
?8l ind accidents resulting in death within eight weeks 
year 1958 - ¡91'y 
per 'OOO. 000 man-nuurs 
BMH »c.mjxaEtTgag-MaeaaBn^asi' »mi n ι ι 'Ί TW ■ ι "ff 11 Ί ΐ'Γ' τττ ι~'~ "' - -
FRANCE |
 195
S 
1) Falls of ground g 0,235 
2) Haulage and transport J 0,115 
3) Movement of personnel | 0,007 
4) Machinery, handling of tools and 
supports 
5) Falling objects 
6) Explosives 
7) Explosions of firedamp or 
coal dust 
8) Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
0,018 
0,025 
_ 
0,115 
suffocation by natural gaees j Q 0^ 
9) Underground combustion and fires S 
10) Inrushes of water 
11) Electricity 
12) Other causes 
TOTAL 
-
-
0,036 
0,594 
"
:~ r^Sf-^s» 
1959 
0, 192 
0.CÍÍ5 
0,018 
0,040 
0,007 
0,026 
0,121 
0,026 
_ 
-
0,011 
0,029 
0,555 
lta3-™
!-
I960 
0,136 
0,082 
0,027 
0,016 
0,004 
_ 
0,019 
-
-
0,012 
0,003 
0,354 
—^'•"■
rr" 
1961 
0,219 
0,122 
0,008 
0,008 
0,017 
_ 
0,004 
-
0,004 
-
-
0,382 
irftwzeiiM· 
1962 
0.167 
0,077 
0,043 
0,030 
0,030 
-
0,004 
-
-
-
0,009 
0,009 
0,369 
-Ä^.*jKr: 
1963 
0, 120 
0,121 
0,009 
0,009 
0,009 
0,005 
0,019 
-
-
0,024 
0,014 
0,330 
-^-^(■^Λ.ν =ù**'" tau^lWBÄ.. 
1964 ι 1965 ί 1966 
0,127 
0,141 
0,009 
0,036 
0,018 
0,005 
. 
0,009 
-
-
-
0,014 
0,359 
0,164 
0,052 
0,042 
0,009 
0,019 
0,009 
0,155 
-
-
0,005 
-
-
0,455 
0,214 
0,126 
0,024 
0,015 
0,015 
0,005 
. 
0,005 
-
-
0,010 
0,005 
0,419 
•Ü_íí3»·---,. 
1967 
0,159 
0,088 
0,016 
0,016 
0,011 
0,005 
_ 
0,027 
-
0,005 
-
0,005 
0,332 
-..T«a-^r-=T 
I960 
0,17 7 
0,101 
0,025 
0,006 
0,031 
0,006 
0,038 
0,019 
-
-
-
-
0,403 
1969 
0,149 
0,186 
0,014 
-
0,014 
-
_ 
0,007 
-
-
0,007 
0,007 
0,384 
1970 
0,143 
0,127 
0,016 
0,032 
0,016 
0,108 
0,127 
-
-
0,016 
-
-. 
0,484 
197! 
0,117 
0,108 
0,072 
0,027 
0,045 
o,ois 
_ 
0,072 
-
-
-
0,009 
0,468 
197 2 
0,07 
0,08 
0,01 
-
-
-
_ 
-
0,01 
0,01 
-
0,03 
0,21 
1973 
0,20 
0,07 
0,01 
0,02 
0,04 
-
_ 
0,01 
-
-
-
-
0,37 
1974 
0,11 
0,12 
0,01 
0,03 
0,03 
-
0,53 
-
0,01 
-
-
-
0,89 
1975 
0,06 
0,07 
0,03 
_ 
0,03 
-
-
-, 
-
-
-
-
0,18 
1976 
0,09 
0,10 
0,03 
0,10 
0,03 
0,01 
0.23 
-
-
-
-
-
O.GO 
1977 
0,09 
0,06 
-
0,02 
-
. 
-
-
-
-
0,07 
0,19 
1978 
Q, η 
0,05 
0,02 
0,00 
0,02 
0,00 
-
-
-
-
-
0,23 
1979 
0,00 
ο,ο4 
ο,ο2 
ο,ο2 
ο,ο2 
-
-
_ 
-
_ 
-
ο,ο2 
ο,15 SAFETY ANO HEALTH COMMISSION 
FOB THE MINING 
AND OTHER EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIE;, 
Common Statistics on victims 
ol accidents underground in coal mines 
COUNTRY  PRANCE 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS ACCORDING TO CAUSE AND SITE 
OF ACCIDENT AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
(absolute figures)  YEAR 1979 
MAN-HOURS WORKED o 54 060 839 
Table 1a 
^S. SITE OF THE ACCIDENT 
\ Porjodof 
^-Oncapacity 
CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS ^C
 
H
 
I FALLSOF GROUNDS AND ROCKS 
II TRANSPORT. TOTAL 
a) Continuous Transpon 
b) Discontinuous Tranaport 
III. FALLS AND MOVEMENT OF THE VICTIM, 
TOTAL 
a) while moving about tho mine 
b) in the course oí other activities · 
IV MACHINES,TOOLSANDSUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a) Machines 
b) Tools 
c) Supports 
Production lacos 
4 to 
20 
daya 
<
3> 
1054 
82 
41 
4,1 
902 
?64 
633 
695 
45 
i 3?0 
J 330 
V.FALLS OF OBJECTS | %2 
VI EXPLOSIVES | 0 
VII. IGNITIONS OR EXPLOSIONS G Q 
OF FIREDAMP AMD COAL DUST Ç 
B 
VIH OUTBURSTS OF GAS, DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATtON OR POISONING BY NATU-
RAL GASES (CO>, CH., CO, HiS). 
TOTAL 
o) Outbursts of Gas 
b) D«-oxyginotion nnrj Poisoning 
by natural Gr.ssi 
IX. HEATINGS OR FIRES i 
0 
0 
0 
0 
X INRUSHES ¡I 3 
XI ELECTRICITY S 1 
XII OTHER CAUSES ! 
TOTAL j 
'-'63 
3547 
21 to 
55 
days 
I
1) 
477 
63 
27 
36 
478 
1/12 
336 
349 
31 
127 
131 
281 
1 
0 
t———■ 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Λ 
1 
48 
1702 
>56 
days 
('1 
174 
29 
18 
11 
114 
44 
70 
91 
13 
3? 
40 
79 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
] 
0 
14 
502 
Fatal 
acci-
denta 
3 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5 
lota! 
I7O8 
174 
86 
88 
1495 
450 
1045 
1136 
95 
479 
562 
902 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
13 
2 
325 
5756 
4 to 
20 
daya 
400 
51 
20 
31 
333 
141 
192 
306 
43 
143 
120 
238 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
139 
1470 
Headings oxc 
snarls and stap 
2 
21 to 
56 
days 
(
5) 
173 
51 
19 
32 
196 
74 
122 
132 
2? 
48 
62 
119 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
pi 
693 
>56 
days 
66 
22 
5 
17 
62 
25. 
37 
42 
17 
15 
10 
36 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
8 
236 
udlng 
e-plta 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
total 
639 
124 
44 
80 
591 
240 
351 
480 
82 
206 
192 
393 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
169 
2399 
Snerte and etople-plts 
•ito 
20 
days 
('1 
1 
9 
0 
9 
29 
16 
13 
9 
1 
5 
3 
22 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Ö 
12 
8? 
21 to 
56 
days 
('1 
0 
9 
2 
7 
14 
8 
6 
4 
0 
3 
1 
13 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
4 3 
>5β 
days 
ei 
0 
6 
0 
6 
6 
4 
2 
1 
0 
0 
1 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
18 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
tot*! 
1 
24 
2 
22 
49 
28 
21 
14 
1 
8 
5 
37 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
18 
143 
Other places 
4 
410 
20 
daya 
('1 
154 
214 
27 
I87 
822 
461 
361 
380 
30 
229 
121 
547 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
237 
2357 
21 to 
56 
days 
('1 
63 
163 
17 
146 
565 
291 
274 
168 
17 
91 
60 
328 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
2 
2 
74 
1366 
>50 
days 
(■) 
23 
88 
18 
7° 
161 
87 
74 
40 
13 
14 
13 
111 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
17 
441 
Fatal 
acci-
denta 
0 
2 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
'4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
3 
total 
24O 
467 
64 
403 
1548 
839 
709 
588 
60 
334 
194 
986 
0 
0 
2 
0 
2 
0 
4 
3 
329 
4167 
410 
20 
days 
(*) 
1609 
357 
88 
269 
2086 
882 
1204 
1390 
119 
697 
574 
1349 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
9 
3 
651 
7457 
acci 
21 to 
56 
days 
('1 
713 
285 
65 
220 
1253 
515 
738 
653 
70 
269 
314 
741 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
6 
3 
147 
3803 
Total of 
dents underground 
5 
>56 
days 
(■) 
263 
145 
41 
10^ 
343 
160 
183 
174 
49 
61 
64 
228 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
42 
1197 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
3 
2 
2 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
8 
total 
2588 
789 
196 
5?3 
3683 
1557 
2126 
2218 
238 
IO27 
953 
2318 
2 
1 
2 
0 
2 
0 
17 
6 
841 
12465 
Group 
accidents (■) 
6 
56 
days 
(•1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
total 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 i 
! 
0 ! 
0 
0 
0 
' 0 
0 
0 1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
C) Accidents involving moro than Ilve casualties (I.e. who either died or wer« unable !o rttume worfc undorrjrounr! lor at Irmi eight week», 
('iCniendJir dtf» SAFE1Y AMT) HEALTH CChTOItSIOtt 
FCR THe MINING 
ANO orvieti EXTRACTIVE IMOUCTRISS 
Common Statistics on victims 
Ol ace.dents underground in cosi mines 
COUNTRY FRANCE 
COAL-FIELD 
DETAILED BRSAKOOWN OF ACCSÖSNÏ VICTIMS ACCCKDiNS TO CAUSE AND SiTS 
Or ACCiDSMT AND PESÌQD OF INCAPACiTY 
(frequency rates)  YEAR 1979 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (') 54 060 839 
Tibi« 1b 
\^^ SITE OF THE ACCIDENT 
\* Period ol 
CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS ^ncapacity 
Production t":;rjs 
1 
4 to 
20 
days 
(') 
I 
I FAI LS OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS ¡ 19, 5o 
II TRAMSFORT TOTAL 
a) Continuous Transpon 
bl Discontinuous Transport 
III FALLS AND MOV EMENT OF THE VICTIM, 
TOTAL 
a) while moving uboul the mino 
b) in (he course of other activities 
IV MACHINES, TOOLS AND SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a) Machines 
0) Tools 
c) Supports 
V FALLS OF OBJECTS 
VI EXPLOSIVES 
VII IGNITIONS OR EXPLOSIONS 
OF FIREDAMP AND COAL DUST 
VII! OUTBURSTS OF GAS, DE-OXYGENATION, 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU-
RAL GASES (CO., CH., CO, HiS). 
TOTAL 
a) Outbursts ol Gas 
b) De-oxygBnation and Poisoning 
by natural Gases 
IX. HEATINGS OR FIRES 
X. INRUSHES 
XI ELECTRICITY 
XII. OTHER CAUSES 
TOTAL 
Ι, -ρ 
o,76 
0.76 
16,68 
4.53 
11,3o 
12,36 
o, 33 
5,92 
6, lc 
lo, o-
0, oc 
o,oc 
o,oc 
0 ,oc 
o,oc 
0, oc 
ο,Ι! 
o,o2 
4,36 
65,61 
2! to 
5S 
days 
3,3? 
1,17 
o, 5c 
o,67 
3,64 
J, 63 
6,22 
6,46 
o,57 
2,35 
hV 
5,2o 
o,o2 
0,00 
0,00 
O,00 
0,00 
0,00 
o,o7 
o,o2 
o,89 
31,48 
> 5G 
days 
3,22 
c. 54 
o,52 
Ml 
o,3l 
1,39 
1,63 
o, 35 
o,5
c' 
of74 
1,46 
0, 00 
ο,οο 
0,00 
0 ,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,0? 
0,00 
o,26 
9,29 
Faial 
occ!· 
denla 
0,06 
0 ,00 
0 ; OC 
tolal 
Htadlnnaoitcllidlns 1 Shaft» «nd «Sple-Dlö 
ühaftu end ïtiip!>piie ! 
2 I 3 
I ¡ 
ito 
20 
daya 
(') 
31,5<¡ 7.4o 
5-11 
1,59 
o, ooi 1, 63 
0, 0? 
ο, oc 
o, o2 
o,o2 
O ,00 
0,00 
0 ,0? 
0 , oc 
0, oo 
0 , oc 
o,oc 
o,oc 
o,oc 
0, 00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
o,o9 
27,65 
6,32 
19,33 
21,ol 
1,76 
3,86 
lo,4o 
16,68 
o,o2 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
ο,οο 
0,24 
o,o4 
6,ol 
lo8,3< 
0,94 
o,37 
o,57 
6,16 
2,61 
3,55 
5,66 
0,80 
2,65 
2,22 
4,4o 
o,o2 
o,o2 
0,00 
0,00 
0,0c 
0,0c 
0,0t 
ο,ο! 
2,51 
27,1; 
21 to 
5S 
daya 
3.20 
o,94 
o,35 
o,59 
3,63 
1,37 
2,26 
2,44 
r- 41 
0,89 
1,15 
2,2o 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
o,41 
12,82 
>58 
days 
(') 
}±l 
Fatal 
ncci-
utffita 
0,00 
of41 ο,οο 
i 
o,o9 ¡ο,οο 
o,31 
1,15 
0,46 
o, 63 
0,8a 
or31 
o,28 
o,l8 
o,67 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
ο,οο 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,15 
4,38 
0,00 
oroo 
0,00 
0 , 00 
0,00 
o, 00 
C,00 
0, 00 
0, 00 
0,00 
0, 00 
0,00 
0, 00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0, 00 
-¡ito 
se 
<Say& 
C) 
11.83 o,o2 0,00 
2,29! 0,17 
0,Si j ο,οο 
MS ¡ o,17_ 
lo ,93 
4,44 
6,49 
3,88 
1,52 
3,81 
3,55 
7,27 
o,o2 
c,o2 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
ο,οο 
0,00 
o,o2 
3,13 
14,38 
o,54 
o,3o 
o,24 
o,17 
o,o2 
o,o9 
0,06 
o,41 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,09 
0,00 
o,2¿ 
1,52 
o,17 
ο,ο4 
ο,13 
o,26 
o,15 
ο,ΙΙ 
o,o7 
o, 00 
0,0ό 
ο,ο2 
ο,24 
0,00 
ο,οο 
0,00 
ο,οο 
Ό. οο 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
ο, 8ο 
>56 
days 
Ρ) 
ο,οο 
ο,ΙΙ 
0,C0 
0 , ìl 
ο,ΙΙ 
O,Ü7 
0,04 
ο,ο2 
ο,οο 
0,00 
ο,ο2 
ο,ο4 
0, 00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
ο,οο 
ο,ο£ 
10,33 
Faiei 
aec!-
rfctnts 
Ο,ΟΟ 
Oj 00 
c ,00 
0 , 00 
c f 00 
0,00 
ο,οο 
0 ,00 
0 ,00 
0 ,00 
ο,οο 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
Toul of 
OthafpliOcS accident* underground 
i 5 
4 to 21 to 
! 20 5S 
0.0 2 
o,44 
0,04 
0 Al 
0,91 
0,52 
0,39 
0,26 
o,o2 
0,15 
0,09 
0,68 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,33 
2,65 
2,33 
3,96 
0,50 
3,46 
15,21 
8,53 
6,68 
7,o3 
0.55 
4,24 
¿ju-
lo, 12 
0,00 
0,00 
o,o2 
0,00 
o,o2 
0,00 
o,o2 
o,o2 
4,0] 
1,17 
3,o2 
o,31 
2.70 
Lo, 45 
5,38 
5,07 
3,11 
0,31 
1,68 
ÜL 
6,07 
0,00 
0,00 
o,o2 
0,00 
o,o2 
0,00 
0,04 
0,04 
1,37 
43,23 25,2" 
>56 
daya 
0,43 
1,63 
0,35 
Ü2. 
2,98 
1,61 
1,37 
0,74 
0,24 
0,26 
0,24 
2,05 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
o,o2 
0,00 
o,31 
8,16 
FetaJ 
accl-
djfiti 
0,0c 
0,04 
0,04 
totxl 
4,44 
8,64 
1,18 
ito 
20 
days 
1") 
29,76 
6,60 
1,63 
0,00 7,45..4,98 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
28,63 
15,52 
13,11 
lo, 88 
1,11 
6,18 
3,^9 
18,24 
0,00 
0,00 
o,o4 
0,00 
0,04 
0,00 0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
o,o2 
0,06 
38,59 
16,31 
22,27 
25,71 
2,2o 
12,89 
lo, 62 
24,95 
0, o2 
o,o2 
o,o2 
o,co 
o,o2 
0,00 
o,o7 o,17 
0,06 0,06 
6,o9 12,o4 
77,oEB7,94 
21 to 
se 
daya 
(·) 
13,19 
5,27 
l,2o 
4,o7 
23,18 
9,53 
13,65 
12,08 
1,29 
4,98 
5,81 
13,71 
o,o2 
0,00 
o,o2 
0,00 
o,o2 
0,00 
0,11 
0,06 
2,72 
7o,35 
;-56 
day» 
(") 
4,86 
2,68 
o,76 
1,92 
6,34 
2,96 
3,39 
3,22 
o,91 
1,13 
1,18 
4,22 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,04 
0,00 
o,78 
22,14 
Fatal 
acci-
denta 
0,06 
0,04 
0,04 
OjOO 
o,o2 
0,00 
0,02 
o,o2 
0,00 
0,00 
o,o2 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
o,o2 
o,15 
total 
48,00 
14,59 
3,63 
lo,?7 
68,13 
28,80 
39,33 
41,o3 
4,4o 
19,oo 
17,63 
42,88 
o,o4 
o,o2 
o,o4 
0,00 
o,o4 
0,00 
o,31 
0,11 
15,56 
23o,76 
Group 
occidental
1) 
6 
50 
days 
('ï 
0,0c 
),oo 
1,00 
3f 00 
3,00 
3, 00 
3,00 
3,00 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
0,0 5 c,00 
ope 
opo 
opo 
opo 
3,00 
3, 00 
Ο,ΟΟ 
0 ,00 
0,00 
0,
r'O 
0,00 
0 ,00 
0,0 ) C,00 
3,00 3,00 
3,00 3,00 
3,00  3,00 
3,003,00 
3,00  3,00 
3,00 3,00 
DPO  3,00 
0,00 3,00 
0,003, OC 
0,00 
3,00 
3,00 
3ρθ 
3,00 
3,00 
0,00 
0,00 
C,00 
C,00 
C ,00 
c, 00 
c ,00 
0,00 
C ,00 
0,00 
Ο,ΟΙ 0,CG 
0,0 
0,0 
0,0 
ι 0, oc 
1 0,0< 
Ο,Οί 
{'ι Number ol hours worked by pit statt and employees of contractor firms who belong to a miners' social Insurance schei 
t') Accidents Involving more than five casualties (I.e. who either died or were unable to resume work underground tor at least eight weeks) 
('(Calendar days. SAFETY AND HEALTH CGMWSSfON 
FOR T>* MINING 
AND OTHER EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES 
Common Statistics on vidimi 
ol accidents underground in coa' mines 
COUNTRY PRANCE 
COAL-FIELD 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF V5CTS&*8 ACCORDING TO LOCATION 
AND NATURE OF EtiJURY ÃftSB PEñtOD OF 6WCÂPÂC8TY 
(absolute figures) 
NATURE OF THE INJURY 
PFRIOD OF INCAPACITY 
LOCATION OF THE INJURY 
I Hea-I and neck 
¡V Upper limbs 
(oxcludingthohsnch) 
I Lower ¡imbs 
«•»eluding foei)' 
I Myilipif loc.ilions 
Amputations 
and 
enucleations 
>59 
days 
c,o^ 
',c4 
Fractur&s 
•vith or without 
dislocation 
>56 
days 
Fatal 
donts 
o,33 
Luxations, 
twist end 
sprains 
>56 
days 
Fätal 
QCCi-
dnnl3 
.JL, 
i .oj 
5.76 
Concussion 
and inter 
nol injury 
>5€ ratal 
days scci-
('i dont/i 
[ 
ί 
o,i.' 
o,?6 
0,39π wounds 
contusion 
end muacular 
Η b rea ton a 
>S3 
daya 
o,15 
o,?2 
Fatui 
r.cci-
riseti 
"Γ" 
,18 
',33 
o,72 
ο,οο r¡, ¿η 
'■" t 
η ^niårig in c .-mniv'a »orlai insu'unce ¡.c'mrns  _X_ 
Burns and 
her mfui effects 
of electricity 
nnd radiation 
>56 
d eye 
(Sì 
0.55 
2,18 
retai 
ECCI-
dents 
Poisonlnp 
snd 
suffocation 
>53 
daya 
Í5) 
Fatai 
acci-
dents 
..-^^Φ,^ .'v 
YEAR 1979 
MAN-HOURS WORKED ί
1) 54 Ο6θ 839 
Multiple Injuries 
oftnosenot 
specified (') 
8 
>56 
days 
(5! 
Fatal 
eed­
den ta 
4 to 
2G 
d nye 
667 
ó 66 
943 
?o44 
115o 
6-0 
211o 
dayfl 
693 
-14 
1344 
568 
179 
>5β 
dayo 
('i 
65 
143 
34 3 
137 
}3c3 119 
Fatal 
accl-
drnta 
lo 5 6 
136.1 
37 31 
?o'? 
:, Tlí Hipt ïnd lh¿ ânnls.- in inri.d?J imua-
', Calibri*, daye Comparative table of number of persons incapacitated 
by underground accidents for eight weeks or longer 
years 1958 ■ 1979 per '000,000 man-hours 
(frequency) 
UNITED KINGDOM 
1) Fall· of ground 
2) Haulage and transport 
3) Movement of peraonnel 
4) Machinery, handling of tool· and 
supporta 
5) Falling objecta 
6) Explosive« 
7) Explosions of flredaap or 
coal duat 
8) Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases 
9) Underground coabustlon and fires 
10) Inrushes of water 
11) Electricity 
12) Other causes 
TOTAL 
1958  19Î9  I960  1961 
A 
1962 
fot ovai 
1963 
'able fe 
1964 
llowin% 
1965  1966  1967  1968 
the system of classification 
1969 
used in 
1970  1971  1972 
the Community of S 
1973 
ix 
1974  1975  1976  1977 
1,05 
1,69 
2,03 
1,09 
0,87 
0,01 
. 
-
-
• 
1,03 
7.75 
1978 
1,02 
1,53 
1./2 
1,02 
0,82 
0,01 
-
-
-
-
3.92 
7,07 
1979 
o,82 
1,33 
1,38 
o,72 
o,55 
ο,οΐ 
ο,οο 
— 
_ 
0,00 
0,69 
5,54 Β. 
Underground accidents resulting in death within eight weeks 
year 1958-1979 
per '000,000 man-hours 
(frequency) 
4^ 
UNITED KINGDOM 
1) Falls of ground 
2) Haulag« and tranaport 
3) Moveaant of personnel 
4) Machinery, handling of tools and 
aupporta 
5) Falling objects 
6) Explosivas 
7) Explosions of firedaap or 
coal duat 
8) Sudden outburats of firedamp, 
auffocation by natural gaaee 
9) Underground combustion and fires 
10) Inrushes of water 
11) Electricity 
12) Other causes 
TOTAL 
1938  1959  1960  1961  1962  1963  1964  1965  1966  1*67  ltM  ltM  1970  1971  1972  197Î  1974  1975 
Not available following the system of classification used in the Community of Six 
i ,. 
1976  1977 
0,02 
0,07 
-
" 
• 
* 
J¿L· 
1378 
fi «1 
u, OJ 
0,12 
Β 
-
" 
0,15 
1979 
0, Ol 
ο,ο6 
0,00 
0,00 
ο,οΐ 
ο,ο3 
— 
-
fifnr> 
ο,13 ¡M-tlY AND HEALTH COMMISSION 
FOR THE MINING 
AND OTHER EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES 
Common Statistica on victims 
of accidents underground in cosi mines 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ACCIDENT VICTIMS ACCORDINO TO CAUSE AND SITE 
OF ACCIDENT AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
COUNTRY 
COAL-FIELD 
UNITED KINGDOM 
(absolute figures)  YEAR 1979 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (') 290 633 581 
Table 1a 
^s. SITEOFTHEACCIDENT 
"N. Periodo! 
CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS \mcapacity 
I. FALLS OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS 
II TRANSPORT. TOTAL 
a) Continuous Transport 
b) Discontinuous Transport 
III FALLS AND MOV EMENT OF THE VICTIM. 
TOTAL 
s) while moving about the mine 
b) In the course ol c'.her activities 
IV MACHINES, TOOLS AND SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a) Machines 
bl Tools 
c) Supports 
V FALLS OF OBJECTS 
VI EXPLOSIVES 
VII. IGNITIONS OR EXPLOSIONS 
OF FIREDAMP AND COAL DUST 
VIII. OUTBURSTS OF G«S. DE-OXYGENATION. 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU-
RAL GASES (CO·. CH., CO. H,8). 
TOTAL 
a) Outbursts of Gss 
b) De-oxygenstlon end Poisoning 
by natural Gasers 
IX. HEATINGS OR FIRES 
X. INRUSHES 
XI. ELECTRICITY 
XII. OTHER CAUSES 
TOTAL 
Production faces 
1 
4 to 
20 
days 
("1 
Î423 
872 
57 
315 
94? 
248 
694 
L7oo 
327 
13o 
L243 
1266 
18 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
8o3 
8025 
Sito 
56 
dsys 
(■) 
745 
3o6 
36 
270 
285 
74 
211 
457 
74 
37 
346 
382 
7 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
242 
2424 
>S6 
dsys 
C) 
153 
I04 
18 
36 
5o 
6 
44 
111 
29 
13 
69 
«5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
42 
525 
Fstsl 
■col· 
dents 
2 
4 
1 
3 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
lo 
total 
3323 
1286 
112 
1174 
1277 
328 
949 
2269 
431 
I80 
1658 
1714 
25 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
lo 89 
^0984 
Headings excluding 
shafts and stsple-prts 
2 
4 to 
20 
dsys 
('1 
62o 
259 
17 
242 
612 
153 
459 
618 
45 
7° 
5o3 
294 
4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
427 
2834 
2110 
66 
dsys 
(') 
Zoo 
96 
9 
87 
19o 
48 
142 
150 
16 
17 
117 
122 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
11a 
877 
>5β 
dsys 
(■) 
55 
21 
4 
17 
38 
8 
3o 
18 
0 
3 
15 
22 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
19 
174 
Fatal 
acci-
dent» 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
total 
877 
376 
3o 
346 
840 
2o9 
631 
786 
61 
9o 
635 
438 
6 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5¿4 
3887 
Shafts snd slsple-pits 
3 
410 
20 
dsys 
1*1 
0 
22 
0 
22 
0 
0 
0 
11 
3 
3 
5 
7 
0 
. 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
"TT" 
54 
21 to 
M 
days 
(·) 
0 
9 
0 
9 
0 
0 
0 
2 
1 
1 
0 
3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
11 
25 
dava 
l'I 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4 
6 
Faul 
acci-
dent» 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
] 
total 
0 
32 
0 
32 
0 
0 
0 
14 
5 
4 
5 
11 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
29 
86 
Other place» 
4 
4 to 
20 
days 
(■1 
579 
2419 
150 
2269 
5177 
2567 
26I0 
1808 
14o 
398 
1270 
1246 
24 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
1 
2548 
L38O4 
¡ito 
5β 
days 
(■) 
173 
805 
60 
745 
1590 
782 
808 
5I0 
4o 
118 
352 
425 
7 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
5 
799 
4316 
>ss 
days 
(■) 
33 
261 
25 
236 
315 
175 
14o 
80 
6 
21 
53 
74 
3 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
138 
9o7 
Fatal 
accl-
dant* 
1 
14 
3 
11 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
lo 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
27 
total 
786 
3499 
238 
3261 
7083 
3524 
3??? 
2398 
186 
537 
1675 
1746 
34 
11 
0 
0 
0 
4 
0 
8 
3485 
I9054 
410 
20 
dava 
m 
3622 
3572 
224 
3348 
673I 
2968 
3763 
4137 
SIS 
60I 
3o21 
2813 
46 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
0 
1 
3792 
24717 
Total of 
accident» underground 
5 
2110 
SS 
day» 
(■) 
III8 
1216 
105 
1111 
2065 
904 
1161 
1119 
131 
173 
815 
932 
15 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
5 
117ο 
7642 
>56 
days 
241 
387 
47 
34o 
4o3 
189 
214 
2I0 
36 
37 
137 
161 
4 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
2o3 
1612 
Fatal 
accl-
dant» 
5 
18 
4 
14 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
3 
0 
lo 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
4o 
total 
4986 
5193 
38o 
4813 
92oo 
406I 
5139 
5467 
683 
811 
3973 
39o9 
65 
11 
0 
0 
0 
5 
0 
8 
5167 
Moll 
Group 
accident» («1 
6 
se 
days 
Cl 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
total 
' ' 1 Number of noun «or »ed by pit Half and employe·· ol conlrecior firmi who belong to a minen' »octal insurance »eherne 
(*> Accidenta involving mora than five camalli·? (la. who eiH.er died Or wer« unable Io returne worn underground lor el ieaal eight week«) 
I'tCalendar deye SAFETY AND HEALTH COMMISSION 
POR ΙΉΒΜΝΝΟ 
AND OTHER EXTRACTIVE INDUSTWES 
Common Statistics en victims 
of accidents underground In coal min« C0UNTRY UNITED KINGDOM 
DETAILED SHEAKDGWN OF ACCIDENT V.CTMÄ9 ACCORDING TO CAUSE AND SITE 
OF ACCIDENT AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
(frequency rates)  YEAR 1979 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (') 290 633 581 
Table 1b 
N. SITEOFTHEACCIDENT 
"
s>w Period ol 
^xjnespacrty 
CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS "NÇ-* 
1 FALLS OF GROUNDS AND ROCKS 
II TRANSPORT, TOTAL 
a) Continuous Transport 
b) Discontinuous Transport 
III FALLS AND MOVEMENT OF THE VICTIM, 
TOTAL 
a) while moving about th· mine 
b) in the course of other activities 
IV MACHINES. TOOLS AND SUPPORTS 
TOTAL 
a) Machines 
b) Tools 
c) Supports 
V.FALLS OF OBJECTS 
VI. EXPLOSIVES 
VII. IGNITIONS OR EXPLOSIONS 
OF FIREOAMP AND COAL DUST 
VIII OUTBURSTS OF GAS, DE-OXYGENATION. 
SUFFOCATION OR POISONING BY NATU-
RAL GASES (COt. CH.. CO. H>S). 
TOTAL 
a) Outbursts of Gas 
b) De-oxygenatlon and Poisoning 
by natural Gases 
IX. HEATINGS OR FIRES 
X. INRUSHES 
XI. ELECTRICITY 
XII. OTHER CAUSES 
TOTAL 
COAL-FIELD 
Production faces 
1 
4 to 
20 
day»  « 
3,33 
2,99 
o,19 
2,8o 
3,24 
0,85 
?,38 
5.84 
1,12 
o,44 
4,27 
4,35 
0,06 
-
0,00 
-
-
2,76 
27,6o 
21 to 
SO 
day» 
(■) 
2,56 
1,05 
0,12 
0,92 
0,93 
0,25 
0,72 
1,57 
o,?5 
0,12 
1,19 
1,31 
0,0? 
-
-
-
-
0,83 
8,33 
>5β 
day» 
(■) 
0,52 
0,35 
0,06 
0,29 
0,17 
o,o2 
o,15 
o,38 
o,o9 
0,04 
o,23 
o,22 
-
-
-
-
o,14 
l,3o 
Fatal 
accl-
dant» 
0,00 
o,ol 
0,00 
o,ol 
-
-
« 
0,00 
0,00 
„ 
_ 
0,00 
-
-
-
-
-
3,00 
3,θ3 
total 
11,43 
4,42 
o,38 
4,o3 
4,39 
1,12 
3,26 
7,So 
1,48 
0,61 
5,7o 
5,89 
0,08 
-
0,00 
-
-
3,74 
S7,78 
! 
Headlno» excluding 
»rural and st»pi>-pi* 
2 
410 
20 
day· 
m 
2,13 
0,89 
0,05 
0,83 
2, lo 
o,52 
1,57 
2,12 
0,15 
0,24 
1,73 
Ι,οΐ 
ο,οΐ 
-
-
-
-
1,46 
9,74 
21 ίο 
Μ 
day» 
(Ί 
ο,68 
ο,33 
ο,ο3 
ο,29 
ο,65 
ο,ΐ6 
ο,48 
ο,5ΐ 
ο,ο5 
ο,ο5 
ο,4ο 
ο,41 
0,00 
-
-
-
-
3,4θ 
>5β 
day« 
ο,ΐβ 
ο,ο7 
ο,οΐ 
ο,ο5 
0,13 
ο,ο2 
ο.ΐο 
ο,ο6 
-
ο,οΐ 
ο,ο5 
ο,ο7 
0,00 
-
-
-
-
ο,ο6 
3,ol ,0,59 
Fatsi 
acci­
dent» 
0,00 
-
_ 
„ 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
_ 
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,00 
totel 
3,ol 
1,29 
(j, lo 
1,19 
2,88 
o,71 
2,17 
2,7ο 
o,2o 
ο,3ο 
2,18 
1.5ο 
ο,ο2 
■ -
-
-
-
1,94 
13,37 
Shift» «nd ·!ΑρΙ»Η>Η· 
3 
4 to 
20 
dava 
m 
-
D.o7 
-
0,07 
-
-
-
ο.ο3 
0,Ol 
C,ol 
o.ol 
0,o2 
-
-
-
-
-
o,o4 
0,16 
21 to 
SS 
doy» 
Ρ) 
o,o3 
-
o,o3 
-
-
-
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
o,ol 
-
-
-
-
-
o,o3 
0,08 
>se 
day» 
m 
-
0,00 
-
0,00 
-
-
-
0,00 
0,00 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
ο,οΐ 
o.o2 
Faul 
acci-
Nfltsl 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,00 
-
-
-
0,00 
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,00 
tetti 
-
0,11 
-
0,11 
-
-
-
0,04 
ο,οΐ 
ο,οΐ 
ο,οΐ 
ο,ο3 
-
-
-
-
-
ο,ο9 
å& 
OthHotacas 
4 
4 to 
20 
day« 
m 
1,99 
8,32 
0,51 
7,8ο 
17,8ο 
8,83 
8,97 
6,21 
0,48 
1,36 
4,36 
4,28 
ο,οθ 
-
0,00 
-
0,00 
8,76 
47,48 
ti to 
M 
Baye 
m 
o«y» 
(·) 
0,59 0,11 
2,76 
o,2o 
2,56 
5.46 
2,69 
2,77 
1,75 
0,13 
0,40 
1,21 
1,46 
o,o2 
-
0,00 
-
0,0] 
2,74 
14,84 
0,89 
ο,οθ 
o,8l 
1,08 
0,60 
o,48 
0,27 
o,o2 
0,07 
o,l8 
o,25 
o,ol 
-
0,00 
-
0,00 
o,47 
Petal 
acci-
dent* 
0,00 
total 
2,7o 
o,o4 [12,o3 
o,ol 
o,o3 
0,00 
-
0,00 
-
-
-
-
0,00 
-
o,o3 
— 
-
-
-
— 
3,12 0,09 
0,81 
11,21 
24,36 
12,12 
12,24 
8,24 
o,63 
1,84 
5,76 
6,00 
ο,ΙΙ 
o,o3 
·■ 
o,ol 
-
o,o2 
410 
20 
days 
m 
12,45 
12,28 
o,77 
11,51 
23,15 
lo,2o 
12,94 
14,23 
1,77 
2,06 
lo, 39 
9,67 
o,15 
-
" 
ο,οΐ 
-
0,00 
11,9° 13,04 
65,54  85,o2 
Totdof 
accldant» underground 
6 
21 to 
se 
dey· 
m 
3,84 
4,18 
o,36 
3,82 
7,lo 
3. lo 
3,99 
3,8r1 
o,45 
o,59 
2,8o 
3,2o 
0,05 
-
0,00 
*~ 
ο,οΐ 
4,o2 
26,28 
>5β 
day· 
m 
0,82 
1.33 
0,16 
1,16 
1,38 
0,65 
0,73 
o,72 
o,12 
o,12 
o,47 
o,55 
ο,οΐ 
-
0,00 
0,00 
0,69 
5,54 
Fatal 
acci­
dent» 
ο,οΐ 
o,o6 
ο,οΐ 
o,o4 
0,00 
*~ 
0,00 
0,00 
0,00 
-
-
ο,οΐ 
o,o3 
_2 
-
0,00 
0,13 
1 
total 
17,15 
17,86 
l,3o 
16,55 
31,64 
13,96 
17,67 
18,80 
2,34 
2,78 
13,66 
13,44 
o,22 
o,o3 
o,ol 
o,o2 
¡■1,11 
116,99 
——■ 
Group 
accidents!
1) 
e 
se 
days 
O 
Fatal 
acci-
dent» 
total 
C) Numbw of houri worked by pit »uff and employ··· of oorrtnclw flnrn who belong lo t mitmt' aoclal .murine· achem·, 
(^A£cHtenta.iwoMngmo*tt^ (l,*.wt»*Hr»af d.*dOfw*f>una*l^ 
(^Cati«nd*trdtys-SAFETY ANO HEALTH COViVtlSSION 
FOR THE MINING 
ANO OTHER EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES 
Common Statistics on victims 
ol accidents underground in coal mines 
COUNTRY 
COAL-FIELD 
Table la 
UNITED KINGDOM 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF VICTIMS ACCORDING TO LOCATION 
AND NATURE OF INJURY AND PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
(absolute figures)  YEAH 1979 
MAN-HOURS WORKED (') 290 633 581 
NATURE OF THE INJURY 
PERIOD OF INCAPACITY 
LOCATION OF THE INJURY 
1. Head and neck 
II Eyes 
III Trunk 
IV Upper limbs 
(excluding the hende) 
i
1l 
V Hands 
VI Lower limbs 
(excluding feet) ι·ι 
VII Feet 
Vili Multiple locetions 
IX Noi specified 
TOTAL 
Amputations 
and 
enucleations 
1 
>se 
dsys 
('1 
-
-
-
-
35 
3 
2 
-
: 
4o 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
total 
-
-
1 
-
94 
4 
4 
2 
lo5 
Fracture« 
with or without 
dislocation 
2 
>M 
days 
('1 
4 
24 
49 
4o 
122 
4o 
28 
3o7 
Fatal 
acci-
dent» 
4 
-
-
-
2 
-
1 
7 
total 
31 
64 
125 
454 
225 
167 
55 
1121 
Luxatlona. 
twist end 
sprains 
3 
>5β 
daya 
(') 
9 
2o8 
28 
12 
154 
-
38 
449 
Fatal 
acci-
dent» 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
UHI 
17ο 
5633 
685 
235 
3?o6 
181 
765 
I0875 
Concussion 
»nd inter-
nal Injur,· 
4 
>N 
days 
(·) 
-
-
-
-
' 
'■■•"■Vii.· 
-
Falei 
acci-
dent» 
-
-
-
IOUI 
-
-
-
-
-
■·" 
-
-
Open wound» 
contusion 
and muscular 
abnsalona 
5 
>M 
day« 
(•1 
44 
16 
60 
49 
269 
157 
82 
9o 
Faul 
acci-
denti 
3 
-
1 
-
-
-
-
3 
7 
total 
1595 
469 
2114 
1799 
7421 
394o 
1946 
1683 
20967 
Burna and 
harmful affecta 
of electricity 
and radiation 
e 
>M 
day» 
(5) 
-
-
-
1 
1 
-
-
1 
1 
4 
Fatal 
acci-
dent» 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
total 
1 
5 
6 
18 
12 
14 
4 
11 
28 
99 
Poiaonlng 
and 
suffocation 
7 
>M 
day. 
(5) 
Fatal 
acci-
dent« 
K ''- ■ 
total 
Multiple ln|uri»a 
ofthaaenot 
specified i*i 
e 
>56 
days 
(!) 
-
15 
1 _ 
"  ! 
·' :
:' 
■ 
-
-
-
-
2 
2 
-
1 
-
-
2 
7 
25 
Fatal 
acci-
dents 
3 
-
2 
-
— 
-
-
1 
2o 
26 
total 
lo 
586 
5 
12 
33 
12 
4 
4 
176 
842 
TOTAL 
9 
4 to 
20 
day« 
(') 
1455 
9o8 
5756 
I989 
5684 
5400 
I6I5 
1771 
139 
24717 
21 to 
5β 
day« 
<·> 
285 
121 
I752 
523 
22o7 
I563 
567 
585 
39 
7642 
daya 
C) 
57 
31 
312 
127 
358 
436 
124 
159 
8 
1612 
Fatal 
acci-
dent« 
lo 
-
3 
~ 
? 
~ 
5 
2o 
4o 
total 
l8o7 
I060 
7823 
2639 
8249 
740I 
2306 
2520 
2o6 
340II 
11 Number of hour· »ckej-d by pit etatt and employ··« of contractor firme who belong IA a miner e aoclal inturance acn*m* 
Ί inciudma complication» 
'1
 The ihoulders and Ih· wrifU ere included under .upper limbi 
I«) The hipa and Ih· ank'·» ar· included under ..Lower limbi-
'Ί Calendar daya Α. 
Comparative table of number of persons incapacitated 
by underground accidents for eight weeks or longer 
years 1958-197 9per '000,000 man-hours 
(frequency) 
ITALY 
1) Fall« of ground 
2) Haulage and transport 
3) Movement of personnel 
4) Machinery, handling of tools and 
•upporta 
5) Falling object« 
6) Explosive« 
7) Explosion« of flredejap or 
coal duat 
8) Sudden outburst of firedeap, 
suffocation by naturel gases 
9) Underground cceabustlon and fire« 
10) Inruahe« of veter 
11) Electricity 
12) Other causes 
TOT AX 
1958 
1,355 
1,335 
0,668 
1,169 
1,169 
0,167 
-
-
-
-
-
0,334 
6,197 
1959 
1,378 
0,984 
0,394 
0,984 
1,698 
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,591 
6,299 
1960 
1,808 
1,205 
1,005 
0,603 
1,808 
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,603 
7,032 
1961 
-
0,676 
1,578 
0,902 
2,029 
0,225 
-
-
-
-
-
0,451 
5,861 
1962 
0,792 
1,84 7 
1,056 
1,584 
2,375 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
7,654 
1963 
0,366 
1,465 
0,732 
1,465 
3,296 
0,366 
-
-
-
-
-
-
7,690 
1964 
0,893 
1,787 
1,7 87 
3,127 
3,574 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
11,168 
1965 
5,572 
-
-
7,164 
0,796 
-
-
-
-
-
-
1,592 
15,124 
1966 
6,360 
0,707 
0,707 
7,067 
-
-
-
-
-
-
3,360 
18,201 
1967 
5,580 
0,797 
1,594 
13,552 
6,377 
-
-
-
-
-
-
3,189 
31,089 
1968 
0, 182 
0,812 
0,812 
7,304 
6,493 
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,812 
17,043 
1969 
3,656 
-
1,462 
8,043 
3,656 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
16,817 
1970 
-
-
-
6,896 
-
-
-
-
-
-
5,172 
12,068 
1971 
5,958 
3,404 
1,702 
2,553 
1,702 
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,851 
16,170 
1972 
2,20 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
2,20 
1973 
-
-
3,25 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
3,25 
1974 
-
-
-
1,64 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1,64 
1975 
-
-
-
4,00 
-
~ 
. 
"* 
-
-
-
-
4,oo 
1976  1977  1978 
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/ 
/ 
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197S Underground accidents resulting in death within eight weeks 
year 1958-1973 
per '000,000 man-hours 
(frequency) 
-Pi-
OC 
ITALY 
1) Falls of ground 
2) Haulage and tranaport 
3) Movement of peraonnel 
4) Machinery, handling of tools 'and 
supports 
5) Falling objecta 
6) Explosives 
7) Explosions of firedamp or 
coal dust 
S) Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
auffocation by natural ganea 
9) Underground combuetion and fires 
10) Inruahea of water 
11) Electricity 
12) Other causes 
TOTAL 
1958 
0,167 
-
-
-
-
0,501 
0,167 
-
-
-
-
0,835 
1959 
-
0,197 
-
-
0,197 
-
-
-
-
_ 
-
0,394 
1960 
0,201 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
_ 
-
0,201 
1961 
0,225 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,226 
1962 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
_ 
-
-
1963 
0,366 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
_ 
-
0,366 
1964 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
_ 
-
-
1965 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
. 
_ 
. 
-
-
1966 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
. 
. 
_ 
-
-
1967 
-
0,7 97 
-
0,797 
-
-
-
-
_ 
_ 
-
1,594 
1968 
-
-
-
-
-
_ 
-
_ 
_ 
_ 
-
-
1969 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
_ 
_ 
-
-
Í97Ó 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
_ 
_ 
_ 
-
-
1971 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
'-
1972 
2,20 
-
-
-
-
-
-
_ 
_ 
_ 
_ 
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stopped / 
1978  1975 Α. 
Comparative table of number of persons incapacitated 
by underground accidents for eight weeks or longer 
years 1958 -1973 per '000,000 man-hours 
(frequency) 
J> 
NETHERLANDS 
1) Fells of ground 
2) Haulage end transport 
3) Movement of personnel 
4) Mechlnery, handling of tools and 
supports 
5) Falling objects 
6) Explosives 
7) Explosions of firedamp or 
coal dust 
8) Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases 
9) Underground combustion end flrea 
10) Inrushes of water 
11) Electricity 
12) Other ceuses 
τα AL 
1958 
1,326 
1,511 
0,324 
0,617 
0,401 
. 
. 
-
-
-
0,262 
4,441 
1959 
1,464 
1,562 
0,386 
0,402 
0,515 
_ 
. 
-
-
-
0,161 
4,490 
1960 
1,305 
1,898 
0,187 
0,780 
0,492 
-
_ 
-
-
-
0,390 
5,051 
1961 
1,829 
1,924 
0,514 
0,915 
0,819 
-
_ 
_ 
-
-
-
0,210 
6,212 
1962 
2,238 
2,590 
0,580 
1,015 
0,642 
-
_ 
_ 
-
-
0,021 
0,497 
7,583 
1963 
1,742 
1,826 
0,630 
1,050 
0,630 
-
_ 
_ 
-
-
-
0,147 
6,025 
1964 
2,017 
1,952 
0,472 
1,094 
0,923 
0,021 
_ 
m 
-
-
0,021 
0,129 
6,629 
1965 
1,923 
2,808 
0,774 
1,282 
0,862 
-
_ 
_ 
-
-
-
0,088 
7,737 
1966 
1,688 
2,621 
0,605 
2,066 
0,958 
-
_ 
_ 
-
-
-
0,353 
8,291 
1967 
2,466 
1,866 
0,766 
0,833 
0,866 
-
-
_ 
-
-
-
0,700 
7,497 
1968 
2,450 
2,407 
1,160 
1,031 
1,590 
-
-
_ 
-
-
-
0,301 
8,939 
1969 
2,737 
2,562 
1,165 
1,689 
1,106 
-
-
_ 
-
-
-
0,116 
9,375 
1970 
2,634 
2,634 
0,905 
1,894 
0,659 
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,165 
8,891 
1971 
2,528 
1,820 
0,404 
3,033 
1,213 
-
-
. 
-
-
-
0,202 
9,201 
1972 
2,06 
2,19 
1,03 
1,81 
1,55 
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,52 
9,15 
1973 
4,219 
2,443 
0,888 
1,554 
0,888 
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,666 
10,659 
1974 
1,041 
2,603 
0,521 
4,686 
1,562 
-
-
_ 
-
-
-
-
10,413 
1975  1976  1977  1978 
/ 
Production stopped 
/ 
/  zl 
/ 
/ 
/ 
t 
1979 
/ 
/ 
/ Β. 
Underground accidents resulting in death within eight weeks 
year 1958-1973 
per '000,000 man-hours 
(frequency) 
o 
NETHERLANDS  1958 
j 1) Falls of ground 1 0,262 
1 2) Haulage and transport 
| 3) Hoveaent of personnel 
4) Machinery, handling of tools and 
I supports 
5) Falling objects 
6) Explosives 
7) Explosions of firedamp or 
coal dust 
8) Sudden outbursts of firedamp, 
suffocation by natural gases 
9) Underground combustion and fires 
10) Inrushes of weter 
11) Electricity 
12) Other csusee 
TOTAL 
0,077 
-
0,015 
-
-
. 
. 
-
-
-
-
0,355 
1959 
0,064 
0,145 
-
0,016 
0,016 
-
„ 
_ 
-
-
-
-
0,241 
1960 
0,034 
0,067 
-
_ 
-
-
_ 
. 
-
-
-
0,017 
0,119 
1.561 
0,114 
0,095 
-
. 
-
-
_ 
_ 
-
-
0,019 
-
0,229 
BBeaeaa—a 
1962 
0,062 
0,062 
-
0,041 
-
-
_ 
_ 
-
-
-
-
0,166 
UHSSZESSBK 
1963 
0,084 
0,105 
-
_ 
-
-
_ 
_ 
-
-
-
-
0,189 
1564 1565 1966 
0,043 
0,172 
-
_ 
0,043 
-
_ 
„ 
-
-
-
-
0,258 
0,044 
0,177 
-
0,022 
-
-
., 
„ 
-
-
-
-
0,243 
0,050 
0,126 
-
. 
-
• 
„ 
„ 
-
-
-
-
0,175 
1907 
0.ÍO0 
-
-
0,067 
-
-
„ 
β 
-
-
-
-
0,1*7 
1Î68 
0,172 
O.OSÍ 
-
. 
Osø43 
-
„ 
_ 
-
-
-
-
0.Ϊ01 
1969 1970 
0,056 
-
0,038 
0,11? 
-
-
β 
„ 
-
-
-
-
0.2JS 
0,082 
0,165 
-
. 
-
-
_ 
β 
-
-
-
-
0,247 
1971 
0,101 
-
-
. 
-
-
. 
_ 
-
-
-
-
0,101 
1972 
-
0,26 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,26 
1S73 1974 1975 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,521 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
0,521 
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/ 
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f ANNEXES ANNEX I 
TERMS OF REFERENCE AND RULES OF PROCEDURE 
OF THE MINES SAFETY COMMISSION 
Decisions from the Council of Ministers of 
9 July 1957, 11 March 1965 and 27 June 1974 COUNCIL OF MINISTERS 
DECISION 
of 9 July 1957 
concerning the terme of reference and rules 
of procedure of the Mines Safety Commission 
Having taken note of the Recommendations adopted by the Conference 
on Safety in Coalmines and of the proposals submitted by the High Author-
ity in connection with the Conference's final Report, which afford a working 
basis for the improvement of safety in coalmines, and 
having regard to their Decisions at the Council's 36th and 42nd sessiona 
on September 6, 1956 and on May 9 and 10, 1957, setting up the Mines Safety 
Commission, 
THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE MEMBER STATES MEETING 
AT THE SPECIAL COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, 
- hereby lay down that the terms of reference of the aforesaid Commission 
shall be as follows: 
1. The Commission shall follow developments regarding safety in coalmines, including 
those regarding the safety regulations instituted by the public authorities, and 
assemble the necessary information concerning progress and practical results ob-
tained, more especially in the matter of accident prevention. 
To secure the necessary information, the Commission shall apply to the Governments 
concerned. 
The Commission shall evaluate the information in its possession and submit to the 
Governments proposals for the improvement of safety in coalmines. 
2. The Commission shall help the High Authority to work out a method of compiling 
intercomparable accident statistics. 
3. The Commission shall ensure the prompt forwarding to the quarters directly concerned 
(including in particular mines inspectorates and employers' and workers' associa-
tions) of relevant information assembled by it. 
4. The Commission shall ascertain, by regular contact with the Governments, what action 
is being taken to implement the proposals of the Conference on Safety in Coalmines, 
and such proposals as it may itself draw up. 
5. The Commission shall propose such study and research as it deems most indicated for 
the improvement of safety, with notes as to the way in which these can best be ef-
fected. 
6. The Commission shall facilitate the exchange of information and experience among 
persons responsible for safety matters, and propose appropriate measures for this 
purpose (e.g. organization of study sessions, establishment of documentation ser-
vices) . 
7. The Commission shall propose appropriate measures for ensuring the necessary liaison 
among the rescue services of the Community countries. 
155 The Commission shall submit annually to the Council of Ministers and the High Author-
ity a Report on its activities and on developments regarding safety in coalmines in 
the different member States. In this connection, it shall in particular examine the 
statistics compiled on accidents and incidents in coalmines. 
- The Representatives of the Governments further lay down that the rules 
of procedure of the Commission shall be those set forth in the Annex to 
the present Decision. 
- The Representatives of the Governments trust that the High Authority will 
arrange for the Commission to start work at the earliest possible moment. 
This Decision was adopted by the Council at its forty-fourth session, 
on July 9, 1957. 
For the Council, 
J. REY 
President. 
156 RULES OF PROCEDURE 
of the Mines Safety Commission 
CHAIRMAN 
Article 1 
The Chairman of the Minea Safety Commission shall be a Member of the High 
Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community. 
Artide 2 
The Chairman shall conduct the work of the Commission in accordance with these 
Rules of Procedure. 
MEMBERS 
Artide 3 (1) 
The Commission shall consist of 36 members appointed by the Governments; each 
country shall have four members, of whom two shall be representatives of that country's 
Governments, one of the employers and one of the workers. 
Each Government shall send in writing to the Chairman a nominal roll of the 
members appointed by it. It shall notify the Chairman of all changes in this. 
Each Government may appoint for any particular meeting of the Commission one or 
two advisers, whose names it shall send to the Chairman. 
I.L.O. PARTICIPATION 
Artide 4 
Representatives of the International Labour Organization shall be invited to 
attend the proceedings of the Commission in a consultative capacity. 
ORGANIZATION 
(a) Restricted Committee 
Artide 6 
A Restricted Committee shall be set up, to consist of Governments representa-
tives on the Commission. 
157 Artide 6 
The Chairman of the Commission shall act as Chairman of the Restricted Committee. 
Artide 7 
The function of the Restricted Committee shall be to ensure permanent liaison 
among the Governments of the member States and between them and the Commission, more espe-
cially for the purpose of exchanging relevant information. The Restricted Committee shall see 
to the preparation of the Commission's activities. 
Article 8 (1) 
The Restricted Committee shall be convened by the Chairman. 
The Chairman shall be required to convene it when asked to do so by the represent-
atives of five or more Governments. 
(b) Working Parties 
Artide 9 
The Commission of the Restricted Committee may set up Working Parties of experts 
to consider specific technical matters. 
Artide 10 
The Working Parties shall decide their own modus operandi. 
Artide 11 
The Restricted Committee shall be given reports by the Working Parties on the 
results of their proceedings, which it shall submit to the Commission with the comments 
of its members. 
In the event of differences of opinion within the Working Parties, the views 
expressed shall be given, together with the names of those expressing them. 
SECRETARIAT 
Artide 12 (1) 
The High Authority shall be responsible for the secretarial arrangements in 
connection with the work of the Commission, the Restricted Committee and the Working 
Parties. 
These arrangements shall be under the charge of a High Authority staff member 
appointed to act as Secretary. 
All documents shall be in the six official languages of the Community. 
158 WORKING PROCEDURE 
Artide 13 
The Chairman shall fix the agenda and the dates of meetings after consultation 
with the members of the Restricted Committee. 
Artide 14 tl) 
The Chairman shall allow to speak any member of the Commission or representativa 
of the International Labour Organization asking to do so. 
The Chairman may allow advisers to speak. 
Artide IS 
The members of the High Authority shall have the right to attend meetings of the 
Commission and of the Restricted Committee, and to speak there. 
The Chairman may bring with him advisers, whom he may allow to speak. 
Artide 16 
Where the Commission or the Restricted Committee deems it desirable to obtain 
information concerning the various aspects of safety in coalmines, it shall request this 
from the Governments of the member States. 
Artide 17 (1) 
24 members shall constitute a quorum. Conclusions shall be adopted by major-
ity of the members present. 
Proposals by the Commission under 1,3 of its terms of reference shall, however, 
require a vote in favour by two-thirds of the members present, and by not leas than nineteen 
members in all. 
Any diasenting opinions shall be brought to the attention of the Governments 
should the members expressing them so request. 
(1) Amended having regard to decision of the Council of the European Ccnrtunitiee of 1 Jan-
uary 1973 (Official Journal of the European Commwitiee L2 of 1 January 1973). 
159 THE COUNCIL 
DECISION (1) 
of March 11, 1965 
of the Representatives of the Governments 
of the Member States assembled in the Special 
Council of Ministers to modify the decision 
of July 9, 1957 
concerning the terms of reference and rules 
of procedure of the Mines Safety Commission 
THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE MEMBER STATES ASSEMBLED 
IN THE SPECIAL COUNCIL OF MINISTERS -
having regard to the decision of July 9, 1957 regarding the terms of 
reference and rules of procedure of the Mines Safety Commission, and 
having regard to the High Authority's proposal of January 7, 1964, 
and 
seeing that this decision in no way affects Article 118 of the Treaty 
setting up the European Economic Commununity, 
DECIDE: 
Article 1 
The terms of reference of the Mines Safety Commission laid down by the decision 
of July 9, 1957 are replaced by the provisions in the annex. 
Article 2 
The provisions of Article 17 of the rules of procedure annexed to the Decision 
of July 9, 1957 are replaced by the following provisions: 
"Should the Mines Safety Commission or the Restricted Committee consider it 
desirable to receive information regarding the various fields for which it is 
responsible, it shall apply to the Governments of the member States." 
This decision was adopted by the Council at its one-hundredth session, on 
March 11, 1965. 
For the Council 
M. MAURICE-liOKANOWSKI 
?· JS- lent 
(1) See "Journal officiel de la Cormrunauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier" no. 46 
o-~ 22nd March 196S. 
160 ANNEX 
TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE MINES SAFETY COMMISSION 
1. The Commission shall follow developments regarding safety and measures to avoid at work-
ing-points conditions which represent a danger to health in coalmines, including to this 
end the safety regulations instituted by the public authorities and assemble the necessary 
information concerning progress and practical results obtained. 
To secure the necessary information, the Commission shall apply to the Governments con-
cerned. 
The Commission shall evaluate the information in its possession and submit to the Govern-
ments proposals for the improvement of safety and health conditions in coalmines. 
2. The Commission shall help the High Authority to work out a method of compiling inter-
comparable statistics on accidents and damage to health attributable to vocational 
activities in coalmines. 
3. The Commission shall ensure the prompt forwarding to the quarters directly concerned 
(including in particular mines inspectorates and employers' and workers' associations) 
of relevant information assembled by it. 
4. The Commission shall ascertain, by regular contact with the Governments, what action 
is being taken to implement the proposals of the Conference on Sefety in Coalmines, 
and such proposals as it may itself draw up. 
5. The Commission shall propose such study and research as it deems most indicated for 
the improvement of safety, and of healthy working conditions in coalmines, with notes 
as to the way in which these can be effected. 
6. The Commission shall facilitate the exchange of information and experience among per-
sons responsible for safety matters and the maintenance of healthy working conditions, 
and propose appropriate measures for this purpose (e.g. organization of study sessions, 
establishment of documentation services). 
7. The Commission shall propose appropriate measures for ensuring the necessary liaison 
among the rescue services of the Community countries. 
8. The Commission shall submit annually to the Council of Ministers and the High Autority 
a Report on its activities and on developments regarding safety and protection of health 
in coalmines in the different member States. In this connection, it shall in particular 
examine the statistics compiled in these fields. 
161 COUNCIL DECISION 
of 27 June 1974 
on the extension of the responsibilities of the Mines Safety and Health Commis­
sion to all mineral-extracting industries 
(74/326/EEC) 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community, and in particular Article 145 
thereof ; 
Having regard to the draft of the Commission ; 
Whereas the Council resolution of 21 January I974(
4) 
concerning a social action programme envisages an 
action programme for workers which aims inter alia 
at improvement in safety and health conditions at 
work ; 
Whereas the Safety and Health Commission should 
be assigned the task of extending to all mineral-
extracting industries the preventive action which has 
hitherto been confined to coal mines ; 
Having regard to the Opinion of the European Parlia­
ment (') ; 
Having regard to the Opinion of the Economic and 
Social Committee ; 
Whereas the representatives of the Governments of 
the Member States meeting within the Council agreed 
to assign this task to the Safety and Health Commis­
sion, 
Whereas the representatives of the Governments of 
the Member States meeting within the special Council 
of Ministers, by Decision of 9 and 10 May 1957, set 
up a Mines Safety and Health Commission whose 
terms of refeience as laid down by Decision of 9 July 
19.57 (
2) of the representatives of the Governments of 
the Member States meeting within the Special 
Council of Ministers, amended by Decision of 11 
March 196.5 (
J) are to follow developments in safety 
and in the prevention of occupational risks to health 
in coal mines and to draw up proposals appropriate 
for the improvement of safety and health in coal 
mines ; 
Whereas this body has proved to be an effective and 
suitable instrument for safeguarding the health and 
safety of workers in coal mines ; 
HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS : 
Article 1 
1. Preventive action against risks of accident and 
occupational risks to the safety and health of workers 
in all mineral-extracting industries except simple exca­
vation, excluding the protection of the health of 
workers against the dangers arising from ionizing radi­
ations which is subject to special regulations pursuant 
to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community shall be the responsibility of the 
Mines Safety and Health Commission within the 
terms of reference laid down by Decision of 11 March 
1965 of the representatives of the Governments of the 
Member States meeting within the special Council of 
Ministers. 
Whereas problems of safety similar to those in coal 
mines also exist in other mineral-extracting indus­
tries ; 
Whereas the prevention of occupational accidents and 
diseases, as well as occupational hygiene, are among 
the objectives of the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community ; 
ί ) Ol No C 40, Η. 4. 1974, p. 64. 
'-'; Ol No M, 11. H. 1957, p. 487/57. 
f-| θ) No 46. 22. î. 1965, p. 698/6.5. 
2. Mineral-extracting industries shall be taken to 
mean the activities of prospecting and of extraction in 
the strict sense of the word as well as of preparation of 
extracted materials for sale (crushing, screening, 
washing), but not the processing of such extracted 
materials. 
λ. Simple excavation shall be taken to mean work 
whose purpose is not the extraction of materials for 
use. 
(<) OJ No C Π. 12. 2. 1974, p. I. 
162 A f lirit 2 —.to the other activities of the mineral-extracting 
_ . ~ . . , „ , , .... industries: as from I January 1976. 
1. This Decision shall enter into force on the fifth ' 
day following its publication in the Officiai Journal 
of I he En rupea n Communities. Done at Luxembourg, 27 June IV74. 
2. It shall apply : ftr tbc <-„„„„., 
— to the underground activities of the mineral- -p „ ■. 
extracting industries : as from the day laid down in 
paragraph I ; K. GSCHEIDLE 
163 ANNEX II 
TERMS OP REFERENCE OP THE VARIOUS WORKING PARTIES 
OP THE SAFETY AND HEALTH COMMISSION 
POR THE MININO AND OTHER EXTRACTIVE 
INDUSTRIES TERMS OP REFERENCE COMMON TO ALL HORKING PARTIES 
The Safety and Health Commission for the Mining and Other Extractive 
Industries recalls that from its inception, the exchange of experience 
and information in Working Parties has been completed wherever necessary 
in the mining "basins, testing institutes and at the manufacturers. 
167 VENTILATION, PIREDAMP AND OTHER MINE GASES 
Chairman : Mr HARLEY 
A ) General terms of reference 
The Working Party on Ventilation and Mine Gas will 
examine general problems of ventilation, particularly 
where prevention of firedamp explosions is concerned 
and other means or measures should be applied in order 
to suppress or control firedamp. 
In addition to the study of firedamp explosions occur-
ring in the Community, attention will also be devoted 
to usable results of research in the field of firedamp 
outbursts, in particular where maximum permissible 
levels in ventilation air of firedamp and other 
poisonous gases are concerned, and the advance estima-
tion of firedamp emission before a working is started. 
Attention will also be devoted to appropriate speeds 
for the flow of ventilation air, measures to be taken 
in the event of deceleration of the fow of air, measures 
for the stabilization of ventilation and the means and 
procedures for monitoring ventilation. 
B) Special terms of reference 
1. Examination of the special requirements for workings 
with auxiliary ventilation in which dust control and 
air conditioning equipment is used 
2. Examination of controlled partial recirculation of air 
in drivages. 
3. Presentation of proposals for the selection of combi-
nations of suitable materials for the impellers and 
housings of auxiliary fans. 
168 4. Preparation of a report on "Methane under armoured 
conveyors". 
5. Preparation of a second report on "Ignitions of fire-
damp by power loaders and heading machines" including 
proposals to the Governments on automatic methane 
monitoring, ventilation of the space between the road-
face and the body of the machine, horizon control and 
automatic extinguishing of ignitions. 
6. Preparation of a report on "Heavy gas emissions". 
7. Preparation of a report on "Effects of firedamp on 
the risk of explosion with coal dusts (in collaboration 
with the Working Party on "Flammable Dusts"). 
8. Drafting of uniform requirements and specifications 
for the design and use of CH¿ monitoring instruments. 
9. Preparation of a report on "Use of diesel engines 
underground in mines". 
10. Drafting conclusions concerning outbursts of coal and 
gases. 
169 WINDING ROPES AND SHAFT GUIDES, 
WINDING ENGINES AND WINCHES 
Chariman : Mr LINTZEN 
Terms of reference 
1. Follow-up of progress made in the testing of winding 
ropes by means of appropriate instruments in order to 
obtain information concerning its application in the 
mines of the Community and the United Kingdom. 
2. Testing of couplings for circular and flattened 
winding ropes. 
3. Arrangements for the installation and inspection of 
capeis. 
4. Testing of guides for winding cages in drafts and 
guide mechanisms for cable haulage in roadways. 
5. Maintenance required to ensure safe operation of 
winding ropes and balance ropes. 
6. Use of studies on the dynamic behaviour of shaft and 
roadway ropes. 
7. Exchange of views on the properties operating condi-
tions and strength of winding ropes of particular 
interest. 
8. Discussion on accidents involving winding and hauling 
ropes and their couplings, which could provide new 
information. 
170 E STRATA CONTROL AND ROCK MECHANICS 
Chairman : Mr J.S. MARSHALL 
The Working Party is instructed to examine, by ex-
changing experience and by evaluating the results of 
research, whether it is possible to draw up measures 
or practical directives for the prevention of falls 
of ground, taking into account the individual features 
of coal measures and workings. 
1. In particular : In the interest of better roof control, 
particularly within the context of working schedules, 
it will study : 
1.1. general measures to be taken into consideration in 
avoiding falls of ground, in the light of the type of 
measures and conditions of workings, e.g. sequence of 
working the seams, features of the working areas 
(length, speed of advance, etc.), type and characte-
ristics of support ; 
1.2. specific measures to deal with individual difficulties 
which may or may not foreseeably arise in the long 
term, such as disturbance zones, protective banks, 
working of a face at right-angles to the end of an 
old seam, etc. 
1.3. specific measures to be taken when starting off a face 
in order to prevent abrupt subsidence of the roof. 
2. It will also compare mining regulations on support 
and draw up minimum roof control requirements, taking 
into account the characteristics of the various faces 
(overall seam thickness, dip, dead rock ...). 
3. Stability of Tips. 
171 ELECTRICITY 
Chairman : Mr STASSEN 
Terms of reference 
1. Comparing adopted safety and accident prevention 
provisions relating to : 
a) electric shock, 
b) fire hazard, 
c) explosion hazard. 
2. Follow the evolution in Community coun-
tries with regard to safety regulations on underground 
electrical networks of low and medium voltage (up to 
1 100 V) and feeder cables for movable equipment, 
with due regard to the specifications for the said 
cables. 
3. Finish the report on steps to be taken when work has to be 
carried out on electrical equipment under voltage. 
4. Finish the study on the construction of high-tension cables (of 
up to 6 000 v) used underground, and protective 
equipment. 
5. Follow the evolution of oil-powered contactors used in gassy 
environments. 
6. Follow the development of techniques designed to eliminate 
entirely the production of sparks on electrical contact lines 
(battery motors excluded). 
7. Examination of the intrinsically safe circuits for remote 
control in conjunction with mechanisation automation. 
8. The Mines Safety and Health Commission instructs the Working 
Party on Electricity : 
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work of the CENELEC entrusted 
with harmonizing the rules covering the design of 
electrical equipment for use in explosive atmosphere ; 
8.2. to propose, if appropriate, modifications to the above 
documents of CENELEC to make them applicable to coal 
mines in countries of the European Community ; 
8.3. to prepare the models of the certificates of conformi-
ty and control for Group I electrical apparatus (in 
collaboration with D.G. Ill of the EC - Commission) ; 
8.4. to compare the rules covering installation and use of 
underground electrical equipment now current in each 
of the Community countries, particularly in respect 
of the dangers of firedamp ignition ; to ensure that 
the rules are uniform or to examine the equivalence 
of certain rules, so that such equipment can be used 
without modification in all the Community countries. 
173 HUMAN FACTORS AFFECTING SAFETY 
Chairman : Mr LINTZEN 
Terms of reference 
1. To study and work out proposals on the aspects by which behaviour 
and attitudes of individuals in extractive industries can be in-
fluenced in order to improve safety and health and working condi-
tions in these industries. 
2. To gather, consider and disseminate information about behavioural, 
organisational and human factors relating to safety and health in 
extractive industries. 
3. To consider arrangements for safety training. 
4. To consider the initiation of campaigns designed beneficially to 
influence attitudes to safety at work. 
5· To study the attitudes of work people and organisational arrange-
ments in order to create greater involvement and awareness of 
safety and health. 
6. To consider any other matters thought by the working party to be 
relevant to improving attitudes towards safety and health at work 
in extractive industries. 
174 MECHANIZATION 
Chairman : Mr MEDAETS 
Taking into consideration current techniques in 
winning and roadway driving linings and roadway con-
veyors, the working party is instructed to study 
particular ways of preventing accidents connected 
with mechanization. 
In particular, it is to : 
a) compile a schedule for machinery manufacturers and 
users of the minimum work safety requirements for mechanical 
protection of machines and equipment} 
b) study safety provisions such as : visual and acoustic 
signalling, operating controls and in particular the 
ability to stop machines from any point on the face or 
roadway, taking account of modern means of telecom-
munication and remote control, electrical protection 
of motors in the event of overloading or jamming of 
equipment, lighting, etc. 
175 K OIL, GAS AND OTHER MATERIALS EXTRACTED BY BOREHOLE 
Chairman : Mr DE KORVER 
Terms of reference 
1. In the light of information available on safety and 
health hazards and the causes of accidents during 
prospecting, boring and extracting to obtain petro-
leum, gas and other materials by the Community coun-
tries within their territory or offshore dependencies, the 
working party is instructed in particular : 
a) to evaluate lessons to be drawn from several serious 
accidents which occurred during the evacuation of 
platforms off shore : recommandation on exercises for 
the rescue of men falling over board, for the evacua-
tion of platforms, fire fighting, etc... 
b) to form a study and editorial group which will etudy 
the problem of accident statistics in the specific 
field outlined under 1. in collaboration with the 
working party on Common Accident Statistics ; 
c) to make proposals in the field of initial and refresher 
training for personnel of all ranks ; 
d) to maintain contacts with the organizations and confe-
rences working in this field, in particular with the 
"London Conference of Safety and Pollution Safeguards 
in the Development of North West European Offshore 
Mineral Resources" and particularly with its group III, 
with the "Inter-Governemental Maritime Consultative 
Organization", with the "International Labour Office" 
and the "European Diving Technology Committee". 
e) to follow the evolution of techniques of exploiting by borehole, 
petroleum, gas and other materials; to up-date and develop proposals 
of the Safety and Health Commission for the mining and other extrac-
tive industries on the prevention of blowouts, and to propose usefull 
methods of controlling these in the event of a blowout occurring. 
176 COMBUSTIBLE DUSTS 
Chairman : Mr. KOCH 
Terms of reference 
Taking into account the mechanism of dust combustion 
and of flame propagation and the various factors which 
may influence this, including the fact that methane 
is frequently involved in this phenomenon, the working 
party is instructed to carry out a study of precau-
tions against dust explosions, in particular : 
a) dust neutralization (dust control in situ, stone 
dusting, spraying, dust fixation by means of spreading 
salts and coagulating pastes etc.), this study to in-
clude the comparative analysis of the regulations and 
instructions applied in the Community countries, along 
with the methods of application of the different pro-
cesses , 
b) dust barriers of various types to halt dust explosions, 
mixed dust-methane explosions and pure methane explo-
sions . 
The working party may make any suggestions for research 
work considered necessary to advance the knowledge of 
the phenomena studied and to promote safety in these 
fields. 
177 M HEALTH IN MINES 
Chairman : Mr MARSHALL 
Studying, from the standpoint of technical prevention 
and industrial medicine, the prevention of environ-
mental risks to the health of workers in coal mines, 
and other extractive industries. 
1. To update the general directives concerning airborne 
dust control methods in coal mines during the use of 
power loaders and heading machines, particularly in 
connection with powered supports, underground crushers 
and rubber tyred transport vehicles. 
2. Dust measurement (methods, frequency, measuring points, 
conclusions to be drawn etc.) and where necessary 
establishing a scale of comparison of the various 
methods employed in coal and other mines. 
3. Establishment of airborne dust thresholds. Definition 
of categories of permissible dustiness. Steps to be 
taken when faced with various categories of dustiness, 
especially in coal mines. 
4. Among the medical problems in the control of ambient 
health hazards to workers in mines and other extractive 
industries priority must be given to the study of the 
following factors : climate, noise, vibration, 
visibility and gas, in particular radon and H_S. and 
other materials which might be dangerous to health. 
5. To indicate the lines of research into the use of dangerous sub-
stances and to use their results to suggest appropriate action. 
178 N RESCUE ARRANGEMENTS, 
FIRES AND UNDERGROUND COMBUSTION 
Chairman : Mr COENDERS 
A) General terms of reference 
(Art. 7 of the Terms of Reference of the Mines 
Safety and Health Commission) 
Exchange of experience between the Community countries 
on : 
1. Rescue operations and action against spontaneous 
combustion, heatings and fires on the occasion of 
accidents or other events underground requiring the 
assistance of rescue teams, from which useful lessons 
have been learned ; 
2. Organization of rescue operations underground and 
the presentation of reports every two years ; 
3. The prevention of spontaneous combustion, heatings 
and fire outbreaks underground, the fighting and con-
trol of spontaneous combustion, heatings and fires, 
and reopening sealed-off workings. 
B) Special terms of reference 
1. Comparison of practical arrangements of rescue opera-
tions existing in the Community countries and possibly 
the drafting of a standard plan of procedure for the 
Community as a whole. 
2. Exchange of experience and practical knowledge in the 
following fields : 
a) methods and apparatus for the early detection of com-
bustion, heatings and pit fires, 
b) CO self-rescuers employing filters or oxygen and more 
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14) generally methods to protect personnel in noxious 
atmospheres (gas, fumes, oxygen deficiency etc.) 
c) Oxygen deficiency warning devices, 
d) Fires in long plant, 
e) Sealing off abandoned workings, 
f) Specifications and testing conditions for fire-
resistant fluids for mechanical power transmission. 
3. Condensed comparative survey of new regulations and 
guidelines promulgated by the mining authorities of 
member countries on rescue arrangements, first aid 
and fire lighting and prevention. 
C ) Analysis of results (partial or overall) of research 
pro.iects at present in progress so as to : 
1. Improve borehole rescue techniques, 
2. Define the standards to which flameproof clothing 
should conform. 
D ) Studies to be completed on the following sub.iects : 
1. Effects of a fire in shafts, 
2. Resources to be applied to combat the danger of ex-
plosion during firefighting : nitrogen and others. 
180 COMMON ACCIDENT STATISTICS 
Chairman : Mr KOCH 
Terms of reference 
1. To extend the tables of accident statistics under 
ground, prepared for coal mines to all the extractive 
industries. 
The working party shall determine the conditions for 
this extension and examine how the condensed statis-
tics on socioeconomic items might be presented for 
all the extractive industries. 
2. To establish statistics on certain occupational diseases notably, 
pneumoconiosis and deafness. 
3. To study the possibility of introducing into the table for the 
coal mining industry which figures in the First Chapter of the 
Annual Report, other technical elements which may have an effect 
on the frequency of accidents. 
4· In order to enable the Mines Safety and Health Commission to 
draw conclusions on accident prevention, the frequency of under-
ground accidents in the Community coal mines should be examined, 
with the following objectives : 
1. To decide on suitable mathematical statistical systems; 
2. To evaluate, with their aid, chronological differences in 
frequency together with differences from country to country 
or coalfield to coalfield. 
181 ANNEX III 
COMPOSITION OP THE SAFETY AND HEALTH COMMISSION FOR THE 
MINING AND OTHER EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES 
AND OF ITS WORKING PARTIES COMPOSITION OP THE SAFETY AND HEALTH COMMISSION POR THE 
MINING AND OTHER EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES AND OP ITS WORKING 
PARTIES 
- SAPETY AND HEALTH COMMISSION 
- RESTRICTED COMMITTEE 
- Secretariat J. LECLERCQ 
- WORKING PARTIES : 
C. Ventilation, Firedamp and Other 
Mine Gases Mr. T. OBST 
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Cl. Piredamp Monitoring Instruments.... Mr. T. OBST 
D. Winding Ropes and Shaft Guides, 
Winding Engines and Winches Mr. WETEKAM 
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Dl. Winding Ropes Mr. WETEKAM 
D2. Winding Engines Mr. WETEKAM 
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M. Health in Mines Mr. GILLARDIN 
N. Rescue Arrangements, Mine Fires and 
Underground Combustion Mr. WALKER 
Committees of Experts : 
Nl. Stabilization of Ventilation Mr. WALKER 
N2. Fire-resistant Fluids Mr. WALKER 
N3· Conveyor Belts and Other long 
Items of Plant Mr. WALKER 
m. Self-rescuers Mr. WALKER 
N5. Safety Signs Mr. WALKER 
0. Common Accident Statistics Mr. WALKER 
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H. HARNISCH  Bergassessor 
Paul Geisler Weg 9 
4600 DORTMUND 
R. HELFFERICH  Geschäftsführer der Deilmann-
Haniel GmbH 
Haustenbecke 1 
D 
4600 DORTMUND 13 
194 BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND - REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D'ALLEMAGNE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY - REPUBBLICA FEDERALE TEDESCA 
BONDSREPUBLIEK DUITSLAND - FORBUNDSREPUBLIKKEN TYSKLAND 
Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbe j dsgrupperne 
P. HERMANN  Direktor 
Technischer Ueberwachungsverein eV 
Steubenstrasse, 53 
N2 
4300 ESSEN 
K.D. HERMS  Bergbau AG Niederrhein 
Verwaltung Homberg 
Postfach 17 02 60 
4100 DUISBURG 17 
K. HORNEFFER  Bundesministerium für Arbeit 
und Sozialordnung 
A-B 
5300 BONN 
G. HURCK  Bergwerksdirektor 
Mitglied des Grubenvorstandes der 
Gewerkschaft Auguste Victoria 
Victoriastrasse, 43 
A-E 
4370 MARL 
F. JUNG  IG Bergbau und Energie 
Hauptverwaltung 
Alte Hattinger Strasse, 19 
4630 BOCHUM 
KEUSGEN  Regierungsdirektor 
Bundesministerium für 
Wirtschaft und Finanzen 
Villemonbler Strasse, 76 
E-El-M 
5300 BONN-DUISDORF 
F. KILLING  Berggewerkschaftliche 
Versuchsstrecke und Spreng-
sachverständigenstelle 
Beylingstrasse, 65 
4600 DORTMUND-DERNE 
195 
6) BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND - REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D'ALLEMAGNE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY - REPUBBLICA FEDERALE TEDESCA 
BONDSREPUBLIEK DUITSLAND - FORBUNDSREPUBLIKKEN TYSKLAND 
Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
A. KLOCKMER  c/o Gewerkschaften Brigitta und 
Elwerath 
Betriebsführungsgesellschaft mbH 
Postfach 510360 
Riethorst 12 
Kl 
3000 HANNOVER 51 
F.J. KOCK  Leiter der Hauptstelle für das 
Grubenrettungswesen 
Steinkohlenbergbauverein 
Franz-Fischer-Weg 61 
N-N4 
4300 ESSEN 
H. KOEHNE  Bergbau-Forschung GmbH 
Frillendorferstr. 351 
N3 
4300 ESSEN-KRAY 
M. KOPKE  I.G.Bergbau und Energie 
Η aup tve rwa1tung 
Alte Hattingerstrasse, 19 
Postfach 1229 
M 
4630 BOCHUM 
U. KROPP  Bergwerksdirektor 
Preussag A.G. Kohle 
Postfach 360 
4530 IBBENBUEREN 
Dr. LEVIN  Bergbau-Berufsgenossenschaft 
Hauptverwaltung 
Postfach 100429 
Gl 
4630 BOCHUM 1 
196 BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND - REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D'ALLEMAGNE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY - REPUBBLICA FEDERALE TEDESCA 
BONDSREPUBLIEK DUITSLAND - FORBUNDSREPUBLIKKEN TYSKLAND 
Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
R. LINTZEN  Ministerialrat 
Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft 
Referat III Al 
Villemomblerstrasse, 76 
A-B-D-
G-Gl 
5300 BONN 
S. MADER  Bergassessor 
Gesamtverband des Deutschen 
Steinkohlenbergbaus 
Friedrichstrasse, 1 
4300 ESSEN 1 
R. MUELLER  Betriebsdirektor 
Leiter der Hauptrettungsstelle 
in Friedrichsthal 
N 
6605 FRIEDRICHSTHAL 
K. PALM  Abteilungsdirektor 
Landesoberbergamt Nordrhein-
Westfalen 
Goebenstrasse 25-27 
C-N-N3 
4600 DORTMUND 
CA. PRIMAVES I  Professor 
Hygiene-Institut des Ruhrgebietes 
Rotthauserstr. 19 
N2 
4650 GELSENKIRCHEN 
W. ΡROCH  AEG-TELEFUNKEN 
Postfach 120 
5750 MENDEN 
197 BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND - REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D'ALLEMAGNE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY - REPUBBLICA FEDERALE TEDESCA 
BONDSREPUBLIEK DUITSLAND - FORBUNDSREPUBLIKKEN TYSKLAND 
Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
J. REDEKER  Bergdirektor 
Referat B/3 Montanwirtschaft 
Ministerium für Wirtschaft, 
Verkehr u. Landwirtschaft des 
Saarlandes 
Hardenbergstrasse, 8 
6600 SAARBRÜCKEN 1 
D. REEH  Bergassessor 
Bergbau-Versuchsstrecke 
Beylingstrasse,65 
4600 DORTMUND 14 
REICHEL  Steinkohlenbergbauverein 
Franz-Fischer-Weg 61 
N2 
4300 ESSEN 
K. REINKE  Bergassessor 
Geschäftsführer der 
Versuchsgrubengesellschaft mbH 
Tremoniastrasse, 13 
L-N 
4600 DORTMUND 
H. RITTER  Bergdirektor 
Landesoberbergamt-Nordrhein-Westf. 
Goebenstrasse, 25-27 
4600 DORTMUND 
H. ROEHLINGER  Leiter der Seilprüfstelle der 
Saarbergwerke A.G. 
Triererstrasse, 1 
D 
6600 SAARBRUECKEN 
198 BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND - REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D'ALLEMAGNE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY - REPUBBLICA FEDERALE TEDESCA 
BONDSREPUBLIEK DUITSLAND - FORBUNDSREPUBLIKKEN TYSKLAND 
Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
F.J. ROELLEKE  Bergdirektor 
Bergamt Meppen 
Widukindstrasse, 
K-K1-K3 
4470 MEPPEN 
Κ. ROESGEN  Erster Bergrat 
Steinkohlenbergbauverein 
Abteilung Grubensicherheit 
Frillendorferstrasse, 351 
L-0 
4300 ESSEN-KRAY 
R. ROETTGER  Ruhrkohle A.G. 
Postfach 5 
4300 ESSEN 
RUST  Industriegewerkschaft 
Bergbau und Energie 
Fuhrberger Strasse 21 
Κ 
3100 CELLE 
M. SCHNIER  Bergassessor 
Bergbau A.G. Westfalen 
Silberstrasse 22 
4600 DORTMUND 1 
W. SCHOETTELNDREIER  Bergdirektor 
Landesoberhergamt Nordrhein-Westf. 
Goebenstrasse 25-27 
4600 DORTMUND 
E. SCHUBERT  Leiter der Prüfstelle für 
Grubenbewetterung der 
Westfälischen Berggewerkschaftskasse 
Hernerstrasse 42-35 
C-Nl 
4630 BOCHUM 
199 BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND - REPUBLIQUE FEDERALE D'ALLEMAGNE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY - REPUBBLICA FEDERALE TEDESCA 
BONDSREPUBLIEK DUITSLAND - FORBUNDSREPUBLIKKEN TYSKLAND 
Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbe j dsgruppe rne 
SEYL  Berghauptmann 
Oberbergamt für das Saarland 
und das Land Rheinland-Pfalz 
Am Staden 17 
A-B 
6600 SAARBRUECKEN 
W. SLONINA  Versuchsgrubengesellschaft mbH 
Tremoniastrasse, 13 
D1-D2 
4600 DORTMUND 
STRÅKERJAHN  Bergdirektor 
Landesobert ergamt Nordrhein-Westf. 
Goebenstr. 25-27 
0-N5 
4600 DORTMUND 
G. THIELEN  Bergdirektor 
Wilhelmsklamm 18 
6604 GUEDINGEN/Saar 
K. TRAEGER  Bergdirektor 
Landesoberbergamt Nordrhein-Westf. 
Goebenstrasse 25-27 
I-N2 
4600 DORTMUND 
200 BELGIQUE - BELGIUM - BELGIEN - BELGIO - BELGIË - BELGIEN 
Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
J. BRACKE  Ingénieur 
Directeur des Mines 
Institut National des 
Industries Extractives (INIEX) 
60, rue Grande 
F-L-N-
N2-N3 
7260 PATURAGES 
M. BRYCH  Professeur à la 
Faculté Polytechnique de Mons 
9, rue Houdain 
K-Kl 
7000 MONS 
P. CAJOT  Inspecteur Général des Mines 
Ministère des Affaires Economiques 
30, rue De Mot 
1040 BRUXELLES 
K-K3 
J.B. CAZIER  Ingénieur Principal des Mines 
Administration des Mines 
Centre Albert 
4, Place Albert 1er - Bte 5 
M 
6000 CHARLEROI 
L. COLINET 
M. DAENENS 
Rue de Monceau-Fontaine, 33 
6031 MONCEAU-SUR-SAMBRE 
Professor aan de K.U.L. 
Laboratorium voor Toxicologie 
Van Evenstraat 4 
C-Gl 
N2 
3000 LEUVEN 
J. DE BACKER  Ingénieur Principal des Mines 
Administration des Mines 
30, rue De Mot 
1040 BRUXELLES 
201 BELGIQUE - BELGIUM - BELGIEN - BELGIO - BELGIË  BELGIEN 
Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
DECKERS  Divisiedirecteur der Mijnen 
Demerstraat 81 -4de Verdieping 
3500 HASSELT 
DE GROOT  e.a.Mi j ningenieur 
Administratie van het Mijnwezen 
Afdeling Kempen 
Demerstraat 81-4de Verdieping 
3500 HASSELT 
M. DEGUELDRE  Conseiller à l'Institut 
d'Hygiène des Mines 
Hovermarkt 22 
A-M 
3500 HASSELT 
A. DENTENEER  Hoofdingenieur 
Directeur der Mijnen 
Demerstraat 81-4de Verdieping 
3500 HASSELT 
Ph. DOM  Directeur 
S.A. FORAKY 
15, place des Barricades 
Κ 
1000 BRUXELLES 
Ch. FRENAY  Directeur Divisionnaire des Mines 
Division du Hainaut 
Centre Albert 
4, Place Albert 1er - Bte 5 
N2 
6000 CHARLEROI 
GHISLAIN  Ingénieur 
Ateliers de Constructions 
Electriques de Charleroi 
Avenue E. Rousseau 
6001 MARCINELLE 
202 BELGIQUE - BELGIUM - BELGIEN - BELGIO - BELGIË - BELGIEN 
Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
P. GOFFART  Ingénieur en Chef 
Directeur des Mines 
Administration des mines 
Ministère des Affaires Economiques 
30, rue De Mot 
1040 BRUXELLES 
H. GREGOIRE  Inspecteur generaal der Mijnen 
Administratie van het Mijnwezen 
30, rue De Mot 
C-Cl-N 
N4-N5 
1040 BRUXELLES 
E. JACQUES  Département de Thermodynamique 
Place duLevant 2 
NI 
3000 LOUVAIN-LA-NEUVE 
J.Ch. JANSEN  Administrateur Principal 
D.G.Marché Intérieur et Aff.Industr. 
Commission des Communautés Européennes 
200, rue de la Loi 
Ì049 BRUXELLES 
M. JANSEN  Ingénieur 
N.V. Kempense Steenkolenmijnen 
Kolenmijnlaan 48 Β 
3540 ZOLDER 
G. LECLERCQ  Directeur des Travaux 
S.A. des Charbonnages de Roton-
Farciennes et Oignies-Aiseau 
20, rue Destrée 
6258 LAMBUSART 
J. LEYS  Ingénieur 
N.V. Kempense Steenkolenmijnen 
Kolenmijnlaan 48 Β 
3540 ZOLDER 
203 
Í7) BELGIQUE - BELGIUM - BELGIEN - BELGIO - BELGIË - BELGIEN 
Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
M. MAUFORT  Koolmijnlaan 194 
3560 BERINGEN 
M. MAYNE  Directeur du Centre de Coordination 
de Sauvetage du Bassin de Campine 
Kempische Steenweg 555 
3500 HASSELT 
L-N-N3 
J. MEDAETS  Directeur Generaal van het Mijnwezen 
Ministerie van Economische 
Zaken en Energie 
30, rue De Mot 
A-B-I 
1040 BRUSSEL 
G. MIGNION  Ingénieur en Chef 
Directeur des Mines 
Centre Albert 
4, Place Albert 1er - Bte 5 
El 
6000 CHARLEROI 
G. MIGNON  Ingénieur en Chef 
Directeur Administration des Mines 
Direction Générale des Mines 
30, rue De Mot 
D1-D2 
1040 BRUXELLES 
J. OLYSLAEGERS  Président National de la 
Centrale Syndicale des Travailleurs 
des Mines de Belgique 
8, rue Joseph Stevens-B.P.4 
A-I 
1000 BRUXELLES 
J. PATIGNY  Université de Louvain 
Bâtiment Stevin 
2, place du Levant 
1348 LOUVAIN-LA-NEUVE 
204 BELGIQUE - BELGIUM - BELGIEN - BELGIO - BELGIË - BELGIEN 
Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
L. PERWEZ  Ingénieur en Chef 
Directeur des Mines 
Administration des Mines 
25, boulevard Frère Orban 
K2 
4000 LIEGE 
Y. PUT  Ingénieur en Chef - Directeur 
Administration des Mines 
13, rue de Spa 
4000 LIEGE 
A. RENDERS  Voorzitter van de Centrale der 
Vrije Mijnwerkers 
Oudergemselaan 26-32 
1040 BRUXELLES 
L. RUY  Ingénieur en Chef - Directeur des Mines 
Ministère des Affaires Economiques 
30, rue De Mot 
1040 BRUXELLES 
J. STASSEN  Inspecteur Général des Mines 
Administration des Mines 
49, rue des Augustins 
4000 LIEGE 
A-B-F-N 
R. STENUIT  Avenue de la Libération,66 
1640 RHODE ST GENESE 
NI 
P. TAMO  Ingénieur Principal 
Ateliers de constructions 
électriques de Charleroi 
Avenue E. Rousseau 
6001 MARCINELLE 
205 BELGIQUE - BELGIUM - BELGIEN - BELGIO - BELGIË - BELGIEN 
Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
H. TRONNIER  Secrétaire Général du CENELEC 
2, rue Brederode 
1000 BRUXELLES 
E.VANDENDRIESSCHE  Secrétaire Général de la 
Centrale des Francs-Mineurs 
113, rue de Trazegnies 
A-C-G-N5 
6180 COURCELLES 
G. VAN GUCHT  e.a. Mijningenieur 
Administratie van het Mijnwezen 
Demerstraat 81 - 4de Verdieping 
3500 HASSELT 
M. VERWILST  Association des Industriels 
de Belgique (A.I.B.) 
Avenue A. Drouart 29 
1160 BRUXELLES 
206 DANEMARK - DENMARK - DAENEMARK - DANIMARCA 
DENEMARKEN - DANMARK 
Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
J. BLOU  Fabrikinspektoer 
Direktoratet for Arbejdstilsynet 
Rosenvaengets Allé 16 
2100 KOEBENHAVN OE 
K 
O. BRUUN  Ekspeditionssekretaer 
for Arbejdstilsynet 
Rosenvaengets Allé 16-18 
2100 KOEBENHAVN OE 
0 
D. BUCH  Afdelingsingenioer 
Ministeriet for Groenland 
Hausergade 3 
1128 KOEBENHAVN K 
A-B-K 
S. ENEVOLDSEN  Petroleum Engineer, M.Sc. 
Danish Energy Agency 
Landemaerket 11 
K2-K3 
1119 KOEBENHAVN - K 
S. FONSSKOV  Forbund s formant 
Dansk-Maskinbesaetningsforbund 
St.Strandstraede 8 
K 
1255 KOEBENHAVN K 
E. SPRUNK-JANSEN  Direktor 
GREENEX A/S 
Landemaerket 10 
A-K 
1119 KOEBENHAVN K 
207 DANEMARK - DENMARK - DAENEMARK - DANIMARCA 
DENEMARKEN - DANMARK 
Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbe j dsgruppe me 
STEEN Danish Energy Agency Kl 
Landemaerket 11 
1119 KOEBENHAVN - K 
B. SVENDSEN Fabriksinspektoer A-B-K1-N5 
Arbejdstilsynets Groenlands Kreds 
Directoratet for Arbejdstilsynet 
Rosenvaengets Allé 16-18 
2100 KOEBENHAVN OE 
208 FRANCE - FRANKREICH - FRANCIA - FRANKRIJK - FRANKRIG 
Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
C. AMOUDRU  Médecin-chef 
des Charbonnages de France 
9, Avenue Percier 
Boîte postale 396-08 
75360 PARIS CEDEX 08 
N2 
M. BIEAU  Directeur des 
Services Techniques des 
Charbonnages de France 
9, avenue Percier 
Boîte postale 396-08 
75360 PARIS CEDEX 08 
G. BLANPAIN  Ingénieur, 
Laboratoire au Centre d'Etudes et 
de Recherches des Charbonnages 
de France 
VERNEUIL-EN-HALATTE 
B.P. 2 
N2 
60550 VERNEUIL-EN-HALATTE 
M. BOULICAULT  Ingénieur en chef des Mines 
Chef du Service des Techniques 
du Sous-sol 
Ministère de l'Industrie 
99, rue de Grenelle 
A-B-Dl 
75700 PARIS 
N. BOUTIER  5, rue du Maréchal Juin 
62800 LIEVIN 
N3 
M. BOUTONNAT  CERCHAR 
B.P.n.2 
Cl 
60550 VERNEUIL-EN-HALATTE 
M. BURGUN  Directeur-Adjoint-Principal 
Association des Industriels de France 
10, rue de Calais 
Dl 
75009 PARIS 
209 FRANCE - FRANKREICH - FRANCIA - FRANKRIJK - FRANKRIG 
Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
J. CEREDE  Ingénieur en Chef de l'exploitation 
10, rue Espariat 
N 
13100 AIX-EN-PROVENCE 
M. CHAMPAGNAC  93, rue Falguière 
7 5015 PARIS 
NI 
J. CRETIN  Ingénieur principal 
Poste central de secours 
BELLE-ROCHE 
N-Nl 
57802 FREYMING-MERLEBACH 
M. DELCLAUX  Laboratoires du Cerchar 
B.P.n.2 
N3 
60550 VERNEUIL-EN-HALATTE 
G.DEPAMAUX  Fédération des Mineurs C.F.T.C. 
43, rue des Cyclamens 
Cité 12 bis 
62300 LENS 
H. DESVIGNE  Chef du Service central de Sécurité 
Houillère du Bassin du Nord 
et du Pas-de-Calais 
20, rue des Minimes 
59500 DOUAI 
M. DOLIGEZ  Ingénieur principal 
Chef du siège 19 
Houillères du Bassin du 
Nord et du Pas-de-Calais 
12, rue Emile Combes 
C-L 
62300 LENS 
J. FOUBET  86, avenue E. Zola 
75015 PARIS 
210 FRANCE - FRANKREICH - FRANCIA - FRANKRIJK - FRANKRIG 
Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbej dsgrupperne 
M. FROGER  Chef du Groupe de Recherche 
"Aerage" 
CERCHAR 
Boite postale 2 
60550 VERNEUIL-EN-HALATTE 
M. GILTAIRE  Ingénieur au Cerchar 
B.P.n.2 
60550 VERNEUIL-EN-HALATTE 
M. GOUILLOUX  Charbonnages de France 
Direction des Services Techniques 
9, avenue Percier 
B.P. 396-08 
75360 PARIS CEDEX 08 
M. GRAGEΖ  Ingénieur en Chef des mines 
Service de l'Industrie et des Mines 
de Rhône Alpes 
11, rue Curie 
69456 LYON CEDEX 3 
R. GRISARD  Ingénieur Principal 
Chef du Service Sécurité des mines 
des Charbonnages de France 
9, avenue Percier 
Boîte postale 396-08 
75360 PARIS CEDEX 08 
M-N-N3-0 
ISNER  Ingénieur Principal 
Houillères du Bassin du 
Nord et du Pas-de-Calais 
20, rue des Minimes 
59500 DOUAI 
C. JAGUSINSKI  1, rue de la Forêt 
Ruelisheim 
M 
68270 WITTENHEIM 
211 FRANCE - FRANKREICH - FRANCIA - FRANKRIJK - FRANKRIG 
Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
KOCH  Ingénieur en Chef des mines 
Direction de la Qualité et de la 
Sécurité Industrielles 
See des Techniques du Sous-sol 
99, rue de Grenelle 
A-L-0 
75700 PARIS 
M. LAMATY  Ingénieur au Service P.E.M. 
Direction des travaux du jour 
Houillères du Bassin de Lorraine 
D-D2 
57800 MERLEBACH 
M. LANDIER  Ingénieur principal 
aux Charbonnages de France 
9, avenue Percier 
Boîte Postale 396-08 
0 
75360 PARIS CEDEX 08 
J.P.LARREUR  Ingénieur Divisionnaire 
Service Technique 
Charbonnages de France 
9, avenue Percier 
Boîte Postale 396-08 
C-G 
75360 PARIS CEDEX 08 
M. LE BOUFFANT  Chef du Département Physique-Biologie 
Lab.du Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches 
des Charbonnages de France 
B.P.n.2 
N2 
60550 VERNEUIL-EN-HALATTE 
Y.LE GAL LA SALLE  Département Sécurité-Environnement-
Sécurité 
Société Nationale Elf-Aquitaine 
Tour Générale 
K2 
92080 PARIS-LA-DEFENSE 
212 FRANCE - FRANKREICH - FRANCIA - FRANKRIJK - FRANKRIG 
Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
We rkgroepen-Arbe j dsgrupperne 
R. LELEUX  Ingénieur Divisionnaire des T.P.E. 
Chef du groupe de Subdivisions 
de Béthune 
297, rue Michelet 
62400 BETHUNE 
MACART  Ingénieur des T.P.E. 
Direction des carburants 
Ministère de l'Industrie 
5, rue Barbet de Jouy 
K 
75700 PARIS 
J.C. MARTIN  Dept. Physique-Biologie 
Lab.du centre d'études et de 
recherches des 
Charbonnages de France 
B.P.n.2 
N2 
60550 VERNEUIL-EN-HALATTE 
M. MATHEUS  Ingénieur 
Arrondissement mineralogique de 
Bordeaux 
26, Cours Xavier Arnozan 
Kl 
33076 BORDEAUX 
A. MONOMAKHOFF  Ingénieur 
Chef du Groupe Agrément-Sécurité 
Centre de recherches 
Charbonnages de France 
B.P.n.2 
60550 VERNEUIL-EN-HALATTE 
M. MONTAGNE  Président Directeur Général 
de la Société Alsacienne 
d'Installations techniques 
B.P.n.24 
67000 SAVERNE 
213 FRANCE - FRANKREICH - FRANCIA - FRANKRIJK - FRANKRIG 
S. NOWAK 
Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
Secrétaire du Syndicat des Mineurs 
Force Ouvrière 
2, rue NANSEN 
A-L-N5 
62300 LENS 
ODIER  Chef du Service Central 
Sécurité et Environnement d'ELF R.E. 
Tour Aquitaine 
K 
92080 PARIS LA DEFENSE,CEDEX 4 
R. PLOUCHARD  Ingénieur des Mines 
Chef du Laboratoire Lubrifiant 
N2 
59450 SIN-LE-NOBLE 
H. POCHELSKI  Ingénieur des P.T.E.(Mines) 
Service de 1'Industrie et des Mines 
des Pays de la Loire - Groupe de 
subdivision du Maine et Loire 
Cité Administrative 
rue Dupetit-Thouars 
49043 ANGERS, CEDEX 
M. POILEVE  Directeur du Poste central de secours 
des Houillères du Nord et du 
Pas-de-Calais 
rue Notre-Dame de Lorette 
D-D2-N 
62300 LENS 
POIRIER  Ingénieur à la Direction 
des Services Techniques des 
Charbonnages de France 
9, avenue Percier 
B.P. 39608 
D-I-N2 
75360 PARIS-CEDEX 08 
R. POIROT  Ingénieur 
CERCHAR 
B.P.n.2 
El 
60550 VERNEUIL-EN-HALATTE 
214 FRANCE - FRANKREICH - FRANCIA - FRANKRIJK - FRANKRIG 
Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
A. PUYO  Division Opérations 
Département Exploitation SNEA(P) 
26, Avenue des Lilas 
Kl 
64000 PAU 
J.Ρ. RAFFOUX  Dr.-Ing. 
Laboratoire mécanique des Terrains 
du CERCHAR 
Ecole des Mines 
Parc du Saurupt 
54000 NANCY 
C. ROGEZ  Ingénieur des T.P.E. 
Direction interdépartementale 
de l'Industrie - Service des Mines 
941, rue Charles Bourseul 
B.P. 838 
Ν 
59508 DOUAI CEDEX 
B. SCHNELL  Ingénieur général des mines 
Conseil général des mines 
Ministère de 1'Industrie 
5, rue Barbet de Jouy 
A-B-M 
75700 PARIS 
S IMO DE  Ingénieur en Chef 
à la Direction de l'Economie et 
de 1'Informatique 
Houillères du Bassin de Lorraine 
5, rue Ambroise Thomas 
C-Nl 
57800 FREYMING 
STAIN  Ingénieur divisionnaire des T.P.E. 
Ministère de l'Industrie 
Direction de la Qualité et de la 
Sécurité Industrielles 
Service des Techniques du Sous-Sol 
99, rue de Grenelle 
75700 PARIS 
215 FRANKREICH - FRANCE - FRANCIA - FRANKRIJK - FRANKRIG 
Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
M. TCHOULAKIAN  Chef du Service Matériel et 
Approvisionnement des 
Charbonnages de France 
9, avenue Percier 
B.P. 396-08 
N3 
75360 PARIS CEDEX 08 
R. THOMAS  Service de Formation et Gestion 
des cadres supérieurs, 
Charbonnages de France 
9, avenue Percier 
B.P. 396-08 
75360 PARIS CEDEX 08 
L. TOURRAND  20, rue Roger Cadel 
75600 FORBACH 
E-I 
M. TRETIAKOW  Ingénieur en Chef 
Service Exploitation des 
Charbonnages de France 
9, avenue Percier 
B.P. 396-08 
F-N4 
75360 PARIS CEDEX 08 
A. TRICOIRE  Ingénieur des mines 
Service de l'Industrie et des 
Mines de Lorraine 
6, Place du Roi Georges 
57000 METZ 
L. VIELLEDENT  Ingénieur général des Mines 
Ministère de 1'Industrie et 
de la Recherche 
Conseil Général des Mines 
35, rue St-Dominique 
75700 PARIS 
N 
216 FRANKREICH - FRANCE - FRANCIA - FRANKRIJK - FRANKRIG 
Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
M. VO VAN QUI Ingénieur des Mines 
Services des Mines 
Nord - Pas-de-Calais 
941, rue Charles Bourseul 
59508 DOUAI 
F. WANECQ Ingénieur des Mines K-K2 
Service de l'Industrie et 
des Mines d'Aquitaine -
Poitou-Charentes 
26, Cours Xavier Arnozan 
33076 BORDEAUX CEDEX 
217 IRELAND - IRLANDE - IRLAND - IRLANDA - IERLAND 
Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
J. CHESTER  Department of Labour 
Davitt House 
Mespil Road 
K-K3 
DUBLIN 4 
J.M. LAYDEN  Arigna Collieries 
ARIGNA, Co.Leitrim 
CARRICK-ON-SHANNON 
N. O'RIORDAN  Dipl.I.E., C.Eng. 
Industrial Inspector 
Grade 11 - Depart.of Labour 
Mespril Road 
DUBLIN 4 
J. SINCLAIR  Grade 1 Industrial Inspector 
Department of Labour 
Anley House 
Mespil Road 
A-B 
DUBLIN 4 
J. STAPLETON  Principal Officer 
Department of Labour 
Mespil Road 
A-B 
DUBLIN 4 
TRACEY  National Group Secretary 
Irish Transport and General 
Workers Union 
Liberty Hall 
DUBLIN 
218 ITALIA - ITALIE - ITALY - ITALIEN - ITALIE 
Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
F. BIAGIOLI  Segreteria Federestrattive 
Via Isonzo, 42/A 
M 
00100 ROMA 
M. CARTA  Professore 
Istituto Arte Mineraria 
della Facoltà d'Ingegneria 
Piazza d'Armi 
09100 CAGLIARI 
A-C 
R. COTZA  Professore 
Istituto di Arte Mineraria 
dell'Università 
09100 CAGLIARI 
G. CRAVIOTTO  F.T.S.I.—C·I.S·L· 
Via Tevere 66 
A-N5 
00198 ROMA 
P.G. CROBU  S.p.A. Carbosulcis 
Miniera di Seruci 
Gonessa 
C-N 
09100 CAGLIARI 
U. CUTTICA  Dirigente della Società 
Nazionale Cogne 
Via S. Quintino 
10100 TORINO 
N. DE PAMPHILLIS  Professore 
C.I.S.L. 
Via Isonzo 42 
00100 ROMA 
219 ITALIA - ITALIE - ITALY - ITALIEN - ITALIE 
Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di Lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
DE ROCCHI  SpA SAMIM 
DIMIM/SAMIM 
19, Via Po 
00198 ROMA 
F. FERRARI  SpA SAMIM 
DIPER/SICU 
19, Via Po 
M 
00198 ROMA 
A. GALATI  Ingegniere 
Ministero dell'Industria, del 
Comercio e dell'Artigianato 
Direz. Gen. delle Miniere 
Serv. Sicurezza Mineraria 
Via Veneto 33 
A-B 
00100 ROMA 
M. GASPARINI  Ingegniere 
c/o AGIP Mineraria SpA 
K-Kl 
20097 SAN DONATO MILANESE 
C. LATINO  Ingegniere 
Capo del Distretto 
Minerario di Grosseto 
Via Trieste 1 
C-E 
58100 GROSSETO 
MIANI  Ingegniere 
SpA SOLMINE 
Stabilimenti Solmine Scarlino 
Scarlino 
58100 GROSSETO 
220 ITALIA - ITALIE - ITALY  ITALIEN - ITALIE 
Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
MICHELAZZI  Ispettore Generale del Ministero 
del Lavoro e delle Previdenza Sociale 
Via Andrea Fulvio 10 
A-G 
00162 ROMA 
G. MOLINO  Ingegniere 
Direttore della miniera 
"Boccheggiano" 
SpA SOLMINE 
Montieri 
D 
58100 GROSSETO 
MORTARINO  Professore Ingegniere 
Istituto di Meccanica applicata 
del Politecnico di Torino 
24, Corso Duca degli Abruzzi 
10129 TORINO 
M. PERSOD  Ingegniere 
Capo delle Miniere 
Distretto Minerario 
Via Gramsci 
09016 IGLESIAS 
PETRONE  Ministero dell'Industria 
Direzione Generale delle Miniere 
Divisione Statistica 
Via Molise 2 
0 
00198 ROMA 
P. PIGA  Professore Ingegniere 
Titolare della Cattedra di 
Arte Mineraria della Facoltà 
di Ingegneria di Roma 
Via Po 47 
I-N 
00198 ROMA 
221 ITALIA  ITALIE - ITALY - ITALIEN - ITALIE 
Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
N.  RICCIARDI-
TENORE 
Ispettore Generale Medico 
Capo dell' Ispettorato 
Medico Centrale del Lavoro 
Minist.del Lavoro e della 
Previdenza Sociale 
Via XX Settembre 97 c 
00187 ROMA 
ROSSI  Ingegniere 
SpA SAMIM 
DIPER/SICU SAMIM 
Via Po 19 
00198 ROMA 
0. SAMMARCO  Ingegniere 
Distretto minerario 
Via Trieste 1 
NI 
58100 GROSSETO 
F. SCIUTO  Ingegniere 
Direzione Generale 
Direttore della Divisione V 
dell'Ufficio Naz. Minerario 
per gli Idrocarburi 
Via Molise 2 
A-B-K-K3 
00187 ROMA 
M. TARABOCCHIA  Federestrattive C.I.S.L. 
Miniera di Niccioleta G.R. 
Via Isonzo 42 
00918 ROMA 
222 ITALIA - ITALIE - ITALY - ITALIEN - ITALIE 
Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
VAVASSORI Direzione generale delle K2 
Miniere 
c/o SAIPEM-PEM 
Cas.Post. 4159 
20100 MILANO 
U. VIVIANI Ingegniere Gl 
Montecatini Edison SpA 
Foro Buonaparte 31 
20121 MILANO 
223 LUXEMBOURG - LUXEMBURG - LUSSEMBURGO 
Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
BIRDEN  Directeur Adjoint 
Inspection du Travail et des Mines 
2, rue des Girondins 
LUXEMBOURG 
MULLER  Ingénieur 
Chef de Service Adjoint 
ARBED-Mines 
B.P. 143 
M 
ESCH-SUR-ALZETTE 
RAUCHS  Chef de Service 
ARBED 
79, rue de Luxembourg 
A-G 
ESCH-SUR-ALZETTE 
SCHUSTER  Directeur de 1'Inspection 
du Travail et des Mines 
2, rue des Girondins 
B.P. 27 
A-B-E-G 
LUXEMBOURG 
224 NEDERLAND - PAYS-BAS - NETHERLANDS - NIEDERLANDE 
PAESI-BASI - NEDERLANDENE 
Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
M. BLOEMEN  Nederlandse Aardolie­
maatschappij 
Schepersmaat 2 
9405 TA - ASSEN 
K3 
J.W. DE KORVER  Inspecteur-Generaal der Mijnen 
Staatstoezicht op de Mijnen 
J.W. Frisolaan 3 
A-B-K-Kl-
K2-K3 
2517 JS - 'S GRAVENHAGE 
W. EYKHOUT  Staatstoezicht op de Mijnen 
J.W. Frisolaan 3 
2517 JS 's GRAVENHAGE 
KI 
L.F. HEEZEN  Amoco Netherlands Petroleum Co 
Postbus 9550 
Κ 
2502 AN 's GRAVENHAGE 
E.A.R. HOEFNAGELS  Inspecteur der Mijnen 
Staatstoezicht op de Mijnen 
Apollolaan 9 
6411 BA HEERLEN 
F-I 
Th. M. JANSEN  Inspecteur der Mijnen 
Staatstoezicht op de Mijnen 
Apollolaan 9 
6411 BA HEERLEN 
A-B-C-G-
G1-K-K3-
L-M-0 
H.W. KIBBELING  St. Annalaan 21 
6417 CP HEERLEN 
225 NEDERLAND - PAYS-BAS 
PAESI-BASI 
NETHERLANDS - NIEDERLANDE 
NEDERLANDENE 
Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
M.L. LUYTEN  Safety Inspection 
Petroland B.V. 
Postbus 475 
K2 
DEN HELDER 
M. 0 ORTMAN-GE RL IN G Staatstoezicht op de Mijnen 
J.W. Frisolaan 3 
2517 JS 's GRAVENHAGE 
K-KI 
SALOMONS  N.A.M. 
Head of Drilling Department 
Schepersmaat 2 
9405 TA ASSEN 
KI 
M. VAN BLARICUM  Staatstoezicht op de Mijnen 
Apollolaan 9 
6411 BA HEERLEN 
D-D2-N2 
M. VAN DER MULE  N.A.M. 
Schepersmaat 2 
9405 TA ASSEN 
KI 
M. VAN DER SCHALK  N.A.M. 
Schepersmaat 2 
9405 TA ASSEN 
K 
N.J. VAN DIJK  Operations Manager 
Nederlandse Aardolie-
maatschappij B.V. 
Schepersmaat 2 
9405 TA ASSEN 
A 
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Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
A.J. AINSWORTH  H.M. Senior District 
Inspector of Mines and Quarries 
Department of Energy 
Regina House 
259-269,Old Marylebone Road 
LONDON, NW1 5RR 
ANDERSON  Production Manager 
National Coal Board 
North Nottinghamshire Area 
Edwinstowe 
EDWINSTOWE, Mansfield 
Nottinghamshire 
R. ARCHIBALD  Chief Medical Officer 
National Coal Board 
Hobart House 
Grosvenor Place 
N2 
LONDON SW1 
BLUNT  General Manager of Rescue Stations 
National Coal Board 
South Parade 
L-N 
DONCASTER, Yorkshire 
R.A. BONELL  Senior Mining Engineer 
National Coal Board 
North Yorkshire Area 
P.O.Box 13 
Allerton Bywater 
CASTLEFORD, WF10 2AL 
Yorkshire 
227 
401 UNITED KINGDOM - ROYAUME-UNI - VEREINIGTES KOENIGREICH -
REGNO UNITO - VERENIGD KONINKRIJK - DET FORENEDE KONGERIGE 
Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
W.J.W. BOURNE  Chief Mechanisation Engineer 
National Coal Board 
The Lodge 
South Parade 
E-I 
DONCASTER, DN1 2DX 
W. BROCKLEHURST  HM Senior District Inspector 
of Mines and Quarries 
Department of Energy 
Regina House 
259-269 Old Marylebone Road 
LONDON NW1 5RR 
A. BULMER  National Union of Mineworkers 
222, Euston Road 
A-C-N-N5 
LONDON NW1 2BX 
J.L. COLLINSON  Chief Safety Engineer 
National Coal Board 
The Lodge 
South Parade 
G-N5 
DONCASTER Yorkshire 
CREW  National Union of Mineworkers 
222, Euston Road 
LONDON NW1 2BX 
S.J. CRIDDLE  Chief Scientist 
National Coal Board 
South Midlands Area 
Newton Road 
NUNEATON, Warwickshire 
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Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
E.G. CRISWICK  Department of Energy 
Petroleum Engineering Division 
Thames House South 
Millbank 
K2 
LONDON SW1 P4QJ 
A.S. CURLET  Petroleum Engineering Division 
Department of Energy 
Room 1011 
Thames House South 
Millbank 
Kl 
LONDON SW1 P4QJ 
D. CUTLER  Principal Scientific Officer 
Safety in Mines Research Est. 
Field Research Station 
Harpur Hill 
N2-N3 
BUXTON SK17 9J1, Derbyshire 
B. DALE  National Union of Mineworkers 
222, Euston Road 
LONDON NW1 2BX 
L. DAVISON  Senior Principal Scientific 
Officer 
Safety in Mines Research Est. 
Red Hill 
SHEFFIELD S3 7HQ 
J.B. HALL  Deputy, Chief Mechanical Engineer 
National Coal Board 
The Lodge 
South Parade 
N2 
DONCASTER-SOUTH DN1 2DX, Yorkshire 
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REGNO UNITO - VERENIGD KONINKRIJK - DET FORENEDE KONGERIGE 
Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
A. HARLEY  HM Deputy Chief Inspector of 
Mines and Quarries 
Health and Safety Executive 
Regina House 
259-269 Old Marylebone Road 
A-B-C 
LONDON NW1 5RR 
H. HARRISON  National Union of Mineworkers 
222, Euston Road 
LONDON NW1 2BX 
R. HÄRTILL  Chief Electric Engineer 
National Coal Board 
The Lodge 
South Parade 
DONCASTER, Yorkshire 
G. HEATHERINGTON  Electrical Consultant 
Victor Products (Wallsend) Ltd 
WALLSEND, Northumberland 
B.W. HINDLEY  Health and Safety Executive 
Marine Offshore Section 
Baynards House 
Chepston Place 
Westbourne Grove 
K2 
LONDON WC 1 
A.J. HINKSMAN  Health and Safety Executive 
Baynards House 
Chepston Place 
Westbourne Grove 
K3 
LONDON WC 1 
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Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
J. HOPKINSON  H.M. Senior Inspector 
of Mechanical Engineering 
Health and Safety Executive 
Regina House 
259-269 Old Marylebone Road 
LONDON NW1 5RR 
D-D2 
I.A. HOWIESON  H.M. Principal Inspector 
of Mechanical Engineering 
Health and Safety Executive 
Regina House 
259-269 Old Marylebone Road 
LONDON NW1 5RR 
N2 
A.G. JOHNSTON  Director 
Sheffield Laboratories (SMRE) 
Red Hill 
A. JONES 
SHEFFIELD S3 7HQ 
Health and Safety Executive 
Research and Laboratory Services Div. 
Red Hill 
CI 
SHEFFIELD S3 7 HQ 
E.O. JONES  CONOCO North Sea Inc. 
Park House 
116, Park Street 
Kl 
LONDON Wl Y 4 NN 
H.D. JONES  HM Senior District Inspector 
of Mines and Quarries 
Health and Safety Executive 
Regina House 
259-269 Old Marylebone Road 
1-0 
LONDON NW1 5RR 
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Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
LUXMORE  HM Principal Inspector of 
Electrical Engineering 
Health and Safety Executive 
Department of Energy 
Regina House 
259-269 Old Marylebone Road 
LONDON NW1 5RR 
M. McGAHEY  Vice President 
National Union of Mine Workers 
5 Hillside Crescent 
EDINBURGH , Scotland 
T. McGEE  National Union of Mineworkers 
222, Euston Road 
L-M 
LONDON NW1 2BX 
D. MAKOWER  Director of Scientific Control 
National Coal Board 
Coal House 
Lyon Road 
HARROW Middlesex HAI 2EX 
N 
J. S. MARSHALL  HM Chief Inspector of Mines 
and Quarries 
Health and Safety Executive, 
Regina House 
259-269 Old Marylebone Road 
A-B-E-M 
LONDON NW1 5RR 
W.R. MONKS  Production Manager 
National Coal Board 
Western Area 
Valley Training Center 
HEDNESFORD, Staffordshire 
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Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
G. MONTGOMERY  National Union of Mineworkers 
222, Euston Road 
LONDON NW1 2BX 
CF. NEALE  Assistant Secretary 
Health and Safety Executive 
Safety and General Branch C 
Regina House 
259-269 Old Marylebone Road 
A-B-G-K-0 
LONDON NW1 5 RR 
J.C. NIXON  Production Manager 
National Coal Board 
South Midlands Area 
Coventry Colliery Keresley 
COVENTRY, West Midlands 
A. OWENS  National Union of Mineworkers 
222, Euston Road 
LONDON NWl 2BX 
R.T. PURVIS  HM Divisional Inspector of Mines 
and Quarries 
Department of Energy 
Regina House 
259-269 Old Marylebone Road 
E-N 
LONDON NWl 5RR 
W. REID  Transport and General Workers Union 
44, King Street 
K 
ABERDEEN Scotland 
AcF. ROBERTS  Senior Principal Scientific Officer 
Health and Safety Executive, 
Field Research Station, 
Harpur Hill, 
BUXTON SK17 9JN, Derbyshire 
L-N-Nl 
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Groupes de travail-Working parties 
Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
W.M. ROBERTSON  Chief Scientist 
(Yorkshire Region) 
National Coal Board 
Golden Smithies Lane 
WATH-UPON-DEARNE 
N3 
ROTHERAM, South Yorkshire 
E. ROBSON  Deputy Director of Mining 
National Coal Board 
Yorkshire Area, St.Georges 
Thorne Road 
N 
DONCASTER, DN1 2JS, South Yorkshire 
F.N. SANDERS  Mining Research and 
Development Establishment 
National Coal Board 
Ashby Road 
Stanhope Bretby 
N3 
BURTON-ON-TRENT, Staffordshire 
M. SEARLE  HM Principal Inspector of 
Mines and Quarries 
Health and Safety Executive 
Regina House 
259-269, Old Marylebone Road 
El 
LONDON NW1 5RR 
Ρ. SELWOOD  UK Offshore Operators Association 
192, Sloane Street 
Κ 
LONDON SW1 X 9QX 
M. SMITH  Medical Officer 
Department of Health and 
Social Security 
Hannibal House 
Elephant and Castle 
N2 
LONDON SEI 6TE 
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Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
R.A. SWIFT  Chief Ventilation Engineer 
National Coal Board 
The Lodge 
South Parade 
DONCASTER, Yorkshire 
P.B. TAYLOR  Rescue Apparatus Testing Officer 
Inspectorate of Mines and Quarries 
Health and Safety Executive 
Silver House 
Silver Street 
N4 
DONCASTER, Yorkshire 
P. TRYCIS  National Coal Board 
Coal House 
Lyon Road 
HARROW, HAI 2EX, Middlesex 
N4 
WALKER  National Coal Board 
The Lodge 
South Parade 
N3 
DONCASTER, Yorkshire 
T.L. WALL  Principal Scientific Officer 
Safety in Mines Research Est. 
Central Laboratories 
Red Hill 
Off Broad Lane 
SHEFFIELD, S3 7HQ 
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Arbeitsgruppen-Gruppi di lavoro 
Werkgroepen-Arbejdsgrupperne 
J.R. WILSON  1, Bassett Gardens 
Blackhouse Hill 
K-K3 
HYTHE CT21 5UY, Kent 
Ph. WOOD  Head of Shafts and Winding 
National Coal Board 
The Lodge 
South Parade 
D-D2 
DONCASTER, Yorkshire 
236 FORM 
to be returned to 
Secretariat of The SHCMOEI, 
Bâtiment Jean Monnet 
Bureau C4/96 
rue Alcide de Gasperi, 
KIRCHBERG 
L - LUXEMBOURG 
Re.: Changes to the list of Members of the SHCMOEI or its 
Working Parties. 
I should be grateful if you would (delete where inappropriate) 
- ADD - CORRECT - DELETE : 
SURNAME : 
Christian name : 
Duties : 
Address : 
Postcode and Town : 
Country : 
Telephone :(please give the regional code and then the 
actual number) 
Office (extension) Home number 
Name of person with whom a message may be left in case of 
absence (secretary or colleague) with telephone number and 
extension : 
Telex : (number and code) 
Telegraphic address 
to/on/from the list of Members of : 
A. The SHCMOEI 
B. The RESTRICTED COMMITTEE 
The following Working Parties and Committees of Experts : 
237 C. Ventilation, Firedamp and Other Mine Gases 
CI*; Firedamp Monitoring Instruments 
D. Winding Ropes and Shaft Guides 
Dl. Winding Ropes 
D2. Winding Engines 
E. Strata Control and Stability of' Ground 
El. Stability of Tips 
F. Electricity 
G. Human Factors affecting Safety 
Gl. Community Safety Campaigns 
I. Mechanization 
K. Oil and Gas 
Kl. Prevention of Blowouts 
K2. Man Overboard Emergencies 
K3. Oil and Gas Accident Statistics 
L. Flammable Dusts 
M. Health in Mines 
N. Rescue Arrangements, Mine Fires and Underground Combustion 
Nl. Stabilization of Ventilation 
N2. Fire-resistant Fluids 
N3. Conveyor Belts and Other Long Items of Plant 
N4. Self-rescuers 
Ν5· Safety Signs 
0. Common Accident Statistics 
Date : 
Signature 
238 ANNEX IV 
PROPOSAL TO GOVERNMENTS 
on 
CONTROL OF THE FIREDAMP RISK ARISING DURING DRIVAGE 
AND FOLLOWING THE ABANDONMENT OF 
CUL-DE-SAC AND OTHER OLD WORKINGS Safety and Health Commission 
for the Mining and other Extractive 
Industries 
Working Party on Ventilation, firedamp and 
other mine gases 
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of the firedamp risk arising during drivage and 
following the abandonment of cul-de-sac and other 
old workings. 
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accordance with Article 1 of the terms of refe-
rence of the Safety and Health Commission for the 
Mining and other Extractives Industries and for 
action in accordance with Article 4· 
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245 1. Introduction 
1.1. During the meeting held on 3 September 1976, the KSKC gave the 
Working Party "Ventilation and Firedamp" the following terms 
of reference : 
1. to study all the aspects of the accidents which occurred at 
Lens-Liévin, Houghton Main and Luisenthal wich might be in-
teresting and important for preventing fireacUiip explosions 
and firedamp ignition and in particular to propose measures 
which can be taken to control the emission of firedamp 
- coming from old workings and cul-de-sac, both those aban-
doned temporarily and those abandoned permanently ; 
- in cul-de-sac workings, account should be taken of the 
dust make, stoppages of work, and stoppage of auxiliary 
ventilation as well as : the length and nature of the 
ducting for the auxiliary ventilation ; 
2. to study the utility of automatic monitoring of auxiliary 
ventilation (air velocity etc..) and of automatic monito-
ring of CH. (by instruments installed on coal-getting and 
heading machines and including electrical cut-out or alarm 
indication devices). 
3· to compare national legislation designed to avoid the risk 
of sparking in auxiliary fans, with the aim of harmonising 
these, if possible. 
1.2. Following these terms of reference the Working Party on "Ven-
tilation, Firedamp and other Mine Gases", presents this report 
which contains proposals to the Governments of the Member States 
for the improvement of safety and health conditions in gassy 
working areas. 
It should be observed that many of the conclusions of this 
report can be applied to other underground workings especially 
246 to those where other toxic or harmful gases may be present. The 
appropriate application of these requirements remain the task 
of the national authorities. 
Continuing efforts are needed in those fields described in items 
2.13, 6.3- and 7-2. 
1.3· The documents from which this report is compiled are listed in 
Appendix 1 ^Bibliography^. 
1.4· The MSHC adopted this report on its meeting held on 7 May I98O. 
It submits this report to the Governments of the Member States 
as a proposal for the improvement of safety and health in coal 
and other mines pursuant to Article 1 of its terms of reference 
and for implementation and follow-up in accordance with Article 
4 of those terms of reference. The report also contains propo-
sals pursuant to Article 5 of the terms of reference. 
Pursuant to Article 3 of its terms of reference the M3HC re-
quests prompt forwarding of this report to the quarters direct-
ly concerned. 
1·5· Origin and treatment of the terms of reference. 
I.5.I· On 27 December 1974 a firedamp ignition and a weak coal dust 
explosion occurred in a new district of shaft 3 of Lens/ldévin 
(Bassin du Nord Pas-de-Calais) ; 42 men were killed and 7 in-
jured. During the meeting held on 11 July 1975 "the MSHC gave 
the Working Party "Ventilation and Firedamp" the terms of 
reference : 
"to study all the aspects of the accident which occurred at 
Lens/Liévin which might be interesting and important for preven-
ting firedamp explosions and in particular to propose measures 
which can be taken to control the emission of firedamp coming 
from old workings and from cul-de-sacs and districts being sal-
vaged". 
247 1·5·2. After the explosion which occurred on 12 June 1975 at Houghton 
Main Colliery, South Yorkshire, which started in a temporarily 
abandoned cul-de-sac working and where 5 men were killed and one 
seriously injured, the MSHC extended the original terms of refe-
rence. 
1·5·3· Following the CH. ignition in a development heading of the 
Luisenthal mine (Saar coalfield) which occurred on 21 July 
I976 and where 2 men were killed and 5 injured, the MSHC exten-
ded once more the terms of references (see item 1.1.). 
1.5·4· The causes and circumstances of these three accidents can be 
summed up as follows : 
1·5·4·1· Lens/Liévin : Presumably ignition of firedamp in form of a fire-
damp layer at the roof in the vicinity of the intake of a descen-
sionally ventilated longwall face where working had just star-
ted. This ignition initiated a weak coal dus,t explosion which 
propagated over the whole district (l)· 
I.5.4·2. Houghton Main : Ignition of firedamp which was drawn through 
a defective auxiliary fan situated at the entrance of a tempo-
rarily abandoned heading. The ignition was considered to be 
caused by frictional sparking in the fan which was faulty. The 
explosion extended into other workings (2). 
1.5·4·3· Luisenthal : Ignition of firedamp in form of a firedamp layer 
at the roof in the vicinity of the face of a development coal 
heading driven by a heading machine. The ignition was presumab-
ly caused by frictional sparking when the machine cut into 
quartzitic rock in the roof. 
This was an ignition without shock wave (3) (4)· 
l) The figures refer to the bibliography (Appendix 1), 
248 1·5·5· In order to deal with these extensive terms of reference the 
Working Party decided to compile and to compare all pertinent 
legislation and rules existing in the Member States, and to de-
rive minimum requirements and guidelines for the future from 
this compilation. 
Furthermore a number of other documents has been taken into 
account (See Appendix l). 
1.5-6. The present report has been divided into 5 chapters, the chapter 
"Minimum requirements on ventilation of cul-de-sac workings 
and measures in the field of auxiliary ventilation, auxiliary 
fans included" being the largest in sope, corresponding to the 
range and importance of problems to be dealt with. 
In this context reference is made to the "Report of the Natio-
nal Committee to examine all aspects of the ventilation of nar-
row drivages"(5) which has been taken into account in parti-
cular for the preparation of the chapter 2. 
This committee was formed in the United Kingdom following the 
public inquiry on the Houghton Main explosion. 
2. Minimum requirements on ventilation of cul-de-sac workings and 
measures in the field of auxiliary ventilation, auxiliary fans 
included (see also chapter 6). 
The evaluation of national legislation has resulted in the es-
tablishment of the minimum requirements indicated below. 
In individual cases, further steps may be necessary because 
of the operating conditions. 
2.1. General 
Comments 
The system should be so designed as to meet the requirements 
249 of all aspects of the environment. The choice of auxiliary 
ventilation system to be used will largely depend upon the 
parameters that it is necessary to control. 
Requirements 
Cul-de-sac workings must be ventilated- in such a way that in 
'~ ~ " * ~ " ~'
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in the air is not exceeded. 
Ventilation by means of diffusion alone should be avoided. It 
may only be used in places specified according to the proce-
dure laid down by national legislation. 
2.2. Air velocities 
Requirements 
The air velocity should be high enough to prevent firedamp 
layering. A search should be carried cut to detect such laye-
ring. 
If layers of firedamp are detected, counter-measures should be 
taken. 
2.3· Planning of auxiliary ventilation 
Requirements 
In order to ensure compliance with the requirements specified 
under 2.1. and 2.2., auxiliary ventilation must be planned 
carefully, taking into account all stages of development of the 
mine working provided with auxiliary ventilation. If 
necessary the plan should also include the equipment required 
for the suppression of respirable dust and the improvement 
of air conditioning. Supervisors responsible for the working 
250 and, if appropriate, the other personnel should be acquainted' 
with the plan. 
2.4· Determining the distance of the end of the air duct from the 
roadhead. 
Requirements 
The distance from the end of the air duct to the roadnead is 
to be laid down in each particular case in such a way as to 
ensure that the requirements under 2.1. and 2.2. are met. 
Comments 
To determine the distance from the end of the air duct to the 
roadhead is one of the elements of the planning provided for 
under 2.3· 
Document 2719/79 (see appendix 2) provides a basis for à cal-
culation. 
2.5· Arrangement of auxiliary fans. 
Requirements 
Auxiliary fans should be so arranged that over—pressure always 
obtains in forced auxiliary ventilation systems and under-pres-
sure in exhaust systems. This should be checked by measurements 
whenever a number of fans is arranged along the ducting with-
in the heading. 
Comments 
Wherever possible the use of more than one fan in series in an 
auxiliary ventilation system should be avoided unless these can 
be grouped outside the heading. Where this is not possible a 
ventilation survey should be carried out to determine the posi-
tion at which the fans should be olaced within the duct. 
251 2.6. Installation, starting and alteration of auxiliary ventilation 
systems 
Requirements 
Auxiliary ventilation systems installed according to the plan 
mentioned under 2.3· should be inspected by the manager or a 
competent person appointed by him when they are put into opera-
tion for the first time. 
Care should also be taken to ensure that the air added to 
the auxiliary ventilation system from the main ventilating cur-
rent is always sufficient to prevent any partial recirculation. 
Partial recirculation is only admissible in cases where exemp-
tion has been granted. 
Rules for starting, stopping or altering auxiliary ventilation 
systems are to be laid down by the manager. 
Comments 
Dust control efficiency can be improved by means of partial 
recirculation of the air cleaned by a dust filter. 
Since the methane concentration may rise as a result, exemption 
is required for this procedure. 
2.7· Planned stoppages of auxiliary ventilation systems 
Requirements 
Auxiliary ventilation may only be stopped for the duration of 
necessary work or to avoid dangers. Further provisions for this 
procedure should be laid down by the manager in special rules. 
Ventilation must be resumed as rapidly as possible, taking 
into account the conditions set out in 2.9· 
252 Comments 
The basic principale is that auxiliary ventilation should be 
designed for continuous operation, i.e. on a 24—hour basis, 
including weekends and holidays, etc... 
2.3. Involuntary stoppages or derangements of auxiliary ventila-
tion. Stay of persons in temporarily unventilated workings 
and fencing of such workings. 
Requirements 
In the event of a stoppage or derangements of an auxiliary 
ventilation system, the personnel is required to inform the 
competent supervisory staff immediately, and to evacuate the 
working if necessary. 
Entry to the workings must than be blocked in such a way that 
it is impossible to enter them inadvertently. Only persons 
authorized by the supervisory staff to carry out inspections 
or to restore the ventilation are allowed to stay in such 
workings. 
Ventilation must be resumed as rapidly as possible, taking 
into account the conditions set out in 2.9· 
2.9· Conditions under which auxiliary ventilation may be restored 
after a planned or unintended stoppage. Return of personnel. 
Requirements 
Auxiliary ventilation may not be restored until it has been 
determined by a competent person that this can be done in a 
controlled manner to minimise the possible hazards. 
The operation of recommissioning an auxiliary ventilation sys-
tem which involved dealing with major quantities of methane 
or other harmful gases whose concentrations exceed the per-
253 missible limit (flushing of methane or other gases) shall be 
supervised by a competent person. 
In such cases, after resumption of auxiliary ventilation, 
access to the workings is prohibited until the competent 
person has determined that the level of CE, or other harmful 
4 
gases in the air does not exceed the permissible limits. Pro­
visions for these operations are to be laid down by the mana­
ger or the person appointed by him. 
Comments 
Where a degassing operation is undertaken a method incorpora­
ting a diluting or regulating arrangement in the system may 
be suitable (see appendices 3 and 4)· 
2.lo. Auxiliary fans 
2.10.1. Precautions to minimize the risk of incendive sparking caused 
by auxiliary fans. 
Requirements 
Fans for underground use should be designed so as to avoid 
the risk of incendi ve sparking inside the fan. 
Tliiε may be achieved by 
a) the selection of suitable combinations of materials for 
impeller and housing ; 
b) protection against ingress of foreign material which may 
also cause sparking. 
2.10.2. Precautions for avoiding electric sparking as a result of re­
manent voltage in electric and combined electric/air fans. 
254 Remanent voltage sufficient to ignite methane can be generated 
at the terminals of an electric motor which is driven by the 
fan impeller in the air current and acts as a generator. To avoid 
the associated hazards, appropriate measures should be laid down. 
As an example the following measures are quoted which are included 
in a circular from the Chief Mines Inspectorate of North Rhine-
Westphalia of 17 August I97I (see Anpendix 5) · 
- Electricians will be given written notice of the dangers ari-
sing from fan motors being turned by the ventilation or com-
pressed air. 
- Prohibition of the use of fans with combined electric/air dri-
ve of a type whose design does not obviate this risk 
where an exemption to exceed the permissible CH. - content 
of 1 fo has been granted. 
2.11. Auxiliary ventilation ducts. 
Requirements 
The materials for air-duct or ventubes must comply with stipu-
lated specifications with a view to preventing the dangers of 
fire and of electrostatic charging, and must have specified 
hygienic properties. These specifications may be determined accor-
ding to the procedure laid down by national legislation. 
Air ducts should be installed in a sufficient solid and careful 
manner in order to minimise leakage and to absorb pressure tran-
siants occuring when fans are started. 
2.12. Supervision 
2.12.1. Supervision of auxiliary ventilation systems. 
Requirements 
Auxiliary ventilation systems must be checked at intervals speci-
255 fi ed by the manager by persons appointed for that purpose, to 
ensure by inspection, functional tests and monitoring of the air 
current that the systems are operating according to plan. 
2.12.2. Supervision of workings with auxiliary ventilation 
Requirements 
The efficiency of auxiliary ventilation systems shall be checked 
by persons appointed for that purpose by talcing regular readings 
of the amount of CK. and other harmful gases in the air, as well 
as measures of air speed and possibly other relevant parameters 
(e.g. leakage coefficient). 
2.12.3. Taking readings 
2.12.3.1. Readings from hand-held measuring instruments 
Requirements 
Persons appointed to take readings with hand-héld instruments 
and supervisors should have had a thorough training including 
instruction in the detection of CH. layers near the roof and in 
4 
any cavities above the supports. The checks are to be carried 
out during operation and before the resumption of work after each 
non-working day. 
2.12.3.2. Readings from fixed-position or mobile measuring equipment 
Comments 
With modern fixed-position or mobile equipment, concentrations 
of methane, carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide and other harmful 
gases as well as the air speed in roadways and air ducts can 
be continuously measured, relayed, recorded and evaluated in 
process control computers in a reliable manner. 
Such measuring equipment is capable of sounding an alert and/or 
256 switching off electrical equipment when set limit values are 
exceeded. 
It may be considered sufficient for the system to indicate whe-
ther the firedamp level has risen to a set limit or the air quan-
titiy has fallen below a set level. The use of this measuring 
equipment in conjunction with power loaders and heading machines 
is dealt with in chaoter 5« 
Requirements 
Where ventilation is monitored by fixed-position measuring de-
vices, the type of equipment to be used and the circumstances of 
its use are to be laid down in special rules which should also 
cover maintenance, checking and commissioning procedures. Most 
of the automatic measuring devices currently in use have to be 
switched off when certain levels are reached because of the 
risk of ignition that may occur in certain conditions. On the 
other hand, however, it is in the interests of safety that auto-
matic monitoring should be maintained without interruption. The 
development and application of suitable automatic measuring equip-
ment which is intrinsically safe should therefore be promoted. 
2.12.4· Isolation of power - resumption of power. 
Electrical apparatus other than that permitted by national le-
gislation for operation in all firedamp levels must be isolated 
when the maximum levels laid down by national regulations are 
exceeded. For auxiliary ventilated workings which may be endan-
gered by firedamp, appropriate mesures are to be taken.If auto-
matic monitoring of the auxiliary ventilation system exists, iso-
lation of power supply for the above specified electrical appa-
ratus for these workings may be carried out automatically when 
a predetermined firedamp level is exceeded or the air quantity 
has fallen below a predetermined level. Isolation of power may 
also be carried out manually after alarm is given by the auto-
matic monitoring system. 
257 Degassing of auxiliary ventilated workings in accordance with 
2.9· should be carried out only when the electrical apparatus 
in this working and, if necessary, in its return airway, also 
is isolated. 
Electrical apparatus must not be switched on again until a test 
of the mine air has indicated that this can be done without risk. 
2.13· Dust control and air conditioning equipment in workings with 
auxiliary ventilation. 
Requirements 
In workings with auxiliary ventilation in which dust control and 
air conditioning equipment is used, the auxiliary ventilation 
systems must meet special requirements. 
Comments 
These special requirements, which should be established by spe-
cial studies will be examined subsequently by the Working Party 
on Ventilation, Firedamp and other Mine Gases. 
3· Minimum requirements on measures when cul-de-sac workings are 
temporarily or permanently abandoned. 
3-1. Measures to be taken when cul-de-sac workings are temporarily 
abandoned. 
3-1.1. Definition 
Temporarily abandoned workings are those in which no work is 
carried out for a fairly long period. It is, however, anticipated 
that work will be resumed at a later date. 
258 3.1.2. Requirements 
3.1.2.1. Temporarily abandoned workings must be ventilated or stopped off 
with a suitable stopping in accordance with pertinent regulation:: 
3.1.2.2. Ventilation must be maintained up to the accessible face of the 
stopping. 
3-2. Measures to be taken when cul-de-sac workings are permanently 
abandoned. 
3.2.1. Definition 
Permanently abandoned workings are those in which work has been 
discontinued and no resumption is envisaged. 
3.2.2. Requirements 
3.2.2.1. Permanently abandoned workings must be stopped off at the en-
trance by means of a solid stopping. 
3.2.2.2. Ventilation must be maintained up to the accessible face of the 
stopping. 
3.3. Reopening of stoppings. 
Requirements 
3·3·1· Where workings have been stopped off, the stopping may be opened 
only on instructions from the Manager and in accordance with a 
method which offers a maximum of safety. 
3.3.2. The subsequent restoration of auxiliary ventilation and return 
of men to the workings are governed by the requirements listed 
under 2.9· above. 
4. Minimum requirements on measures to be taken to control the 
emission of firedamp from old workings and temporarily or por-
259 manently abandoned cul-de-sac workings. 
4·1· Requirements 
Vfnere harmful gases may be emitted from old workings and from 
stopped-off workings especially in the event of a sudden sharp 
drop in barometric pressure, and which may not be adequately 
diluted by the main ventilating current, special mesures must 
be taken. 
4.2. Comments 
Methods used so far include applying an underpressure to the 
workings in question and draining off the gas. To this end, the 
workings must in general be sealed off with stoppings. These 
methods must only be used after a thorough study has been carried 
out since they involve the risk of introducing air into old 
workings through uncontrolled leakage circuits which may lead 
to spontaneous combustion of coal. 
The following are examples of these methods : 
4.2.I. "Simple" methods, which involve passing a pipe through the stop-
ping and making use of the pressure gradient between the open 
end of the pipe and the back of the stopping to drain off the 
gas, which is then released and diluted at a suitable point into 
the return air. 
4-2.2. Methods involving draining the gas through a stopping and then 
feeding it into the mine's firedamp drainage system in which 
case the monitoring equipment prescribed by national legisla-
tion for firedamp drainage is to be provided (e.g. automatic 
monitoring of the CH. concentration in the drained gas, automa-
tic closure of the drainage range leading from the sealed-off 
workings if the CH. concentration drops below a limit value). 
4-2.3· Methods involving drainage of the gas behind a chamber which con-
sists of two stoppings, with facilities for regulating the pres-
260 sure within the chamber. The gas is fed into the firedamp 
drainage system. (See Doc. 3965/75 - Pressure chamber method). 
This method offers the following advantages, which are of par-
ticular importance at times of marked variations in barome-
tric pressure. 
/[. 2.3-1· Minimizing of lerkage of gar through the stortings or the 
surrounding ground. 
4.2.3.2. Minimizing of in-breathing of air into the workings to be 
drained. (This prevents a reduction of the CK, concentration 
in the exhausted gas and reduces the danger of spontaneous 
combustion). 
4.2.4. Methods involving draining the gas through a stopping, dilu-
ting it to a safe concentration level and then releasing it 
at a suitable point into the return air (See Doc. 4258/1/76 -
Low concentration gas drainage). 
So far, this method has only been applied in cases where drai-
nage using the method according to 4«2.2. is not possible. 
This method may be used in retreating systems where the make 
of firedamp in the dead end of the return gate inbye the 
face is so great that dilution to the permissible CH. concen-
tration cannot be carried out reliably. This method may only 
be applied if there is no tendency to spontaneous combustion 
in the seam. 
Utility of automatic CK. monitoring by instruments installed 
on coal-getting or heading machines together with cut-out or 
alarm indication devices (see also 2.12.3.2.). 
Comments 
Such instruments alone do not resolve the problem of fire-
damp monitoring, especially in mechanised headings, but never-
261 theless malee a substantial contribution to such monitoring. 
The question of the cut-out limits to be set should be deci­
ded by the authorities in the light of local conditions. 
The good results obtained in French mines with such instru­
ments fitted on heading machines are encouraging. 
There is agreement in principale on the desirability of deve-
lopping automatic CK. monitoring instruments for installation 
on longwall coal-getting machines. Priority should be given 
to measuring instruments for shearers, trepanners and cutters 
as the risk of firedamp accumulation and ignition occuring 
with this equipment is greater than for coal ploughs . 
6. Comparison of national legislation designed to avoid the risk 
of sparking in auxiliary fans, with the aim of harmonising 
these, if possible. 
6.1. 'With respect to the selection of the most suitable combinations 
of materials for impellers and housings of auxiliary fans work 
was completed some time ago in Belgium, in the Federal Republic 
of Germany as well as in France. This question has been raised 
again by the Houghton Main explosion and further research 
work is currently being carried out in the United Kingdom. 
A research and development project on "Light alloys under­
ground" has been started in the German coal mining industrie. 
c o  The Working Party on Ventilation, Firedamp and other Mine Gases 
will present proposals for the selection of suitable combina­
tions of materials when the above mentioned work is completed 
and evaluated. 
7- Conclusions 
l) See "First..report an ignitions of firedamprby power loaders 
and heading machines" (14th Report of the MSHC,· Annex" Ιό). 
262 7.1. The MSHC proposes to Governments cf the Member States that 
the requirements contained in the different chapters of this 
report are adopted and asks them to take account of the guide-
lines for the future listed therein. 
7.2. Furthermore the MSHC proposes to promote research, studies 
and developments as well as the use of appropriate equipment 
in the following fields : 
7.2.1. The effects of the use of auxiliary fans in series should be 
the subject of further research. 
7.2.2. Search for nev; combinations of materials for impellers and 
housings of auxiliary fans which further reduce the risk of 
incendive frictional sparking between these components. 
7.2.3· Further development and use of automatic airflow monitoring 
instruments. 
7-2.4- Further development and use of automatic CH. monitoring instru-
ir , 
ments (including the supply system) applicable at any CK. con-
centration level. 
7.2.5· Further development of other automatic monitoring instruments 
installed on long.íall coal-getting machines, priority being 
given to the cutting types of these machines. 
7.3. With regard to the question of combinations of materials for 
impellers and housings of auxiliary fans and the effect of 
dust control devices on auxiliary ventilation proposals will 
be submitted in due course to the Governments of the Member 
States. 
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268 1. INTRODUCTION 
Dangerous gases at the head ends of drivages must be dispersed 
and removed as quickly as possible. A number of relevant obser-
vations on the effect of jet discharge in headings with forcing 
auxiliary ventilation systems and during pneumatic stowing have 
been described by Spencer and Carver. The aim of the present 
paper is to investigate the appropriate distance between the 
delivery end of the duct and the heading face and the positio-
ning of the duct within the heading. In order to provide a 
better basis for understanding the phenomena involved a few 
preliminary remarks are required on the laws governing the be-
haviour of a round free jet discharged into an unconfined space 
(see also e.g. Prandtl (Abriss der Strömungslehre), Tollmien, 
Ruden, Förthmann, Schlichting and Reichhardt). 
A round jet of air emerges from the duct (diamter d) at a vir-
tually uniform velocity w (Fig. l). Particles of the surroun-
ding air are entrained at the jet periphery so that the volume 
of air moved increases as the jet progresses. Initially, the 
velocity in the vicinity of the jet axis remains constant (w ) 
from the discharge orifice to the extreme limit of the "oentral 
cone" χ . In the peripheral regions the jet widdens "by turbu-
lent exchange, spreading linearly with the distance χ from the 
discharge orifice while the axial velocity of the jet decreases 
with increasing distance from the central cone. The lenght of 
the central cone χ varies directly with the diameter of the 
discharge orifice d and inversely with the exchange coefficient 
m (a mesure of the degree of turbulence in the discharge jet). 
At a medium level of turbulence, the exchange coefficient m is 
between o.l2 and o.l6, i.e. the length of the central cone 
will be about 6 to 8 times the duct diameter d. 
At greater distances from the discharge orífice (χ>χ ) the ve-
locity distribution in the jet is such that the profiles are si-
milar. From the end of the central cone, the velocity at the 
center of the jet w decreases linearly with increasing distance 
from the point of discharge. 
269 The velocity profiles take the form of a normal curve. 
The jet diameter D increases as a function of the exchange 
coefficient m and the distance χ from the point of discharge. 
The volume of air 0 displaced by the jet at a point 'x also 
increases by the same ratio in relation to the volume Q dis­
charged from the duct. 
It is thus a characteristic of a free jet that for a given dis­
charge volume Q and exchange co< 
affected by the duct diameter d. 
charge volume Q and exchange coefficient m its form is not 
The processes involved in the spreading of a jet in an uncon­
fined space may be observed e.g. on windless days above cooling 
towers and chimneys. The central cone spreads linearly although 
the laws applying are somewhat different beoause of changes in 
the temperature of the gases in the jet. 
2. JET SPREAD IN A HEADING 
2.1. Depth of jet penetration where the duot is dipoee4|jUl th· 
centre of a heading 
When air is discharged from a duct into a roadhead, the spread 
of the jet is restricted by the dimensions of the available 
space. 
The depth of jet penetration in a heading is limited by the 
availability of sufficient momentum to produce reversal of the 
air current and generate a return flow. If the space available 
is greater than the depth of jet penetration, a buffer sone in 
which no turbulent mixing occurs must necessarily be formed 
between the end of the jet and the heading face. In auxiliary 
ventilation systems the distance between the delivery end of 
the duct and the heading face must therefore be such as to 
guarantee that the jet reaches the face. 
As far as is known, no measurements have as yet been made of the 
depth of jet penetration. Certain conclusions may, however, be 
270 drawn on the basis of the laws governing the spreading of jets 
in an unconfined space. 
The simplest model relates to the flow in a tube of diameter D, 
in which a jet emerging from a duct of diameter d spreads coun-
tercurrently to and coaxially with the return flow in the tube. 
Fig. 2 is a schematic representation of the flow patterns and 
the air velocity distribution in the jet and in the return flow. 
The jet attains a penetration depth L j at this point the direc­
tion of air movement is reversed to produce a return flow, which 
also entrains air in the zone up to the point of reversal. 
The jet penetration depth may be determined by calculation of 
energy values on the basis of the laws governing the behaviour 
of free jets. It transpires that the penetration depth of the 
jet L varies directly with the diameter Ώ of the tube and in­
versely with the exchange coefficient m of the jet· Within oer— 
tain limits, the jet penetration depth L is virtually indepen­
dant of the ratio of the duct and roadway cross-sections 
( v ) · Given an exchange coefficient of average value (m » 
0.15), the penetration depth of a ooxial jet is about 2,5 to 3 
times the tube diamter D, if there is a sufficient distane· 
between the delivery end of the duot and the heading face. 
These conclusions are consistent with empirical observations. 
The mixing zone becomes shorter if the turbulence of the dis­
charged jet is increased e.g. in extreme cases by imparting a 
spiral movement to the jet by appliances fitted in the outlet. 
If the delivery end of the duct is brought sufficiently close 
to the heading face for the intervening distance to he equal 
to the jet penetration depth, turbulent exchange of the air­
flows in the head end occurs and the intake air and undesirable 
firedamp are thoroughly mixed. The intermixing of the discharged 
jet and the return air is very intensive. 
For a duct/heading diameter ratio d/_. of o,2, the volume of air 
displaced at the end of the jet is about three time as great as 
the air quantity discharged. The air velocity in the centre of 
271 the jet at the end of the mixing zone, which may be taken as 
a measure of scouring velocity of the jet, is then about half 
the velocity of discharge from the duct. 
This finding is consistent with the frequent observation that 
the jet discharged from a duct at the head end is felt to be 
unpleasant wherever workmen are standing near the jet axis. 
If the distance between the delivery end of the jet and the 
heading face is less than the penetration depth, a backing 
effect is observed.The phenomena are described by Spence and 
Carver in the article "Effect of pneumatic stowing on venti-
lation". By using smoke to render the air currents visible, the 
authors observed eddy zones at the end of the duct when the dis-
tance between the duct end and the heading face was less than 
the jet penetration depth. The authors gave no details of the 
penetration depth of the jet. 
2.2. Jet spread where the duct is located near the side or roof 
of the heading 
In drivages the duct is generally placed under the roof or at 
floor level at the side of the heading. The jet discharged is 
not coaxial with the heading with the result that the mixing 
flow patterns are altered. In his article on air movement in 
air-conditioned premises, Regensoheidt mentioned the depth of 
penetration of a "half-size plaine jet" entering a confined 
space. 
If ventilation is effected e.g. by forced air delivered through 
a slit immediately below the roof, the jet penetration depth is 
considerably increased (see Fig. 3)· 
The jet behaves like a full-size plaine jet entering a non-con-
fined space through a slit of twice the width. The flow patterns 
and velocity distribution are represented in Fig. 3· In the 
case of a plaine jet, no air can be entrained on the roof side 
and mixing is confined to the underside of the jet. 
272 This applies only in part to a duct in a heading. That part 
of the jet which is directed towards the heading roof or wall 
must entrain air from the adjacent part of the heading. The 
resulting movement of the mixing flow has the form of part of 
a spiral (Fig. 4)· 
The maximum possible penetration depth of an eccentric jet can 
only be estimated. It will not be quite twice the depth attai-
ned in the case of the plane jet, but it will be greater than 
in a coxial arrangement. The zone within which the flow direc-
tion is reversed at the heading face is also larger. Depending 
on the degree of eccentricity of the duct within the heading 
cross-section, the jet will under normal conditions attain a 
penetration depth L which is 4 to 5*5* times as great as the 
equivalent diameter d corresponding to the heading cross-section 
F. 
As in the coaxial arrangement, the scouring velocity at the 
heading face is to he regarded as the velocity at the centre 
of the jet. It is thus Y$ to Ï2 of the velocity of discharge 
from the duct. 
The scouring velocity at the heading faoe will be about 7 to 
12 times as great as the average velocity in the heading. 
This should he satisfactory for the dispersion of methane layers 
at the head end provided that care is taken to ensure that the 
jet penetration depth is equal to the distance between the deli-
very end of the duct and the heading face. A further margin of 
safety is provided by the fact that the transverse movement of 
the mixing flow further assists gas dispersal. 
3. MODEL TESTS 
It is difficult to make detailed measurements of the mixing 
flows in the vicinity of the jet at the end of a ventilation 
duct. These flows can, however, be readily observed in a model. 
The flow patterns in a model and in full-scale tests are similar 
273 develops between the point at which the jet flow is reversed 
and the heading face. 
4.2. Observation of zones of secondary movement (eddy zones) 
The technique of rendering flow patterns in the roadhead visible 
by means of smoke was used in order to study the eddy zone in 
the vicinity of the duct end, which had also been observed by 
Spence and Carver. 
In the following figures the flow patterns in these eddy zones 
and their extension are shown roughly to scale. The air movement 
may be described as follows : 
If the distance between the duct end and the heading face is 
less than the maximum penetration depth of the jet, and eddy 
zone forms at the roof if the end of the duct is placed at one 
side of the heading, the air immediately under the roof travel-
ling inbye against the return flow. The flow velocity in this 
eddy zone is greather than the average air velocity in the pre-
ceding section of the heading. It is sufficient to ensure rapid 
dispersion of smoke accumulations behind the lagging. In the 
immediate vicinity of the duct outlet a smaller hut very rapidly 
rotating eddy also develops. 
If the distance between the duct end and heading face is equal 
to the penetration depth, this small eddy persists (see Fig. 8). 
If the duct-to-face distance is greater than the maximum jet 
penetration depth, a buffer zone develops between the point at 
which the jet flow is reversed and the heading face. Smoke injec-
ted into this zone moves very slowly. It rises to the roof, lar-
gely under the influence of thermal effects, and there creeps 
slowly to the point of jet reversal where it is entrained at 
high velocity towards the floor by the air current produced by 
the jet. 
Large eddy zones, such as were observed when the distance bet-
ween the duct end and the heading face was small, are most un-
desirable in the event of firedamp layering at the roof and 
276 should be avoided as far as possible. It was therefore natural 
to consider the possibility of preventing the development of 
such zones by altering the position of the duct outlet in the 
heading. 
A folding duct was therefore used to reposition the duct outlet 
immediately beneath the roof at a distance a of 7 m from the 
heading face (Fig. 9)· The large eddy was now formed at floor 
level near the delivery end of the duct as shown in Fig. 9» At 
the roof, the velocity of the jet between the duct end and the 
heading face was very high. Smoke clouds were very rapidly disper-
sed, even behind the lagging. For purposes of comparison the duct 
outlet was moved to a position at floor level at the side of the 
roadway at a distance a of 5 œ from the heading face, the other 
test conditions remaining unchanged. The large eddy zones was 
then formed in the vicinity of the duct end at roof level as 
shown in Fig. lo. 
The following conclusions may be derived from the studies of 
jet spread in forcing auxiliary ventilation systems. 
1. The maximum penetration depth L of the air discharged from 
the duct in a heading of cross-sectional area F (m ) is about 
4« 5 "to 5 times the equivalent diameter 
L « 4-5 to 5 χ Dhs;4.5 to 5 xtf~F(m) 
if the duct outlet is disposed in the usual manner at the 
roadway periphery, so that the jet and heading axes are paral-
lel (the outlet being positioned as close as possible to the 
roadway side or roof) and if no rotational movement has been 
imparted to the air leaving the duct. 
The local air velocities in the zone between the duct outlet 
and the point at which the jet flow is reversed are much grea-
ter than the average air velocity in the heading. It was obser-
ved that smoke accumulations in this zone were very quickly dis-
persed as a result of increased turbulence, even behind the lag-
ging. 
277 2. If the distance a between the end of the duct and the heading 
face is greater than the jet penetration depth L (a >L), a 
buffer zone is formed between the zone in which the jet flow 
is reversed and the heading face irrespective of the location 
of the duct outlet within the roadway cross-section. In this 
buffer zone there is virtually no air movement. 
3- If the distance a between the end of the duct and the heading 
face is less than the possible jet penetration depth L (a<L), 
eddy zones of varying dimensions develop in the vicinity of 
the duct end and outbye. These eddy zones causes flows ("back 
flows") countercurrent to the return air flow in specific areas 
near the duct end at the heading sides, floor or roof. 
The position of these eddy zones within the heading cross-sec-
tion depends on the position of the duct outlet in the hea-
ding. 
4. It is useful that the duct outlet be placed at the roof for 
the following reasons t 1. this absolutely prevents any 
blackflow of air at roof level in the vicinity of the duot 
end ; 2. the highest local jet velocities between the deli-
very end of the duct and the heading face will he encountered 
at roof level. 
The field tests were made possible by the kind assistance of 
the Bergwerkgesellschaft Hibernia AG. The authors would like 
to express his thanks to the management of the Hibernia AG 
for the material assistance provided and to Dipl.-Ing. Escher 
and Dr Böhm for their help and advice in the conduct of the 
tests. 
278 ABSTRACT 
The air-flow conditions created in a roadhead by a jet discharged 
from an air duct are deduced from the laws governing the behaviour 
of a free jet entering an unconfined space. 
The jet penetration depth can be estimated where the duct is laid 
coaxially with the roadway ; it is greater where the duct is laid 
eccentrically. Experiments with a water model and in the field 
have shown that the jet penetration depth largely depends on the 
equivalent roadway diameter D and the exchange coefficient m 
(an indicator of the degree of turbulence of the air discharged 
from the duct). Given an auxiliary ventilation system of normal 
dimensions and configuration, the penetration-to-diameter ratio 
h/WA to 5. 
(L «* maximum penetration depth, see page 9) 
Where the distance between the duct outlet and heading faoe is 
greather than the penetration depth, a buffer zone is formed 
between the point at which the direction of the jet flow is 
reversed and the heading face, in which fresh air and dangerous 
gaees are basically mixed by diffusion only. If the duot-to-face 
distance is reduced to lees than the penetration depth, extensive 
eddy zones will form in the vicinity of the duct outlet. Depen-
ding on the positioning of the outlet in the heading cross-sec-
tion, these eddies will produce back flows (countercurrent to 
the return air flow in the heading) at the sides or roof. 
It is therefore recommended that the duct outlet be positioned 
1. at a distance from the heading face approximately correspon-
ding to the jet penetration depth and 2. as close to the 
roof as possible. This will definitely prevent the formation 
of eddy zones under the roof and will ensure the availability 
at roof level of the local air velocities required to disperse 
methane layers. 
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Strahlkern = central cone of the jet 
Freistrahl mit Kern - free jet with central cone 
vollausgebildeter Freistrahi = free jet fully 
developed 
Länge des Strahlkerns - length of central cone 
Mischzahl « exchange coefficient fri 
Strahldurchmesser « jet diameter 
Mittengeschwindig#eit - velocity in the centre of 
the jet 
Geschwindigkeitsverteilung ■ velocity distribution 
Im vollausgebildeten Freistrahl ■ in the fully deve-
loped free jet 
Der rande Freistrahl (Geschwindigkeiteverteilung ) » 
Round free jet (velocity distribution) 
FIGURE 2 
Strömungsverlauf und Geschwindigkeitsvertei· 
lung eines runden koaxialen Strahls' im ab-
geschlossenen Rohr (Schema). 
Abströmung entgegengesetzt der Strahlriohtung 
Flow pattern and velocity distribution of a 
round coaxial jet within a closed tube 
(schematic representation). Back flow counter 
to direction of jet. 
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Kindringtiefe und Schema der Geschwindigkeitsver-
teilung eines ebenen Strahles in einen begrenzten 
Raum. Abströmung entgegengesetzt der Strahlenrich— 
tung = 
Penetration depth and velocity distribution pattern 
for a plane jet entering a confined space. Back 
flow counter to direction of jet. 
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Wasserzulauf » water inlet 
Wasserablauf » water outlet 
Wassermodell zur Strahlenausbreitung bla-
sender Sonderbewetterungsanlagen in Streck« 
vortrieben - Water model for the investiga-
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ventilation systems in headings. 
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Luttenleitung « duct 
Druckluftleitung ■ compressed air range 
Wettergeschwindigkeiten ■» air velocities 
Lutte = duct 
Strecke = heading 
Querschnitt der Strecke für Untersuchung 
blasender Sonderbewetterungsanlagen vor 
Ort = Cross—section of heading used for 
investigation of forcing auxiliary venti-
lation systems. 
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Strömungsverlauf vor Ort bei blasenden 
Sonderbewetterungsanlagen bei verschiedene 
Abständen von der Ortsbrust (Schema) -
Flow patterns at the head end produced by 
forcing auxiliary ventilation systems with 
varying distances between the duct end and 
the heading face (schematic representation). 
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heading face (schematic representation). 
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FIGURE 9 
Aufriss » vertical section 
Grundriss - plan 
Strömungsverlauf vor Ort bei blasenden Son-
derbewetterungsanlagen. Luttenausblas in der 
Firste (Schema) - Flow patterns at the head 
end^produced by forcing auxiliary ventilation 
systems. Suot outlet at the roof (schematio 
representation). 
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(schematic representation). 
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283 APPENDIX 3 
Report of the National Committee 
(United Kingdom) to examine all 
aspects of the ventilation of nar-
row drivages (Doc. No. 4293/78 -
Excerpt) 8. DE-GASSING OF HEADINGS 
If proper provision is made for the continuous ventilation of 
auxiliary ventilated places then the need to de-gas a heading 
should be the exception rather than the rule. There will always 
be cases where there is a heading to be de-gassed and the correct 
procedure to be adopted should take into consideration the fol-
lowing points. 
The need to de-gas a heading will usually arise from the failure 
of a component in the auxiliary ventilation system. The first 
steps to be taken should be to determine the nature and the ex-
tent of the problem. This will be dictated by the gas make in the 
heading, the lenght of drivage, the gradient and the lenght of 
time that the ventilation has been interrupted. The person in 
charge of the de-gassing operation should ascertain the extent 
of the problem by entering the heading and making determinations 
of the firedamp and/or blackdamp content. Before any de-gassing 
operation a paramount consideration is that in all workings 
likely to be affected the electrioal equipment other than that 
specified in categories of approved apparatus referred to in 
Regulation 6 of the Coal & Other Hines (Electricity) Regula-
tions, 1956, should be isolated and all men withdrawn. 
The importance of maintaining complete control over any de-
gassing operation cannot be over-emphasized· 
If proper control is not exercised during a de-gassing operation 
using an exhausting system there may be a possibility of dra-
wing explosive mixtures of gas over rotating fan blades. This 
could be avoided by changing an exhausting system to a forcing 
system for a de-gassing operation but the effect of this change 
on other districts in the ventilation circuit should be fully 
assessed. 
It is possible using a system of ducting and diverting shutters 
to provide a means of readily changing an exhausting system in-
to a forcing system. The operation of such a layout would not 
be in compliance with Regulation 24 (3) of the Coal & Other 
287 Mines (Ventilation) Regulations 195b· At this stage it is diffi-
cult to envisage the widespread application of the system. 
Two basic methods of de-gassing a heading are available. These 
are independent of whether the heading is ventilated by an ex-
hausting system or a forcing system. 
The first method relies on a heading being progressively reco-
vered by extending the duct line into the heading as tests for 
gas indicate that it is being gradually dispersed. Although this 
method has been widely used effective control is difficult and 
it is possible that with an exhausting system high concentra-
tions of gas may be drawn through the fan. In both exhausting 
and forcing systems, it is almost inevitable that the persons 
advancing the duct will at times be subject to high concentra-
tions of gas. 
The second method incorporates a by-pass attached to the main 
duct line which permits the regulation of the quantity of fresh 
air introduced into the system. 
This is the method which should be adopted whenever possible. 
The by-pass system is illustrated in Fig. 12 and the arrange-
ment is basically the same whether the auxiliary system is 
exhausting or forcing. This method of de-gassing relies upon 
the by-pass being fully open at the commencement of the opera-
tion and the regulator on the main line fully closed. As de-
gassing proceeds the by-pass will be gradually closed and the 
regulator gradually opened. Firedamp readings taken in the 
appropriate places will indicate what adjustments are necessary. 
The firedamp readings should be taken to ensure that no air con-
taining more than 1
 1/4 f° passes over powered fan blades or elec-
trical apparatus. The adjustment of the regulator in the by-pass 
will be done manually to ensure complete safety in the de-gassing 
operation. 
288 The by-pass method is relatively simple in operating using one 
fan or a series of fans situated outbye of the heading. The me-
thod becomes more complex where the auxiliary system employs 
fans in series within the duct line in the heading. In this case 
it may not be possible to completely de-gas the heading using 
only the outbye fan so that additional staged fans may have to 
be installed at the outbye position. 
If the normal system is forcing then a de-gassing operation may 
necessitate passing high concentrations of firedamp through the 
windmilling impeller of the inbye fan. Where the system is ex-
hausting the de-gassing operation will inevitably involve passing 
high concentrations of firedamp through the windmilling impeller 
of the inbye fan or fans. Work currently being carried out at 
S.H.R.E. may indicate that some metallic materials reduce the 
frictional sparking hazard when compared with steel. In any 
change over to fans made with such a material priority should 
be given to replacing those fans in systems employing fans in 
series along the duct. 
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290 APPENDIX 4 
Examples of instructions for the controlled scouring 
of firedamp in workings with the requisite dilution 
equipment and a centralized or local remote methane 
monitoring system, instructions for the arrival and 
departure of workers, and an example of instructions 
on deluting firedamp (Charbonnages de France) 
48) APPENDIX 4 a 
Example of instructions for the controlled scouring of firedamp 
in workings with the requisite dilution equipment and a centra­
lized remote methane monitoring system. 
G. T. M. (multifunctional mobile methanometer) 
Remote methanometry sensing head 
ς 
Δ 
Dilution duct 
\oj.M.  Telephone 
Telephone 
hOh 
·/· 
io ceh/'AÍ retocS* bohWorïhf JÍA+UH 
The requisite equipment for the controlled scouring of fire-
damp or dilution consists of the following : 
- in the main ventilation system : 
• at the fan, 2 air supply points with hoses to allow the fan 
to be switched to compressed air supply ; 
• a genephone or telephone connected to the central remote metha-
nometry station } 
- in the development roadway : 
292 χ metres from the entry, a remote methanometry sensing head 
to warn the personnel charged with the dilution operation of 
the approach of a cloud with a high concentration of methane ; 
y metres from the entry : 
. a diluter (delution duct) to proportion the airflow from 
the air duct. 
ζ metres from the entry : 
. a multifunctional mobile methanometer (G.T.M.) providing 
readings, at one-minute intervals, set to switch off the 
power supply automatically at the fan switch when concen­
trations of over 1.5 % occur. This G.T.M. is to be placed 
at the centre of gravity of the roadway section ; 
an intrinsically safe genephone or telephone connected to 
the central remote methanometry station. 
When a firedamp level of over 2 % is deteoted during a fire­
damp inspection or by the remote methanometry sensing head lo­
cated in the working area, a dilution operation must be perfor­
med after evaouating the personnel if necessary, the power swit­
ched off (by electrical or manual means) the compressed air sup­
ply to the working area cut off, explosives removed and the mono­
rail winch disconnected. 
This dilution operation may only be performed under the direct 
surveillance of a supervisor or ventilation specialist designa­
ted by the mine engineer. 
Personnel required : 
A supervisor or ventilation specialist and a man equipped with 
methanometers and flame safety lamps. 
Procedure : 
The supervisor or ventilation specialist responsible for the 
293 dilution operation informs the central remote methanometry sta­
tion. 
The station official takes readings from the sensing head posi­
tioned χ metres from the entry once a minute (manual interroga­
tion) throughout the dilution operation and informs the super­
visor or ventilation specialist of the concentration levels. 
The supervisor or ventilation specialist takes up a position at 
the controls of the diluter ; he and his assistant, who is next 
to the fan, are in communication with each other by genephone ; 
as soon as the central remote methanometry station informs the 
supervisor or ventilation specialist that the firedamp level at 
the sensing head positioned χ metres from the entry is over 1·5$» 
the supervisor or ventilation specialist opens the diluter with 
caution. 
a) If the diluter's opening is set correctly, the cloud's fire­
damp level will fall below 1.5 % on the G.T.M. controlling the 
operation of the fan ; the latter's operation will remain nor­
mal and the dilution operation will not be interrupted until the 
remote methanometry head positioned χ metres from it detects a 
methane concentration of under 1.5 5^· The supervisor or venti­
lation specialist may then visit the working area accompanied 
by his assistant ; the electric current must not be switched 
on again until the gate-end boxes have been ventilated. 
b) If the diluter's opening is not wide enough, the cloud's fire­
damp level will rise above 1.5 % on the G.T.M., causing the fan 
to be switched off. The assistant then switches on the compressed 
air supply to the fan and the supervisor or ventilation specialist 
widens the diluter's opening. The supervisor or ventilation 
speoialist takes concentration readings from the G.T.M. and ad­
justs the diluter's opening until the readings fall below 1.5 %'f 
he then instructs his assistant to switch on the electric power 
supply again ; the dilution operation can then be continued as 
described in a). 
294 Special cases where the diluter is not accessible (firedamp 
level over 2 fo between the entry of the development roadway 
(heading) and the diluter controls). 
In such cases, scouring of firedamp may be performed only in 
accordance with the second indent of Article 13 of the instruc­
tions relating to Article 174 of the French General Regulations 
(personnel to be evacuated from the independent ventilation dis­
trict). 
Note : Distances x, y and ζ are specified in the instructions 
of the engineer responsible for the ventilation of the 
mine on the basis of air speed and layout of the wor­
kings. 
295 APPENDIX 4 h 
Example of instructions for controlled scouring of firedamp 
in workings with the requisite dilution equipment and local 
remote methane monitoring system 
G. T. M. (multifunctional mobile methanometer) 
remote methanometry sensing head 
\ 
dilution duct 
k 
G.T.M. 
□ ö£ 
Genephone 
/ 
ï  sz 
Genephone 
Fan 
Sfero 
/ ù 
local measuring station 
The requisite equipment for controlled scouring of firedamp 
or dilution consists of the following ι 
- in the main ventilation system : 
- at the fan, 2 air supply points with hoses to allow the fan 
to be switched to compressed air supply ; 
- a local measuring station ; 
- a genephone connected to a second genephone located near 
the dilution duct ; 
- in the development roadway : 
- χ metres from the entry, the remote methanometry head to 
296 warn the personnel charged with the dilution operation of the 
approach of a cloud with a high concentration of methane. This 
head is connected to the local measuring station. 
- y metres from the entry : 
a diluter to proportion the airflow from the air duct ; 
- ζ metres from the entry : 
. a multifunctional mobile methanometer (G.T.M.) providing 
readings at one-minute intervals, set to switch off the po­
wer supply automatically at the fan switch when concentra­
tions of over I.5 % occur. 
This G.T.M. is to be placed at the centre of gravity of the 
roadway section ; 
. an intrinsically safe genephone allowing communication bet­
ween the man at the G.T.M. and the dilution duot with the 
man at the local measuring station. 
When a firedamp level of over 2 % is detected during a firedamp 
inspection, a dilution operation must be performed after evacua­
ting the personnel, if necessary the power switched off (by elec­
trical or manual means), the compressed air supply to the wor­
king area cut off, explosives removed and the monorail winch 
disconnected. 
This dilution operation may only be performed under the direct 
surveillance of a supervisor or ventilation specialist designa­
ted by the mine engineer. 
Personnel required : a supervisor or ventilation engineer and a 
man equiped with methanometers and flame safety lamps. 
Procedure: 
The supervisor or ventilation specialist responsible for the 
297 dilution operation posts a man at the local-measuring station. 
The latter takes a reading from the sensing head positioned χ 
metres from the entry once a minute (manual interrogation) through­
out the dilution operation and informs the supervisor or ventila­
tion specialist of the concentration levels. 
The supervisor or ventilation specialist takes up a position 
at the controls of the diluter ; he and his assistant, who is 
next to the fan, are in communication with each other by gene­
phone ; ^3 soon as the man at the local measuring station informs 
the supervisor or ventilation specialist that the firedamp level 
at the head positioned χ metres from the entry is over 1.5 % 
the supervisor or ventilation specialist opens the diluter with 
caution. 
a) If the diluter's opening is set correctly, the cloud's fire­
damp level will fall below 1.5 % on the G.T.M. controlling 
the operation of the fan ; the latter's operation will re­
main normal and the dilution operation will not be interrup­
ted until the remote methanometry sensing head positioned χ 
metres from it detects a methane concentration of under 1.5 %· 
The supervisor or ventilation specialist may then visit the 
working area accompanied by his assistant ; the electric cur­
rent must not be switched on again until the gate-end boxes 
have been ventilated. 
b) If the diluter's opening is not wide enough, the cloud's fire­
damp level will rise above 1.5 % on the G.T.M., causing the 
fan to be switched off. The assistant then switches on the 
compressed air supply to the fan and the supervisor or venti­
lation specialist widens the diluter's opening.The supervisor 
or ventilation specialist takes concentration readings from 
the G.T.M. and adjusts the diluter's opening until the rea­
dings fall below 1.5 % ; he then instructs his assistant to 
switch on the electric power supply again ; the dilution ope­
ration can then be continued as described in a). 
Special cases where the diluter is not accessible (firedamp level 
of over 2 % between the entry of the development roadway and 
298 the diluter controls). 
In such cases, scouring of firedamp may be performed only in 
accordance with the second indent of Article 13 of the instruc­
tions relating to Article 174 of the French General Regulations 
(personnel to be evacuated from the independant ventilation dis­
trict). 
Note : Distances x, y and ζ are specified in the instructions 
of the engineer responsible for the ventilation of the 
mine on the basis of air speed and layout of the wor­
kings. 
299 U. P. LENS 
Hine 19 Lens APPENDIX 6 c 
Geographical sector 3/4 Lens 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR DRIVAGE 
OF 
WORKING AREA EQUIPMENT 
The working area equipment consists of the following : 
- at the fan, two air supply points and 25 mm dia. hoses to 
allow the fan to be switched to compressed air supply. A 
genephone connected to the diluter controls. 
~ m from roadway junction t 
a diluter to proportion the air supply from the air duct ; 
a multifunctional mobile methanometer (G.T.M.) providing rea-
dings at one-minute intervals, set to switch off the power 
supply automatically at the fan switch when concentrations of 
over 1.5 % occur. This G.T.M. is to be placed at the centre of 
gravity of the roadway section. 
- at the diluter controls located t 
. an intrinsically safe genephone - telephone (ï) connected to 
the central remote methanometry station ; 
. a genephone connected to the fan location. 
- m from the roadway junction , a remote 
methanometry sensing head, No , to warn the personnel 
charged with the dilution operation of the approach of a cloud 
with a high concentration of methane. 
300 at the scraper ramp, a methanometry sensing head, No 
An instrinsically safe genephone-telephone (ï) connected to 
the central remote methanometry station. 
above the electric pump, a G.T.M., to disconnect the power 
in the development roadway when the firedamp level is above 
1.5 % (ι). 
(ï) Delete where inapplicable 
301 IN3TRUÇTI0NS_FOR_TíE_SHlFTrF0RMíAN_r_ 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF WORKERS 
- A. Electrical risks 
(1) When there are no men in the working area, the cul-de-sac power 
supply is disconnected in the TT section by the shift foreman 
when he leaves the working. 
When the workforce arrives, the shift foreman calls the central 
remote methanometry station by genephone from the entry to the 
working in order to determine the concentration levels àt the 
methanometer sensing heads. If these levels are below 1.5 % 
and have not exceeded 2 % for more than 8 hours whilst the po-
wer was cut off, the power supply to the TT section may be 
switched on again. If the firedamp levels are higher, the super-
visor must be informed (ï). 
Alternatively 
(2) The G.T.M. at the face of the heading which controls the elec-
tric pump disconnects the TT section if the firedamp level is 
above 1.5 %» 
When the workforce arrives, if the TT section is disconnected, 
the power supply should not be switched on again and the super-
visor must be informed (ï). 
The supervisor inspects the working with a flame safety lamp 
and methanometer, and switches on the TT section again if the 
firedamp level is below 1.5 % throughout the working. If the 
level has exceeded 2 % for more than 8 hours, the gate-end boxes 
must be ventilated beforehand. 
302 Β. Compressed air and monorail_ risks (i) 
When there are no men in the working, the compressed air is 
switched off at the entry and the monorail prevented from ope-
ration (ï) by the shift foreman when he leaves the working. 
When the workforce arrives, after obtaining the readings from 
the central remote methanometry station by genephone, the shift 
foreman 
- switches on the compressed air and authorizes operation of 
the monorail (I) if the firedamp level is below 2 % at all 
the sensing heads located in the cul-de-sac ; the workforce 
may then enter the working ; 
- fences the working off and informs the supervisor if the fire-
damp levels are abnormal (2 % or more at one sensing head at 
least). 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SHOTFIRING 
Immediately prior to shotfiring the shotfirer shall contact the 
central remote methanometry station. 
All monorail operation shall be discontinued before shotfiring 
and may not be resumed until the firedamp levels has been checked 
following shotfiring (ï). 
The following precautions shall be taken if two readings of over 
2 % are obtained after shotfiring during three successive shot-
firing rounds. 
These instructions shall only be rescinded if no readings above 
2 % are obtained after 6 successives rounds : 
(ï) - Delete where inapplicable. 
303 1) The firing station shall be taken back to the main ventilation 
circuit. 
2) Prior the shotfiring, the power shall be switched off at the TT 
section supplying the electrical equipment. After shotfiring 
the power may not be switched on again until the firedamp level 
has been checked and found to be less than 1.5 %. If it has 
exceeded 2 % for more than 8 hours, the gate-end boxes shall be 
ventilated beforehand. 
All monorail operations shall be prevented until the firedamp 
check has been carried out after shotfiring (ï). 
3) Prior to shotfiring, the compressed air supply shall be swit-
ched off in the cul-de-sac working and shall not be re-esta-
blished until the firedamp level has been checked. 
4) If the readings taken at the face of the heading (head No ) 
indicate that a cloud of over 1.5 % methane may arrive at the di-
luter, which may cause the fan to be switched off by the G.T.M., 
the concentrations at head No shall be checked at 1 -
minute intervals by the central remote methanometry station. 
The supervisor, the man placed in charge (ï) (2) shall take up 
position at the controls of the diluter, an assistant at the fan, 
and the procedure for controlled dilution of the methane cloud 
is performed according to the dilution instructions given below ι 
(2) The ventilation technicians and qualified firedamp inspec-
tors designated by the ventilation engineer shall be placed 
in the same category as supervisors. 
(ï) Delete where inapplicable. . 
304 INSTRUCTION FOR THE DEPUTY 
DILUTION INSTRUCTIONS 
When a firedamp level of over 2 $ has been detected during a 
firedamp inspection or by one of the remote methanometry sen-
sing heads in the working, a dilution operation must be perfor-
med after evacuation the workforce if necessary, the compressed 
air supply switched off and explosives removed from the heading. 
. The power supply shall be disconnected from the TT section (ï). 
. The power supply will have been automatically disconnected by 
the G.T.M. at the face of the heading (ï). 
This dilution operation may only be performed under the direct 
surveillance of a supervisor (2). Requisite personnel : a super-
visor and an assistant equipped with a methanometer and a flame 
safety lamp. 
Procedure : 
The supervisor (2) in charge of the dilution operation informs 
the central remote methanometry station. 
The central station operator shall take a reading from the head 
located m from the entry once a minute (manual interroga-
tion) throughout the dilution operation and shall inform the su-
pervisor of the levels. 
The supervisor (2) and his assistant shall take up positions at 
the diluter controls and next to the fan respectively. They 
shall be in communication by genephone. 
As soon as the central remote methanometry station informs the 
supervisor that the firedamp level is higher than 1.5 % at the 
sensing head located m from the entry, the supervisor 
shall open the diluter. 
305 a) If the diluter's opening is set correctly, the firedamp level 
of the cloud will fall below 1·5 ',t on the G.T.M. controlling 
the fan's operation ; the latter will continue to operate 
normally and the dilution operation shall be resumed until 
the sensing head located 5° m away detects firedamp levels 
below 1.5 %. The supervisor may then inspect the working 
accompanied by his assistant. The power may not be switched 
on again until after the gate-end boxes have been ventilated 
if they have been subjected to a firedamp atmosphere for over 
8 hours. 
b) If the diluter's opening is not wide enough, the firedamp 
level of the cloud will rise above I.5 % on the G.T.M., cau-
sing the fan to be switched off. The assistant shall then 
switch the latter over to compressed air supply and the 
supervisor shall widen the diluter's opening. The supervisor 
shall check the firedamp level on the G.T.M. and adjust the 
diluter's opening to lower the level to below I.5 % on the 
G.T.M. 
He shall then instruct his assistant to switch on the electric 
power supply again and the dilution operation may then prooeed 
as in a). 
Special cases where the diluter cannot be adjusted (firedamp 
levels of over 2 % between the entry to the development road-
way and the diluter's controls). 
In such cases, scouring may only be performed in compliance with 
the first indent of Article I5 of the instructions relating to 
Article 174 of the French General Regulations (personnel to be 
evacuated from the independent ventilation district). 
(2) The ventilation technicians and qualified firedamp inspectors 
designated by the ventilation engineer shall be placed in the 
same category as supervisors. 
(ï) Delete where inapplicable. 
306 SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS 
The engineer responsible for The engineer, Head of Safety, 
drivage, Management and Staff Training, 
307 Diagrams : 
DILUEUR DE GRISOU POUR VENTUBE DE 800 : Firedamp diluter 
for 800 ventube 
Commande à distance : remote control 
Volant de Vanne : valve wheel 300 mm dia. 
Unité de production : production unit 
Siège : mine 
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316 APP5MDIX 5 
Circular from the Chief Mines Inspectorate of 
North-Rhine-Westphalia of 17 August I97I con-
cerning 'Pans with combined electric/air drive 
(Combi nat ion fans)' ELECTRICAL APPARATUS 
To the Inspectorates of North Rhine-Westphalia 
Subject : Fans with combined electric/air drive ("Combination 
fans") 
The Berggewerkschaftliche Versuchsstrecke has recently carried out 
tests on this type of fan to determine whether in compressed 
air operation the electric drive, deactivated but acting as a 
generator on account of the remanence in the iron of its rotor 
(which continues to be driven), is capable of generating energy 
sufficient to ignite firedamp. 
These studies have shown that firedamp can be ignited at around 
one third nominal revolutions (3 ooo rpm) of the fan by a short-
circuit across the terminals. Current peaks of over 1 A were 
noted. 
The results of similar studies on motors running down, and en 
face conveyor drives which are deactivated but continue to ro­
tate, have been known for some time. These resulte led to the 
requirement in service instructions for electrioiane that work 
may not be carried out on motors, their cables and associated 
switchgear after shutdown until the rotors have come to a «tand*-
still. 
I consider the following action advisable : 
1. In accordance with the provisions of § 124 BVOE(Mining re­
gulations for electrical apparatus) electricians are to be 
informed of the dangers arising from the generative opera­
tion of motors and the service instruction to be supplemen­
ted ££ appropriate 
κ D 
2. The provisions of S lo9 subpara. 1 BVOE also apply to this 
generative operation. All components of an installation in 
which a remanent potential occurs are to be considered as live. 
1) see pages 2/3 3· Combination fans, the design of which may give rise to the 
same hazards, should not be used in workings for which an 
exemption from § I50 subpara. 1 BVOSt (Mining regulations 
for hard coal mines) has been granted or is being sought. 
Dortmund, I7.8.I97I Landesoberbergamt NW 
Coenders 
l) see pages 2/3 
319 1. Excerpt from the Mining regulations for electrical apparatus 
issued by the Chief Kines Inspectorats :Torth-Hhine-.7estfalia 
Art. lo9 
Work on live parts of electrical installations in underground 
workings exposed to firedamp hazards, and in areas exposed to 
explosion hazards. 
(1) In underground workings exposed to firedamp hazards, and in 
areas exposed to explosion hazards, work on live parts and 
the internal cleaning of equipment through which current is 
passing are forbidden. 
(2) Para. 1 does not apply to intrinsically safe installations 
or circuits ; exceptions to this are parts of power networks 
and power sources which are not intrinsically safe, belonging 
to such installations or circuits. 
(3) If both dead and live parts are accommodated within 
the same housing, work may be done on the dead parts 
only if the design is such as to exclude all risk 
of accidental contact with the live parts· 
(4) Para. 1 does not apply to the changing of "batteries for 
local battery-telephone systems. 
(5) Notwithstanding the provisions of para. 1, firedamp-proof 
or explosionproof testing appliances aay be applied to 
live parts (Articles 98 & 99). 
320 Art. 124 
Instructions to electricians on measures for maintaining the-
protection against firedamp and explosion 
(1) In mines where the workings are exposed to firedamp hazards, 
the Owner or the qualified electrical engineer appointed by 
him must instruct the electricians at intervals of not more 
than two years on the measures which have to be taken to 
maintain the protection of the equipment against firedamp 
hoards. A set of appropriate instructions must be issued 
to them. 
(2) In mines with electrical installations in areas exposed to 
explosion hazards,the Owner or the qualified electrical engi-
neer appointed by him must instruct the electricians at intervals 
of not more than two years on the measures which have to be 
taken to maintain the protection of the equipment against 
explosion hazards. A set of appropriate instructions must 
be issued to them. 
2. Excerpt from the Mining regulations for hard coal mines issued 
by the Chief Mines Inspectorate North-Rhine-Westfalia 
Art. I50 
Air volume 
(l) The volume of air supplied to the workings should be such 
that the air in the clear cross—section of the workings as 
a whole should contain less than 1 % mine gas (CH.). The 
Mines Inspectorate can grant exceptions under para 1, up 
to a level of I.5 % CEL. 
321 ANNEX V 
PROPOSAL TO GOVERNMENTS 
for 
PRODUCTION WELL COMPLETION OFFSHORE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
SAFETY AND HEALTH COMMISSION FOR THE MINING AND EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES 
Working Party 
on 
Oil, Gas and other materials extracted by borehole 
Committee of Experts 
on Well Control 
PROPOSAL TO GOVERNMENTS 
for 
PRODUCTION WELL COMPLETION OFFSHORE 
This proposal is the third stage of the work of the Committee of Experts, referred to 
in paragraph 2 (2.3.) of paper 3318/6/77 and forms the continuation ofthat document. 
Adopted by the SAFETY AND HEALTH COMMISSION 
FOR THE MINING AND EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES 
on 7 september 1979 
in accordance with articles 1 and 4 of the terms of reference, 
and article 1 of the Council decision of 27 june 1974 
on the extension of the responsabilities of the Safety and Health Commission 
LUXEMBOURG, 1979 A. Naturally flowing production wells 
1. In section A, the wells referred to are those which can produce 
oil and/or gas under naturally flowing conditions to the 
surface. 
2. Christmas trees of such wells above the sea-surface require two 
master valves, the highest one remotely controllable, one valve 
in the flow-wing and one swab valve with a manometer connection 
and valve. 
3. Wellheads of such wells which are above the sea-surface must be 
equipped with two outlets for each annular space between 
casings. 
The components of the wellhead above the surface-casing housing 
must also have a valve removal capability. 
Each outlet must be closed off with a valve if the annular space 
has open connection to the formations. If there is no open 
connection to the formations only one of the outlets must be 
closed off with a valve. 
The annular space between casing and tubing must have two out-
lets each with two valves. The outlets, valves and annular 
space between casing and tubing must be large enough to permit 
the well to be killed. 
The wellhead with flanges and spools must be sufficiently strong 
for the expected pressures. Provision must be made for the 
monitoring of all critical annuii. 
Remark : On Christmas trees and wellheads the installation of a 
second valve is recommended when regular valve opera-
tion is foreseen. 
327 4. Christmas trees of such wells below the sea-surface require at 
least one remotely controllable master valve and a similar valve 
in the flow-wing. 
5. Wellheads of such wells below the sea-surface must be equipped 
with at least one remotely controllable valve of a size which 
is sufficient to permit the killing of the well. Provision 
must be made for the monitoring of all critical annuii. 
6. The pressure rating of the Christmas tree and the flowline must 
be adéquats for the maximum expected pressure to which each is 
subjected. 
7. The tubing hanger must be provided with a facility to accomoda-
te a plug or safety valve. 
8. The tubing must be equipped with a surface controlled subsur-
face safety valve below the mudline. 
The proper working of this valve must be tested at least twice 
yearly. 
Details and dates of the tests must be recorded. 
Remark : The installation depth of the valve should be adapted 
both to the type of formations just below the sea-bed and to 
the depth of water. 
9. The production tubing should preferably be equipped with a 
circulating device down-hole. 
10. Such wells must be equipped with a production packer in the 
casing as close as possible above the producing interval, to 
seal off the annular space between the casing and the tubing. 
11. The production packer or tailpipe below the packer must be 
provided with a facility to accomodate a retrievable plug or 
safety valve. 
328 12. A safety device must be installed to activate the closing of 
the well in the event of abnormal flowline pressures. 
B. Artificially producing wells 
1. In section Β of this document the wells refered to are those 
which can not produce oil and gas under naturally flowing 
conditions to the surface. 
Remark : Where the quantity and/or pressure of oil and gas 
flowing naturally from a well would not create dange-
rous conditions, such a well may be included in this 
section. 
2. The energy supply to an artificially producing well must be 
shut off automatically in case of damage to the Christmas tree 
or flowline, whether the energy supply is electric, high pres-
sure gas, air or hydraulic oil. 
3. All provisions under A are applicable to artificially producing 
wells, except provisions 1, 8, 10 and 11. 
C. Général 
A full specification of the completed well must be available 
in every case. 
Remark : The specification should include all test results. 
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333 WORKOVER PROGRAMME OFFSHORE 
1. A workover is an operation involving the removal of the 
Christmas tree to permit downhole operations and which 
requires the killing or securing of the well. A 
programme must be issued before work is begun. 
2. The programme must include details on the following : 
2.1. The ¿justification of the workover, including a brief 
production history. 
2.2. All crucial data of the well : e.g. 
1. field-name, number and location (co-ordinates) of well, 
2. date of the original completion or last workover, 
3· a plot of the well deviation, if applicable, 
4.. a description of the well production casing, its 
specifications, setting depth and the depth to the 
top of the annular cement, 
5· completed interval and perforations, 
6. a description and specification of the surface or 
sub-sea completion, including the wellhead installation, 
7. a full specification of the down-hole completion, 
8. maximum expected closed-in tubing and annular pressures, 
9. bottom hole formation pressures and reference depth, 
10. bottom hole and surface well temperature, 
11. contents of tubing and annular spaces, 
12. production mechanism, 
13. open flow potential. 
2.3. The workover unit to be employed. 
2.4. The wellhead safety installations to be installed. 
335 2·5· The sequence of the workover operations, indicating any 
foreseeable alternative step - and in particular commen-
ting on critical operations. 
2.6. The method of safe-guarding adjacent wells, if applicable. 
2.7· The estimated duration of the work. 
2.8. The job title of the responsible persons, designated by 
the operator to take charge of operations on the side and 
on the land base. 
GENERAL REMARK 
Important changes of programme must, when safety 
conditions permit, be notified in advance 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The teras of reference of the Working Party on Flammable Dusts laid down by the 
Mines Safety and Health Commission are as follows: 
'To carry out a study of precautions against the combustion and explosion of dust, 
in particular: 
- dust neutralization..., this study to include the comparative analysis of the 
regulations in the Community countries, along with the methods of application of 
the different procedures...' 
1.2 In 1974, The Working Party commenced such a comparative study of the procedures 
employed in the various countries, and by 1976 this study had already led to a 
recommendation on the application of dust binding by hygroscopic salís (adopted 
by the Mines Safety and Health Commission on 3 September 1976). 
1.3 In addition, on 11 July 1975 the MSHC stated that it 'attaches great importance 
to any conclusions that it (the Working Party) may draw (from the examination of 
the Lens - Lievin accident of 27.12.1974), especially if harmonized measures for 
the most effective control of dust explosions in coal mines can be proposed.' 
1.4 With this harmonization in mind, the Working Forty has carried out a comparative 
detailed analysis of the procedures for monitoring stcnedusting in the Member States, 
both from the point of view of the regulations currently in force in these States 
and of their practical application. 
1.5 This document concerns all mine workings whers the method used tc neutralize 
dust is stonedusting with calcareous dust, and is not concerned with workings where 
other neutralization methods are employed. 
2. EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
;í>a.üi.  2.1 The purpose of stonedusting is tc prevent the initiation and pror 
explosions by rendering the dust which can be raised into the air non-explcsicle. 
This dust must therefore contain, everywhere and at all times, a minimum percentafre 
of inerts as specified in national regulations. 
341 2.2 In the 'Recommendation on the application of dust binding by hygroscopic salts 
etc...', the MSHC states that it 'considers stonedusting as acceptable provided 
that it is carried out with appropriate regularity*. As its effectiveness decreases 
with the passage of time, stonedusting must therefore be monitored at suitable 
intervals. 
2.3 Monitoring of stonedusting generally comprises the measurement of the neutral-
ization ratio of samples made up of increments taken at specific points or from 
specific areas. But experience has shown that the formation of dust deposits in 
roadways is not regular, and this constitutes a difficulty when approaching the proble 
of sampling. 
2.4 In fact, numerous factors influence the deposition of dust: of these, the 
following are the most important:-
- the quantity and particle size of the dust generated; 
- the location of the deposits relative to their sources; 
- the velocity of the air current and the obstacles encountered; 
- the variations in direction and cross—section of roadways; 
- transport and other types of movement; 
- the nature of the roadway surfaces. 
2.5 In principle, one ought to take into account all these factors when choosing a 
system of sampling. 
In this way the Working Party has brought forward a recommendation that a very 
general distinction should be made between two types of workings:* 
- Type A: Workings or part of workings situated near a source of emission of dusts 
and in which the depositions of dust are large and irregular. 
- Type B: Workings or part of workings situated a greater distance from such 
sources, and in which the dust depositions are smaller and more uniform. 
The present document makes in addition recommendations concerning: 
- on the one hand, certain aspects of monitoring in general (Chapter 3), and of 
sampling in particular (Chapter 4)î 
- on the other hand, the preparation of samples for analysis, and their actual 
analysis (Chapter 5)· 
Concerning other aspects of sampling, each of the interested countries has its own 
principles and its own system, hallowed by long years of use. These principles and 
systems are described in Annexes I to IV. 
* It is up to the competent national authorities to divide underground workings 
into these two types. 
342 3. MONITORING REQUIREMENTS 
3.1 The object of stonedusting is to obtain, everywhere and at all times, in the 
surface layer* of deposited dust, not less than a minimum percentage of inert matter 
(fixed by the national regulations, as stated in para.'2.1). 
3.2 The responsibility for the relevant measures rests with the mine manager, i.e. 
he must arrange for stonedusting operations to be carried out at intervals which 
depend on the dust concentration in each roadway or length of roadway. 
3.3 The mine manager must also be satisfied that these measures achieve their 
purpose, i.e. that the neutralization ratio is adequate everywhere and at all times. 
3.4 In consequence, it would be desirable, on the one hand, to provide for stcnedusti 
operations as a function of the characteristics of each roadway on the basis of 
experience and/or the systematic measurement of the amount of coal dust deposited, 
and, on the other hand, to keep a record of controls carried out. 
3·5 Great importance attaches to the training of the personnel responsible for the 
monitoring. This training should cover both theoretical aspects (causes and 
development of explosions, mechanism of the various preventive methods, etc.) and 
practical aspects (proper application of these methods and proper verification of 
their effectiveness). 
3.6 Frequency. As a consequence of what has been said above, and because the manager 
is always responsible for the efficacy of the methods used, he must be allowed a 
certain latitude concerning the frequency of monitoring in a particular working or 
part of a working. 
A maximum interval between two consecutive monitoring operations should certainly 
be recommended. This maximum is 1 month for Type A and 3 months for Type Β workings. 
For workings where the manager is able to show that the quantity of coal dust 
deposited is small or that the variation of the degree of neutralization is 
negligible over the period mentioned above, these maxima may be extended by law** 
4. SAMPLING UNDERGROUND 
4.I General principles 
The general distinction between two types of underground workings (mentioned in 
para. 2.5) has already led us to a recommendation for the frequency of monitoring 
based on the type. This same principle is recommended in respect of the number of 
samples and the distance between them: it seems logical that the density of sampling 
like the frequency - should be greater in workings of Type A than in those of Type 3. 
*The work 'surface' is used here in the sense that will be explained in paragraph 
4.3. 
**The principles stated in this paragraph may be changed if new and reliable methods 
of continuously measuring deposited dusts are developed and applied. 
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The general rule on this subject can be put as follows: 
In Type A workings, one makes up at least two samples: the first by means of 
increments taken from the floor and the second, distinct from the first, by 
means of increments taken from the other surfaces. 
In Type B, a' single sample is formed from increments from the floor and the other 
surfaces. 
Possibly, one could have 3 samples: floor, roof and sides. 
The particular case where the floor is treated with hygroscopic salts, and the roof 
and sides by stonedusting, is left to the consideration of the national authorities 
in those countries where this is practised. 
4.3 Depth of sampling 
When an explosion occurs, the thickness of the layer of dust which is raised into 
the air depends on the intensity of the explosion. Stonedusting - like the other 
procedures for preventing dust explosions — must prevent the propagation of any 
explosion, even of the least violent ones that raise only a thin surface layer of dust. 
The effectiveness of neutralization must therefore be guaranteed, even for a surface 
layer of limited thickness. From a practical viewpoint, however, it would be difficult 
to stipulate sampling to a small precise number of millimetres. 
A compromise between these two viewpoints leads one to recommend a sampling depth, 
or thickness, of: 
— not more than 1 cm for the floor; 
- not more than 5 or.6 mm for the other surfaces. 
Sampling should be carried out with a paintbrush or flexible sweeping brush. For 
the floor, use may also be made of a scoop. 
4.4 Sampling in lengths of wet roadways* 
The question whether, in a length of wet roadway, stonedusting or some other method 
should or should not be applied, is not the concern of this document which only 
deals with the monitoring of stonedusting. 
The problem of sampling in a damp length of road where stonedusting is nevertheless 
carried out may arise. In this case, the sampling should be carried out according 
to the general rule. 
We shall discuss in para. 5,3 the moisture content of the samples that are collected 
and of the samples prepared for analysis. 
* One may note here the interest shown in water—resistant limestone for -stonedust: 
when the moisture in the air is such that normal limestone has a tendency to 
agglomerate and so become ineffective. 
N.B. the German delegation requests that this note be deleted. 
344 5· PREPARATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE SAMPLE 
From the total sample collected as described in Section 4 (and in the Annexes I to Ϊ7), 
a sample for analysis is obtained by means of a series of operations. This series 
of operations is referred to as the preparat ion. The sample so obtained is subjected 
to one or more operations in order to determine the neutralization ratio. This is 
called the analysis. 
5.1 Preparation of the sample to be analysed 
5.1.1 The final sample for analysis is obtained from the total sample collected by: 
— mixing and successive divisions into quarters; 
— sieving with a sieve of 250 ¿un mesh, the waste in this sieve being thrown away; 
- drying at a temperature of IC5 - 2 C; 
- determination of the moisture content if knowledge of this variable is desired. 
A detailed description of these processes does not seem necessary in a document such 
as this. 
5.1.2 Depending on established practice and the size of the total samples taken, a 
more or less substantial part of the preparation can take place underground. 
5.2 Analysis of the sample 
5.2.1 Several methods are in use in the different countries of the Community: 
one of them is used, in different ways, everywhere and has been harmonized, and is 
recommended as a common method. This is combustion at a temperature of 490 — 10 C* 
5.2.2 The other methods, which have been proved for some time, need net be excluded. 
As a matter of information, these are listed in annex V. 
5.2.3 Analysis of a sample by combustion at 490 — 10 C. 
A quantity of approx. 1 g, (weighed to the nearest 0.1 mg), is taken from the sample 
prepared as in 5«1 and spread out on a dish or boat made of silica, porcelain or 
platinum. 
This quantity is placed in a cold muffle furnace and heated to a temperature of 
49O — 10 C until its mass is constant (loss of mass ^ 1 mg). 
The quantity is weighed to the nearest 0.1 mg after it has cooled in a dryer. The 
neutralization ratio Ν of the sample analyzed is expressed as a percentage oy the 
formula: 
where m. is the mass of the dried sample, and m„ is the mass of the residue. 
The result is recorded to one decimal place. 
*In recommending this method, it is not the intention to exclude any new methods, 
accurate and quicker, which may be brought forward in the future. 
345 5·3 Moisture content 
It was stated in paragraph 5·1·1 that the moisture content of the sample could, be 
determined if desired. 
But the question of whether or not to count the moisture content as part of the 
inert material in the sample is not within the competence of the present document. 
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Principles and practice of sampling in Belgium: present conditions and the future 
The 'Code des Mines' states a very general rule on measures to prevent the initiation 
and spread of a dust explosion: 'In the roadways of any classified mine... coal 
dust which could be dispersed into the air shall be bound or neutralized by means 
of substances which do not contain free silica*. 
The general rule is applied in practice through directives set out in circulars 
from the Chief Inspector of Mines. Thus the current method of sampling is based on 
the circular of 24 July 1963, of which Article 5 stipulates: 
'The effectiveness of stonedusting... shall be monitored once a month by taking and 
analysing representative samples from each stonedusted zone... In a neutralized 
zone exceeding 50 m in length, at least four samples are necessary, of which two 
(one from the walls and one from the floor) shall be taken per zone of 20 m or of 2c 
compartments of supports. 
The distance between these two zones shall not exceed 100 m. 
Each sample shall comprise a mixture of 20 increments obtained in the following 
way: 
A. (walls) the 20 increments ... shall be judiciously distributed over a spiral ... 
B. (floor) the 20 increments shall be taken at points vertically below where the 
corresponding increments for the first sample were taken.' 
The 'philosophy' of such monitoring is simple: it is monitoring by sampling, every 
neutralized zone being 'represented' by two sampling zones. Of course, the monitoring 
in successive months relates to sampling zones which change from one month to the 
next. 
Belgium considers that these principles are still valid. The only lacuna observed 
is the absence of a definition for 'neutralized zone': this expression is generally 
interpreted as denoting an entire roadway, whatever its length. 
After studying the procedures followed in the other countries, the Belgian authorities 
are contemplating the following amendments to the regulations (which will be explained 
in detail below by way of example): 
- 20 m—long sampling zones; 
- 2 χ 20 increments from each of these zones (walls and floor); 
- the distance between the sampling zones would vary according to the characteristics 
of the roadways and the dust; concentration. The maximum distance could for example 
be fixed: 
347 — at 200 m in the conveyor roadways used for transporting coal (type A workings); 
— at 300 or 4OO m in the other stonedusted workings (type Β workings). 
— There should always be one sampling zone in the 100 m length of roadway downwind 
of each dust source. 
— The position of these sampling zones would vary from one monitoring operation to 
the next, so as to cover the whole length of the working in a certain period of 
time. 
— The results of the analysis of the samples would be recorded in a register laid 
out to give an overall view of each stonedusted working with its characteristics 
and its dust sources. 
— The monitoring operations as a whole would be the responsibility of a person 
appointed for that purpose by the mine management. 
The application of such a method is intended to achieve the following results: 
— excellent monitoring by sampling; 
— the material aspects of monitoring are not too cumbersome; 
— nevertheless, special attention is given to the points at which large dust deposits 
are to be expected. 
Examole of the aoolication of the above Principles 
■ I ■ I - I I I - 1 I I - - ■-■-!.■■■ 
This example relates to the main gate and intake airway of an advancing face in 
operation. 
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The conveyor belt discharges the îoal into the spiral chute of staple shaft 1. 
A number of hypotheses had to be made, regarding this face, before it was possible 
to complete the attached table. 
348 The rate of advance of the face is 40m a month. 
At the end of I98O the gate is 300 m long. 
At the end of July I98I it reaches 550 m, and it is necessary to install a 
second belt conveyor; the coal falls from this conveyor onto the first conveyor 
at point 495· 
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350 Certain points concerning the registering of the results: 
- In the first column the fixed sources of dust are noted. 
- The second column comprises the division of the roadway into 20 m-long sampling 
zones. 
- The other columns are used for entering the results of the monitoring carried out 
during each month of a given year. 
- The shaded portion of the table represents the part of the roadway not yet driven 
at the time successive monthly samples are taken. 
- The crosses entered in the table represent the instructions given to his staff 
by the person responsible for monitoring. Their distribution takes account of the 
requirements formulated above. 
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Principles and practice of sampling in West Germany 
In German collieries, stonedusting is practised mainly, outside the winning area. In 
gate roads, as well as in other workings where the deposition of dust is considerable, 
coal dust is bound using hygroscopic salts. Stonedusting is therefore practised 
in mine workings where the dust concentration is generally lower than in the vanning 
area. 
With regard to sampling, practice is based on the fact that the quantity of dust 
deposited becomes progressively less the further one goes from the dust source 
in the direction of the air flow. That is why samples need only be taken at a samll 
number of points. 
The samples are therefore taken at such points, for example downwind of loading 
or transfer points, at air doors, etc. The choice of these sampling points, whether 
fixed or variable, is the responsibility of the 'Explosionsschutzsteiger'* ("explosion 
control deputy'). It is he who must talee the necessary decisions in the light of 
his training and experience. 
For samoling, it is the walls which must be considered first and foremost. A sample 
from the floor is not necessary if only very small quantities of dust that can ce 
raised into the air are deposited there, and also because the dust on the floor is 
very often kept indispersibie, either through dust binding or through natural dampness, 
Sampling from the roof is usually not done, for experience has shown that coal dust 
deposits are greater on the walls than on the roof, and because the roof can usually 
be reached only by using special equipment. 
Consequently, samples are in practice taken in the following way. At each of the 
chosen points, at least 50 cm is taken from the dust deposited on the walls or en 
the ropdway installations. The increments are taken on both sides of the roadway, 
at knee-height, chest-height, and raised-arm height. When deposits of dust are small 
it may be advisable to take samples in a zone of about 10 metres' length. V.hen 
samples are taken from the floor, they must be kept apart and analyzed separately. 
*The 'Explosionsschutzsteiger' is a person whose essential task comprises supervision 
and monitoring of all measures to protect against explosions, neutralization and 
binding of dust, barriers, etc. 
With regard to the stonedusting process, this means that it is the 'Explosionsschutz-
steiger' himself who must take the samples. 
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Principles and practice of sampling in France 
Principles 
The sample should be representative of the average concentration in the monitored 
zone of dust that is liable to be raised into the air and ignited during a dust 
explosion. 
Samples should be taken at regular intervals in lengths of the roadways that are 
homogenemis from the point of view of dust concentration. 
The length of a homogeneous section decreases and samples should be taken at closer 
intervals with increasing proximity to the dust source. In the vicinity of these 
sources it becomes necessary to malee up two separate samples - one from the floor 
and one from the rest of the surface of roadway. At distances of more than 300 m 
from the dust source this is not compulsory. 
Practice as provided for by new draft regulations 
Each roadway is divided into sections which are homogeneous from the point of view 
of dust concentration. The maximum length of a section is 1000 m when outside a 
district and 200 m in district roadways. In the vicinity of dust sources, this 
maximum is reduced to 50 m. 
Two separate samples are made up, - one from the floor, and one from the roof and the 
walls, up to a distance of 300 m from the working face, after which a single sample 
is permissible. 
Sampling increments are taken as follows (L = length of section): 
- every ~ up to 300 m from the working face; 
after which : 
- every rjr with a lower limit of 4 m if the roadway contains belt conveyors; 
- every — if there are not belt conveyors. 
353 Annex IV 
Princroles and. practice of sampling in the United Kingdom 
ι ι . ά ιι η ι i ι ι ι Ί 
The philosophy and practice derive from a regulation which, broadly speaking, 
requires that any dust on the floor, roof or sides that can be raised into the air 
shall contain not less than a minimum amount of incombustible matter, the amount-
depending on the volatile content of the coal. Sampling is required to check that 
this regulation is being complied with. 
In practice, the average composition of the dust on the floor, roof or sides over 
80 m'lengths or roadway is determined. Roadways are, in effect, divided into lengths 
of 80 m, these being known as 'sub—zones', and alternate sub—zones are sampled at 
monthly inteivais. This means that the whole length of a roadway is sampled at 
intervals of no more than two months; the frequency of sampling, however, may be 
reduced when experience has shown that the deposition cf coal dust is low. 
The method has the advantage that the personnel carrying out the sampling have a 
relatively routine and well-defined task and are not faced, with the question of 
choosing a length of roadway over which to sample in order to obtain average 
conditions, or worse than average conditions, as the case may be. It also means 
that the accuracy of sampling, that is the degree to which samples reflect conditions 
along the whole length of the roadway, is likely to remain constant over a period of 
time"and be consistent from one roadway to another. 
The amount of sampling done is great, but it is felt that the effort is justified 
because it has been shown that conditions can be maintained within acceptable units 
by this means. 
354 Annex V 
Methods, other than combustion at around 500°C, which are currently in use in one 
or more countries of the Community for the analysis of samples 
Preliminary note: 
This list does not exclude any new, accurate and quicker method which may be developed 
in the future. 
1. Combustion at 8l5 - 10 C 
This method corresponds to the standard ISO II7I for determining ash content. As 
it leads to decomposition of the carbonates contained in the stonedust, the level of 
carbon dioxide must be determined separately. 
2. Combustion at temperatures above 950 C 
The above remarks also apply this method which would appear to give rise to more 
complex chemical phenomena. 
3« Volumetric method 
Two volumes are compared: the one is that of a weighed amount of the mixture of 
coal-dust and calcareous dust that constitutes the sample and the other is that of 
the same weight cf a standard mixture. This method must be frequently calibrated. 
4. Colorimetrie method 
Comparison of the colour of the sample for analysis with that of a sample containing 
805& or more incombustible matter. 
Methods 3 and 4 must be verified periodically by comparing the results with those 
of analysis by combustion. 
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The filter self-reseuer, with which the majority of miners in the 
European Coal Mining Industry is equipped, represents a compromise 
between the ideal requirements and the technical feasibility of an 
effective escape apparatus, since such rescuers will permit the escape 
of personnel through fire gases or post-explosion fumes only in the 
presence of sufficient oxygen and the absence of too high concentrations 
of carbon monoxide. The ineffectiveness of filter 3elf-rescuers in 
oxygen deficient atmospheres had already· caused the High Authority in 
1957 "to promote by financial means the development of self-rescuers to 
give full protection against toxic gases and the lack of oxygen. Prizes 
were awarded in 1962'for two types of such "full protection self-rescuers." 
The maximum protective life of these devices was about 45 minutes. 
The Working Party on Mines Rescue and Mine Fires, after publication of 
Parts I to III of the Report on Filter Self-Rescuers", under a remit 
from the Mines Safety and Health Commission, has closely followed the 
further development of the "full-protection" self-rescuers for the mining 
industry. Latest apparatus of this type uses the principle of oxygen 
storage in chemical form, a method that, after some initial doubts, is 
no longer regarded as unacceptable in the coal mining industry. Hie 
increasing use of diesel—engined trackless vehicles in mines and 
its associated increase in fire hazard also were among reasons for the 
remit to the Experts' Committee on Self—Rescuers to prepare the Guidelines 
for the Construction and Testing of Oxygen Self-Rescuers *) giving a 
protection for 90 mins. even in difficult escape conditions. These 
Guidelines are presented herewith, as a guide for rescuers for use in 
coal mines. 
The requirements on which these Guidelines are based approximate in their 
severity to the regulations in force in the U.S.A. At the moment there 
are no commercially available oxygen self-rescuers which fulfill the 
requirement for a 90 min. life under these conditions. Until apparatus 
to comply with these European Guidelines is built (to be known as "standard 
apparatus") testing of lighter apparatus of similar type should be carried 
out according to the procedures listed herein. 
*) 
In France such apparatus is called APEVA. 
361 In the meantime apparatus with a test life of 60 min. at a minute 
volume of 30 litres on the artificial lung will be accepted. Such 
apparatus will be called "light—type oxygen self-rescuer". As soon 
as "standard apparatus" become available on the market (except in special 
cases) only apparatus of the standard type should be acquired. 
The Working Party on Mines Rescue and Mine Fires takes it that the present 
Guidelines will be published as a recommendation of the Organe Permanent. 
After publication of the recommendation the Working Party and its Experts* 
Committee on Self Rescuers will still have to continue with the preparation 
of proposals for the check-testing and training in the field 
l) Commission of the European Communities, Safety and Health 
Commission for the Mining and Extractive Industries. 
The Use of Filter Self-Rescuers in Coal Mines in Member 
States of the European Community. 
Document No. 3919/79E 
Luxembourg, 1979 
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367 Guidelines for the construction and testing of chemical oxygen self-rescuers 
1. Procedure for testing and approval 
1.1 Procedure used in the German Federal Republic. 
The manufacturer of a chemical oxygen self-rescuer applies to the 
director of the German Mines Rescue Committee in quadruplicate to 
have the device tested for its suitability as an gscape apparatus 
for use in deep mines. The application must state clearly the 
designation of the apparatus and the name of the manufacturer. 
Drawings and description of the apparatus should be appended in 
quadruplicate. The application should be accompanied by 8 sets 
of apparatus together with parts needed for testing by the testing 
establishments of the Committee. 
The director of the Committee passes one copy of the application 
together with the drawings and descriptive material on to the 
testing establishments. The testing laboratories, independently 
of one another, carry out the tests specified in the Guidelines 
and report their results to the director. 
When an apparatus is judged suitable by the Committee the director 
issues the applicant with a certificate (suitability certificate). 
This suitability certificate forms the basis for the approval of 
the chemical oxygen self-rescuer by the Mining Authority in the 
Länder of the Federal German Republic. Only approved breathing 
apparatus (approved by the appropriate authority) may be used 
underground. 
368 1.2. Procedure used in Belgium 
The application for approval must be made by the manufacturer 
to the Chief Director of the Belgian Mining Authority. 
One copy of this application, four prototypes to be tested, 
nine copies of descriptions and drawings must be sent to the Chief 
Engineer, Director of the ΏΠΕΧ test gallery, Pâturages· División. 
The apparatus is tested by the test gallery in accordance with the 
current regulations. When a positive result is obtained the test report 
on the apparatus is passed on to the Chief Director for approval. 
Only breathing apparatus of a type and construction approved by the Chief 
Director of the Mining Authority may be used underground. 
1.3. Procedure in France 
In France there are no official approval conditions. The 
Apparatus is brought into use after tests at Cerchar and the rescue 
stations. The choice of the type of apparatus is entirely a matter for 
the owner of the mine. 
1.4. Procedure in the United Kingdom. 
The manufacturers apply for approval to the H.M· Mines Inspectorate, 
Health and Safety Esecutive. After a preliminary discussion (at which the 
fees are agreed) 2 sets of the apparatus are supplied for testing for 
compliance with BS. 4667, Part 4 at HSE Laboratories in Sheffield (SMEE). 
369 If the apparatus passes this test practical men-*earing trials are 
made at the NCB Doncaster Mines Rescue Station. After successful 
completion of these trials the Health and Safety Executive issues a 
certificate to that effect. Having obtained this certificate the 
manufacturer applies to H.M. Mines Inspectorate for approval of the 
apparatus for use in mines. H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines then decides 
whether the apparatus is suitable for underground use a^ij issues the 
appropriate certificate of approval. 
370 2. General 
2.1 Application and Storage 
Oxygen self-rescuers'must protect the underground personnel against 
toxic gases and lack of oxygen by providing an Op supply independent of 
the surrounding atmosphere. The guidelines are aimed at an 
oxygen self—rescuer that would protect endangered miners for 90 min« even in 
difficult conditions during escape in oxygen deficient atmospheres. 
In coal mines, they should preferably only be stored in protected 
caches or carried on machines in protected places in order to prevent 
the risk of fire as a result of violent mechanical damage. In addition, they 
could serve as auxiliary apparatus for mines rescue services. 
2.2. Definitions 
The term oxygen self—rescuer *as carried* describes the complete 
apparatus including the outer container. As a rule, it consists of the 
outer container and the actual oxygen self-rescuer. 
The oxygen self-rescuer provides its. wearer with oxygen generated by 
a chemical. Carbon dioxide and moisture in the exhaled air react with 
the chemical and produce the oxygen required for respiration. 
2.3. Life 
The life of an oxygen self-rescuer must be a least 90 minutes 
for a minute volume of 35 l/min, and at least 240 minutes for a minute 
volume of 10 l/min in a test conducted according to paragraph 4.2.2.1. 
371 3. Guidelines for the construction of chemical oxygen self-rescuers 
3.1 Physiological requirements 
3.1.1 Oxygen content of inspired air 
The oxygen content of inspired air may not be less than 21$ 02 
by volume at any time. 
3.1.2 Carbon dioxide content of inspired air 
The carbon dioxide content of inspired air must not exceed 
1.5$ v/v 
3.1.3 Temperature and humidity of inspired air 
The temperature of inspired air may not exceed 50°C in a 
test conducted according to paragraph 4*2.2.1. 
During wearer trials the inspired air must not lead to any 
int ol érable drying out of the respiratory passages. 
3.1.4 Purity of inspired air 
The materials in contact with the respired air and the oxygen 
must not produce any harmful, evil-smelling or evil-tasting 
vapours or gases. Over and above this, the wearer
fs breathing 
and the functioning of the apparatus must not be impaired by 
dust. 
3-1-5 Volume demand 
Oxygen self-rescuers must at all times, especially immediately 
after donning, provide the necessary volume flow without causing 
any marked difficulty in breathingf it shall also perform 
satisfactorily at a high flow rate of 70 litres per minute for 
a period of five minutes (as per 4.2.2.1.1). 
372 3.1.6 Respiration resistance 
The total pressure change in the apparatus may not exceed 
11.5 mbar when tested in accordance with paragraph 4.2.2.1. 
The pressure change during inhalation or exhalation must not 
exceed 6.5 mbar. The pressure change during exhalation may 
briefly reach 12.0 mbar shortly after the self—rescuer is put on. 
3.1.7 Operating pressure of the relief valve. 
The pressure relief valve must open ia any position at- an excess 
pressure of 2.5 ± 1·0 mbar. 
3.2 Constructional requirements 
3.2.1 Materials 
Materials must be stable and retain their physical properties 
when stored over several years. The container must be adequately 
protected against corrosion. 
The materials used must be of sufficient strength to withstand 
the mechanical stresses to which self—rescuers may be subjected 
when carried on mining machinery underground. 
Light alloys must not be used for the outer case or for the 
exposed "parts of the oxygen self-rescuer. 
In order to avoid the accumulation of dangerous electrostatic 
charges, the surface resistivity of the materials used for the 
container must not exceed 10^ ohms. 
The apparatus must be so constructed that it cannot ignite Hp/air 
mixtures when used in the prescribed manner. 
The starting device, if present, must be incapable of accidental 
activation. 
373 3.2.2 Weight 
No limit is prescribed for the weight of the oxygen self-rescuer 
and its container. The weight of the ready—for-use oxygen 
self-rescuer removed from its case and including the breathing 
connections must not exc eed 5·0 kg. 
3.2.3 Dimensions 
No specification 
3.2.4 Supporting harness 
The oxygen self-rescuer must have a harness giving safe and 
comfortable support when the device is worn. The harness 
must be adjustable within adequate limits. 
The outer container must also be provided with carrying straps. 
3.2.5 Handleability 
The oxygen self-rescuer must be capable of being opened, donned 
and put into operation quickly, simply and without undue 
exertion in difficult conditions. 
3.2.6 Breathing connection and goggles 
3.2.6.1 Breathing connection 
The breathing connection should consist of a mouthpiece with 
a nose clip. The mouthpiece shall have two *teeth lugs* 
arranged so that they are gripped by the canine teeth or outer 
incisors. The part of the mouthpiece between the lips and the 
gums must be of a shape to ensure a good seal. The mouthpiece 
must not cause any irritation of the mucous membranes when worn 
for the whole of the protective life of the rescuer. It must 
be so constructed that the air passage cannot be accidentally 
restricted while the rescuer is worn. 
374 The mouthpiece oust be provided with an adjustable »lasti« support 
strap if it is likely to «xert «a undue pull on th· w««x«r
,i south· 
Th· nose olip must provid« en air-tight teal of th· no«·. It 
is flexibly attached to th· mouthpieo· and must hav· larf· prêteur· 
pads. Ta· material in skin contact oust b· elastic, soft and 
non-elip and have no harmful effect on the nos·· 
3.2.6.2. Goggles 
The oxygen self-resouer must have anti-gas goggles with non-shatter lenses 
protected against misting. The head-bands must be flexible 
and easily adjustable. 
3.2.7 Breathing tubes and breathing bag 
3.2.7.1 Breathing tubes 
If the apparatus has one or more breathing tubes, they must be 
flexible and allow «t/i adequate range of head movement 
3.2.7.2 Breathing bag 
The breathing bag must either be made of a reinforced material 
or be specially protected. It must be highly impermeable to 
gas and resistant to ageing. 
Ihe useful volume of the bag must be at least 6 1. 
3.2.8 Valves 
3.2.8.1. Breathing valves 
If the apparatus is fitted with breathing valves they must 
reliably govern the circulation of the breathing air. 
3.2.8.2. Pressure relief valves 
Ike apparatus must be fitted with one or more pressure relie f 
valves incorporating noi>-retum valves. The pressure relief 
valves must be automatic in operation. They must be sufficiently 
375 air-tight to prevent a change of pressure of more than 1 mbar in a volume 
of 11.within one minute of a pressure of 10 mbar being exerted on the 
valves from outside. Other designs are permitted, provided they 
afford the same protection. 
3.2.9 Air-tightness 
3.2.9.1 Aiiwfcightness of oxygen self-rescuers 
When ready-f or-use oxygen .self-rescuers are subjected to a 
partial vacuum or pressure of 7*5 mbar using dry air with the pressure 
relief valve sealed, the pressure change shall not exceed 0.3 mbar 
within one minute. 
3.2.9.2. Aiiwtightness of the container 
The container must be designed to remain aiiwfcight over a long 
period, even under very demanding conditions. 
Loss of air-tightness must be easily and quickly recognisable. 
3.3 Marking and instructions for use 
3.3.1 Marking of the container 
The container must be reasonably permanently marked. 
The marking must state : 
(a) The manufacturer 
(b) Type of apparatus 
(0) Serial No. of apparatus, month and year of manufacture of 
apparatus. 
3.3.2 Marking of components 
376 The following components must carry a permanent marking of 
the year of manufacture: 
Breathing tube with mouthpiece 
Breathing bag 
Body of the goggles 
Chemical cartridge 
Starter Cartridge (if separate from the chemical container). 
3.4.1 Instructions for use and Training Model Oo-Self-Rescuers 
3.4.I Instructions for use 
The oxygen self-rescuer must be supplied together with instructions 
for use which give the information necessary for the use of the 
oxygen self-rescuer by suitably trained personnel : 
Intended application 
short description 
tests 
use 
maintenance 
care 
storage 
operation 
Furthermore, indication of possible user errors should also be 
given. 
The container should also have on it instructions for donning in 
pictogram form. 
3.4.2. Training Model O2- self-rescuers 
The training model makes it possible to practise the donning of the 
apparatus and to simulate its use. It should, therefore, be just 
like the actual O2—seIf-reseuer in its most important functions, 
377 in particular with respect to handling, donning, weight and 
breathing resistance. 
4. Guidelines for the testing of chemical oxygen self-rescuers' 
4.1 General 
Chemical oxygen self-rescuers should be tested to ensure that 
the conditions and requirements of the Guidelines for the 
Construction of Chemical Oxygen Self-Rescuers have been fulfilled. 
The following test describes only apparatus and test procedures that 
require explanation. Additional tests can be undertaken by the 
testing establishments. 
During testing allowance shall be made for the effect of the 
barometric pressure, ambient temperature and humidity. 
If the rescuer is provided with a starting device it shall be 
operated at the start of the test. Otherwise the test in the test 
rig will be initiated according to the manufacturer's instructions 
for use. 
Components taken from older oxygen self—rescuers which have already 
been tested and have undergone no changes in design or functional 
alterations require no further testing in the testing establishments. 
If the apparatus to be tested is such that procedures described 
below are insufficient or can lead to an erroneous assessment, the 
testing establishments can alter the test procedures. 
4.2 Laboratory testing 
378 4.2.1 General guidelines for testing 
laboratory 
NormaJ/procedures and equipment should be used unless specific 
methods of measurement or equipment are mentioned in the 
following guidelines for testing. 
4.2.2. Test to ensure compliance with physiological requirements. 
The purpose of this test is to ensure that the oxygen self-
rescuer meets the requirements stated in paragraph 3·1· 
4.2.2.1. Testing of oxygen and carbon dioxide content of inspired air. 
4.2.2.1.1. Test at breathing rate of 35 l/min. and 70 l/min. 
A schematic arrangement of the equipment required for the test 
is shown in figure 4.5.I. The apparatus consists of an 
artificial lung with solenoid valves controlled by the lung, 
a humidifier, a connector, a CO2 flowmeter, a gas meter, carbon 
dioxide and oxygen analysers and temperature and pressure meters. 
The apparatus subjects the oxygen self-rescuer to a respiration 
cycle by the artificial lung (set at 1.75 1/inhalation, 
20 inhalations/min), the respiratory air remaining in a circuit. 
During the test, CO2 is added to the exhaled air so that it 
contains 4·5$ CO« in addition to the residual CO« in the air 
passing through the chemical canister. The CO*) is fed into the 
artificial lung via a control valve, a flow meter, a gas meter,compense 
ting bag and a non-return valve. 
379 Immediately behind the humidifier a small quantity of exhaled 
air is continuously withdrawn through a sampling line and then 
fed into the exhaled air via a CO2 analyser in front of the 
humidif i er. 
The exhaled air must have a temperature of 37° 0 and be saturated 
with moisture. 
The required humidifier is illustrated in fig. 4·5·3· The 
temperature of the exhaled adr is checked and adjusted before 
starting the test, at a point behind the humidifier and just 
in front of the solenoid valve. 
To measure the CO2 and 02 content of the inhaled air, 1.57 l/min. 
of inhaled air is drawn off from the connector (see fig. 4.5.2.) by 
an auxiliary lung during the inhalation phase and fed to an O2 meter 
and a CO2 analyser. The sample volume is checked by a gas meter. 
The total dead volume of the gas path, (excluding the artificial 
lung) of the test installation must not exceed 2000 cm3. 
Test at a respiration rate of 70 l/min. 
During one test at 35 l/min after a period of 80 minutes the 
minute volume is raised to 70 l/min (setting : 2.33 l/inhalation, 
30 inhalations/min) for 5 minutes. The CO2 content of the 
exhaled air during this test should be jfo and the sampling 
stream during inhalation 3·5 l/min. 
380 4.2.2.1.2. Test at a respiration rate of 10 l/min. 
The test at a breathing rate of 10 l/min is carried out 
like the test described in 4.2.2.1.1 except for the 
following changes in the testing conditions : 
Setting of artificial lung : 1.0 l/inhalation, 
10 inhalations/min. 
Amount of CO2 added to the exhaled air : 4% by 
volume instead of 4.57« CO2 v/v. 
0.4 l/min drawn off during inhalation phase. 
4.2.2.2 Testing of temperature and humidity of inspired air. 
The temperature of the inspired air is measured at the 
connector (diagram 4«5»2) by means of a fast—response 
thermo-couple and recorded continuously. Ihe assessment 
of the tolerability of inhaled air is made together with 
the test under 4«3« 
4.2.2.3 Testing of breathing resistance 
4.2.2.3.1 Testing of inhalation resistance 
The inhalation resistance is measured at the connector (see 
diagram 4«5«2) by means of an accurate inertia—free recording 
instrument. Readings should be taken at least every 10 minutes. 
Any blank readings should be subtracted from the recorded value 
4.2.2.3.2 Testing of exhalation resistance 
The exhalation resistance test is carried out as described 
under 4.2.2.3.1· 
4.2.2.4 Testing of the operating pressure of the relief valve. 
The relief valve is checked in situ in the rescuer when the 
latter is in its normal position as worn. The operating pressure 
381 is measured with an instrument approved for the testing 
of breathing apparatus, or by other suitable type of precision 
manometer. The measuring instrument is attached to the 
breathing connector for the test. 1.51 of oxygen per minute 
is fed into the apparatus through the connector. The maximum 
value recorded by the instrument is taken as the operating 
pressure. 
4.2.3 Test to ensure compliance with constructional requirements 
4.2.3.I Testing of materials 
In the case of non—metallic containers, the surface resistance 
RQ£ should be measured as per DIN 53486 in a normal atmosphere 
at 23^ 2°C with a relative humidity of 50 ± 5$. The surface 
resistance should be measured at ten different places. The 
reading should be taken immediately after the current has been 
switched on and after a period of 60 seconds. The measuring 
voltage must be 100 V. 
To check the impact resistance of the oxygen-self—rescuer and the 
starting device the rescuer is allowed to fall freely from a 
height of 1.5 m onto a concrete floor. The test must be carried 
out so as to stress the impact—sensitive parts of the rescuer. 
At least 3 tests should be carried out on one apparatus. 
After the test the oxygen self-rescuer must remain airtight and 
serviceable. 
The explosion safety is to be attested by the presentation of 
a test certificate from a competent institute. 
382 4.2.3.2 Testing of handleability 
The opening, donning and operation of the self-rescuer should 
be tested in a dark room by at least five previously instructed 
test people. 
4.2.3.3 Testing of breathing bag 
The useful volume of the breathing bag is the volume available 
in the pressure range from the operating point of the relief valve 
to a partial vacuum of 5 mbar. This volume is measured by means 
of a gas meter. 
4.2.3*4 Testing of air—tightness and materials 
The OSR
Ts ai ^tightness is tested by subjecting it to : 
an atmosphere at 70°C with 100$ humidity for 72 hours; 
an atmosphere at 70°C with less than 10$ humidity for 
72 hours 
and a temperature of -30°C for 24 hours. 
After exposure to the above conditions the rescuers are allowed to 
return the room temperature and a leakage test is carried out by a 
method recommended by the manufacturer. The container must retain 
its air—tightness ; there must be no permanent deformation or other 
faults. The apparatus must remain fully serviceable. 
4.3 Tests with persons (rescue men). 
4.3.1 Testing in training galleries 
4.3.I.I General 
Purpose of the test 
The test in the training gallery involves exercises with the 
apparatus worn by trained rescue men in order to establish whether the 
apparatus operates satisfactorily in practical conditions. The test 
also checks the functioning of the components and the life of the OSR. 
In the course of the exercises, the person using the self-rescuer is 
subjected to various forms of physical stress. 
383 Above all, these exercises provide the persons conducting and 
undergoing the test with the opportunity to detect by observation 
faults in the equipment which cannot be determined by means of 
measurements 
Location, number and duration of exercises 
The test is carried out in a training gallery. 
The exercises must be carried out at a temperature of approximately 
25°C with normal humidity. The training gallery must contain 
atmospheric air without smoke and with no appreciable air movement. 
The exercise prescribed in 4.3.1.2 must be performed at least four 
times. Further exercises may be conducted at the discretion of 
the testing establishment. Exercises should be terminated when 
the generation of oxygen ceases,· the oxygen content of the inspired 
air is less than 21$ by volume, or when there is evidence that the 
person undergoing the test is no longer physically capable of 
completing the exercise. After particularly high physical 
stress, the CO2 limit of 1.5$ by volume may be exceeded for a 
short period. The oxygen and carbon dioxide concentrations 
in the inhaled air must be determined (see also 4·3.1.1.1)· 
4.3.1.1.1 Performance of exercises 
Before the exercise begins, the test person should be informed, 
on the basis of the operating instructions, how the self-rescuer is 
opened, donned and put into operation. 
The test person should be accompanied by an assistant during the 
exercise. 
384 Before the start of the exercise, the following information should 
be obtained on: 
The test person 
Surname 
Christian name 
Age 
Height 
Weight 
Vital Capacity 
Occupation (duties underground) 
The training gallery 
Dry and wet bulb temperatures at several locations 
The Test appliance 
Air-tightness of the oxygen self-rescuer (as per 3·2·9·1·) 
During the exercise: 
At the start and conclusion of each exercise, and before and after 
each special activity in the course of the exercise, the following 
should be measured: 
oxygen and carbon dioxide content of the inspired air 
temperature of the inspired air 
change of pressure in the appliance during respiration 
(if necessary). 
The following should also be noted during the exercise : 
nature and time of the different activities, complaints, e.g. 
with regard to the manner of wearing the appliance 
visibility through the goggles, etc. 
After the exercise the following should be noted: 
385 The test person 
weight 
personal comments 
4.3.1.2 Escape exercise in training building 
4.3.1.2.1 Definition 
An escape exercise is an exercise in which the average rate of 
breathing of the test person is approximately 35 l/min· *) 
During this test, the appliance is examined under the type of 
conditions that are generally expected to prevail when the 
appliance is normally used. For this reason a rapid run to 
the OSR cache before the start of the exercise should also be 
simulated. 
4.3.1.2.2 Performance of the exercise 
The escape exercise is divided up into equal sections of 20 minutes, 
each following immediately. In each of these sections, the test 
person must perform the following or equivalent activities : 
5 min. walking on a moving belt at a speed of 3·3 km/h » 275 m. 
The exercise in the training galleries could, for example, 
include : 
13 min. walking through the training galleries. 
The training galleries exercises should included level and 
rising roadways of varying heights and a climb of at least 
15 m on a ladder moving at 10 m/min. During this period the 
average minute volume should be of the order of 35 l/min. 
2 mins. walking on belt moving at 2.4 km/h » 80 m inclined at 
After four exercise sections have been completed, the test person 
should walk on the level until the end of the oxygen self-reseuer*s 
utilization period. 
*) Por the light-type OSR the escape exercise should be made 
correspondingly easier. 
386 4.3.2 Test underground 
4.3.2.1 General 
Purpose of the exercise 
The exercise under ground supplements the test in the training gallery 
as described in 4*3.1 and is performed under operating conditions. 
It serves the same purpose; in particular, the method of wearing the 
appliance is put to the test. 
Type, number and duration of the exercise. 
During the exercises, sections of the mine with unfavourable climatic 
conditions should also be visited. At least two exercises should 
be carried out according to the method described below. Further 
exercises may be performed at the discretion of the testing 
department. The exercises should be terminated when the generation 
of oxygen ceases or when there is evidence that the persons undeiw 
going the test are no longer physically capable of completing the 
exercises. 
4.3.2.1.1 Performance of exercises 
Before the exercise begins, the test person should be informed, 
on the basis of the operating instructions, on how the self-rescuer 
is opened, donned and put into operation. 
The test person should be accompanied by an assistant during the 
exercise. 
Before the start of the exercise, the following information should 
be obtained on: 
The test person 
Surname 
387 Christian name 
Age 
Height 
Occupation (activity in the mine) 
At each location in the mine 
Dry and wet bulb temperatures 
The test appliance 
Air-tightness of the oxygen self-rescuer 
The following should also be noted during the exercise: 
nature and time of the different activities, complaints, e.g. 
with regard to the manner of wearing the appliance, visibility 
through the goggles, etc. 
After the exercise, the test person should make an assessment of 
the appliance with regard to: 
physiological aspects of breathing and the wearing of the 
appliance. 
4.3.2.2 Escape exercise underground 
4.3.2.2.1 Definition 
During the escape exercise underground, the average respiration rate 
of the test person should be 35 l/min. *) 
During this exercise, the appliance is tested under conditions 
generally to be expected during an escape attempt. 
4.3.2.2.2 Performance of the exercise 
*) Correspondingly easier conditions should be selected for the 
light-duty oxygen self—rescuers. 
388 During the escape exercise, the test person must walk along level 
and inclined roadways, and coal faces. The escape route should be 
selected to ensure that the test person is obliged to assume a 
stooped posture, to crawl and to climb ladders along some sections. 
The route to be taken should be selected by the test department. 
4.4 Testing of storage and carrying of self-rescuers underground **) 
4*4.1 General 
The testing of the storage and the possibility of carrying the appliance 
underground is an important supplement to the laboratory tests. In 
order to eliminate the possibility of errors, a large number of osygen 
self—rescuers, i.e. at least ten, must be made available for this test. 
This test can also be carried out under a "provisional approval". 
4.4.2 Trial procedure 
The oxygen self-rescuers should be "in use" eveiy working day for 
at least three months. 80$ of the appliances in service should be 
installed where possible on trackless diesel vehicles or on heading 
machines. The rest of the appliances should be used to establish 
the possibility of their being carried underground. 
At the end of the trial period, each of the persons concerned should 
be asked for his comments on the carrying of the appliance. 
Afterwards, 60$ of the appliances should be tested according to 4*2 
and 40$ of the appliances tested according to 4·3.1. The purpose of 
the test is to establish whether the appliances meet the requirements 
of Section 3. 
*■*) A research programme to investigate these questions is being 
undertaken in France with financial assistance from the EEC. 
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4.5.1 Diagram of the Test Rig 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
Artificial lung 
Auxiliary lung (controlled by 
main lung) 
3/2-way valve (controlled 
by main lung) 
Contact thermometer 
Heater (controlled by 
contact thermometer) 
Humidifier 
Temperature measuring device 
Pressure gauge 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
Fast-response recorder for 
pressure and temperature 
Non-return valve 
Balancing bag for CO injection 
) Measuring and control 
) devices for CO,. 
C02 
Connector 
Meter on air sampling line 
V 
.„-analyser (exhaled air) 
CO„-analyser and recorder 
(inhaled air) 
18. Oxygen self-rescuer 
390 A note on the test rig. 
The Experts
1 Committee assumes that oxygen self-rescuers (escape 
apparatus) and oxygen breathing apparatus (rescue apparatus) are 
tested on one and the same test rig. In connection with efforts 
to establish a European Standard, CM, TC.79, there is a British 
proposal to make a few small alterations to the test rig (e.g. to 
incorporate a cooler). The Experts* Committee agrees formally 
to include this alteration in the oxygen self-rescuer test rig after 
CEN deliberations are completed. 
4.5.2  Connector 
H* A 
EzZ  Æ 
ill 
! · I, 
my '■>>>';<■/ " 
¿/JJ.U. 
£2> 
mzz 
36 
1Z 
777ΖΖΣΠ2ΖΖ 
SECTION . W - A 
TUBE . 5x1 
52  -ÏSs 
[-*> ί\ 
Material: BSASS 
391 k.5- 3 Humidifier 
(all "dimensions in mm) 
Contact thermometer 
(controls heating 
element) 
Humidifier dimensions 
250 χ 200 χ 190 
From the artificial 
lung 
t 
250..- 300-Watt heating element 
y L 
'-Λ 
f^TT-.  ' , / 2 2 2 ' > 7 / ' J ' f > s . , ? J ; s J s ,  Ι 
2S0 
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SURVEY 
relating to 
CAGE-ARRESTING DEVICES 
CONCLUSIONS COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
SAFETY AND HEALTH COMMISSION FOR THE MINING AND EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES 
Working Party 
on 
Winding Engines, 
Ropes and Shaft Guides 
SURVEY 
relating 
TO CAGE-ARRESTING DEVICES 
CONCLUSIONS 
Adopted by the 
Safety and Health Commission for the Mining and other Extractive Industries 
on 7. May 1980 
and sent to Governments and interested parties 
as an information Report 
in accordance with Art. 3 and 6 of its terms of reference 
Doc. 2663/1/78 E LUXEMBOURG - 1980 Printed separately mm CONCLUSIONS 
The above enquiry and the report submitted by the Rope Testing Centre at Bochum 
(Doc. No 4703/761) provide the following information: 
A) Regulations; 
Within the European Community, the use of cage-arresting devices is not compulsory 
in the Federal Republic of Germany, in the United Kingdom and in Belgium; it is, 
however, compulsory in Prance and in Italy. 
The use of cage-arresting devices is compulsory in the following non-Community 
countries: Spain, Canada, USA and Australia. 
Exemption is granted in the case of multi-rope installations, provided that the 
safety factor is 10 when men are being conveyed. In Poland, similar exemptions 
are granted for multi-rope installations. 
Exemption is occasionally granted in the case of staple pits or of shafts which 
are not very deep. 
It is permissible to render the cage-arresting inoperative devices when men are 
not being conveyed; the Spanish regulations specify that such non-operation of 
the cage-arresting devices must be clearly signalled. 
Β) Types of cage-arresting devices: 
The cage-arresting devices used are apparently the same as those in operation 
in Prance (wedge or rotating cam). 
C) Effectiveness of the cage-arresting devices 
It must first be emphasized that the use of cage-arresting devices implies 
regular examination: a daily inspection (in Prance), a trial run at least 
every month (every week in Prance) and dismantling (with cleaning and 
lubrication of parts) every 6 months to a year. 
With regard to the effectiveness of cage-arresting devices which are presumed to be 
in good working order, we may conclude: 
a) the question of cage-arresting devices does not apply in installations with rope 
guides; 
397 b) the cage-arresting devices are most efficient when the shafts are equipped with 
wooden guides. In the case of shafts with metal guides, their usefulness is 
questionable, except perhaps where light loads are being wound upwards. 
c) whether the guides are made of metal or wood, there is certainly a maximum load, 
which, if exceeded, renders the efficiency of the cage-arresting device dubious. 
For metal guides, this maximum load is 'small; for wooden guides, it could be as 
much as 50 t. Apparently, no systematic experiments have ever been carried out 
to determine this maximum load. 
In installations which have a high payload (this may reach 170 t in some installa-
tions), there is no doubt that cage-arresting devices are ineffectual whether the 
guides are made of wood or metal. A factor restricting the use of cage-arresting 
devices in upcast shafts with metal guides is the risk of sparks, produced by 
braking, which could ignite any firedamp present. 
From the point of view of the effectiveness of cage-arresting devices, the winding 
systems may be theoretically divided into three groups: 
ï) those systems which have a low payload with metal guides, and those with a 
low to average payload with wooden guides; in these cases cage-arresting devices 
are effective. Unfortunately, there is not enough information to establish the 
load ceiling beneath which the cage-arresting devices are effective. This cei-
ling depends on several factors: speed of winding, the kind of guides, the 
components of the cage-arresting device (the strength of the springs, the kind 
of claws used, operating gear). 
2) those systems which have a high payload. Por these, cage-arresting devices are 
ineffectual. Here again there is not enough information to lay down a lower 
threshold. 
3) winding systems with an intermediate load where the effectiveness of cage-
arresting devices is doubtful, especially when they are triggered during 
downward winding. An examination of the accident statistics makes it clear 
that very few lives have been saved thanks to the presence of cage-arresting 
devices (one case in Germany was mentioned during the survey). 
The number of men killed by the spurious operation of cage-arresting devices 
is certainly no lower than the number saved by them (there was one fatal 
accident in Belgium following the spurious operation of an arresting device, 
and injuries have been recorded in the Saar during the past 50 years, again 
as a result of spurious operation). In such installations, the presence of 
398 a cage-arresting device of doubtful efficiency could lull personnel into a 
false sense of security and encourage negligence in the examination of ropes; 
it follows from this that, if, for psychological reasons, it is not advisable 
to discourage the use of cage-arresting devices, neither is it advisable to 
encourage it. Safety must above all be based on sound engineering as regards 
the suspension gear, quality manufacture of the ropes and efficient examina-
tion of the ropes and suspension gear by appropriate means. Furthermore, 
even when a cage-arresting device functions properly, rope failure can lead 
to fatal accidents when the snapped ropo whips around the adjacent compartment. 
It therefore seems that cage-arresting devices should be confined to winding 
installations with lov; payloads and low winding speeds too. They can be used 
more widely where shafts are equipped with wooden guides. But even in this 
case the cage-arresting device must be considered only as a supplementary 
safety device, basic security being maintained by stringent checks on the 
ropes and suspension gear. Where cage-arresting devices are in use, care 
must also be taken that spurious operation cannot create an additional danger; 
in order to avoid such spurious activation, it is particularly important to 
check the state of the guides carefully and to ensure that the play between 
the guide shoes of the ropes and the guides themselves is correct. 
The application of cage-arresting devices could be more widespread if shock 
absorbing devices were installed at the bottom of shafts; such buffers have 
been developed in the United Kingdom where the use of cage-arresting devices 
has practically been discontinued. If the cage-arresting device were not 
able to stop the cage completely (especially in a shaft with metal guides 
the cage during downward winding), the consequences of such an accident 
could be moderated by these buffers. 
While we may state that the field of application of cage-arresting devices 
is restricted, we must also acknowledge that we know little about the limits 
of their use. Cage-arresting devices seem to have been developed empirically 
and we lack reliable technical data, notably on the coefficient of friction 
399 on the guides as a function of the kind and type of guide and as a function 
of the design and type of the self-gripping devices. A technical examination 
could also be made of the trigger mechanism. The mechanism may be triggered 
when tension on the rope slackens or vihen abnormal acceleration is registered 
by a mass supported by a spring and subject to. inertial force. 
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Supplement to ï) "Statutory national provisions relating to cage-arresting devices" 
Italy: 
The regulation provides for each cage destined for the conveyance of personnel 
to be equipped with a cage-arresting device capable of stopping the cage 
without human intervention. The cage-arresting device must be inspected every 
month by a mechanic to test its efficiency; it is dismantled for examination 
purposes every year. Cage-arresting devices are not compulsory however in 
staple pits. 
The regulation relating to the Sicilian region also makes the presence of 
cage-arresting devices compulsory. An exception is, however, made for cages 
which are normally used for material or mineral winding and which are only 
used in exceptional cases (in the event of danger) for the conveyance of 
personnel; in the latter case, the mining authorities may dispense with the 
cage-arresting device as long as the cage is supported by at least two ropes 
which must function with a safety factor of 10. The Sicilian regulation also 
stipulates that the speed of the cage when conveying personnel may not be 
more than half of the normal speed in material and mineral winding. 
Other countries 
Spain: 
Cage-arresting devices are compulsory for cages conveying personnel; 
they may, however, be deactivated when material and minerals are being 
transported; when the cage-arresting devices are not in use, a clear 
notice to this effect is compulsory. Preference is given to cage-
arresting devices with progressive braking which limit the speed of 
the cage to 3p m/sec. 
The same provisions exist in the Uruguayan regulation but here the 
speed of the cage is limited to 20 m/sec. 
401 Canada (Quebec) 
In shafts which are deeper than 120 m, cages must be equipped with cage-
arresting devices capable of stopping them in the event of rope failure. 
Australia (Queensland) 
Cages must be equipped with cage-arresting devices of a type approved by 
the mines inspectorate. The latter may grant exemptions in the case of 
shafts fitted with metal guides. 
The functioning of cage-arresting devices must be checked every month. 
The cage-arresting devices have to be taken to pieces every six months 
for the purposes of examination and maintenance (cleaning and lubrication), 
USA: 
There are legal provisions which require the use of cage-arresting devices, 
In some states, the rule that a cage-arresting device shall be fitted 
is waived for multi-rope winders. In this case the Bafety factor for 
man winding must be about 10. 
The cage-arresting devices used in the USA are the same type as those 
which are used in Prance. 
It is pointed out that the cage-arresting device can be effective when 
rope failure occurs as the cage is being wound upwards; during lowering 
operations, its effectiveness has already been seen to be at fault. 
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ANNEX X, - 1  - 1 
Year  1978  FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
MINERAL 
COAL. 
LIGNITE 
OIL 
NATURAL GAS. 
IRON 
ALUMINIUM ..(Pis?).. 
COPPER (ore) 
LEAD (ore) 
ZINC (ote* 
POTASH SALTS 
ROCK SALT (except sea salt).. 
MARBLE FOR POLISHING 
MARBLE FOR SEDIMENTARY ' 
MARBLE IGNEOUS 
Total MARBLE 
MINE, 
QUARRY 
<DR BORE 
HOLE 
SANDS (SLATE. FOUNDRY AND 
OTHER INDUSTRIAL SANDS) 
ALLUVIAL SANDS AND GRAVEL 
S 
0 
0 
D 
D 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
s 
S + 0 
NUMBER OF 
SITES WHERE 
MINERAL IS 
WORKED 
..43 
....Aa 
.1.5.0 
240 
.1.0. 
1 
11 
JB.. 
24 
PRODUCTION 
TONS ROM 
'ORE OF 
MINERAL 
.8.3....964...a.9.9..... 
.1.2.3....5.9.6.....8..63... 
5...0.5.8...3.4.2... 
19 382 638 
S : deep mining  O : opencast mining or D 
quarring 
boreholes 
1 600 781 
280 
...2.5...181... 
..9.7...-4.Q5... 
..ÍL.018..001.. 
..6....8.4.5....Z65.. 
.±...aalaafl< 18.7....21.9.... 
1000 m i 
t 
..t .Cu.. 
t Pb., 
..t. Zn.. 
PERSONS 
1..Ã29... 
t 
80 054 
....ila... ïUiiaaJL 
...18....4.6.5.. 
7...P.8.7.. 
.5.11. 
.1....2.3.3.. 
Λ..5.13.. 
..L...6.7Û.. 
.M?... 
..2.5.....Q.4.8.... 
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ANNEX X  -1-2 
Year  1978  FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
MINERAL 
HARD DIMENSION STONE 
- MONUMENTAL STONE 
HARD CRUSHED STONE 
- FOR CONCRETE 
I - ROAD BASES 
1 - SURFACING -
IChalk and Lime 
J Gypsum 
Steatite 
Kaolin 
Pegmatite 
Calcspar 
Sandstone 
Dolomite 
Sulphur 
Pyrite 
Graphite 
Fluorspar 
Feldspar 
Uranium 
Talc 
Natural Stone 
Limestone 
Barytes 
* Combined Workforce 
MINE, 
QUARRY 
OR BORE-
HOLE 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
D 
S 
s 
s 
s 
0 
s 
O/S ; 
NUMBER OF 
SITES WHERE 
MINERAL IS 
WORKED 
1.-2.8.Q 
·? 
113 
40 
4 
29 
12 
5 
1 
2 
3 
3 
1 
13 
18 
13 
5 
9 
7 
PRODUCTION 
51  ö33 
1.3.5....0.Q0.  '000 
68 000 
1 749 
9 
520 
88 
11 
37 600 
636 
767 
501 
11 
75 
385 
9 
5 
2 614 
182 
000 
136 
673 
982 
570 
817 
000 
001 
790 
696 
927 
722 
590 
770 
773 
617 
948 
TONS ROM 
ORE OF 
MINERAL 
¿> 
.m?. 
t 
t 
t 
t 
t 
piece 
t 
t 
t 
t 
t 
t 
t 
t 
t 
t 
PERSONS 
34 495* 
_J?. * 
10.577 
1 421 
51 
1 676 
133 
19 
25 
35 
178 
837 
192 
171 
171 
147 
16 
182 
272 
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Year  1978 
MINERAL 
COAL. 
LIGNITE 
OIL 
NATURAL GAS , 
IRON 
ALUMINIUM ..(°.Γ£?λ. 
COPPER (ore) 
LEAD (ore) 
ZINC (or.e). 
POTASH SALTS 
ROCK SALT (except sea salt).. 
ANNEX X 
BELGIUM 
: MINE, 
QUARRY 
(DR BORE-f 
HOLE 
S 
0 
MARBLE FOR POLISHING 
MARBLE FOR SEDIMENTARY "' 
MARBLE IGNEOUS 
Total MARBLE 
SLATE 
SANDS (SLATE, FOUNDRY AND 
OTHER INDUSTRIAL SANDS) 
ALLUVIAL SANDS AND GRAVEL 
S 
0 
NUMBER OF 
SITES WHERE 
MINERAL IS 
WORKED 
S 
0 
10 + D 
1 
5 
2 
6 
..4.2.9.. 
PRODUCTION 
..6....5.90 ..2.6.8.  jaleable 
..4.5.Q.. 
..4.2...5..4.Q t 
TONS ROM 
ORE OF 
MINERAL 
3 608 
211 002 
no fig.available 
id. 
1.9.. .0.3.0. ..3.5 5 
Total 
m-
m  2(20  mm 
-2-1 
PERSONS 
.2.3....02.3.. 
16 
,1.3. 
21 
87 
3 
2 070 
25 233 
S : deep mining  0 : opencast mining °r D 
qu arring 
boreholes 
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ANNEX X  - 2 
Year : 19 78 
MINERAL 
HARD DIMENSION STONE 
- BUILDING STONE 
- PAVING STONE 
- MONUMENTAL STONE 
HARD CRUSHED STONE 
- FOR CONCRETE 
- ROAD BASES 
- SURFACING 
HARD STONE FOR CALCINATION 
j - FOR LIME 
I 
j - FOR CEMENT KILNS j 
CHALK .and MARL 
GYPSUM 
OTHER ROCKS : 
DOLOMITE 
j KAOLIN 
j CLAY 
* estimations 
MINE, 
QUARRY 
OR BORE-
HOLE 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
I NUMBER OF 
| SITES WHERE 
! MINERAL IS 
■ WORKED 
.6.5 
112 
24 
j 
1.3. 
11 
5 
114 
BELGIUM 
PRODUCTION 
1 057 419 
31 324 026 
10 902 261 
, .4...2.7.4...1.5..7. 
3 655 855 
39 717 
5 200 000 
TONS ROM 
ORE OF 
MINERAL 
PERSONS 
1 269 
Z...2S3. 
L...7.4.3 
13.6 
421 
10 
4 576 
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ANNEX X  -3-1 
Year :  1978 
DENMARK 
MINERAL 
COAL. 
LIGNITE 
OIL 
NATURALGAS 
IRON 
ALUMINIUM ..(°.Γ«λ... 
COPPER (ore) 
LEAD (ore) S 1./.. 
ZINC iocei.S.?.)... 
or sea 
POTASH SALTS ...salte 
«AGI 
ROCK SALT (except sea salt). 
PEAT (for soil 
improvement) 
MARBLE FOR POLISHING 
MARBLE FOR SEDIMENTARY 
MARBLE IGNEOUS 
Total MARBLE 
SLATE 
SANDS (SLATE, FOUNDRY AND 
OTHER INDUSTRIAL SANDS) 
ALLUVIAL SANDS AND GRAVEL 
( eea ) 
(1) Pb 42.000 concentrate 
(2) Zn 148 000 t 
MINE, 
QUARRY 
OR BORE 
HOLE 
D 
0 
0 
NUMBER OF 
SITES WHERE 
MINERAL IS 
WORKED 
PRODUCTION 
TONS ROM 
ORE OF 
MINERAL 
PERSONS 
5.9....?.l.K.'.ay.a.i.l.a.b.l.e 
id..,.. 
1. 
18 
926 
(with silT 
.621...0JÛ.0.. 
..3-38 ...ο.αα. 
322 953 
795 
30 049 205 
.4...5.8.4....2.λ9.. 
er 
..A...000„..m. 
P.b... 
..t...Zn. 
m-
.8.Y.a.i.la.bl.e 
.Id.·.. 
-300-
i-d-. 
id. 
id. 
.M,.. 
..i.d... 
S : deep mining  O : opencast mining or D 
quarring 
boreholes 
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ANNEX X -3-2 
Year : 1978  DENMARK 
MINERAL 
SUPPLEMENTARY 
INFORMATION 
HARD DIMENSION STONE 
■ BUILDING STONE 
■ PAVING STONE 
MUMENTALSTONE 
MINE, 
QUARRY 
OR BORE 
HOLE 
0 
NUMBER OF 
SITES WHERE 
[ MINERAL IS 
WORKED 
ÎHED STONE 
[LES 
23 
11 
123 
PRODUCI ON 
55 492 
TONS ROM 
* ORE OF 
MINERAL 
3..ΛΊ5...Λ11. 
119 121 
2 311 676 
..».: 
m' 
TO­
PERSONS 
«JMIWWMJl 
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Year  1978 
MINERAL 
COAL. 
LIGNITE 
OIL 
NATURAL GAS. 
IRON 
ALUMINIUM ..(°Γί??λ. 
COPPER (ore) 
LEAD (ore) 
ZINC (arci 
POTASH SALTS . 
ROCK SALT (except sea salt).. 
ANNEX X  - 4' - 1 
IRELAND 
MINE, 
QUARRY 
[(DR BORE 
HOLE 
3 
0 
NUMBER OF 
SITES WHERE 
; MINERAL IS 
WORKED 
.8.. 
4 
D 
D 
PRODUCTION 
no figure 
•a-v-a-i-l-abl-e ! n.9....£ig.»..a.Y£.il.a.bl.!Ç 
MARBLE FOR POLISHING 
MARBLE FOR SEDIMENTARY 
MARBLE IGNEOUS 
Total MARBLE 
SANDS (SLATE, FOUNDRY AND 
OTHER INDUSTRIAL SANDS) 
ALLUVIAL SANDS AND GRAVEL  D 
prolo] 
1 
■3-
..ZA....Q.Q.Q.: 
7...0.5.?.. 
TONS ROM 
'ORE OF 
MINERAL 
.Ì....R.QK.. 
t ROM 
..?.°....Ρ.?Γ..?..4..
1ί 9.$.i 9?. 
777 955 
2Ô-19-6-
Z..7..4...15.5.. 
..3.1.2....185....I... 
no figure 
available  .no...f ig.,, available 
η ?e 
...380 
d induet 
1000 m3 
PERSONS 
2.6.5. 
12 
.9.1.1. 
no figures 
■avai-lft-b-l-e-—· 
FROM 
eonee-n-t-rk-te 
trate  ί 
no fig. 
a. ya.il.*. 
aa...ugnava. Liable 
ial dispute 
no fig 
.-a.va.iL. 
222 
1...6.3.5... 
.1.7.. 
..9.1.9.. 
S : deep mining  O : opencast mining or D 
quarring STATISTICAL TABLES FOR EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES OTHER THAN COAL 
ANNEX X - 4 _ 2 
Year : 1978 
IRELAND 
MINERAL 
[MINE, 
jCUARRY 
OR BORE-
HOLE 
HARD DIMENSION STONE . 
- BUILDING STONE 
- PAVING STONE 
- MONUMENTALSTONE... 
HARD CRUSHED STONE . 
- FOR CONCRETE 
- ROAD BASES 
- 'SURFACING 
HARD STONE FOR CALCINATION 
- FOR LIME 
- FOR CEMENT KILNS 
CHALK 
GYPSUM 
OTHER ROCKS 
LIMESTONE 
SHALE 
BARYTES 
PYRITE 
* byproduct of copper ores 
NUMBER OF 
SITES WHERE 
MINERAL IS 
WORKED 
0 
0 
0 
0 
S 
.22.. 
5-
.1.7. 
..6.4.. 
PRODUCTION 
dry metric tons 
no....f.i.g...available 
n.a...f.i.g.,.ay.aila.bJLe 
TONS ROM 
ORE OF 
MINERAL 
PERSONS 
no' 'fig. 
..Ä.yail.«... 
no fig. 
avail-*··· 
no-fig^-ayaila-ble 
92 
6 
1 
..3.S.5....79J...  R....Q....M, 
no fig.available 
no fig.available 
42 542 ) 
12 473 \ 
338 100 
41 793 
(already :.ncluded under 'c 
no fig. 
avail. 
no fig. 
avail. 
no fig. 
avail. 
R 
co 
R.O.M. 
concetr. 
'. » a J. J. . 
'..O.M.") 
mcetr jj 
opper') 
13.. 
114 
.6.1.3. 
.7.4.. 
1 308 
9 
60 
75 
«—WWawi 
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ANNEX X - 5 - 1 
Year :  1978 
S : deep mining  boreholes 
MINERAL 
COAL 
LIGNITE 
OIL 
NATURAL GAS 
IRON 
ALUMINIUM ..(°ÎS?). 
COPPER (ore) 
LEAD (ore) 
ZINC (orejt 
[ POTASH SALTS 
ROCK SALT (except sea salt) 
MARBLE FOR POLISHING 
MARBLE FOR SEDIMENTARY "'" 
MARBLE IGNEOUS 
Total MARBLE 
SLATE 
SANDS (SLATE, FOUNDRY AND 
OTHER INDUSTRIAI SANDS) 
ALLUVIAL SANDS AND GRAVEL 
SAND OF volcanic 
origin 
EARTH COLOURS j 
! POZZOLANA (sand) ; 
ί MINE, 
! QUARRY 
(DR BO ΚΕ­
Ι HOLE 
S 
o 
0 
s+o 
0 
s 
s 
s 
0 
ITALY 
NUMBER OF 
SITES WHERE 
MINERAL IS 
WORKED 
..· 1 
2 
3.+.1 
Z. 
3. 
24.Í.1.).... 
5. 
η 
100 
1.Q.0 
..2...5.0.0. 
15 
1
4 (2) 
roo
 
v¿
;
 
PRODUCTION 
1...S.68....0.7.8. 
34S....9.X2 
2.4....4.1.Q 
1...9.3.2 
7·3-5'·58 
1.....6.3..6...3.Q.4 
3....7.21...25.8. 
100 000 
.4....2Q.Q.....Q.Q.Q 
120.....0..Q.Q....0.0.0. 
150 000 
170 000 
5 000 000 
TONS ROM 
ORE OF 
MINERAL 
....1..R.Q.M 
...AQ..S..l.e. 
.Λ 
...t-Xa 
tK2..Q.(X2$ 
1 1 !■!■■■ IIIM 1 ■ M> 
PERSONS 
16.3 
6.J.6. 
5.33 
6 
1.9.0. 
2...6.74.U.L 
1...35.3. 
3.Q.3 
400 
5.6.Q 
Ö....6.5.0. 
20 
25θ(2) 
O : opencast mining or D : 
quarring 
Also included in activity and work force : l) lead ores . 
2) hard stone for calcination 
(see following page) 
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ANNEX X  .. - 5 - 2 
Year : 1978 
ITALY 
MINERAL 
MINE, 
QUARRY 
OR BORE 
HOLE 
HARD DIMENSION STONE 
. BUILDING STONE 
- PAVING STONE 
- MONUMENTAL STONE 
SEDIMENTARY MARBLE 
METAMORPHIC MARBLE 
HARD CRUSHED STONE . 
- FOR CONCRETE 
- ROAD BASES 
- SURFACING 
HARD STONE FOR CALCINATION 
- FOR LIME 
- FOR CEMENT KILNS 
CHALK ... 
GYPSUM 
OTHER ROCKS 
CLAY 
DOLOMITE 
GRAVEL 
* Combined 
NUMBER OF 
SITES WHERE 
MINERAL IS 
WORKED 
.5..0... 
..2...9Û0.. 
135 
1 010 
PRODUCTION 
..22....Q.6.Q....Q.Q.0. 
.9....32.6....O.Q.O.. 
1 044 000 
1 935 000 
TONS ROM 
ORE OF 
MINERAL 
PERSONS 
9.0. 
1 050 
13 
Included 
mder othe] 
headings 
.3.5....4..0..Q.....Q.Q.Q.. 
4....0.5.Q...Û.Q.Q.. 
36 000 000 
1 100 000 
65 920 000 
ivwutiw iwm 
2.5.O. 
16...ÛÛ.0.· 
1 350 
7 250 
.5.50.. 
2 500 
100 
included 
elsewhere 
aO»y>i na§ måmm om 
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ANNEX X  5-3 
Year: 1978 
ITALY 
MINERAL 
PYRITE 
MANGANESE 
SULPHUR 
ANHYDRITE 
ASBESTOS 
BARYTES 
FELDSPAR 
FLUORSPAR 
GRAPHITE 
MARL 
ASPHALTIC ROCK FOR 
SURFACING 
BITUMINOUS ROCK 
HYDRATED ALUMINIUM 
SILICATES 
TALC AND STEATITE 
MERCURY 
ANTIMONY 
CELESTITE 
STEAM 
CLAY 
PEAT 
MINE, 
QUARRY 
NUMBER OF 
SITES WHERE 
OR BOREJ MINERALIS 
t HO LE 
S 
S 
S 
0 
e 
s 
s 
s/o 
ί s 
0 
0 
0 
s/0 
s 
s 
0 
0 
D 
0 
0 
WORKED 
5 
1 
12 
15 
2 
14 
7 
11 
1 
27 
3 
1 
40 
16 
1 
12 
PRODUCTION 
786.666 
9 741 
357 444 
49 531 
135 402 
236 613 
251 083 
171 216 
4 108 
10 309 239 
68 560 
46 638 
663 879 
175 157 
1 855 
365 
29 104 120 
TONS ROM 
ORE OF 
MINERAL 
37,8# S 
39 % Μη 
12 la S 
î5^CaF2 
p0,2^ SS 
PERSONS 
873 
! 13 
1 758 
124 
323 
343 
105 
871 
19 
307 
27 
16 
212 
460 
811 
54 
2 
261 
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ANNEX X -6-1 
Year  1978 
Ν Ε Τ Η Ε R L A  D S 
MINERAL 
COAL 
LIGNITE _ 
OIL 
NATURAL GAS 
IRON 
ALUMINIUM ..fers?). 
COPPER (ore) 
LEAD (ore) 
ZINC (ore). 
POTASH SALTS 
ROCK SALT (except sea salt) 
MARL 
SANDSTONE 
MARBLE FOR POLISHING 
MARBLE FOR SEDIMENTARY 
MARBLE IGNEOUS 
Total MARBLE 
SANDS (SLATE, FOUNDRY AND 
OTHER INDUSTRIAL SANDS) 
ALLUVIAL SANDS AND GRAVEL 
MINE· NUMBER OF 
QUARRY SrTES WHERE 
(DR BORE- MINERAL IS 
HOLE : WORKED 
D 
D 
D 
D 
0 
0 
0 
1 
è. 
■ 
ι 
„1 
3 
1 
ι 
PRODUCTION 
...1....4.Q2...2.5.4. 
9..4....995...X...1.Q.Ë 
J6...4.0.7. 
2 936 858 
2 992 755 
196 000 
....3..4.:..4.2.9....Q.P.Q. 
TONS ROM 
ORE OF 
MINERAL 
,...t...R.0JÍ 
j, Λ. 
*L..j... 
■er 
.t...JX2-0-
.t 
t 
t 
.t. 
' 
PERSONS 
- 2 400 
. . 
„ 1Û 
5.3. 
79 
4 
«? 
S : deep mining O : opencast mining or D 
quarr ing 
boreholes 
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ANNEX X - 1 - 1 
Year  1978 
MINERAL 
COAL 
LIGNITE 
OIL 
NATURAL GAS 
IRON S.T.Q.HE 
ALUMINIUM „(ñíS·?). 
COPPER (ore) 
LEAD (ore) 
7ΙΝΓ forel 
POTASH SALTS... 
ROCK SALT (except sea salt) 
MARBLE FOR POLISHING 
MARBLE FOR SEDIMENTARY "'" 
MARBLE IGNEOUS 
Total MARBLE 
SANDS (SLATE, FOUNDRY AND 
OTHER INDUSTRIAL SANDS) 
ALLUVIAL SANDS AND GRAVEL 
MINE, 
QUARRY 
<DR BORE 
HOLE 
S 
0 
s 
s 
0 
s 
s 
): 
UNITED 
| NUMBER OF 
f SITES WHERE 
: MINERAL IS 
WORKED 
.411 
1.7.3 
1 
2 
11 
.. 1 
L 
L...395. 
KINGDOM 
PRODUCTION 
1.Q.7....6.9.6. 
1.4....7.3.Q. 
8. 
5.84. 
3 670 
9.4.5 
L...3.11 
,6....22.4 
...9.CL..1.4.6 
TONS ROM 
'ORE OF 
MINERAL 
.t...B.0Jtt 
.I.Q.Q.Q....®?.... 
X ..K2.Q 
PERSONS 
2.4.8.. „10..Q 
.8....4.7..7. 
2 
232 
622 
X.„22â 
3.63 
1...3.3.Q. 
1.Q....5.3.3 
S : deep mining  O : opencast mining or D 
quarring 
boreholes 
417 STATISTICAL TABLES FOR EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES OTHER THAN COAL 
Year : 1978 
ANNEX X  -7-2 
UNITED KINGDOM 
MINERAL 
LINESTONE „ 
CLAY SHALE 
CHALK & CHERT 
IGNEOUS ROCK 
SANDSTONE 
! CLAY 
CALCSPARE 
GYPSUM & ANHYDRITE 
BARYTES „.. 
OTHER ROCKS : 
.DJiÅliXL. 
GT?SUM 
MINE, 
QUARRY 
OR BORE 
jHOLE[ 
S 
0 
s 
0 
0 
0 
s 
0 
s 
0 
S+0 
S+0 
S+0 
0 
S+0 
NUMBER OF 
SITES WHERE 
MINERAL IS 
WORKED 
: 
.6 
.4.8.9. 
.1 
.23.Q 
26 
30.5 ... 
2 
241 
29 
158 
3. 
.12 
16 
PRODUCTION 
5.5.7. 
8.5....7.9.7. 
218 
2.5....4J.2 
„ 16..17.2 
27 807 
10 424 
705 
4 920 
13 
3...32Z. 
5.4. 
IJL.3.21 
31..23.Q 
TONS ROM 
ORE OF 
MINERAL 
PERSONS 
101 
12...2.64 
26 
1 660 
1 020 
5 476 
212 
2 119 
397 
4 117 
3.8 
„...680_._. 
9 
1 011 
.6..6.1._... 
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ANNEX X  -8-1 
Year :  1978  FRANC E 
MINERAL 
COAL.: 
LIGNITE 
OIL 
NATURAL GAS 
IRON...QRJE 
ALUMINIUM ..(ΡΓ?.?). 
COPPER (ore) 
LEAD (ore) 
ZINC (ote). 
POTASH SALTS 
ROCK SALT (except sea salt) 
MARBLE FOR POLISHING _ 
MARBLE FOR SEDIMENTARY '"" 
MARBLE IGNEOUS 
Total MARBLE 
SLATE 
SANDS (SLATE, FOUNDRY AND 
OTHER INDUSTRIAL SANDS), , 
ALLUVIAL SANDS AND GRAVEL 
r—— 
j MINE, 
QUARRY 
<DR BORE-
HOLE 
S 
0 
0 
s 
s 
s 
s 
NUMBER OF 
SITES WHERE 
MINERAL IS 
WORKED 
■ „„„ —, 
2.4 
2 
1 
1 
:. 5 
■ 
25 
12 
.4. 
3. 
3 
2.Q 
.132....... 
18 
1....9.62 
PRODUCTION 
TONS ROM 
ORE OF 
MINERAL 
18 351 000 t ROM 
L..3J1..000 
1 167 000 
1...5.65....Q.Q.0. 
1....1.1.7....Q.Q0 
11 297 ooo 
33....45.4....0.0.0. 
l...a.7.7....Q.OO 
35....2.Q.9. 
3.9....9.O.O..... 
1 795 000 
6 169 000 
9 
84 000 
..„2.2.8....1ACL.Û.Q.Q 
t ROM ) 
t ROM 
1000 m
5
 
....t. 
t 
....t....£ft....l. 
...±...ZXL...X. 
t K2L0 
....*... 
t 
.....t 
PERSONS 
5.4...814. 
1....6Ü8 
.6....0.3.Ê 
6.7.6. 
" T57 
.4....5A2 
X 020 
6....3.4.S 
2 000 
1.4....621 
S : deep mining  O : opencast mining or D 
quarr ing 
boreholes 
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ANNEX X  -8-2 
Year: 1978  FRANCE 
MINE, 
MINERAL QUARRY 
OR BORE-
HOLE 
HARD DIMENSION STONE 
- BUILDING STONE ....— 
- PAVING STONE 
- MONUMENTAL STONE 
HARD CRUSHED STONE 
- FOR CONCRETE „ 
- ROAD BASES 
- .'SURFACING 
HARD STONE FOR CALCINATION 
- FOR LIME 
- FOR CEMENT KILNS „ 
GYPSUM ..MJR...EM.S.X.ER. 
OTHER ROCKS : 
URANIUM 
TUNGSTEN 
GOLD 
FLUOSPAR 
BARYTES 
TALC 
S 
S 
NUMBER OF 
SITES WHERE 
MINERAL IS 
WORKED 
. 
■ 
.65 
„.2 
*ζ...55 
PRODUCrON 
. not available _ 
122....3.6.0....Q.Q0·.— 
4 519. 600 
2.. 
.6....QJ1....10.Ü 
2 561 
767 
185 
260 000 
225 000 
275 000 
TONS ROM 
' ORE OF 
MINERAL 
....*. 
....*....„ 
....*. 
t 
t WOj, 
t 
t 
t 
t 
PERSONS 
-
9....5.D.Û 
3....4.1.6. 
«? 
4 266 
2 106 
200 
161 
604 
173 
561 
420 Year 
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ANNEX X -.9-1 
1978 
LUXEMBOURG 
MINERAL 
MINE, 
QUARRY 
NUMBER OF 
SITES WHERE 
OR BORE-Í MINERAL IS 
HOLE 
COAL. 
LIGNITE 
OIL 
NATURAL GAS. 
SILICIOUS 
IRON ...ORE 
ALUMINIUM ..feiS?).. 
COPPER (ore) 
LEAD (ore) 
ZINC (ore* 
PHOSPHATES 
\: 
POTASH SALTS 
ROCK SALT (except sea salt).. 
MARBLE FOR POLISHING 
MARBLE FOR SEDIMENTARY "" 
MARBLE IGNEOUS 
Total MARBLE 
(l) Combined 
WORKED 
.2. ) 
PRODUCTION 
TONS ROM 
ORE OF 
MINERAL 
834 905 
PERSONS 
t 32,55^ 
ί. 
0,67 JÉ 
282 (l] 
(D 
S : deep mining O : opencast mining or D : 
qu arring 
boreholes 
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ANNEX X -9-2 
Year  1978 
LUXEMBOURG 
MINERAL 
MINE, 
jOUARRY 
OR BORE-
HOLE 
HARD DIMENSION STONE 
- BUILDING STONE 
- PAVING STONE 
- MONUMENTAL STONE 
SIZED STONE 
PACING STONE 
SAND 
GRAVEL ,.. 
. FOUNDRY SAND 
HARD STONE FOR CALCINATION 
- FOR LIME 
- FOR CEMENT KILNS 
CHALK 
GYPSUM 
SLATE 
POLISHED MONUMENTAL 
STONE 
MONUMENTAL STONE 
NUMBER OF 
SITES WHERE 
MINERAL IS 
WORKED 
U 
PRODUCTION 
6.....6.3.0. 
14 
4.6.Ü 
72 
2 717 
...71.4...9.5.8 
•614.623 
212.687 
..2.7.7.1. 
1 363 
3 283 
568 
TONS ROM 
ORE OF 
MINERAL 
PERSONS 
..m.. 
JLO.QÛ...P.. 
2 
...BL. 
m^ 
m3 
1000 ρ 
1000 ρ  'j 
54 
422 ANNEX XI 
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE WORK OF 
THE SAFETY AND HEALTH COMMISSION 
updated 1.12.1979 
I (72) C VENTILATION. FIREDAMP AND OTHER MINE GASES 
Printed separately 
1. Study of the group of Experts on 
Ventilation Stabilization of Ven-
tilation in Pit Fires - investi-
gation in the light of Prof. 
Budryk'y theory [this study consists 
of two separate parts : 
the Report itself and Annex III to 
the 6th Report of the MSHC, 
September 1966 
2. Practical conclusions of the 
application of the theory of sta-
bilization of ventilation 
6th Report of the MSHC, Annex III, 
September 1969 
3. Circular 181 of the Belgian Ministry 
of Economic Affairs relating to the 
prevention of outbursts of Firedamp 
11th Report of the MSHC, Annex X, 
May 1974 
4. Conditions under which exemption 
might be granted to raise maximum 
permitted CH. limits in Member 
States 
12th Report of the MSHC, Annex V 
5. Notes for guidance on the measures 
to be taken to stabilise ventila-
tion in the event of open fires 
underground (Except in shafts) 
14th Report of the MSHC, Annex IX, 
June 1977 
6. First Report on Ignitions of Fire-
damp by Power loaders and Heading 
Machines 
14th Report of the MSHC, Annex X, 
June 1977 
7. Information report on two accidents 
(explosions) arising from the use of 
hand-held gas monitoring instruments 
in the Ruhr and Saar Coalfields Doc. 4582/l/77 
E F D I N DK 
425 D 
1. 
WINDING ROPES AND SHAFT GUIDES. WINDING ENGINES AND WINCHES 
„..,,, . . Printed separately 
Report on the electro-magnetic
 
r *-
examination of winding ropes 
3rd Report of the MSHC, Annex VI 
November 1966 
2. Final report on electro-magnetic 
tests carried out with the finan-
cial aid of the High Authority in 
the Bochum Rope-testing Station 
3rd Report of the MSHC, Annex XIa, 
November 1966 
3. Report on the use of accelerometers 
for testing winding installations 
3rd Report of the MSHC, Annex V, 
November 1966 
4. Report on measurement and testing 
procedures for shaft and roadway 
winding ropes and for guides for 
shaft and roadway haulage installa-
tions 
7th Report of the MSHC, Annex VII, 
September 1970 
5. Report of the Rope Testing Office of 
the Westfälische Berggewerkschaftskasse 
Bochum on rope testing means and 
procedures for improving safety in 
mine shafts and roadways employing 
rope haulage 
10th Report of the MSHC, Annex V, 
June 1973 
6. New aspects of the testing of ropes 
in winding installations subject to 
high and maximum stress 
(Arnold's report 1975) 
Printed separately - 1980 
7. Safety requirements for brakes on 
winding engines and winches in the 
shaft winding plant of the German 
mining industry (HAEUSLER - 1975) 
Printed separately - 1980 
8. Shaft winding and safety 
(H0ISCHEN - 1975) 
Printed separately, July 1975 
Doc. 4044/74 
Ε F D I DK 
Doc. 3254/74 E F D 
Doc. 4046/74 E F D 
426 9. Minimum safety requirements for 
winding and balance rope suspension 
gear, for shaft winding and sinking 
installations 
13th Report of the MSHC, Annex VII 
10. Information report "New aspects of 
the testing of ropes in winding 
installation subject to high and 
maximum stress" by Dr. Ing. ARNOLD, 
Seilprüfstelle der Westfälischen 
Berggewerkschaftskasse, Bochum 
13th Report of the MSHC, Annex VII 
427 E STRATA CONTROL AND STABILITY OF GROUND 
1. Notes concerning the statistical com-
parison of serious and fatal accidents 
due to falls of ground in the bitumi-
nous coal ming industry of the European 
Communities and Great Britain 
11th Report of the MSHC, Annex XII 
May 1974 
2. Notes on operating statistics in the 
coal mining industry of the European 
Community countries as established 
for 1972 
11th Report of the MSHC, Annex XIII 
May 1974 
3. Strata reinforcement by bolting, 
dowelling and injection techniques 
15th Report of the MSHC, Annex VII 
July 1978 
4. Strata reinforcement by bolting and 
injection techniques 
Printed separately 1979 Doc. 1612/3/76 
E F D 
5. Construction of gateside pachs for 
longwall faces 
16th Report of the MSHC, Annex VIII 
Printed separately 1980 Doc. 2196/4/77 
E F D I N DK 
428 F ELECTRICITY 
1. Decision on the removal of oil 
from resistors, condensers, trans-
formers, switches and relays used 
underground 
1st Report of the MSHC, April 1959 
2. The use of non-flammable materials 
for the manufacture of electric 
cables and leads for underground use 
2nd Report of the MSHC, p. 5, June 1961 
3. Requirements which must be met by 
electrical shotfiring leads 
2nd Report of the MSHC, p. 8, June 1961 
4. Protection of the underground elec-
trical network against the danger of 
electric shocks 
2nd Report of the MSHC, p. 11, June 1961 
5. Report on investigations into the 
protection of underground electrical 
network against dangers arising 
from fires or from firedamp explosions 
3rd Report of the MSHC, Annex VII 
November 1966 
6. Report on firedamp-proof electrical 
switchgear for nominal voltages 
above 1100 volts 
3rd Report of the MSHC, Annex VIII 
November 1966 
7. Notes on the problem of heat trans-
mission in an insulated conductor 
3rd Report of the MSHC, Annex IX 
November 1966 
8. Report on characteristics and the 
electrical protection of power feed 
cables for mobile machines (cutters, 
loaders, etc.) used underground in 
the coal mines of the countries of 
the Community 
7th Report of the MSHC, Annex V 
September 1970 
429 9. Comments and recommendatinns arising 
out of the report adopted by the Mines 
Safety and Health Commission on 
20 June 1969 on the characteristics 
and electrical protection of cables 
supplying mobile machines (coal 
cutters, loading machines etc.) used 
underground in coal mines in the 
Community countries 
8th Report of the MSHC, Annex IX 
June 1971 
Printed separately 1980 Doc. 1145/3/70 
10. Policy statement on the deleterious 
effects of dust-binding processes 
using saline pastes and powders upon 
electrical plant underground 
9th Report of the MSHC, Annex IX 
July 1972 
11. Comparison of safety provisions con-
cerning electric trolley locomotives 
underground and in particular, 
possibilities of reducing the inci-
dence of trolley sparks 
9th Report of the MSHC, Annex X 
July 1972 
12. Report and conclusions on overvol-
tages caused by lightning 
9th Report of the MSHC, Annex XI 
July 1972 
13. Report on trends in the use of 
explosion-proof electrical apparatus 
for nominal voltages above 1100 volts ; 
conclusions and recommendations 
10th Report of the MSHC, Annex VIII, 
June 1973 
14. Report and conclusions on Haulage 
powered by linear motors 
11th Report of the MSHC, Annex IX 
May 1974 
15. Decisions of the Mines Safety and 
Health Commission concerning mate-
rials to be used, and specifications 
for the construction of electrical 
apparatus for use in mines which are 
liable to be affected by firedamp ; 
430 - Surface temperatures of caseings 
12th Report of the MSHC, Annex VIII 
July 1975 
- Oil immersed contacts in switchgear 
12th Report of the MSHC, Annex VIII 
July 1975 
- Provisions for locking off aparatus 
in the opencircuit condition 
12th Report of the MSHC, Annex VIII 
July 1975 
- Use of Light Alloys 
13th Report of the MSHC, Annex IX 
1976 
which will be taken into account in 
the preparation of a European Standard 
by the CENELEC committee (European 
Committee for Electrotechnical 
Standardization). 
16. Harmonization of construction requi-
rements of the rules covering the 
design, installation and use of 
electrical equipment 
Final report - 1979 Doc. 3272/5/78 
431 G HUMAN FACTORS 
1. Psychological and sociological factors in mine safety 
1.1. Report on the psychological and 
sociological factors affecting 
safety 
3rd Report of the MSHC, Annex XII 
November 1966 
1.2. Recommendations on the psychological 
and sociological factors affecting 
safety 
3rd Report of the MSHC, Annex XIII 
November 1966 
2. Effects of remuneration methods on safety 
2.1. Report on the implications of payment 
at piece rates for mine safety 
4th Report of the MSHC, Annex III 
December 1967 
2.2. Recommendations as to principles to be 
observed in view of the possible 
influence of payment at piece rates 
on safety in coal mines 
4th Report of the MSHC, Annex IV, 
December 1967 
3. Medical problems 
3.1. Report on pre-entry and routine medical 
examinations and recommendations 
2nd Report of the MSHC, p. 74, June 1961 
3.2. Colliery medical services in the 
countries of the Community and the 
United Kingdom 
2nd Report of the MSHC, Annex C 
June 1961 
4. Safety training 
4.1. Report on the study "Measures rela-
ting to the safety training of mine 
workers employed in the mines of 
the European Community." 
Report ROETTGER 
Printed separately 1978 Doc. 4372/3/77 
E F D 
432 I MECHANIZATION 
1. Recommendations concerning the 
equipment of locomotives 
1st Report of the MSHC, April 1959 
2. Recommendations concerning the 
neutralization of exhaust gases from 
diesel engines 
1st Report of the MSHC, April 1959 
3. First Report on Safety in the winning 
area 
15th Report of the MSHC, Annex VIII 
July 1978 
433 κ 
1. 
PETROLEUM. GAS AND OTHER SUBSTANCES EXTRACTED BY DRILLING 
Basic information which should be 
contained in drilling programmes 
of offshore wells 
16th Report of the MSHC, Annex XI  Doc. 3318/6/77 
E F D I Ν DK 
2. Drilling wellhead safety instal­
lations offshore 
16th Report of the MSHC, Annex X  Doc. 3767/4/77 
E F D I Ν DK 
3. Workover programme offshore 
17th Report of the MSHC, Annex ..  Doc. 4945/3/78 
E F D I N DK 
4. Production well completion 
offshore 
17 Report of the MSHC, Annex ...  Doc. 2487/5/78 
E F D I N DK 
434 L COMBUSTIBLE DUSTS 
1. Report on work done on the neutra-
lization of combustible dusts and 
dust barriers 
7th Report of the MSHC, Annex VIII 
September 1970 
2. Memorandum on information necessary 
for the examination of coaldust 
explosions or ignitions of fire-
damp in mines 
10th Report of the MSHC, Annex VII 
June 1973 
3. Information Report on 'Dust binding 
by means of salt pastes, powders and 
flakes» 
11th Report of the MSHC, Annex VI 
May 1974 
4. Information Report on 'Water trough 
barriers' for protection against 
underground explosions of coal-dust 
11th Report of the MSHC, Annex VII 
May 1974 
5. Report on triggered barriers and 
recommendations for their use underground 
11th Report of the MSHC, Annex VIII 
May 1974 
6. Recommendations on the application 
of dust binding by hygroscopic salts 
as a means of combatting coal dust 
explosions 
14th Report of the MSHC, Annex V 
June 1977 
7. Recommendations for the use of water 
trough barriers for containing coal-
dust explosions underground 
15th Report of the MSHC, Annex VI 
July 1978 
435 M HEALTH IN COAL MINES 
1. Explanatory notes to the recommen-
dation on 'Fixing of climatic limits' 
3rd Report of the MSHC, Annex X 
November 1966 
2. Recommendation on 'Fixing of cli-
matic limits' 
3rd Report of the MSHC, Annex XI 
November 1966 
3. Recommendation embodying directives 
on means of suppressing dust 
concentrations in underground workings 
8th Report of the MSHC, Annex VI 
June 1971 
4. Recommendation on the organization 
of special services responsible for 
the inspection of dust conditions 
in underground working 
8th Report of the MSHC, Annex VII 
June 1971 
5. Statement on the need to reduce the 
dust concentration resulting from 
the use of coal-cuttings and getting 
machinery and roadway drivage 
8th Report of the MSHC, Annex VIII 
June 1971 
6. Guidelines concerning the Design and 
use of Coal Getting and Heading 
Machines, relating to the reduction 
of airborne dust 
11th Report of the MSHC, Annex XI 
May 1974 
7. Examples of proven and effective methods 
of installing and operating water sprays 
on plough faces (Annex to the guide 
lines concerning the design and use of 
coal getting and heading machines, 
relating to the reduction of airborne 
dust, which were printed as Annex XI 
to the 11th Report 
12th Report of the MSHC, Annex VII 
July 1975 
436 N RESCUE ARRANGEMENTS. FIRES AND UNDERGROUND COMBUSTION 
I. Mine rescue 
1. Organization of mine rescue arrangements 
1.1. Report on tour of central rescue stations 
in the Community countries and Great 
Britain 
(First Report on th% organization of 
mine rescue services 1958/59) 
2nd Report of the MSHC, Annex B, 
June 1961 
1.2. Second Report on the organization of 
mine rescue services, I960 
3rd Report of the MSHC, Annex Va 
November 1966 
1.3· Third Report on the organization of 
mine rescue services, 1961 
3rd Report of the MSHC, Annex Via, 
November 1966 
1.4. Fourth Report on the organization of 
mine rescue services, 1962 
3rd Report of the MSHC, Annex Vila 
November 1966 
1.5. Fifth Report on the organization of 
mine rescue services, 1963 and 1964 
3rd Report of the MSHC, Annex Villa 
November 1966 
1.6. Sixth Report on the organization of 
mine rescue services, 1965/66 
5th Report of the MSHC, Annex V 
October 1968 
1.7. Seventh Report on the organization of 
mine rescue services, 1967/68 
7th Report of the MSHC, Annex IV 
September 1970 
1.8. Eighth Report on the organization of 
mine rescue services, 1969/70 
9th Report of the MSHC, Annex IV 
1.9. Recommendations regarding the provision 
of advice from foreigh experts in the 
case of major accidents 
3rd Report of the MSHC, Annex III 
November 1966 
437 1.10. Communication links between the 
rescue base and the rescue team 
3rd Report of the MSHC, Annex IV 
November 1966 
1.11. List of regulations and directives 
concerning the organization of 
mine rescue services in the coun-
tries of the Community and the 
United Kingdom 
9th Report of the MSHC, Annex VI Doc. 3845/l/70 
1.12. Ninth Report on Mine Rescue Services, 
Organization, Personnel, Apparatus 
available, and recent developments 
for rescue work in irrespirable 
atmospheres, giving the position in 
Member States of the Community as 
at 31.12.1975 
14th Report of the MSHC, Annex VI 
June 1977 
438 2. Rescue equipment 
2.1. Interim report on the continued 
development of the CO-filter self-
rescuer 
10th October 1968 D Doc. 1872/68 E F D 
2.2. Results of the research carried out 
with financial assistance from the 
Commission of the European Communities 
into the improvement of the physiolo-
gical conditions for the wearing of 
breathing apparatus 
8th Report of the MSHC, Annex IV 
June 1971 
2.3. First report on filter self-rescuers 
for use in coal mines in the European 
Community countries - Part I : 
minimum design requirements and 
testing procedures 
13th Report of the MSHC, Annex X, 1976 
2.4. The Use of Filter Self Rescuers in 
European Coal Mines Part II. 
Maintenance and Training 
14th Report of the MSHC, Annex VII 
June 1977 
2.5. The Use of Filter Self Rescuers in 
European Coal Mines Part III. 
Future developments 
16th Report of the MSHC, Annex IX 
2.6. The Use of Filter Self Rescuers in 
Coal Mines in Member States of the 
European Community 
Part I - Minimum design requirements 
and testing procedures 
Part II - Maintenance and Training 
Part III- Future developments 
Printed separately - 1979 Doc. 3919/79 
E F D I N DK 
439 3. Research work at high temperatures 
3.1. Final report on research into the 
establishment of simple criteria for 
the selection of rescue team personnel 
for heavy work in high temperatures 
3rd Report of the MSHC, Annex IXa 
November 1966 
4. Rescue with boreholes 
4.1. List of specialists for borehole 
rescue work and equipment available 
in Community countries 
8th Report of the MSHC, Annex III 
June 1971, revised giving position 
as at 1.1.1976 
13th Report of the MSHC, Annex VI, 
1976 
440 II Fires and underground combustion 
1. Shaft fires at great depth 
1.1. Recommendation on the equipment 
having regard to the prevention 
of open fires 
1st Report on the MSHC, April 1959 
1.2. Fighting of fires in shafts by 
bringing in water 
2nd Report of the MSHC, p. 24 
June 1961 
see also modification contained in 
10th Report of MSHC, Annex VI, 
June 1972 
1.3. Final report on experiments with 
shaft fires carried out by the 
Experimental Roadway Association 
in Dortmund, with the financial 
aid of the High Authority, at 
Dorstfeld Colliery, Dortmund 
3rd Report of the MSHC, Annex Ilia 
November 1966 
1.4. Explanatory notes and views of the 
Working Parties on Underground 
Combustion and Fires and Mine Rescue 
Organization, and their expert sub-
committees, concerning the final 
report of the Experimental Roadway 
Association, Dortmund, on the shaft 
fire experiment at Dorstfeld Colliery 
3rd Report of the MSHC, Annex Illb 
November 1966 
1.5. Memorandum on the Neutralization of 
Mine Fires by the Injection of 
Nitrogen 
14th Report of the MSHC, Annex VIII 
June 1977 
441 2. Fire stoppings (dams) 
2.1. Sealing-off of mine fires and under-
ground combustion by dams 
2nd Report of the MSHC, p. 51 
June 1961 
2.2. Report on trials with explosion-proof 
dams carried out by the Experimental 
Roadway Association in Dortmund at 
the request of the Safety Commission 
and with financial aid of the High 
Authority - Statement of policy 
regarding the erection of advance 
dams of plaster as a fire fighting 
measure 
3rd Report of the MSHC, Annex I 
November 1966 
2.3. Final Report on trials with explosion-
proof dams, carried out by the 
Experimental Roadway Association in 
Dortmund with the financial aid of 
the High Authority 
3rd Report of the MSHC, Annex Ia 
November 1966 
2.4. Instructions for the construction of 
plaster stoppings by the method 
developed by the Essen-Kray Main 
Rescue Station 
3rd Report of the MSHC, Annex Xa, 
November 1966 
2.5. Instructions for the hydro-mechanical 
method of constructing plaster 
stoppings developed from the Central 
rescue station of the Saarbergwerke AG 
8th Report of the MSHC, Annex V 
June 1971 
442 3. Fire-resistant fluids 
3.1. Report on the establishment of 
criteria for fire-resistant fluids 
for power transmission (Hydraulic 
fluids) and on the tests to be 
carried out for that purpose 
2nd Report of the MSHC, Annex A, 
June 1971 
3.2. Second Report on specifications and 
testing conditions relating to fire-
resistant fluids used for power 
transmission 
3rd Report of the MSHC, Annex IVa 
November 1966 
3.3. Third Report on specifications and 
testing conditions relating to 
fire-resistant fluids for power 
transmission 
pamphlet 10th October 1967 
3.4. Fourth Report on specifications 
and testing conditions relating to 
fire-resistant fluids for power 
transmission 
pamphlet 26th March 1971 
3.5. Fifth Report on specifications 
and testing conditions relating to 
fire-resistant fluids for power 
transmission 
pamphlet November 1974 
4. The reopening of fire areas 
4.1. Report on the opening of sealed-off 
fire areas and the rules applicable 
thereto 
3rd Report of the MSHC, Annex II 
November 1966 
4.2. Study on the reopening of sealed-off 
fire areas by Bergassessor a.D.G. 
Lehmann 
3rd Report of the MSHC, Annex IIa 
November 1970 
443 5. Use of urethane foam for sealing 
5.1. Opinion on the use underground of 
Polyurethane foam in the coal mining 
industry 
7th Report of the MSHC, Annex VI 
September 1970 
6. Conveyor belts 
6.1. First report on tests and criteria 
of flammability of conveyor belts 
with fabric cores used in the coal 
mines of the European Community 
12th Report of the MSHC, Annex VI 
July 1975 
6.2. The check testing of conveyor belts 
with textile carcas for use under-
ground in coal mines. Resistance to 
flame. 
16th Report of the MSHC, Annex VI 
Printed separately 1979 Doc. 1479/8/77 
E F D I N DK 
6.3. Comparative testing of conveyor 
belts during 1976. 
Report and test result. 
Printed separately 1980 Doc. 142/7/77 
E F D I N DK 
444 0 COMMON STATISTICS ON VICTIMS OF ACCIDENTS 
1. Report and Recommendations on the pre-
paration of common statistics on 
victims of accidents underground, in 
accordance with Community Definitions 
9th Report of the MSHC, Annex V, 
July 1972 
445 MISCELLANOUS 
A. CONGRESSES 
1.1. Safety and health in mines for 
inspectors of Member States of 
the EEC 
9-10-11 december 1975 - Bochum 
Printed separately 
1.2. 20th Anniversary of the Mines 
Safety and Health Commission 
21/22 November 1977 in Luxembourg 
Printed officially 
without No of doc. 
EUR 6360 
E F D I Ν DK 
1.3. International conference for 
safety representatives (Workmen's 
inspectors) responsible for 
inspection underground 
28/29 September 1978 in Luxembourg 
Printed officially 1980 
1.4. Medical aspects of diving accidents 
12/13 October 1978 
Printed separately 1979 
Available in 1980 
Doc. 4282/79 f 
Doc. 5204/79 E 
F D 
Β. 
1.4. 
1.5. 
1.6. 
DIVERS 
As above 
Guidance notes for safe diving 
Volume I - General recommendations 
Printed separately  Doc. 3735/78 E 
Volume II - Directory of information 
sources for diving operations in 
Western Europe only available in E Doc. without No 
C. SIGNS AT WORK 
1. Harmonization and applications of 
safety signs at work in coal mines 
16th Report of the MSHC, 
Printed separately 1979 
Annex VII 
Doc. 3040/3/78 
E F D I Ν DK 
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